Seemingly innocuous statement, 'the physical bases of consciousness'. On the face of it there might be nothing wrong in it, the grammar looks right.

The 'non-physical bases of consciousness' looks just as grammatically correct. However, consider the following.

The first statement implies the physical bases of the consciousness of this writer here.

It implies the physical bases of the consciousness of the reader (there),

It also implies the physical bases of the consciousness of the author of the statement ('physical bases of consciousness') itself.

The physical bases of the transmission of this 'knowledge', it being this computer here, and what have you, seem obvious.

However, the 'knowledge' thus transmitted re-writes (it seems, quite correctly) as,

the physical bases of the consciousness by the reader of the physical bases of the consciousness by this writer of the physical bases of the consciousness of the author of the statement 'the physical bases of consciousness' (of, presumably, anyone there be).

How can the 'materialist' account for such a concatenation ? I do not see how, should there be any discernible (physical) structure to some actual import of any such proposition it would probably require a computer ten times the size of the known universe, working on the problem for a number of kalpas, perhaps, to produce.

It being a sort of joke, the preceding statement. By the literature known to me, the 'materialist', understandably, cannot account for any such propositions and the general public is being instead sometimes deceived by assertions, made in the name of "science", that the problem "cannot be understood".

Is that 'knowledge' ? A something which "cannot be understood" is not knowledge, obviously, but a useless statement. Are you any the wiser for somebody's telling you something "cannot be understood", the reader ?

Attempting to follow the 'materialist' : on that premiss, "I" is a term which some physico-chemical processes have placed on themselves.

Scio me scire,1 or, the consciousness of my own consciousness2 : this would then be the opinion which one stage of some physico-chemical processes holds on another stage — of self-same physico-chemical processes.

1.   Augustine, quoted by H. Driesch, The Crisis in Psychology.       2.   T. Paine, The Age of Reason.

The "logic" seems unassailable. What does all this have to do with me (this writer).

It seems that all that (some physico-chemical processes) might have nothing to do with me after all. (At this point one could rest comfortably, hoping that Science will eventually solve all this in some way or other.) There may be a danger to it, however, of sorts.

To wit : the 'materialist' would insist that all that has everything to do with me (and with any one for that matter). Yet all that is rank non-sense (is it not, the reader ?)

Am I being in any way unfair ? If there be any faults found with the "logic" of 'materialism', the way I have here attempted to develop it, then examine the "logic" of the 'materialist' authors themselves, the reader — as found in their treatises.

* * *

This is an effort by a learner. I seem to have happened on some key data which do seem to answer certain key questions regarding the human existence — (as distinguished from some other data, sometimes of broad currency).

Part of the problem, and this looks certain, may be on many occasions of there appearing fallacies in the realms of either 'science' or 'religion', or 'philosophy', etc. Thus one sort of fallacy had been made to work against some counter-fallacy (the apparent bulk of the philosophic dispute throughout the ages seems to consists of such).

Does man have a soul ? An instance known to me, told me by another, of a plainly fallacious definition of 'soul', which was by a certain school being taught to be rejected might do for an illustration of the type of problem.

What the acquaintance of mine was taught to reject was certainly (by my reading) either unmeaning or illogical (depending on how you interpreted the given terms). Instead of that, he had been given something else — which was plainly false (of the 'cannot be understood' sort of school : which is never an answer to anything at all).

One fallacy seems to have been rather frequent. If a man had a soul, then two entities or sorts of entity had been verbally distinguished, the haver (of the soul) and the "thing" or "something" had (the soul itself).

Which is which had not been answered by this scheme — but rather obscured. If the soul was a "something" had then the one who 'has' it had been distinguished from "it" by another sort of noun (man).

Who then is apprehending and what is that is being apprehended became in some instances a sort of the circularity of language, sometimes accepted and repeated without much scrutiny (sometimes rejected, even by the best thinkers, due simply to the vague expressions).

The apparent error had been on the fundamentals ; that is, an error of the sorts which could be the most difficult of any ones to notice (a category sometimes called "too simple").

One certainly has a body (a thing I am using now for typing this text here).

* * *

Writers on these subjects have been numerous, the most notable scientists (natural philosophers) through the ages were keenly interested, e.g. Des Cartes, Newton, Leibnitz, Berkeley, etc. ; notably preceded by Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinue, etc.

Came the 20th century, a certain question appears salient : was there a 'something added' to man.

Was there some fulguration, a spark, or something 'supernatural'. The quality of its being said to be "had", "added" (even "superadded", by some writers), of its being 'a plus affair' could not compute.

There has been some progress, and even much progress on these lines in the meanwhile, which the 'official science' for the most part had not noticed. (Why could be a difficult question ; the reason for this very site here has been, I for one had just too often found something other than I had initially looked for on these subjects).

It seems that some workable answers had been present all along1 : often, such had not been generally noticed — sometimes due to some other articles associated therewith (of secondary importance, if any at all) ; often due to having been misunderstood ; also due to other factors, political etc.

