From "Molotov Remembers"
Molotov . . . brought a portrait of Roosevelt presented to him at the talks in Washington in 1942—a large photograph of a handsome man in a splendid frame, covered with green silk, with an inscription in English in a violet ink, “To my friend Viacheslav Molotov from Franklin Roosevelt. May 30, 1942.”
[6-11-79 ; page 51]And what do you think of Roosevelt as a person? * * *
Reasonable enough.
So nice, and sociable, yes?
Sociable, yes, a nice person. I have a portrait from Roosevelt—”To my friend Molotov. . . .” So I came to be friends with the bourgeoisie.
[11-7-79, page 72 ]Roosevelt was an imperialist who would grab anyone by the throat. * * *
As a comrade has noted, to be paralyzed and yet to become president of the United States, and for three terms, what a rascal you had to be!
Well said.
[2-5-82, page 51]
Chuev, Feliks Ivanovich, 1941- Title(s) Sto sorok besed s Molotovym. English Molotov remembers : inside Kremlin politics : conversations with Felix Chuev / edited with an introduction and notes by Albert Resis. Publisher Chicago : I.R. Dee, 1993. Paging xxiii, 438 p. ; 24 cm. Notes Includes index.
" . . . those citizens of the United States who bamboozled the President into acting as if Stalin were a cross between Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson deserve a high place on an American roll of dishonor. " —WILLIAM C. BULLITT, 1946
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 10 October 1933 to Mikhail KalininSince the beginning of my Administration, I have contemplated the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations between the people of the United States and the people of Russia.It is most regrettable that these great peoples, between whom a happy tradition of friendship existed for more than a century to their mutual advantage, should now be without a practical method of communicating with each other.
The difficulties that have created this anomalous situation are serious but not, in my opinion insoluble, and difficulties between great Nations can be removed only by frank, friendly conversations. If you are of similar mind, I should be glad to receive any representatives you may designate to explore with me personally all question outstanding between our countries.
Mikhail Kalinin replied:
I have always considered most abnormal and regrettable a situation wherein, during the past sixteen years, two great Republics have lacked the usual methods of communication and have been deprived of the benefits which such communication could give.
There is no doubt that difficulties, present or arising, between two countries, can be solved only when direct relations exist between them . . . I shall take the liberty further to express the opinion that the abnormal situation, to which you correctly refer in your message, has an unfavorable effect not only on the interests of the two States concerned, but also on the general international situation . . .
In accordance with the above, I gladly accept your proposal to send to the United States a representative of the Soviet Government to discuss with you the question of interest to our countries. The Soviet Government will be represented by Mr. M. M. Litvinov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who will come to Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon.
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s OWN STORY
Told in his own words . . as selected by Donald Day
Boston : Little, Brown &ct., 1951, pages 190-1.
From The SWORD and the SHIELD, C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin, 1999
For most of the inter-war years the United States had ranked some way behind Britain as a target for INO operations. Even in the mid-1930s the main Soviet espionage networks in the United States were run by the Fourth Department (Military Intelligence, later renamed GRU) rather than by the NKVD. Fourth Department agents included a series of young, idealistic high-flyers within the federal government, among them: Alger Hiss and Julian Wadleigh, both of whom entered the State Department in 1936; Harry Dexter White of the Treasury Department; and George Silverman, a government statistician who probably recruited White.1 . . . Wadleigh wrote later:When the Communist International represented the only world force effectively resisting Nazi Germany, I had offered my services to the Soviet underground in Washington as one small contribution to help stem the fascist tide.2Comment if the man was not simply lying (which was the communist norm — but I do not know in this instance) — then he was deluding himself and others with some atavistic logics. The Communist Internationalists would usurp any issue for use towards their own crooked goals. The history of 'anti-fascism' in the U.S., etc., can be examined by a truly skeptical reader — (WPT)
The main NKVD operations in the United States during the mid-1930s were run by an illegal residency established in 1934 under the former Berlin resident, Boris Bazarov (codenamed NORD), with Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov (YUNG), a Soviet Tartar, as his deputy.3 Bazarov was remembered with affection by Hede Massing, an Austrian agent in his residency, as the warmest personality she had encountered in the NKVD. . . .
