Diary 20th July 1920
. . . On the way back on Saturday [17th] Lloyd George asked me if I would go on a special mission to Poland with Lord D'Abernon,2 our ambassador in
Berlin, and General P. de B. Radcliffe.1 I am due to start this evening and have my passport and railway ticket, although Lloyd George, with whom I spent most of yesterday at Cobham, still refuses to say finally whether I am to go. All he says is that I must be ready to start — so I have had to pack in a frightful hurry late last night and make all preparations. I do not at all appreciate the job and hereby put it on record . . .
All this I have told Lloyd George. ( . . ) He knows that in my view . . . we ought to orientate our policy so as to make Germany and not Poland the barrier between eastern and western civilisation. Finally he knows that I want a holiday with my family after all these years of work. Yet he insists on my going off on this ridiculous and vague mission.
[S. Roskill : ] the Polish frontier dispute in which Hankey was so unwillingly involved, had actually taken up quite a lot of the time of the Spa Conference — as indeed it had at the Paris Peace Conference. The re-creation of an independent Poland was one consequence of the break-up of the Habsburg Empire ; but the settlement of the new nations [?] frontiers proved an extremely intractable problem, and the aggressive nationalism of the Polish government under Marshal Pilsudski, the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the army,2 nearly proved their undoing. Very rashly, ad as we have seen in total contradiction to British advice, they set out in the spring of 1920 to conquer and annex the Ukraine. [?] Soviet Russia, at last free from foreign intervention and civil strife, at once turned unitedly on the Poles, and in June smote them so heavily that it seemed likely that Warsaw itself would fall. The chief purpose of the D'Abernon mission was to press the Polish government to seek an armistice. but the presence of military advisers, together with the fact that on 23rd Hankey passed a message to the War office to prepare 'a list of 200 suitable officers for service with the Poles' shows that active assistance was certainly envisaged as a possibility.
Comment : 'Pilsudski wanted arms and not advisers'. (Colonel Fuller). (WPT)
2 [p180] Edgar V. D'Abernon, 1st Baron 1914, Viscount 1926. (1857-1941). Expert on Middle East, diplomat and politician (Cons.). Financial adviser to Egyptian government 1883-90. Governor of Ottoman Bank, Constantinople 1889-97. Ambassador at Berlin 1920-26.
1 [p181] See vol. I, p. 529, note : ... General Sir Percy de B. Radcliffe (1874-1934). Director of Military Operations, War Office, 1918-22. G.O.C. Scottish Command 1930-33. Generally referred to in the Army as "P. de B." to distinguish him from General Sir Charles Delmé-Radcliffe . . .
Hankey and his invaluable Sylvester left London for Paris on 20th July, accompanied by D'Abernon and Radcliffe. By the time they reached Paris Hankey's ill humour had evaporated, and he told Adeline, who had evidently taken this new separation from her husband hardly, that he was 'in this "con amore"' and would do his 'level best to put it through'.1 After calling on Lord Derby at the British Embassy, D'Abernon and Hankey went to the Quai d'Orsay for talks with Millerand, Berthelot, Paléologue2 and General Weygand, which Hankey described as 'most satisfactory and cordial'.3 Meanwhile, M. Paderewski4 had arrived in Paris 'as a special commissioner with wide powers to represent Poland'. He dined with the British mission that evening and, according to Hankey, gave 'a most disturbing accounts' of affairs in his country. But when the need to ask for an armistice was mentioned he was at first 'rather truculent'.5 Hankey, who was as usual keeping Tom Jones au courant with his contacts and discussions, told him the he must on no account let Adeline know anything about Paderewski's 'rather disquieting information'.6 If his mission was to involve him in danger he was evidently determined that his wife should not be caused avoidable anxiety. Typically Lord Derby took advantage of Hankey's presence in Paris to further his own interests — [ etc., etc.]
1To Lady Hankey. Ritz Hotel, Paris, 21st July 1920.
