From Russia's Race for Asia by George Creel, 1949
Karakhan's prize performance . . . was his success in persuading Dr. Sun to accept Michael Borodin as a trusted right hand in managing Kuomintang affairs. Born in Russia, but brought to the United States as a boy, Borodin became a fanatical Communist at an early age and by 1918 had so risen in the American party as to attract the notice of Lenin and Trotsky. Drafted by them for revolutionary activities, he changed his name from Grusenberg to Borodin, and worked effectively in Mexico, Scotland and Turkey.( .. )
Worn out by years of struggle, Dr. Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925, without designating a successor. It had been the somewhat confident expectation that his mantle would fall on the shoulders of Chiang Kai-shek, a favorite disciple, but Borodin kept the soldier in his Whampoa post and pitted Wang Ching-wei, a fellow traveler, against Hu Han-min, a Rightist. With the party torn by discord, the Russian gave the signal for an armed uprising in Shanghai, not only the heart of Chinese capitalism, but where foreigners enjoyed their greatest extraterritorial privileges.
On May 30 a mob of strikers invaded the International Settlement, and in the battle that followed both police men and workers were killed. In Canton, on June 3, a huge demonstration was staged to protest the "Shanghai massacre," and again there was savage fighting between the marchers and the police on guard at the British and French Concessions. To this day there is still dispute over the firing of the fist shots, but the Communists put full blame on the "massacres" on the British and French, and launched a nationwide campaign of hate against "foreign imperialists." Great Britain, however, was the principal target, and along with a boycott of British goods, some 100,000 Chinese were induced to leave Hongkong for Canton.
George Sokolsky, in his Tinder Box of Asia, has a page that throws light on Borodin's strategy. "Anti-imperialism," he explains, "is a slogan about which all Chinese, including non-Communists, can rally. Therefore, when an anti-imperialist issue is evoked, party activities may be pursued on a wide front. It is difficult, however, to accomplish much against all foreign powers. Therefore the anti-imperialist movement should be focused on one foreign power at a time. . . . Anti-imperialism is not only art of the Communist theses because the foreigners possess special rights in China, but also because they either control or dominate invested capital. The principal industrial organizations are under their direction. By attacking the foreigner's position directly, the capitalistic structure of the country is attacked indirectly."
Meanwhile various "generals," more interested in loot than Communism or Nationalism, had taken advantage of turmoil to set up independent commands, seizing cities and levying tribute with heavy hands. The campaign for their suppression marked the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek from comparative obscurity, for Borodin was forced to select him as commander in chief.
Many considerations compelled the choice. A soldier from his nineteenth year, Chiang had learned his trade in Japan, serving with an artillery unit after his graduation from the Japanese Military College. After returning to China on the outbreak of the revolution in 1911, he had followed the fortunes of Sun Yat-sen with unwavering devotion and won distinction for both courage and leadership. No other army commander enjoyed greater prestige or was more of an inspiration to his troops. Events quickly justified Chiang's selection, for a masterly campaign routed the rebels from stronghold after stronghold, and by October the Canton area was restored to a fair semblance of order.
At the second Congress of the Kuomintang in January 1926 Borodin came out from behind the scenes and took over full control of the party. While Wang Ching-wei, fuzzy-headed but ambitious, was chosen as chairman of the new government, every key position went to Communists with left-wingers in all of the secondary posts. Chiang Kai-shek, by reason of his victories, had to be taken into account and was thrown the job of Inspector General of the Kuomintang armies as a sop. Thus ended the first phase of Communist infiltration.
CHAPTER IIChiang's Break with the Communists
Where Michael Borodin blundered was in his underestimation of Chiang Kai-shek as a simple soldier conditioned to the habit of blind obedience, for even cursory study of the record would have shown him that the one great controlling force in Chiang's life was his worship of Sun Yat-sen. From 1911 to 1925 he had been the leader's inseparable companion and most devoted disciple, accepting every feature of his program as a sacred commandment.
How could such a man forget the agreement with Abram Joffe in which the "father of the republic" had stated explicitly that neither Communism nor the Soviet system could ever be introduced into China? Borodin might also have remembered that Chiang, returning from a Moscow visit in 1923, had openly expressed his dislike of Bolshevik methods. The Russian's* major mistake, however, was his failure to bear in mind that Dr. Sun's last words urged a Northern Expedition that would overthrow the war lords and bring about the unification of China. What more stupid than to expect that Chiang would let this deathbed command go unheeded?