Though Akhmerov, by contrast, struck Massing as a "Muscovite automaton," he was less robotic than he appeared.4 Unknown to Massing, Akhmerov was engaged in a passionate love affair with his assistant, Helen Lowry, the cousin of the American Communist Party leader, Earl Browder, and—unusally—gained permission from the Centre to marry her.5
Bazarov's and Akhmerov's recruits included three agents in the State Department, ERIKH, KIY and "19",6 Probably the most important, as well as the only one of the three who can be clearly identified, was agent "19," Laurence Duggan, who later became chief of the Latin American Division.7 To Hede Massing, Duggan seemed "an extremely tense, high-strung, intellectual young man." His recruitment took some time, not least because Alger Hiss was simultaneously attempting to recruit him for the Fourth Department. In April 1936 Bazarov complained to the Centre that the "persistent Hiss" showed no sign of abandoning the attempt.8 A year later, in the midst of the Moscow show trials, Duggan told Akhmerov that he was afraid that, if he "collaborated" with Soviet intelligence, he might be exposed by a Trotskyite traitor. By the beginning of 1938, however, Duggan was supplying Akhmerov with State Department documents which were photographed in the illegal residency and then returned. In March Duggan reported that his close friend Sumner Welles, undersecretary at the State Department from 1938 to 1945, had told him he was becoming too attracted to Marxism and had given him a friendly warning about his left-wing acquaintances.9 Duggan’s' future in the State Department, however, seemed as bright as that of Donald Maclean in the Foreign Office.
The Center also saw a bright future for Michael Straight (codenamed NOMAD and NIGEL), the wealthy young American recruited shortly before his graduation from Cambridge University, in 1937.10 Its optimism sprang far more from Straight's family connections than from any evidence of his enthusiasm for a career as a secret agent. Straight's job hunt after his return to the United States began at the top—over tea at the White House with Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt. With some assistance from Mrs. Roosevelt, he obtained a temporary, unpaid assignment in the State Department early in 1938. Soon afterwards, he received a phone call from Akhmerov, who passed on "greetings from your friends at Cambridge University" and invited him to dinner at a local restaurant. Akhmerov introduced himself as "Michael Green," then ordered a large meal. . . .
Akhmerov seemed to accept that it would be some time before Straight had access to important documents, but was evidently prepared to wait. Before paying the bill, he delivered a brief lecture on international relations. Straight was "too stunned to think clearly." Though Straight claims that he was "unwilling to become a Soviet agent in the Department of State," he plainly did not say so to Akhmerov. The two men "parted as friends" and Straight agreed to continue their meetings.11
With the approach of war in Europe, the Centre's interest in the United States steadily increased. In 1938 the NKVD used the defection of the main Fourth Department courier, Whittaker Chambers, as a pretext for taking over most of the military intelligence agent network, with the notable exception of Alger Hiss.12 In the United States, as elsewhere, however, the expansion of NKVD operations was disrupted by the hunt for imaginary "enemies of the people." Ivan Andreyevich Morozov (codenamed YUZ and KIR), who was stationed in the New York legal residency in 1938-9, sought to prove his zeal to the Centre by denouncing the Resident, Pyotr Davidovich Gutzeit (codenamed NIKOLAI), and most of his colleagues as secret Trotskyists.13 In 1938 both Gutzeit and Bazarov, the legal and illegal residents, were recalled and shot.14 Morozov's denunciation of the next legal resident, Gayk Badalovich Ovakimyan (codenamed GENNADI) was less successful and may have prompted Morozov's own recall in 1939.15
Bazarov was succeeded as illegal resident by his former deputy, Iskhak Akhmerov, who henceforth controlled most political intelligence operations in the United States.16 Mitrokhin noted the codenames of eight rather diverse individuals in whom the Centre seemed to place particularly high hopes on the eve of the Second World War.17 Laurence Duggan (agent "19," later FRANK) in the State Department;18 Michael Straight (NIGEL), also in the State Department; Martha Dodd Stern (LIZA), daughter of the former US ambassador to Germany, William E. Dodd, and wife of the millionaire Alfred Kaufman Stern (also a Soviet agent); Martha’s brother, William E. Doss [Dodd?], Jr. (PRESIDENT), who had run unsuccessfully for Congress as a Democrat and still had political ambitions; Harry Dexter White in the Treasury Department (KASSIR, later JURIST); and agent codenamed MORIS (Probably John Abt) in the Justice Department;19 Boris Morros (FROST), the Hollywood producer of Laurel and Hardy's Flying Deuces and other box-office hits;20 Mary Wolf Price (codenamed KID and DIR), an undeclared Communist who was secretary to the well-known columnist Walter Lippmann; and Henry Buchman (KHOSYAIN, “Employer”), owner of a women’s fashion salon in Baltimore.21
In August 1939, however, political intelligence operations in the United States, as in Britain, were partially disrupted by the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Laurence Duggan broke off contact with Akhmerov in protest.22 Others who had serious doubts included Michael Straight. At a meeting in October in a restaurant below Washington’s Union Station, Akhmerov tried to reassure him. “Great days are approaching!” he declared. With the beginning of the Second World War, revolution would spread like wildfire across Germany and France.23 Straight was unimpressed and failed to attend the next meeting.24 Duggan and Straight are unlikely to have been the only agents to break contact, at least temporarily, with the NKVD.
