From Testimony of Miguel Bolanos Hunter

”There are two major division of the DGSE, intelligence and counterintelligence. Intelligence for the outside; counterintelligence for the inside. There are many different sections for counterintelligence. It is organized along functional lines with each section designated by the letter F and a number, such as F1. One section for foreign embassies. One in charge of political parties, the church, and the independent labor unions. To the Sandinistas, the Church is Enemy Number 1. there is no doubt about it. Additionally, there is a counterintelligence section in charge of private enterprises and the economy. One in charge of telephone tapping, microphones, surveillance, opening mail. An interrogation section. A section on information and analysis.

"Intelligence is organized along geographical lines.

"The head of everything officially and structurally is Louis Carrion. Carrion is vice Minister of the Interior and thus under Tomas Borge structurally, but Carrion is of the Proletarian faction and party agreements gave him a place in the National Directorate [the highest political authority in Nicaragua which consist of the Nine Commandantes[. So in a sense Carrion is also a co-equal of Tomas Borge. As the head of the DGSE, Carrion oversees both the intelligence and counterintelligence sections. The head of counterintelligence if Lenin Cerna. The head of intelligence is a Cuban named Barahona who goes by the nickname Renan Montero. Renan Montero knows Nicaragua better than I do and better than most Nicaraguans. He was the link between the FSLN and Cuba for many years. Now he is the intelligence link for Nicaragua from Fidel. That is why Fidel has him there. He is one of the main instruments for Cuban control of events in Nicaragua”

* * *

“El Salvador has been the main target for subversion, but the Sandinistas have not neglected other countries. They have been training Costa Ricans and providing them with weapons since 1980. Also, the Sandinistas have directed Costa Rican labor unions to pursue a hard line in negotiations with the government in order to create friction. They have also been working with the Hondurans and the Guatemalans. Fight after Castro united the Salvadoran guerrilla groups, the Sandinistas did the same thing with the Guatemalans. They made them sign a unity pledge. Humberto Ortega was the main force behind this. Since then, they have aided the Guatemalans quite a bit.

”El Salvador is the test case. Subversion is a double-edged sword. If they are successful, the Sandinistas will remove some of the pressure on themselves by surrounding Nicaragua with allies. But exporting subversion can also attract attention and bring in the Americans. So the Sandinistas do their best to hide their involvement. For example, when a group of Chinconeros (a Honduran revolutionary group) hijacked a plane from Tegucigalpa to Managua and asked for asylum, the Sandinistas refused to grant it. They sent the plane to Panama in order to avoid the appearance of having anything to do with the guerrillas.

”In Sandinista thinking, Guatemala is the next revolutionary situation. . . .. In Costa Rica, the situation is not so volatile. The Sandinistas are trying to destabilize Costa Rica by advising the unions to make unreasonable demands in their negotiations with the government. They are trying to force a confrontation between the government and the unions which would lead to repression. Repression would justify the creation of armed bands.

”In long-term strategy, Mexico is slated to be the last country to fall. The high-ranking Cuban intelligence officials that I talked with were very confident of their position in Mexico. They used to say that “we have everything under control.’ They have a large number of agents in the unions and political parties. If they just snap their fingers, the situation will explode. They have also paid off and blackmailed the Mexican security forces, which would thus be paralyzed in a crisis.

”Ideologically, terror, as opposed to prolonged guerilla warfare, is not a problem. The people in charge of subversion think only in operational terms—whether a particular action will be productive or counter productive. They don’t care about blowing up a busload of people if that action will have the desired effect.”

( Oral History Project, International Security Studies Program,
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. )
Hydra of Carnage, pages 310-320.

Hydra of carnage : the international linkages of terrorism and other low-intensity operations : the witnesses speak / [edited by] Uri Ra'anan ... [et al.] (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University). Publisher Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, c1986. Paging xvii, 638 p. : facsims. ; 24 cm. Notes Part I based on a meeting held in Apr. 1985. Includes bibliographies and index.