* Not a Slav — not a Russian. An international criminal. —
(WPT)None of these danger signals had power to halt Borodin's steady communization of the whole Canton area. The ranks of the opposition, were increasingly thinned by dismissals, arrests and assassinations, and the thousands of importees from Hongkong, supplied with arms, cowed loyal troops by their violences. A reactionary clique in the Kuomintang also plotted, and disaffected "generals" and out-of-office politicians added to riot and terrorism.
Finally convinced that Dr. Sun's hope of a unified China hung in the balance, and after two attempts on his own life, Chiang Kai-shek struck with the decision that was to mark his later career. On March 20, 1926, every Communist stronghold in Canton was surrounded by Whampoa troops, and Russian and Chinese Reds, along with the leaders of the Kuomintang's right and left wings, were imprisoned. here and there isolated groups offered resistance, but at the end of three days Chiang was master of the city. General Rogachoff and his Russian staff, caught in the dragnet, were first formally wined and dined, and then put on a train for Moscow and politely advised not to come back.
Borodin, absent from Canton at the time, suavely accepted the situation on his return, nor did he make any open protest against the immediate and drastic de-communization of the Kuomintang. Shrewd enough to see that the deal had gone against him, the [not-really] Russian was still amiable when a chastened Central Executive Committee authorized the Northern Expedition, and made Chiang Kai-shek commander in chief with full powers.
Chiang, for his part, was no less conciliatory. Eager for an appearance of unity on the eve of his campaign, and not yet ready for a complete break with Moscow, he disclaimed any intent to institute a Communist purge. If Borodin and his Reds were disposed to abide by the Sun-Joffe agreement and call off their agitators and hatchet men, no further punitive steps would be taken.
( pages 23 - 28 )
In April [1927], Chang Tso-lin, the Peking war lord, charged Karakhan with giving open aid and comfort to the nationalists, and raided the Russian embassy. The documents that he seized proved conclusively that the Comintern had not only been sending almost daily orders to Borodin, but that the Communist movement in China was receiving a monthly subsidy.1
1 "The documents, published immediately, showed a financial connection between the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the Comintern or unofficial activities of Borodin and Galen in South China." Walter Duranty, in Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. 19, Fourteenth Edition, by permission of the Encyclopædia Britannica.Even while this news was filtering down from the North to the South, further evidence of Moscow's control and purposes was uncovered in Hankow. On April 27, out of a very definite irritation stirred by Borodin's cautious policies, Stalin sent the gauleiter a telegram that gave these mandatory instructions:
1. Land in Hunan and Hupeh is to be confiscated by the peasants without any reference to the government, the peasants acting through the Communist Party.
2. A new leadership is to be created within the Kuomintang, consisting entirely of Communist Party members. The left wing of the Kuomintang is to be eliminated.
3. The Kuomintang is to be reconstructed along more radical lines, so that in due course the Kuomintang as a party disappears, and the Communist Party of China takes its place.
4. A court is to be created, consisting of persons with known reputations, which is to judge counterrevolutionary military men and is to punish them for their opposition to the revolutionary activities of the Communist party.
5. Finally an army is to be organized, drilled and armed. This army is to consist of 20,000 armed Communists, and 50,000 laborers and peasants of Human and Hupeh.
Borodin concealed the telegram, knowing that any such program would alienate the Kuomintang left wing and at the same time play right into the hands of Chiang Kai-shek by confirming his charge of Russian control. At his side, however, sat one Roy, a native of India and a doctrinaire enthusiast sent to Canton as a special representative of the Comintern. Abstracting the telegram from the pigeonhole where it had been hidden by Borodin, Roy showed it to Wang Ching-wei and other left-wing leaders, and the results were immediate.
Want and his faction were wakened from their befuddlement with a start, but while the banishment of Borodin was debated, a fear of Moscow's wrath prevented action. As they struggled with their doubts and dreads, a peremptory telegram from Chiang Kai-shek ordered the arrest of all Communists. . . . Wang Ching-wei hung back from so bold a step, but the message had its effect on those troops who served Borodin for for profit rather than from conviction. Deciding that Chiang looked to be top dog, they suddenly rebelled and opened Hankow's gates to General Ho Chien, a nationalist commander notorious for his belief that the only good Communist is a dead one. {Right on}.