2Maurice Paléologue (1859-1944). French diplomat and author. Ambassador at Sofia 1907 and in Russia 1914-17. Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs 1920.
3Diary 21st July 1920.
4Ignace Paderewski (1860-1941). Polish politician and world-famous pianist. visited U.S.A. 1915 and obtained from President Wilson the promise of a free and independent Poland. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 1919. signed Treaty of Versailles. Retired from public life 1921.
5Diary 21st July 1920.
6Hankey to Jones 22nd July 1920 from Ritz Hotel, Paris.
In Paris the mission was soon engaged in more talks, including a long session with Dr. Benes, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister. Like Paderewski he feared 'an outbreak of Bolshevism' in Poland ; and to provide against such an eventuality the French government provided the mission with a special train 'provisioned and prepared for them to live in for some time'. The French members, led by M. Jusserand,2 joined their British colleagues at the Gare de l'Est, and late on 22nd the train left for Prague. Almost continuous conferences took place en route, and Hankey made extensive notes on the condition of the inhabitants of the towns through which they passed, on the quality of the harvest and on anything else that caught his observant eye.3 Early on 24th they arrived at Prague, and were met by Hankey's 'old friend Sir George Clerk', the British Minister.4 Clerk at once took them to visit Masaryk,5 The President, whom Hankey described as 'a very remarkable man with a very big view of the situation'. Obviously he was gratified to find that the President's opinions on the Polish problem
'were in almost every detail' the same as his own — namely that 'Polish resistance had collapsed beyond possibility of repair'. Masaryk was emphatic that in no event would Czecho-Slovakia involve herself in support for the Poles. he even went further, and declared that if such support were provided it would 'inevitably fail', (etc). That same day Hankey wrote in his diary that he was 'trying gradually to force the idea' on his colleagues that 'the main object of our mission is an armistice and a general peace, and that the military side viz. support for Poland, though important, is only an alternative and a bad one.' He went on to declare that 'Bolshevism could not be beaten by bayonets', that an anti-Bolshevist barrier such as Foch wanted to create with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania was futile' ; and that 'the only way to combat Bolshevism was by propaganda and by trade.' With evident approval he quoted Masaryk's saying that 'one locomotive is worth more than the capture of a Bolshevist battalion'. [?]
2Jules Jusserand (1855-1932). Diplomat and writer on English literature and history. Ambassador to Denmark 1898 and to Washington 1902-20.
3Diary 22nd-23rd July 1920. Lord D'Abernon included in the mission Lord Colum Crichton-Stuart (etc).
4See Vol. I, p. 348, note.
5Tomas G. Masaryk (1850-1937) Czech academic and statesman. Professor at Vienna 1879 and at Prague 1882. Emigrated 1914 and conducted vigorous Czech nationalist campaign. President of Provisional Government 1917. President 1918, re-elected 1927 and 1934. A supporter of alliance with France. Father of Jan Masaryk, ambassador at London 1921-38.
On the evening of 24th the mission train entered Poland, and on reaching Warsaw next morning they were met by the British Minister Sir Horace Rumbold, another old friend of Hankey's. Talks with members of the Polish government began at once — and as always Hankey jotted down shrewd comments on their appearance and personalities. By 27th he was able to write that 'a tremendous change has come over the situation', that peace negotiations would probably take place in London, that a Russian advance on Warsaw was now unlikely, and that his presence was therefore no longer necessary. Though he still regarded the mission as a 'waste of time' he told Adeline that he was 'picking up a lot of information about Polish, Central European, Russian and Baltic politics which cannot fail to be useful hereafter'. 'Knowledge, according to my experience', he went on, 'is always useful, and one should never lose an opportunity to acquire it'. [ (4) : To Lady Hankey, British legation, Warsaw, 17th July 1920.]
