From Red Cocaine, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., 1990

Evidence has . . . surfaced on drug and narcotics trafficking by the government of Nicaragua, and of its close relationship with Cuba. This evidence has been provided, among others, by Antonio Farach, former minister counselor to the Nicaraguan embassies in Venezuela and Honduras; by James Herring, an American who assisted the government of Nicaragua in establishing cocaine production and transportation; by Ubi Dekker, a European hashish trafficker who dealt with the Nicaraguan officials in establishing trade routes for Nicaraguan drug trafficking into Europe; and by Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles, an official in the Nicaraguan intelligence service.

Antonio Farach�s first knowledge of the drug trafficking came in 1981, when he learned that Raul Castro visited Nicaragua in September and met with Humberto Ortega. The visit signaled the beginning of a �new and special business.� Farach deduced from other information that Cuba had offered to guarantee in a reasonable and safe manner the entry of the Nicaraguan government into drug trafficking. When asked whether Castro offered or ordered the Nicaraguans entry into the drug business, Farach could not state which. But he did say the relationship between the two countries was never one of respect. �The Cubans always spoke as if they were the bosses. They were always very arrogant and demanding. They do not suggest in Nicaragua. They order in Nicaragua.�²⁶

Baldizon, a former Nicaraguan counterintelligence officer, confirmed the arrogant role of the Cuban advisors in the Nicaraguan intelligence and military services. The presence of Cuban advisors and instructors was �pervasive,� he explained. Their mission was to provide substantive advice, implement security systems and methods employed in Cuba, support the Nicaraguan leadership in the planning and execution of combat actions, oversee ideological development, ensure close coordination between Nicaraguan and Cuban security services, and prepare war plans. �The Cuban influence on decision-making in the ministry is virtually complete and Cuban advice and observations are treated as though they were orders.� Cubans operating out of the Cuban mission also performed a counterintelligence role in Nicaragua. Other advisors and technicians he identified were East German, North Korean, Bulgarian, and Soviet.²⁷

Similar observations were provided in 1988 by Major Aspillaga, who described the Marxist Sandinistas as being under Castro�s �complete control.� In particular, he described communications intercepts from 1980 in which Castro ordered the defense minister Humberto Ortega to have his brother Daniel Ortega assume the post as Nicaragua�s political leader, so that Humberto could maintain control of the armed forces. The key advisors in the Nicaraguan government, including the intelligence chief, are Cuban intelligence officers, he explained.²⁸ He also said the Cubans were training Nicaraguan Sandinista agents and performing counterintelligence work. Moreover, a key intelligence official in the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry is a Cuban who married a Nicaraguan woman, but who still works for Cuban intelligence.²⁹ Additionally, the Columbian drug traffickers met regularly in Cuba with Raul Castro, Aspillaga said. Raul is Fidel�s right-hand man for all clandestine operations and Fidel viewed the drugs as �a very important weapon against the United States, because drugs demoralize people and undermine society.�³⁰

[ . . ]

When Farach asked other Nicaraguan officials why their revolutionary government should become involved in drug trafficking, he was told, �In the first place, drugs did not remain in Nicaragua. The drugs were destined for the United States. Our youth would not be harmed, but rather the youth of the United States, the youth of our enemies. Therefore, the drugs were used as a political weapon because in that way we were delivering a blow to or principal enemy..�³¹ The second reason he was given was �in addition to a political weapon against the United States, the drug trafficking produced a very good economic benefit which we needed for our revolution. Again, in a few words, we wanted to provide food to our people with the suffering and death of the youth of the United States.� ³²

Nicaragua�s participation in drug and narcotics trafficking into the United States sprang from Raul Castor�s meeting with Humberto Ortega. The narcotics operation itself was placed under the Nicaraguan intelligence service, with Tomas Borge, the Minister of Interior and head of the intelligence service, in charge of the operation, and his deputed, Frederico Vaughan, the chief of staff of the operation. Frederico Vaughan was indicted in 1986 in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, along with Carlos Lehder, the Ochoa family, Pablo Escobar-Gaviria, and others on twenty-four counts of producing and smuggling cocaine into the United States, conspiracy, obstructing justice, and related crimes. James Herring is an American who was recruited by Robert Vesco for various nefarious tasks. He has described how he was introduced to the Nicaraguan and Cuban Government officials and his work in �drugs and high-tech smuggling.� He made a total of four trips to Cuba and four trips to Nicaragua. He was always �escorted and treated very well by dignitaries from both governments.� In Herring�s opinion, the operation was government-initiated.