There is little question that Ho, left to his own devices, would have dealt summarily with the Russian group, but timorous Wang insisted on deportation. In July, therefore, Borodin and General Bluecher-Galen were sent out of China by way of the motor transport route through Inner Mongolia. Along with them went quite a crew of young radicals who had been brought to Canton from other countries for revolutionary training. Among the lot, it is interesting to note, were Ho Chi Minh, now [1949] the Communist leader in Indo-China, and Alimin Prawirodirdjo, present head of the Communists in Indonesia.
The Comintern, following its traditional policy of never admitting fault, put entire blame for the Chinese failure on Borodin, and doomed him to poverty and obscurity. Karakhan, less fortunate, was arrested as a counterrevolutionary and set before a firing squad. . . .
( pages 33 - 35 )
Indianapolis New York : Bobbs-Merrill, 1949.
From BORODIN : Stalin's Man in China, Dan N. Jacobs, 1981
In late August 1919 Borodin visited the U.S. consul-general in Santo Domingo and told him that he was an employee of the Mexican consulate, on his way to Mexico City with sealed documents from the Mexican consul-general in Moscow destined for the Mexican foreign office. However, he first wanted to visit his wife and children I Chicago. The consul-general, suspicious of anyone coming from Moscow, wired Washington recommending a �most careful" examination of Borodin when he reached New York. On September 17, Borodin arrived in New York harbor abroad the S. S. Huron. The message from the consul-general in Santo Domingo was heeded and Borodin was detained . . .. . . Jacob Spolansky* . . . had been a Hull House habitué, at one time had published a Russian newspaper in Chicago, and knew Borodin quite well. In 1918, Spolansky had been inducted into army intelligence and was now a member of the Bureau of Investigation, predecessor of the FBI.2 Special agents Spolansky was sent to interrogate Borodin. He searched Borodin�s baggage thoroughly and questioned him. But he discovered little except that Borodin was anxious to visit his wife and family. The Bureau of Investigation decided to allow Borodin to go to Chicago and remain there briefly, but ordered Spolansky to keep a close check on him. As soon as Borodin was released, his first stop was the office of D.H. Dubrowsky, a dentist associated with the Russian Soviet Government Bureau in New York. Borodin told Dubrowsky that he had been given diamonds in Moscow to deliver to the United States, that he did not have them with him, but that Dubrowsky could expect delivery in the near future.3
* The given �Russian-born� may be not exact enough for Spolansky was born in Kiev. At that time Kiev was indeed in the Russian-tsarist hands but the population was Ruthenian (Ukrainian) ; the city was the seat of an ancient Kingdom whose civilisation had preceded that in Muscovy by a number of centuries. The man Spolansky would not necessarily count among �the Russians� (whether villains or heroes). — (WPT).Shortly thereafter Borodin left for Chicago where he was met at the depot by Spolansky who reminded him that his visa was only good for a short visit—and that they should �keep in touch.� Borodin was in Chicago the third and fourth weeks in September. . . .
Borodin saw many of his old colleagues in Chicago. Even though he was under surveillance, there was no reason to avoid them, since old-time Chicagoan Spolansky who had been at the founding congress of the Communist Party of America, knew who the radicals, old and new, were. Borodin probably tried to recruit some of them for the CI, as he did Spolansky. . . . But Borodin had two other important reasons for being in Chicago. One was to see his . . . wife and sons, now ten and four . . . Borodin�s other reason for returning to Chicago was to recover the diamonds when they reached there. But they had not arrived . . .
2. Spolansky�s memory is very bad on some points, and he writes with great license. Much of what he states is not to be trusted, but what is related here seems plausible. Jacob Spolansky, The Communist Trail in America (New York, 1951.)Comment He �writes with great license� would have even more applied to the story by Elizabeth Bentley. Yet these are the materials by the people who were there and who not only did see but had actively participated in the events. The inaccuracy or plain error (in the case of Ms. Bentley even some seeming flights of fancy) are at times apparent, especially on comparison with other discovered or re-discovered sources ; but one sees no evidence of deliberate attempts at misleading—unlike the Bolshevik/communist propaganda writers.One also notes that even experienced agents were not immune to the Kremlin-driven deceptions. Spolansky, for example, was clearly misled by a multiple-agent Liptschitz alias Winchell into believing that the latter's anti-Bolshevism was genuine. — (WPT)
3. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings 76th Cong. 1st sess., 1939, vol. 8, pp 5157-5159.Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England :
Cambridge University Press, 1981, pages 62 - 64.