* * *

The individual (e.g this writer, or the reader, etc.) — had been sometimes artificially divided. The indivisible, the undivided individual, a one, the fundamental perceiving agent ; these need not be argued about as essences before some consistency in the language is present.

Grammar and Epistemology : so long as one speaks about anything at all the one must be consideered as well as the other.

We want some answers ; some people want some answers, anyway ; some others want some other things (including obscuring the answers that had already been formulated).

Anti-swear : the term 'answer' is an abbreviation. Some one swear posed against another swear. A something posed against another something. In other words, a correspondence of some terms.

If the correspondence be exact it could be said, this answers that.

* * *

Some Remarks on Monism and Dualism

These could be the surest ways to bog down somewhere, these sorts of '-ism'.

To Leibnitz I have seen attributed an "unbroken range of perceptions", from the highest to the lowest.

This could be a sort of 'monism', one range of perceptions being spoken about. A direction is present in this formulation however, from the highest to the lowest.

This seems not inconsistent with some sorts of 'dualism' : from the spiritual (higher levels of perception) to the material (the lower levels of perception — if any).

Any two-term expression could be termed 'dualism'. Do not get stuck on any 'dualism' — the reader.2 These only have to do with the sorts of expression used to some particular purpose, none of those '-isms' is either true or untrue except in some particular context of some actual proposition.

* * *

What did they really mean, the philosophers.

The English 'soul' is apparently connected with the word 'sea'. (So is the German 'Seele'). This much I have got from the philologists, anyway.

As a matter of paleo-psychology it could be surmised this to have been some relict, some remaining awareness, of the life forms first having appeared in the sea, then venturing onto the land.

(This seems a neat hypothesis, I would not think there being much to be gained by arguing either for or against it. Whether this hypothesis be probable or not, an independent pattern is seen in the following).

On the Life that Breathes

The Latin spiritus (present in English and in other languages), a form of spirare, breathe.

The Greek pneuma, akin to psukhein, breathe, here psyche, the one who does the breathing in other words.

The Slav duch, or 'dukh', connected with dech, the breath. This apparently connected with the English 'dune' — formed by the wind, notion of blowing apparent in any of these concepts.

The Indian Atman, connected with the German atmen (verb, to breathe).

The German Geist, connected with 'gas'.3

The pneuma, breath, appears in many places and in many languages as a representation of anything 'spiritual' (itself a word for the breathe).

Is there anything more obvious, the scientist, than this report if verified : some creatures do breathe (including the plants, by peculiar processes, which however appear in some ways similar).

Also note : some bodies (objects) do perform spontaneuous motions (e.g. people, any brute animals, also note the internal motions of fluids in the plants) ; and some bodies do not (e.g. stones, the particles of sand, man-made bricks or chairs, etc.). Is there anything more obvious ? the Scientist ?

Is there anything more obvious ? the Scientist ?

Some sorts of controversiorum theologicorum could possibly get into the way of such investiagions. I am attempting here to notice what is obvious ; this dogma or that dogma (even if called 'scientific') have to be confronted, and had better be confronted (in some rational manner) lest some mob or other slow down the progress of science (or of everything) but once again.

Of anyone to suppose that such terms as the spiritual have no meaning, or too vague a meaning, would ultimately have little if anything to do with any science. The 'spiritual' has to do with some breathing objects (bodies), somewhere, by the fundamental derivation.

Vague meanings there may have sometimes appeared, due to some excesses of 'philosophy' or the like. Any superstition there may have accrued on a notion can be gradually abandoned, preferably by the appeals to the observable facts and to reason rather than to any authorities.

To clarify any such issues would seem worthy a goal for any kind of science, worthy such a name (and not to try to impose on the people any dogmas 'in the name of science' even more vague or plainly impossible than the exploits of some old-time Theologians).

It "cannot be understood" has been sometimes seen in the realms of religion ; what do you think of any "science" which tells you exactly the same thing ? in other words, "it cannot be understood".

(I have seen such 'scientific' texts). The 'answer' given is a mystery. While the mystery is never an answer to anything at all but a term placed on an absence of knowledge (anti-science, in other words, anything that "cannot be understood").

* * *

To speak of the immaterial spirit : one way of understanding such an idea could be by negating any arrive-at-able definitions of anything material. I have seen this proposed, attempted or done, by more than one author.

I am not specifically promoting a particular system here ; an idea of a suggestion occurred me : all this has in the end to do with the observer. If he be supposed to be an immaterial being (entity) then anything material could, from such a premiss, be capable of some sharper definitions than had been produced before, by way of trial, apparently the procedure by anything that has ever been to some conviction somewhere called science at all.

Why speak abut the immaterial spirit : this does seem to answer, it does seem to correspond with what can be actually seen there.