Further disruption to NKVD operations in the United States followed Akhmerov’s recall, soon after his last meeting with Straight, to Moscow where he was accused by Beria of treasonable dealings with enemies of the people.25 Though, for unknown reasons, the charges were dropped, Akhmerov was placed in the NKVD reserve and remained under suspicion for the next two years while his record was thoroughly checked. For the first time, the center of NKVD operations in the United States was moved, after Akhmerov’s recall, to the legal residency headed by Gayk Ovakimyan . . . Ovakimyan found himself terribly overworked, all the more so since he was also expected to take an active part in the complex preparations for Trotsky’s assassination in Mexico City. He would sometimes return home exhausted after meeting as many as ten agents in a single day.26
Ovakimyan’s main successes were in scientific and technological (S&T), rather than political, intelligence. He was unusual among INO officers in holding a science doctorate from the MVTU (Moscow Higher Technical School) and, since 1933, had operated under cover as an engineer at Amtorg (American-Soviet Trading Corporation) in New York. In 1940 he enrolled as a graduate student at a New York chemical institute to assist him in identifying potential agents.27 Ovakimyan was the first to demonstrate the enormous potential for S&T in the United States. In 1939 alone NKVD operations in the United States obtained 18,000 pages of technical documents, 487 sets of designs and 54 samples of new technology.28
Ovakimyan was probably also the first to suggest using an INO officer, under cover as an exchange student, to penetrate the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The first such “student,” Semyon Markovich Semyonov (codenamed TVEN), entered MIT in 1938. The scientific contacts which he made over the next two years, before changing his cover in 1940 to that of an Amtorg engineer, helped to lay the basis for the remarkable expansion of S&T collection in the United States. One of his colleagues in the New York residency was struck by Semyonov’s “Large eyes which, while he was talking to somebody, [revolved']like parabolic antennae.”29 By April 1941 the total NKVD agent network in the United States numbered 221, of whom forty-nine were listed in NKVD statistics as “engineers” (probably a category which included a rather broad range of scientists).30 In the same month the Centre for the first time established separate departments in its major residencies to specialize in scientific and technological intelligence operations (later known as Line X), a certain sign of their increasing priority.31
According to an SVR official history, the sheer number of agents with whom Ovakimyan was in contact ”blunted his vigilance.” In May 1941 he was caught by the FBI in the act of receiving documents from agent OCTANE, briefly imprisoned, freed on bail and allowed to leave the country in July.32 But for the remarkably lax security of the Roosevelt administration, the damage to NKVD operations might have been very much worse than the arrest of Ovakimyan. On September 2, 1939, the day after the outbreak of war in Europe, Whittaker Chambers had told much of what he knew about Soviet espionage in the United States to Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of State and President Roosevelt’s adviser on internal security. Immediately afterwards, Berle drew up a memorandum for the President which listed Alger, Hiss, Harry Dexter White and the other leading Soviet agents for whom Chambers had acted as courier. One of those on the list was a leading presidential aide, Lauchlin Currie (mistranscribed by Berle as Lockwood Curry). Roosevelt, however, was not interested. He seems to have dismissed the whole idea of espionage rings within his administration as absurd. Equally remarkable, Berle simply pigeon-holed his own report. He did not even send a copy to the FBI until the Bureau requested it in 1943.33
( pages 104 - 107 )
