http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/ni/vol14/no01/nom3.htm
    "During the recent war we said that we stood for the “third camp,” which, we explained, meant that we gave no support either to the camp of Allied or to the camp of Axis imperialism, but represented the revolutionary interests of the working class against both rival groups of exploiters."

Comment : The 'revolutionary interests' of the working class are reported to have been represented — and not those of both rival groups of exploiters.

Hard to Ask Questions

What about the anti-Jewish policies and actions of the Axis' Third Reich ? Was this issue of no interest ?

In perplexity, I keep reading on.

More reading (notes made on the following day). Wrote the Polish Ambassador in Paris, Juliusz Łukasiewicz : " . . .on . . . September 10 [1939], I also had a chance to speak with fomer premier Blum . . .  M. Léon Blum . . . felt that the policy of hesitation should be abandoned immediately" [regarding the Nazi sttack on Poland, 1 September 1939].

"In a word, M. Blum's outlook on the whole situation, and particularly on the war policies . . . did not differ from mine;", etc.
(J. Łukasiewicz, Diplomat in Paris 1936 - 1939, New York and London, 1970, page 309.)

Question This does not much agree with "we we gave no support either to the camp of Allied or to the camp of Axis"

"I don't know", the reader. Whenever I happen on any 'marxism', there is practically invariably something wrong somewhere.

In more peplexity I keep reading on. (WPT).

 

From I Was There, William D. Leahy, 1950

When Pétain and I discussed the situation on June 27 [1941], the Marshal expected Germany to succeed in occupying the Soviet provinces near the German border and set up buffer states. He believed Hitler would then make a peace offer or launch a vigorous operation against Great Britain. Pétain thought that the fear of an offensive alliance between England and Russia had been the compelling motive in Hitler’s decision to strike eastward.

Most of the French people seemed to hope for German failure but not to expect it. Some more partisan and presumably well-informed citizens claimed that Germany had been building a revolutionary party in the disaffected parts of the Soviet Union, notably the Ukraine, and they expected whole segments of the population of these areas to go over to the German side at the first promising opportunity.

French military men thought the German campaign would be successful in two or three months. With Pétain, they shared the hope that Communism would be driven back into less fertile parts of Russia, that Stalin’s government would fall, and that the menace of Communism to France would be removed. There was no doubt that Hitler’s so-called “attack on Communism” had improved his standing in some important quarters. Many French officials seemed to prefer Nazism to the danger of Communist domination. There was a Communist group in France, but officials in whom I had the most confidence did not anticipate any serious uprisings. Nevertheless these officials had a real fear of Communism. Time has now justified those fears.

( pages 40 – 41 )

 

The trials of former French Government leaders and General Maurice Gamelin charged with the responsibility for the defeat of France in 1940 began at Riom on February 19 [1941]. The accused were Édouard Daladier, ex-Defense Minister; former Premier Léon Blum; Gamelin, who commanded the French Army when it collapsed; and two other Cabinet officials — Guy la Chambre and Robert Jacomet. President Roosevelt took an active interest in the proceedings and requested daily transcripts. I made arrangements to get them and to have someone from the Embassy attend the court occasionally.

It soon developed that the attempt to make scapegoats of those accused was not going well and that the Pétain government had a “bear by the tail.” It appeared that many others — possibly some members of the present government — might become involved, and the whole thing was giving Vichy many unhappy moments as well as arousing the resentment of the German authorities. It surprised no one when the trials were allowed to lapse before reaching any verdicts.

( page 81 )

New York : Arno Press, 1979.

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