From The New Frontier of War by William R. Kintner with Joseph Z. Kornfeder, 1962
The reader should, of course, be aware that much of the literature on the communist take-over of China presents the view that Mao Tse-tung pursued an independent line and was often hostile to Stalin�s publicly avowed policy of neutralism toward the outcome in China. Stalin went out of his way to convince the world that the Soviet Union had no political connection with the Chinese Communists. He repeatedly assured Chiang Kai-shek that the Soviet Union�s moral and material help to China would be extended only to the Chinese government and not to the Chinese Communists. He did, however, hope that the Chinese government would make more concessions to meet the communist demands that they might �engage in peaceful competition.�These are the facts regarding Mao Tse-tung�s presumed independence :
(1) The Chinese Communist Party was an affiliate of the Comintern until the latter was formally — but not really — dissolved by Stalin in 1943. All parties so affiliated had to follow the Comintern line.
(2) Sun Yat-sen* University was established in Moscow in 1925, and from then on, it and other colleges training Chinese Communists turned out at least one thousand graduates per year. By 1941, at least sixteen thousand were so trained — the decisive part of the cadres of the Chinese Communist Party.17* Sun Yat-sen harbored the sentiments of some (rather vague) pristine communism, but, towards the end of his life, had decidedly rejected some of the Marxian fundamentals (the �class�-struggle, etc). The Bolshevik Kremlin and their various stooges can be considered entirely predictable as to falsifying such matters. — (WPT).(3) Though there had been little direct military aid from Russia to the Chinese Communists in the Yenan period, Mao Tse-tung�s guerrilla and other combat forces became heavily dependent on supplies released by the Soviet military authorities in Manchuria after 1945.18 The amount of this aid, in dollar replacement cost, has been put as high as four thousand million American dollars. It is difficult to imagine that Stalin would supply a dissident force. The ideological and physical dependence of Mao Tse-tung was so overwhelming that Stalin had no need to temporize with, let alone tolerate, a dissident Chinese Communist movement.19
17. As of 1945, 56 per cent of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party was Moscow trained. See Robert C. North Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites, p. 72.
18. The Soviet Union turned over to the Chinese Communists large quantities of Japanese arms, which had been surrendered to her in Manchuria, as well as a considerable amount of Russian equipment. See Cheng Tien-fong, History of Sino-Russian Relations, pp. 274-75.
19. In this connection , it is worth remembering Mao Tse-tung�s celebrated �lean-to-one-side" doctrine. Mao said in 1949: ��You (the Chinese Communists ) lean to one side.� Precisely so. The forty years� experiences of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years� experiences of the Chinese Communist Party have taught us to believe that in order to win and to consolidate the victory we must lean to one side. The experiences of forty years and twenty-eight years, respectively, show that, without exception, the Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. To sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not exist. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique who lean to the side of imperialism; we also oppose the illusion of a third road. Not only in China but also in the world, without exception, one either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is mere camouflage and a third road does not exist.� Mao Tse-tung. �On the dictatorship of the People�s Democracy,� statement of July 1, 1949, (In commemoration of the Twenty-eight Anniversary of the Chinese Communist party), reproduced in Pravda, July 16, 1949. For an English translation see Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1952), pp. 453-54.( pages 189 � 191 )
Communist China�s foreign policy has undergone tactical changes during the past decade. In the period from 1949 to 1952, Mao Tse-tung and his regime enthusiastically embraced the then current Soviet picture of a world sharply divided into two antagonistic camps — the two-camp thesis adopted by the Comintern in September, 1947.38 Accordingly, the Peking regime branded all non-communist countries, regardless of their political orientation, as �hostile.� . . .
38. For details of the adoption of the two-camp thesis by the Comintern see New York Times, October 6, 1947, p. 3; David Dallin, Facts on Communism: The Soviet Union from Lenin to Khrushchev, Vol. II, pp. 255-57, published by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., December, 1960.
Liu Shao-ch�i wrote in 1948: �The world today has been divided into two mutually antagonistic camps: on the one hand, the world imperialist camp, composed of American imperialists and their accomplices, the reactionaries of all countries of the world; on the other hand, the world anti-imperialist camp, composed of the Soviet Union and the New Democracies of Eastern Europe, and the national liberation movements in China, Southeast Asia and Greece, plus the people�s democratic forces of the world. American imperialism has become the bastion of all the reactionary forces in the world; while the Soviet Union has become the bastion of all progressive forces. . . . These two camps include all the peoples of the world — of all countries, classes, sections of the population, parties and groups.� Liu Shao-chi�, Internationalism and Nationalism, p. 32.
A major change occurred in 1954 when Communist China signed an agreement with India on Tibet and, at the same time, accepted the so-called �five principles of peaceful co-existence� (Panch Shila). . . .
( pages 201-2 )
Chicago : Henry Regnery, 1962.