There was . . . a breathtaking gulf between the intelligence supplied to Stalin on the United States and that available to Roosevelt on the Soviet Union.62 Whereas the Centre had penetrated every major branch of Roosevelt’s administration, OSS—like SIS—had not a single agent in Moscow. At the Tehran Conference of the Big Three in November 1943—the first time Stalin and Roosevelt had met—vastly superior intelligence gave Stalin a considerable negotiating advantage. Though there is no precise indication of what intelligence reports and documents were shown to Stalin before the summit, there can be no doubt that he was remarkably well briefed. He was almost certainly informed that Roosevelt had come to Tehran determined to do his utmost to reach agreement with Stalin3even at the cost of offending Churchill. FDR gave proof of his intentions as soon as he arrived. He declined Churchill’s proposal that they should meet privately before the conference began, but accepted Stalin’s pressing invitation that—allegedly on security grounds—he should stay at a building in the Soviet embassy compound rather than at the US legation. It seems not to have occurred to Roosevelt that the building was, inevitably, bugged, and that every word uttered by himself and his delegation would be recorded, transcribed and regularly reported to Stalin.63
Stalin must also have welcomed the fact that Roosevelt was bringing to Tehran his closest wartime adviser, Harry Hopkins, but leaving behind his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Hopkins had established a remarkable reputation in Moscow for taking the Russians into his confidence. Earlier in the year he had privately warned the Soviet embassy in Washington that the FBI had bugged a secret meeting at which Zarubin (apparently identified by Hopkins only as a member of the embassy) had passed money to Steve Nelson, a leading member of the US Communist underground.64 Information sent to Moscow by the New York residency on the talks between Roosevelt and Churchill in May 1943 had also probably come from Hopkins.65 There is plausible but controversial evidence that, in addition to passing confidences to the Soviet ambassador, Hopkins sometimes used Akhmerov as a back channel to Moscow, much as the Kennedys later used the GRU officer Georgi Bolshakov. Hopkins’s confidential information so impressed the Centre that, years later, some KGB officers boasted that he had been a Soviet agent.66 These boasts were far from the truth. Hopkins was an American patriot with little sympathy for the Soviet system. But he was deeply impressed by the Soviet war efforts and convinced that, “Since Russia is the decisive facto in the war she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship.”67 “Chip” Bohlen, who acted as American interpreter, later described Hopkins’s influence on the President at the Tehran summit as “paramount.”68
It was at Tehran, Churchill later claimed, that he realized for the first time how small the British nation was:
There I sat with the great Russian bear on one side of me, with paws outstretched, and on the other side the great American buffalo, and between the two sat the poor little English donkey . . .69Despite the closeness of the British-American wartime “special relationship” and Roosevelt’s friendship with Churchill, his priority at Tehran was to reach agreement with Stalin. He told his old friend, Frances Perkins the Secretary of Labor, how
Winston got red and scowled, and the more he did so, the more Stalin smiled. Finally, Stalin broke out into a deep, hearty guffaw, and for the first time in three days I saw light. I kept it up until Stalin was laughing with me, and it was then that I called him “uncle Joe.” He would have thought me fresh the day before, but that day he laughed and came over and shook my hand.From that time on our relations were personal . . . We talked like men and brothers.70
Comment The problem was in that Stalin did know full well what exactly he was laughing about, while President Roosevelt had no damn idea what he was laughing about. Churchill, who apparently did understand what was going on, was not laughing,. — (WPT).
