" . . . the real purpose of Soviet involvement in Vietnam was to spread world Communism . . . not to upgrade the lot of the poor people . . . "—Gen. SARIN & Col. DVORETSKY, 1996.
From Soviet Union's Aggressions Against the World, Gen. Oleg Sarin & Col. Lev Dvoretsky, 1996
As the documents of surrender were being signed by the Allies and Japan, Communist guerrillas in Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh were waging active war against the Japanese occupier. His forces were called the Viet Minh and were successful by this time in having brought a great portion of the northern part of their country under their control. They were aided in this endeavor by the United States and Nationalist China . . . In the months that followed, a singularly uninspired policy was followed by the Allies. They was to it that the French were reinstated into the country . . .This made it easy for the USSR to gain influence in all of Indochina. Ho declared himself the president and premier of Vietnam and proclaimed a people�s republic. . . . Stalin could see that with some encouragement, all of Indochina could be brought into the Communist family of nations. This was the agenda proposed to �Vietnamese comrades� by Kremlin advisers along with promises of support during a visit by a Vietnamese delegation to Moscow in November 1947. the Vietnamese Communists needed support . . . They could not depend much on their fraternal brothers from China because of their fight [together] with the nationalist Chinese and their lack of modern weapons. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was armed to the teeth after World War II and was in a position to contribute significantly.
Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) were established on January 30, 1950. After this date, close contacts between them in economic, military, political, and ideological matters took place. . . .
The French recognized their own puppet regime, the Republic of Vietnam, as a member state in the Indochinese colony. They sought to reestablish their control over the entire country, so during the next several years the French war against the Viet Min h raged from north to south, but especially in the northern sectors. . . . The war went on for years and finally ended with the great set piece battle of Dien Bien Phu, a siege that lasted from November 1953 to May 1954. The French met with a resounding defeat . . . The surprise . . . rocked all France, and marked the true end of the first Vietnamese war.
The war finally came to a close with the signing of the Geneva Accords on July 20, 1954. this agreement between the major powers temporarily divided Vietnam into two countries at the 17th parallel of latitude, similar to the situation in Korea. The southern part of Vietnam because a French-oriented country under the rule of a member of the old Vietnamese monarchy, Emperor Bao Dai, with rising star Ngo Dinh Diem as premier. In the north a Communist state was organized under Ho Chi Minh. The southern regime was recognized by France and the United States, and aid to this new nation began to flow from both countries. In October 1955, as a result of an election, the new Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was formed with Ngo Dinh Diem as its first president.
Pressure on the RVN began almost immediately from their northern cousins, as the Communists fought to complete their conquest of the country. The United States in response supplied the South Vietnamese government with various kinds of military and economic aid and in training and organizing the Army . . .
Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown and assassinated in a coup in November 1964. Succeeding governments came and went and the struggle against the Communists, now known as the Viet Cong, continued . . .
Aid supplied by the United States was being matched by the Soviet Union to its ally, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Many reports and requests from DRV arrived in Moscow, validated by the armed forces� intelligence department (the GRU). . . . Ho Chi Minh reinforced the reports of the GRU by requesting the necessities for waging modern war from his big sponsor in Moscow. He wrote as follows to Leonid Brezhnev;
. . . I request that small arms and artillery and associated ammunition should e sent at first, as well as specialists capable of taking part in combat actions. We are thankful to learn that a large food shipment is on the way.2
2. Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry Archive, 526/5067, Vol. 76, p. 68.( pages 87 - 90 , note on p. 227)
Even before he became the CPSU secretary, Leonid Brezhnev spent a great deal of time studying the questions concerning party, state, and military ties with the DRV. On many occasions he met with Vietnamese leaders, including Ho Chi Minh. Now that he was the leader of the USSR, he devoted more attention to the assistance provided to Vietnam. At the Politburo meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on December 13, 1966, Brezhnev pointed out the necessity of intensifying military aid to the DRV, which face massive escalation of American forces in the war in Vietnam. He underlined the fact that the Soviet people would not abandon their Vietnamese brothers to face disaster. He ordered the defense minister to prepare for him information on providing new shipments of weapons and other combat equipment to the DRV very rapidly, as well as sending more military specialists there.9
Although he was giving the impression that the USSR was sending most of the combat goods received by the DRV, he should have mentioned that other countries in the Communist bloc were also providing a great amount of material too. According to data kept in the USSR Foreign Ministry, the value of annual shipments to the DRV, expressed in U.S. dollars, was 450 million from the USSR, 180 million from China, and 190 million from other Communist countries.10