Ubi Dekker is a cover name for a European who was a major Interpol fugitive and international narcotics trafficker; his true identity is concealed for security reasons. When he was asked if the trafficking was not really just the work of a few corrupt officials, Dekker responded, �Completely doubtful. It�s impossible. . . .  It is the total [Cuban] Government.� The Cuban Government provided security, facilities, manpower, in short, everything; and there was a direct linkage between Cuba and Nicaragua. ³⁴

Baldizon�s debriefing by U.S. officials is particularly revealing. From 1982 until his defection on July 1, 1985, Baldizon was the chief investigator of internal abuses within the Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior. In 1984, Baldizon�s office received reports that linked Interior Minister Tomas Borge with cocaine trafficking. Baldizon was instructed to investigate this as a compromise of a state secret. He thought this was a mistake, because he could not believe his government was involved in narcotics trafficking. Thus, he went to the chief of his office, Captain Charlotte Baltodano Egner, and asked her if it should not be investigated as a slander against the minister. Baltodano was taken aback and said that the office should not have received the report. The fact that Borge had involved the government in narcotics trafficking was highly classified, she explained, and known in the Ministry only to Borge, his assistant [Frederico Vaughan], the chiefs of police and sate security, and to her. Outside the Ministry it was known only to members of the FSLN�s National Directorate. Baldizon also provided additional details concerning Borge and cocaine trafficking and the use of the money �for mounting clandestine operations by the Intelligence and State Security Department outside Nicaragua. ³⁵ Baldizon died in 1988, in California.³⁶

In 1987, another high-ranking official from the Nicaraguan government defected to the United States: Major Roger Miranda Bengoechea. Miranda also confirmed Nicaragua�s involvement in drug trafficking. He reported how one day the Defense Minister Humberto Ortega told him that the trafficking was Borge�s operation, and added, �It�s a way of waging war on the United States. It also provides profit."³⁷

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    26. U.S. Senate, Drugs and Terrorism, 1984, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, August 2, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984,), p. 83.
    27. Information Supplied by Baldizon Aviles, unedited and unpublished draft produced during debriefings with U.S. Government representatives, S/LPD 632-6751, pp. 16-17. Testimony by Miguel Bolanos, a counterintelligence officer in the Sandinista State Security apparatus also supports the important role of Soviet Bloc advisors in Nicaraguan intelligence. In Bolanos�s counterintelligence section there were two Soviet and one Cuban advisors. In State Security Bolanos reports there were 70 Soviet, 400 Cuban, 40-50 East German, and 20-25 Bulgarian advisors. Inside Communist Nicaragua: The Miguel Bolanos Transcripts (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, September 30, 1983), pp. 8-9.
    28. [Bill Gertz, �Castro Runs a Resort for Narcotics Dealers,� Washington Times, March 23, 1988], p. A6.
    29. Joe Pichirallo, �Cuba used Noriega to Obtain High-Tech U.S. Goods, Defector Says,� Washington Post, April 27, 1988, p. A24.
    30. Quoted in David Brock, �The World of Narcoterrorism,� The American Spectator, June 1989, p. 27.
    31. Drugs and Terrorism, 1984, op. cit., p. 79.
    32. Ibid., p. 80.
    33. U.S. Congress, Senate, Role of Nicaragua in Drug Trafficking, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, April 19, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 27, 32, 34.
    34. Role of Nicaragua in Drug Trafficking, op. cit., p. 41.
    35. Information Supplied by Alvaro Baldizon Aviles, op. cit., p. 11.
    36. The coroner�s report states that death was caused by an aneurism in the brain (stroke). Unofficial reports say this happened several hours after Baldizon had dinner at his favorite Nicaraguan restaurant. There is, of curse, the possibility of assassination. . . .
    37. Trevor Armbrister, �Nicaragua�s Secret Plan,� Reader�s Digest, April 1988, p. 76.

Red Cocaine The Drugging of America
Atlanta, Georgia : Clarion House, 1990, pages 100 - 103 , notes p. 243.

In their own words : testimony of Nicaraguan exiles : Alberto Gamez Ortega, Alvaro Baldizon Aviles, Mateo Guerrero Flores, Silvio Herrera, Santiago Dixon, Jose Alonso Valle, Francisco Delgado Flores, Guadalupe Castellanos, Prudencio Baltodano Selva, Oscar and Sarita Kellermann. Publisher [Washington, D.C.] : U.S. Dept. of State, [1987] Paging 14 p. : ill. ; 28 cm. Series Department of State publication ; 9471 SUDOC number S 1.2:W 89/5 Notes "Second printing"--P. [2] of cover. Shipping list no.: 87-126-P. "February 1987"--P. [2] of cover.

Inside the Sandinista regime : a special investigator's perspective. Publisher [Washington, D.C.] : U.S. Dept. of State : [For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.], 1986. Paging 46 p. : ill., ports. ; 28 cm. Series Department of State publication ; 9466 SUDOC number S 1.2:Sa 5/4 Notes Cover title. Based on information provided by Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles, formerly Chief Investigator of the Special Investigations Commission of the Nicaraguan Ministry of the Interior. Shipping list no.: 86-225-P. "February 1986." S/N 044-000-02110-2 Item 876.