Hankey actually left Warsaw on 30th and travelled home via Danzig, where the [communist-infested] dockers were refusing to unload arms for the Poles, and Berlin. During the journey he dictated a long report to the Cabinet, in which he was highly critical of the Poles (etc). It covered 40 pages of foolscap typescript, (etc). Hankey's efforts drew very warm praise from D'Abernon who, on the last day of July wrote to Curzon drawing his attention to 'the remarkable services rendered by Sir Maurice Hankey', and stressing 'that he is deserving of special thanks from His Majesty's Government'. In truth Hankey had made a firm friend of D'Abernon who, for the rest of his career, regularly sent him extracts from his diary and copies of his reports to the Foreign Office.
Contrary to Hankey's pessimistic prognostications about Polish military prospects, in August the situation was transformed by their total defeat of the Red Army — justly described by General Radcliffe as 'a victory as complete and dramatic as any in the annals of war'. Weygand, [is being credited with decisions with which he seems not to have been involved. (WPT)] . . . the large gap which separated the army under Tukachevsky (Soviet Chief of Staff), who aimed to capture Warsaw, and that under Generals Yegorov and Budienny, which was advancing through eastern Galicia towards Lemberg [Lwow].
. . . . with a few days the Red Army was in full retreat. As Trotsky, the Commissar for War, was Tukachevsky's superior and patron, and Joseph Stalin was political Commissar attached to Yegorov and Budienny these events had profound effects on the struggle for power as successor to Lenin — as so probably on the entire history of the 20th century.
Hankey made no entry in his diary between the day he reached Warsaw and 18th September, by which time he was of course well
aware that . . . much of what he had foretold had proved erroneous. That misjudgment no doubt explains the unusual note of defensiveness in his next entry.
Diary 18th September 1920
My visit to Poland will be found described in my letters and official reports. I was about 6 days in Warsaw. By that time I felt there was not much more to be done. We had compelled the Polish Government to employ the French officers and to take Weygand's advice. [*] My main preoccupation had been that the poles would not make peace and that Lord D'Abernon and M. Jusserand would not put sufficient pressure on them and would support them in taking up an intransigent attitude. But, by this time, I felt satisfied as regards Lord D'Abernon and my farewell interviews with Prince Sapieha2 and M. Grabski3 were of a reassuring character as regards the Poles. Lord D'Abernon and M. Jusserand were quite sufficient . . . and Rumbold . . . was a tower of strength. . . . .I found England in general and Lloyd George in particular very unpopular there. . . ( . . ) . . . I received a very warm welcome . . . from Lloyd George and the Cabinet, a meeting of which I attended within an hour of my arrival in London. The subsequent recovery of the Poles was unexpected by me. [Mr. Hankey then asserts that the 'recovery was entirely due to our mission's insistence on the employment of Weygand and the French officers on the spot' — but read the Memoirs by Weygand. Mr. Hankey's self-service goes further : 'the plan eventually carried out was one which I had outlined to Gen. Radcliffe before I left Poland'. Is there any truth to this ? (I don't know.) (WPT) ] On my return I found, as I had anticipated, that Lloyd George had altogether underrated the hostility of British public opinion to the Poles and was running away from it. He never gave any public recognition to the value of the work of our mission . . . for fear of letting the public see he had helped the Poles.
Comment the overall story had veered towards the absurd. It may be nobody's right to be liked ; however, 'the British public opinion' knew little other than the 'Prussian' and the Muscovite and Bolshevist propaganda. (WPT)
2Prince Eustache Sapieha, a member of a famous and influential family, originally Lithuanian, was Polish ambassador in London July 1919-June 1920, when he became Foreign Minister in M. Grabski's government.
3Stanislaw Grabski (1871-1949) and his brother Wladislaw (1874-1938) were both active in Polish politics at this time, but Hankey is here probably referring to the latter, who was a Polish delegate at the Paris Peace Conference and President of the council at the time of the Bolshevist invasion of 1920. It was however Stanislaw who signed the Treaty of Riga in 1921. Both held many Ministerial offices and played a large part in Polish politics in between the wars.