In the course of the Tehran Conference, Hopkins sought out Churchill privately at the British embassy, and told him that Stalin and Roosevelt were adamant that Operation OVERLORD, the British-American cross-Channel invasion of occupied France, must take place the following spring, and that British opposition must cease. Churchill duly gave way. The most important political concession to Stalin was British-American agreement to give the post-war Soviet Union its 1941 frontier, thus allowing Stalin to recover his territorial gains ill-gotten under the Nazi-Soviet pact: eastern Poland, the Baltic states and Moldova. The Polish government-in-exile in London was not consulted.Stalin returned to Moscow in high spirits. The United States and Britain seemed to have recognized, as a Russian diplomat put it privately, Russia’s “right to establish friendly governments in the neighboring countries,’71 Roosevelt’s willingness to go so far to meet Stalin’s wishes at Tehran had derived chiefly from his deep sense of the West’s military debt to the Soviet Union at a time when the Red Army was bearing the overwhelming brunt of the war with Germany. But there is equally no doubt that Stalin’s negotiating success was greatly assisted by his knowledge of the cards in Roosevelt’s hand.72
Comment there two very distinct issues present : (a) the territorial claims by Stalin etc. to the parts “ill-gotten under the Nazi-Soviet Pact” and (b) the alledged “right to establish friendly governments in the neighboring countries”. These issues were distinct indeed (please see a letter by Churchill to Stalin in Stettinius). One both counts Stalin had got all he had asked, and more than he had asked. Followed the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the Pol Pot in Cambodia, Castro in Cuba, the troubles in Nicaragua, etc. ; one is hardly able to grasp the entirety of the betrayal. — (WPT).
1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 241-2. At least in the early 1930s, the Fourth Department was probably primarily interested in the United States as a base from which to collect intelligence on Germany and Japan. Mitrokhin did not have access to Fourth Department files on its American agents and did not note references to these agents in KGB files. The case against Hiss, which has been strong but controversial ever since his conviction for perjury in 1951, is now overwhelming as a result of new evidence revealed during the 1990s from the VENONA decrypts, KBG files made available to Weinstein and Vassiliev which refer to his work for military intelligence, and Hungarian interrogation records of Hiss’s fellow agent Noel Field. These sources also do much to vindicate the credibility of Hiss’s principal public accuser, the former Fourth Department courier Whittaker Chambers. [Etc.]
2. Wadleigh, “Why I spied for the Communists,” part 7, New York Post (July 19, 1949).
3. vol. 6, ch. 5, part; vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1, n, 2.
4. Massing, This Deception, p. 155. The fact that Massing defected from the NKVD in 1938 makes her tribute to Bazarov all the more impressive.
5. vol. 6 ch. 5, part 2.
6. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
7. The details in Mitrokhin’s notes on “19” (date or birth, work in the Latin American division of the State Department, later transfer to the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) clearly identify him s Duggan; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. By 1943, at the latest, however, Duggan’s’ codename had been changed to FRENK (or FRANK); VENOMA, 2nd release, pp. 278-9.
8. Weinstein, Perjury, pp. 182-3.
9. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
10. See above [i.e. “Sword and Shield”], p. 84.
11. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 110, 122-3; Newton The Butcher’s Embrace, pp. 20-2.
12. Andrew and Gordievsky KGB, pp. 240-3, 290. On Whittaker Chambers, see his memoir, Witness, and the biography by Sam Tanenhaus, Whittaker Chambers.
13. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
14. Others recalled from the United States to be interrogated and liquidated in Moscow included the illegal CHARLIE, whose file was destroyed and whose identity is now unknown. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 180-1.
15. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Significantly, material on Morozov’s denunciation of two successive residents was among that 4excluded from the documents selected by the SVR for the recent study of Soviet espionage in the United States in the Stalin era by Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood.. [Etc.]
16. It is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether or not Akhmerov was given charge of an independent illegal residency before Bazarov’s recall. However, Hede Massing’s memoirs strongly suggest that both Bazarov and Akhmerov were members of the same illegal residency until at least 1937. Massing, This Deception, pp. 187-8, 191.
17. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1. Significantly, the list of names noted by Mitrokhin did not include Samuel Dickstein, a Democratic congressman from Manhattan (codenamed CROOK), who had volunteered his services to the NKVD in 1937 but demanded a high price for his intelligence. Over the next two years, the NKVD oscillated between pride at having an agent in Congress and suspicion that Dickstein was recycling publicly available information. In June 1939 Ovakimyan denounced him in a message to the Center as “a complete racketeer and blackmailer.” Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, ch. 7.
18. On Duggan’s codenames, see above, n 7.
19. MORIS is described in Mitrokhin’s note as an “archivist” at the Justice Department (vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1); this may, however, mean simply that he had access to department files and archives.
