From I Was There, William D. Leahy, 1950

The China question was on Roosevelt’s mind constantly during the month preceding our departure for the Yalta meetings because of the growing seriousness of opposition to the National Government of Chiang Kai-shek. The dissident elements were said to be Communist-inspired. The President and I discussed at length the stream of reports coming from Chungking, where General Hurley was acting as the President’s personal representative to Chiang kai-shek. My views as to the necessity, from the standpoint of our own national defense, of having a strong, friendly China are now well known to the reader. I was particularly interested in this new crises because of the difficulties facing General Hurley and the President. The Chief Executive was unwavering in his determination to support his wartime Far Eastern ally who had fought so bravely for so long a time against great odds. Roosevelt wanted also to give every possible assistance to China to insure a free postwar democratic government in that country.

The President’s instructions to Hurley were that the latter should advise him (the President) as to what actions our government should take to support the Chiang regime and accomplish a unification¹ of the divergent political elements in China. Hurley also was to keep Roosevelt informed of the activities of the British, French, and Dutch in Southeast Asia. What follows here is a condensation of notes of the many conversations I had with the President on the problem during January, 1945.

Hurley reported that there were in China representatives of the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, Lord Louis Mountbatten; and at Kunming, the British headed another organization known as the Southeast Asia confederacy. Neither the Embassy, other American diplomatic agencies, nor American intelligence groups were able to give the General any facts concerning the operations of these British-Dutch-French organizations.²

The dispatches to Roosevelt also reported (and Hurley confirmed to me personally in conversations later) that a large number of British officers and civilians were working in Kunming for imperial propaganda and intelligence services. The British wanted two squadrons of American planes to be maintained with British crews, for the use of their Kunming units. These planes, with their service jeeps, trucks, cars, and other lend-lease supplies, were intended to be used for British-French-Dutch underground activities.³ They could have had nothing whatever to do with the war against Japan.⁴

Hurley also reported that a British army aid group, formed originally to aid British prisoners escaping from Hong Kong and other parts of Chine, then claimed it was rescuing American pilots forced to land in areas occupied by Japanese forces. General Chennault denied the British claim. The aid group was said to be headed by a colonel Ride of the British Army.

A report of Colonel Ride came into our possession which said that America’s attempts to unify Chinese forces against the Japanese were considered as “interference in the local Chinese Government.” The British Ambassador to China told Hurley that the American policy to unify China was detrimental if not destructive to the position of the white man in Asia. None of the imperial nations took any interest in the war being fought by China against Japan. Hurley summarized the purpose of the British-French-Dutch propaganda at that time as follows :

1. To condemn America’s effort to unite Chinese military forces as interference in the Chinese Government.
2. To keep China divided against itself
3. To use Chinese and American forces and American lend-lease equipment for reconquest of their colonial empires
4. To justify imperialism as opposed to democracy.

Hurley was able to arrange a conference between Chiang and Chou En-lai, vice chairman of the Chinese Communist party, at which Chiang was willing to grant the Communist demands except that he could not agree to a coalition government or a coalition military council. Obstacles to the unification of China seemed to be : a standpat element in the Kuomintang Party; stubborn resistance of the Communists; underhand tactics of the British-French-Dutch representatives; and constant opposition from some of our own diplomatic and military officers;. Dr. T. V. Soong had been won over to favoring an agreement with the Communists in order to obtain personal credit for avoiding civil war and for unifying china.

Hurley thought he had practically overcome all of these elements when the Communists refused to continue the discussions. Hurley blamed the cessation of negotiations on an attempt by some officers of General Wedemeyer’s command to by-pass Chiang’s national Government and deal directly with Washington. He reported that during an absence of General Wedemeyer from headquarters, these officers formulated a plan to put American paratroopers in the Communist-held area. These paratroopers were to be used in leading Communist bands in guerrilla warfare. American supplies were to be furnished directly to the Communists and the dissident troops would be placed under command of an American officer. If the Communists could succeed in making such an arrangement with the United States Army, it would be futile for us to try to save Chiang’s National Government.

Hurley understood that his directive was to support the National Government and sustain the leadership of Chiang. He had some inkling of this plot to by-pass the Generalissimo, but it did not become clear to him until General Wedemeyer was asked to secure passage to Washington for Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, the top Chinese Communist leaders for conferences with the President. The Communists asked Wedemeyer to keep this proposal a secret from Hurley and form the Central Government. Working with Wedemeyer, Hurley was able to thwart the plot without doing further damage to the prospects of arranging a peaceful settlement.

General Hurley suggested to Roosevelt that at the approaching conference of the Chiefs of Government (Yalta), we should get Stalin and Churchill to agree to a plan to unify immediately all military forces in China and organize a democratic government. If such an agreement could be secured, Hurley felt it would be possible to carry out the desires of Roosevelt for strong postwar China

New York : Arno Press, 1979, pp. 287-9.

Leahy, William D. Title Las memorias de Leahy : los relatos del almirante William D. Leahy sobre su gobernacioìn de Puerto Rico (1939-1940) = Leahy's Puerto Rican memoirs (1939-1940) / Jorge Rodriìguez Beruff, editor. Publisher San Juan, P.R. : Proyecto Atlantea, 2002. Description 261 p. : ill. ; 22 x 28 cm. ISBN 1881730093 Language Spanish Note Includes bibliographical references (p. 254-255) dn index.

Leahy, William D. Title I was there / William D. Leahy. Imprint New York : Arno Press, 1979,c1950. Descript 527 p.: ill.; 23 cm. Series American military experience. Note Includes index.

Leahy, William D. Title I was there; the personal story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, based on his notes and diaries made at the time. With a foreword by President Truman. Publisher New York, Whittlesey House [1950] Description 527 p. ports. 24 cm. Language English Note Errata slip tipped in on p. 342.

Leahy, William Daniel, 1875- Title Address at the Army and Navy dinner, Bancroft Hotel, Worcester, Mass. [Microform] Imprint [Worcester, Mass., 1939] Descript 7 l. 27 cm. Note At head of title: Navy Department. Microfilm. New York, N.Y.: New York Public Library, 19--.