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From Memoirs by Sir George Buchanan
[July 23, 1917]
"The position of the Government on that afternoon was a very critical one, and had not the Cossacks and a few loyal regiments come out in time to save them they would have had to capitulate. While we were at dinner the Cossacks charged the Cronstadt sailors, who had gathered in the square adjoining the
Embassy, and sent them flying for their lives. The Cossacks then rode back along the quay, but a little higher up they got caught in a cross-fire. We saw several riderless horses returning at full gallop, and two Cossacks who were bringing back a prisoner were attacked by some soldiers and all but murdered under our windows. On Tuesday night an order was issued forbidding anyone to go out in the streets after noon on the following day, and all the bridges were either opened or strongly guarded so as to prevent the Bolsheviks crossing over from the other side. A guard, consisting of an officer and ten men, had been placed in the Embassy, and General Knox and Colonel Thornhill also slept in the house.
( vol. ii, pages 153-4 )
[November 18, 1917]
"Nobody at the Embassy or in the colony has so far suffered, but we are still having a very anxious time. Yesterday a report reached us from two sources that an attack was to be made on the Embassy in the course of the night. In addition to our Polish guard we have six British officers sleeping in the house, and Knox, who acts as commander-in-chief, is a tower of strength in these troublous times. Though the Bolsheviks, who want to stand well with the Allies, are hardly likely to encourage such an attack, there is always the danger that German agents may incite the Red Guard to raid the Embassy in order to cause friction between Great Britain and Russia. In site of the measures taken for the maintenance of order, life is not very secure at present, and this morning a Russian petty officer was shot dead in front of our windows for refusing to give up his sword to some armed workmen."
( vol. ii, page 213 )
{November 25, 1917]
[ . . ]
"The elections for the Constituent Assembly commenced to-day. At yesterday's meeting of the garrison,
which was attended by representatives of all the political groups, the Bolsheviks obtained what virtually amounted to a vote of confidence."
November 27.
" Trotsky has communicated to the Allied military attachés a note asserting that his Government never desired a separate but a general peace, but that it was determined to have peace. It will, the note concluded, be the fault of the Allied Governments if Russia has after all to make a separate peace."
November 27.
"I have come to the conclusion that the only thing for us to do is to faire bonne mine à mauvais jeu. Acting on an idea originally suggested by Knox, I have telegraphed to the Foreign Office as follows :
I share the view, already expressed by General Knox, that the situation here has become so desperate that we must reconsider our attitude. In my opinion, the only safe course left to us is to give Russia back her word and to tell her people that, realizing how worn out they are by the war and the disorganization inseparable from a great revolution, we leave it to them to decide whether they will purchase peace on Germany's terms or fight on with the Allies, who are determined not to lay down their arms till binding guarantees for the world's peace have been secured.
It has always been my one aim and object to keep Russia in the war, but one cannot force an exhausted nation to fight against its will. If anything could tempt Russia to make one more effort, it would be the knowledge that she was perfectly free to act as she pleased, without any pressure from the Allies.
There is evidence to show that Germany is trying to make
an irreparable breach between us and Russia, so as to pave the way for the German protectorate which she hopes eventually to establish over the latter. For us to hold to our pound of flesh and to insist on Russia fulfilling her obligations, under the 1914 Agreement, is to play Germany's game. Every day that we keep Russia in the war against her will does but embitter her people against us. If we release her from those obligations, the national resentment will turn against Germany if peace is delayed or purchased on too onerous terms. For us it is a matter of life and death to checkmate this latest German move, for a Russo-German Alliance after the war would constitute a perpetual menace to Europe, and more especially to Great Britain.
I am not advocating any transaction with the Bolshevik Government. On the contrary, I believe that the adoption of the course which I have suggested will take the wind out o their sails, as they will no longer be able to reproach the Allies with driving Russian soldiers to the slaughter for their Imperialistic aims."
( vol. ii, pages 225-6 )
My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories
by Sir GEORGE BUCHANAN
British Ambassador, Petrograd, 1910-1918
Boston : Little, Brown and Company, 1923.
From Russia To-day and To-morrow by Paul N. Miliukov, 1922
The military group now decided to prepare for a third coup d�etat. The candidate for a dictatorship was ready in the person of Kolchak. The last measure to take was to show Kolchak, who had recently come to Omsk from the East, to his army. He went to the front and came back on November 16. In the night of Nov. 18, Avxentiev and his colleagues in the Directory were arrested by the officers.
It is now known that the British military attaché, Gen. Knox, then in Omsk, approved of the overthrow. The Council of Ministers endorsed the accomplished fact. After a short and embarrassed discussion all decided for a
dictatorship and against the "Directory' as the form of government, and all voted for Kolchak, as the "Supreme Ruler."