The spontaneous motions by any thing alive can thus be surmised to involve some agent present there, a being or sort of being whose presence preceded any such a motion by some such a body (dead when absent).

This does partially seem to agree with some ideas found in some religions ; the motions by or in the living bodies are facts by any sort of reckoning, the descriptions of the agents present is the only apparent difficulty.

I recall Tho. Hobbes questioning some such attempts : he would not accept an 'incorporeal body' — nor 'incorporeal substance'. Please note, an 'incorporeal body' is an absurdity indeed, a contradiction (a body, the Latin corpus, being usually a word for some sorts of material object).

One can safely leave that one (in my opinion). However, an 'incorporeal substance' does not necessarily look a contradiction. Try it for size, the scientist. (I think this might be a good example of the problem ; a very good thinker, Hobbes, had not quite noticed some fine distinction somewhere).

What is being spoken about : this writer, the reader there, any human being at all. The human spirit has never been quite an unmeaning term.

The mind, not an unmeaning term, often, could be first understood as a verb.

On An Unclouded Mind

Let one say : the immaterial bases of everything at all.

That not only includes but does naturally begin with one who might exmine such an expression.

I for one am not in the business of telling the reader who he is ; this here tells him rather what he is not.

Whence said immaterial bases of everything at all ? A grammatically possible question (seeming valid) — seems unmeaning.

(Whence this or that could sure apply to any of the forms of matter, or physical phenomena ; this seems to have been to source of the confusion by the 'materialist').

It is by proceeding from the immaterial 'levels' (expression possibly inexact) that anything material is being considered or apprehended.

Immaterial, incorporeal, spiritual ; the first two terms state a negative, the third can (fundamentally) mean an action, that of breathing.

Whence a decision, by one, to hold one's breath for a moment ?

There is absolutely no accounting for such an action by any of the 'materialist' schools. (If you hold your breath longer than just a moment, the material manifests itself by way of certain sensations. Explain, the 'materialist' ; why should 'matter' work against 'matter' without any need, necessity, reason, cause, sense).

* * *

Does immaterialism answer the questions present. Apart from the arguments over essences some kind of order in the language used could just as well be considered.

If this one person here (this writer, that is) be an immaterial entity a plenty of numerous philosophical etc. "problems" are simply no longer apparent.

There should be absolutely no need to prove anything on such subjects were the Humanity by now civilized enough to answer the works by its best members. This here could be primarily a self-defense against some "schools", who would insist that someone (a) is a sort of piece, a portion, of matter and (b) all this "cannot be understood" (anyway).

Those certainly are not answers, by any stretch of meaning that could be imposed on the term 'answer'.

(Nothing of the sort should be mistaken for science no matter what claims may have been made and by whom. An absence of answers called 'science' is only suspect — hard words have to have meanining too, else one is only being deceived by somebody's impositions).


    1. The Pythagorean school, others, had kept their knowledge secret. One could see two, much different, reasons for such conditions. One of them could be simply to prevent some novices from bragging or gossiping over what they had not yet quite themselves understood.
    I would not be surprised if that had been found out one day to have been the reason for the secrecy expected of the initiate then. Howbeit, the Pytharogeans continued for several centuries and eventually disappeared (as a school, that is).
    It might be that the requirement of secrecy could be eventually perceived as the possession of some advantage over others. This could perhaps account for the (apparent) demise of the Pythagorean school, as a distinct organization, anyhow.
    The reason would be, in addition to the knowledge hitherto had some postulates, not germaine to the original, would alloy the original postulates, with the effect of the keepers of the knowledge eventually getting confounded themselves and the knowledge had in some such circumstances then tending to degenerate.
    This seems possible ; a sort paradox can be seen in that the fundamental knowledge hangs on fundamental (basic) simplicities. The actual problem may be not so much with keeping it secret as with conveying it, in some deft fashion (so that no error would spring up in the process).
    Any party confused on such a point would in the end only corrupt whatever knowledge they had got. I am afraid this is something which very much has to be taken into account — in order for the entire achievement of the human civilisation to date not to get lost (due to some petty designs by some mean individuals).
    2. It looks like an expression, 'cartesian dualism' had been coined by some creeps in order to narrow the issue down to one (notable) author on these subjects (there having been many) — and to make discussion over an '-ism' obscure the entire discourse.
    3. 'Gas' also (in consideration of the randomness in the movements of the particles in gases) connected with 'chaos' — which by some sources was the condition preceding the appearances of some order in this universe. Whatever the Authority, some such phenomena as proceeding from the less-organized to the more-highly-organized life might seem obvious ; by some schools this may have been cyclical, which to me seems a better explanation than many others
    Compare the notions of entropy (progressive randomness in the closed systems) and negentropy ; note that whatever some theory might say about entropy, negentropy could be termed what Life really does, any forms of life when you look at it. There may have been some such cycles of the universe ; to say that all this is but one-time affair would be a very small view indeed.
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