9. Central Committee, 18/127, Vol. 17, p. 92.
10. Russian Foreign, 21/144, Vol. 78, p. 26.( pages 92-3 , notes on p. 227)
The Soviet military specialists were under the command of a senior official who was assisted by a rather small staff. He received his orders from the General Staff of the Armed Forces in Moscow. He sent written and other reports to the same authority through the regular communications means. From time to time he was summoned to Moscow to present his reports personally on the work accomplished in Vietnam. The work of all military advisers and technicians was coordinated by the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to Vietnam, Ivan Scherbakov. He was in constant contact with the leadership of Vietnam, particularly Ho Chi Minh. He passed on to Ho the views of the Soviet Union on the course of the hostilities and received, in turn, views on the struggle from the Vietnamese viewpoint. They discussed the overall military and economic situation and the problems that needed solution by both sides.17
The Soviet Union responded rapidly and constructively to the ambassadors� recommendations, because there was a sincere desire on the part of Soviet officials to alter the situation in Vietnam in favor of the DRV. Hey were looking toward the elusive day of unification of the entire country under, of course, the patronage of the USSR with its Marxist-Leninist ideology. They not only were enlarging and strengthening the overall socialist group of countries, but were doing so in Asia, a long-desired objective. Additionally, successes in the Vietnamese jungles were a boost to the reputation of Soviet arms. So each ne request from Ambassador Scherbakov to Moscow received expedited treatment, sometimes even by Brezhnev himself. Sometimes rosy pictures were painted for the leadership like this briefing note by Brezhnev:
. . . during the first three months of 1965, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee has discussed questions concerning our provision of military aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on four occasions. thanks to our ambassador and information from the military, we have a complete picture of the situation in the theater of operations in the region. I am pleased to state that we control the situation there. . . .18
17. Russian Foreign, 75/2112, Vol. 45, pp. 67-77.
18. Central Committee, 18/127, Vol. 21, p. 14.( pages 97-8 , notes on p. 227-8)
The reunification of the country under a Communist regime has not brought to the Vietnamese people the expected hopes for material prosperity and democratic reforms. The Soviet Union and other nations in the Soviet bloc continued to provide economic aid, but this was undermined by the United States, which imposed a trade embargo . . . Food has been rationed, small businesses have been discouraged, and the Marxist-Leninist ideology has been imposed. This has turned people into zombies who adhere to the cult of leaders. These policies all contributed to dissatisfaction among the people, resulting in a mighty flood of emigrations to neighboring countries.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe made economic conditions even worse . . . Russia and other former Communist bloc nations have lost interest in their former ally. They are all too poor to help Vietnam . . .
So what did the Soviet Union gain from its participation in the Vietnam War? Some have held that it was a good �proving ground� whereby weapons were tested and our troops seasoned. But did we gain a friend there? Obviously not. The negative consequences of the war were great, just as for the United States. Both sides lost men for no good reason and depleted their treasuries of funds that could have been used to ameliorate the living conditions of their own peoples. Further, the Soviet Union lost prestige in the world and faced the ever-present danger of the cold war turning into a hot war. We must keep in mind the obvious fact that the real purpose of Soviet involvement in Vietnam was to spread world Communism and strengthen its influence in the world, not to upgrade the lot of the poor people of Vietnam. . . .
( pages 113-4 )
Alien wars : the Soviet Union's aggressions
against the world, 1919 to 1989 / Oleg Sarin, Lev Dvoretsky
Novato, CA : Presidio, 1996.