20. On the careers of Morros (who became an FBI double agent early in the Cold War0< Martha Dodd Stern and William E. Dodd, Jr. (both of whom failed to live up to the Centre’s high early expectations, see Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, chs, 3, 6.
21. KHOSYAIN is identified as Buchman in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2, but the spelling of his name (“Bukman” in Cyrillic transliteration) is uncertain.
22. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
23. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 143-4.
24. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 7, ch. 10, app. 6.
25. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. The claim in an SVR official history hat Akhmerov was recalled in mid-1939 is difficult to reconcile with Straight’s account of a meeting with him in late October. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 15.
26. Primakov et al. Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3 ch. 15. On Ovakimyan’s role in preparations for Trotsky’s assassination, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 183-4. The Centre’s obsession with the pursuit of Trotskyists in the United States continued even after Trotsky’s assassination.
27. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 169-71; Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 177-8. There were two New York chemical institutes; the SVR histories do not make clear which one I referred to.
28. vol. 6, ch. 6.
29. vol. Y, ch. 5, part 2. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 135-7. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol.3, p. 177. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 173.
30. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1. The VENOMA decrypts of NKVD wartime telegrams from the United States include the codenames of approximately 200 agents (about half of whom remain unidentified.). Since these telegrams represent only a fraction of the wartime communications between the Center and its American residencies, the total NKVD network must have been substantially larger. Mitrokhin’s notes give no statistics for the size of the network after 1941. The occupational breakdown for the network in April 1941 is highly incomplete. Apart from the forty-nine “engineers,” Mitrokhin gives the occupations of only thirty-six others, of whom twenty-two were journalists. Many of the agents were immigrants and refugees. In 1940-1, sixty-six Baltic recruits emigrated to the United States (vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1).
31. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 173.
32. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki< vol. 3, p. 178.
33. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 290-1. Weinstein, Perjury, pp. 292-3. KGB files cited by Weinstein and Vassiliev (The Haunted Wood, pp. 106, 149, 161-2) identify Lauchlin Currie as the agent PAGE referred to in a number of the VENONA decrypts. Mitrokhin’s notes do not mention Currie.62. On the woeful limitations of the intelligence on the Soviet Union available to Roosevelt early in the war, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 132-3.
63. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 340-1.; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 23.
64. vol. 6, ch. 12. Hopkins had been personally briefed by Hoover on Zarubin’s visit to Nelson (Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA,, document 9). Hoover would doubtless have been outraged had he known that Hopkins had informed the Soviet embassy.
65. The source of the information on the talks between Roosevelt and Churchill was codename “19”—an example of the Centre’s confusing habit of sometimes recycling the same codename for different people. Laurence Duggan had formerly been codenamed “19,” but by now had the codename FRANK; he cannot, in any case, have provided this information. A detailed, meticulous and persuasive study by Eduard Mark concludes that it is “probably virtually to the point of certainty that Hopkins was 19.” Mark, “Venona’s Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of 1943.”
66. Andrew, “Anglo-American-Soviet Intelligence Relations,” pp. 125-6. Crozier, Free Agent, pp. 1-2.
67. Hopkins’ efforts to avoid US-Soviet friction also included securing the removal of officials he judged to be anti-Soviet: among them the US ambassador in Moscow, Laurence A. Steinhardt; the military attaché, Major Ivan D. Yeaton; and Loy W. Henderson, head of the Soviet desk in the State Department. When Soviet foreign minister Molotov visited Washington in May 1942, Hopkins took him aside and told him what to say to persuade Roosevelt of the need for an early second front in order to contradict contrary advice from the American military. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 297-300, 341; Mark, “Venona’s Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of 1943,” p. 20.
68. Bohlen, Witness to History 1919-1969, p. 148.
69. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, OM, 1938-1945, p. 582.
70. Cited by Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 412. On relations between Churchill and Roosevelt at Tehran, see also Kimball, Forged in War, pp. 237-55.
71. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 342.
72. The use made by Stalin of intelligence from Britain during the Tehran Conference remains more problematic, given the Centre’s unwarranted suspicion at that time of its main British sources.( notes on pages 591-3 and 594 )
The SWORD and the SHIELD :
The MITROKHIN ARCHIVE and the secret history of the KGB
Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin.
New York : Basic Books, 1999.