In January [1950], following a telephone conversation between Stalin an Mao, a detailed discussion . . . took place in Moscow when the Chinese leaders Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-lai made a month-long visit. On January 22 they had a lengthy meeting with Stalin.
During these talks, all parties agreed that Soviet military contingents and Chinese �volunteers� would take part in the war by North Korea against its southern neighbor. . . .
On February 4, 1950, Shtykov notified Stalin . . . that Kim had requested credits from the Soviet Union for the purchase of weaponry. In addition, he asked for permission to increase the number of infantry divisions from seven to ten, with three new divisions to be organized.
After consulting with Beijing, on February 9, 1950, Stalin gave
his approval for the preparation of plans for a large-scale operation on the Korean peninsula and thus approving Kim�s wish to unify the country by force. . . .
On May 30, 1950, Shtykov reported the following to Moscow:
Kim Il Sung informed me that the chief of the general staff has finished formulation of the principal operation plan in conjunction with (Soviet) adviser Vasil�yev for the upcoming offensive. Kim Il Sung has approved the plan. . . . Out of twenty divisions, seven are ready for the offensive. In July the rains will begin. Generals Vasil�yev and Postshev informed me that more time will be needed for assembling the troop units. The general staff suggests that the operation be started late in June. My opinion is that we can agree to this date. The Koreans are asking for fuel and medical supplies. I request expedited directives.5
Stalin himself wrote the answering telegram to Shtykov: �Your suggestions have been approved. Fuel and medical supplies will be shipped on an expedited basis.�6
The period from June 1, 1950, until the 25th was used the North Koreans and their Soviet advisers to perfect their plans, conduct rehearsals, perform needed maintenance on the equipment, and otherwise get themselves prepared . . .
On June 25, 1950, North Korea troops crossed the 38th parallel, seven divisions strong along with a tank brigade. . . .
The excuse given to the world for the attack was that their southern brothers had attacked first; this seems reminiscent of the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939. This, charge is, of course, ludicrous. . . .
Having started the war with . . . great success, Kim Il Sung felt as though he had wings. . . .
Despite the indisputable fact that there was considerable Soviet involvement in all phases of the war and the preparations thereof, Stalin did his best to deceive the rest of the world by concealing the facts. . . .
5. USSR Central State Historic Archive, p. 93.
6. Ibid., p. 96.
( pages 58 � 60, notes on p. 225 )
On October 1, North Korea�s foreign affairs minister handed an urgent letter to Shtykov for delivery to Stalin personally. In this documents, seemingly written with the help of Soviet advisers, Kim Il Sung addressed the problem as follows:
. . . Dear Comrade Stalin, if the enemy continues offensive actions at North Korea, we will not be able to stop the enemy by ourselves. That is why, dear Iosif Vissarinovich, we ask for special military assistance.
If for some reason this is impossible, then help us to organize international volunteer forces in China to provide military support in our struggle.8
Political prestige of all parties sat in the scales of ambition of three leaders, Kim Il Sung of North Korea, Mao Tse-tung of China, and the Soviet dictator, I. V. Stalin. . . . So Stalin wrote a letter to Mao . . .
The USA cannot allow itself to be involved in a large-scale war. Consequently, China will be involved in conjunction with the USSR as we are tied together by our mutual assistance treaty. Shall we be afraid of This? To my mind we shall not . . . If a war is inevitable, let it come now . . .9
Ma responded: �I am very glad that your letter describes the joint fight of China and the USSR against the USA. . . . [Etc.]�10
. . . Mao agreed to provide direct military support to the North Koreans, as he informed Stalin. The intervention of huge masses of Chinese troops began on October 25, 1950, In the Socialist press they were called �Volunteers.� Their offensive proved to be long and difficult, but entirely responsive to the request of Kim Il Sung. . . .
Desperate fighting occurred over the entire breath of the Korean peninsula as the combined Chinese-North Korean assault threatened to overrun the entire territory of South Korea. Over a period of about two months, United Nations forces were ejected from North Korean territory with Pyongyang, Seoul, and Inchon recaptured. The front gradually stabilized about fifty miles south of Seoul. The Eighth Army commander, General Walker, was killed in an accident in late December and General Matthew Ridgway was appointed to replace him. Ridgway initiated a
counter-offensive in late January 1951. this was successfully accomplished after much hard fighting on both sides, and the front was stabilized roughly at the original 38th parallel boundary by the end of March.
8. USSR Central State Historic Archive, p. 92.
9. USSR Central Military Historic Archive, 14/40, Vol. 116, p. 18.
10. Ibid., p. 26
( pages 62 - 65, notes on p. 225 )