A year later, in his depositions before the Bolshevist tribunal which sentenced him to death, Admiral Kolchak recognized that the coup d�état of Nov. 18, 1918, was a political mistake. One might add that the mistake was not his own, and that I was much more than a mistake. The events in Siberia which are just described make it clear why Russia could not be liberated by the anti-Bolshevist forces. Both socialists and non-socialists had not yet fully learned their lessons. The mistakes of 1917 were not yet forgotten and forgiven to the socialists. The non-socialists were just committing their own mistakes, and thus the cause for which they fought was doomed to lose. Moreover, with the coup d�état of November 18 a turning point was reached after which even that kind of very imperfect coöperation that had existed between the two anti-Bolshevist groups since November 7, 1917, definitely broke down. The military element was left to itself and has made itself an exponent of social groups and tendencies of the old régime. The socialist element has not yet detached itself from its extremist connections. Between the two extreme, the right wing of the Social Revolutionaries and the left wing of the Constitutional-Democrats, i.e., the very elements that were united in the �All-Russian� Government of Avxentiev, might have been able to form a democratic center. But these elements were as yet few and powerless to combat the prejudices of their opponents on both extreme wings of public opinion. The Allied representatives might also bring the help, but they did not know again, as had been the case in 1917, where to find that
center. In May, 1918, M. Albert Thomas had helped to enthrone Kerensky. In November, 1918, Gen. Knox ousted Avxentiev. A coalition had been formed when it was dangerous for the success of the Revolution. It was now destroyed just at the time when it was vital for the liberation of Russia.
( pages 152-4 )
. . . . General Knox . . . had met him [i.e. Kolchak] in August, 1918, in Tokio . . .
( page 155 )
General Knox explains the military defeat of the Kolchak forces by the fact that "things were taken out of Kolchak's hands." He wished to proceed slowly and �gradually to work up the recruits to the necessary level of efficiency.� Such was also the view of the organizer of the Siberian Army, Grishin-Almazov. But on his coming to power Kolchak found that �the Siberian Government had already ordered a mobilization of 80,000 recruits.� Grishin-Almazov was dismissed by one of the plots arranged by the officers� organization as early as September 5, 1918. Under his successor, Ivanov-Renov, the old army régime was reëstabished, and the army had become and independent factor before Kolchak appeared. The �dictator,� obviously, could not dictate to such as put him in power, and,—I quote again Gen. Knox� authoritative statement,—the recruits �were called up where there was insufficient barrack accommodation, clothing and trained instructors. They were sent to the front half trained. Thus our task was half lost before we began.� The severities of the winter campaign did the rest. The only moments of enthusiasm and success reached at the front were connected with the activity of the democratic Ural army, formed of some tens of thousands of working men from the Ishevsk and Votkinsk mining concerns. This was also the only army that did not dissolve and pass over to the Bolsheviks when the general retreat began in October, 1919.
( page 161 )
New York : Macmillan, 1922.
From My Mission to Russia by Sir George Buchanan, 1923
I went to Mohileff on October 18 [1916], accompanied by General Knox and Captain Grenfell, our military and naval attachés, and by Bruce, the head of the chancellery. The Emperor received us at once in a short private audience . . .
( vol. ii, page 22 )
I . . . only got back to Petrograd on the Sunday evening, and on Monday [2/27/? - 1917] at noon I went, as usual, with my French colleague to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, While I was there General Knox telephoned to tell me that a large part of the garrison had mutinied and was in undisputed control of the Liteini Prospekt. . . .
( vol. ii, page 63 )
The start from the Embassy in the early hours of that mid-winter morning was not calculated to cheer us. There was no electric light, and the candles placed here and there on the staircase and in the corridors did but serve to accentuate the prevailing darkness. Then, when, after a slow motor drive through the deep snow, we reached the Finnish station, the way that the evil-looking Red Guards on duty there scowled on us as we passed made me wonder whether we should get through our journey unmolested. Trotzky had made no difficulties about my leaving, and had granted me the usual customs facilities. He had, however, refused to extend this privilege as an act of courtesy to General Knox, Admiral Stanley and the five other officers who were travelling with us unless I guaranteed that similar facilities would be accorded any military attachés or officers whom he might wish to send to England. I told him that I could not do this. Our officers, I pointed out, were returning home after having served several years in Russia, and as he had no Russian officers in England who wished to return to Russia, there could be no question of reciprocity. . . .
( vol. ii, page 249 )
My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories
by Sir GEORGE BUCHANAN
British Ambassador, Petrograd, 1910-1918
Boston : Little, Brown and Company, 1923.
Knox, Alfred William Fortescue, Sir, 1870-
Title With the Russian army, 1914-1917 [by] Alfred W. F. Knox.
Publisher New York, Arno Press, 1971.
Description 752 p. illus., maps, ports. 23 cm.
Series Russia observed
ISBN 0405030843
Language English
Note First published in 2 v. in 1921.
Note Includes bibliographical references.
Nikitin, B. V. { Boris Vladimirovich ? }
Title The fatal years; fresh revelations on a chapter of underground history, by Colonel B. V. Nikitine; with a preface by Sir Alfred Knox, K. C. B., M. P.
Imprint London [etc.] W. Hodge and company, limited, 1938.
Descript xiii, 312 p. 22 cm.
Note "Translated by D. Hastie Smith."
Knox, Alfred William Fortescue, Sir, 1870-
Title With the Russian army, 1914-1917,
Publisher London : Hutchinson & co., 1921.
Description 2 v. fronts., plates, ports., maps (part fold.; in pocket) 24 cm.
Language English
Knox, Alfred William Fortescue, Sir, 1870-
Title With the Russian army, 1914-1917, being chiefly extracts from the diary of a military attach�,
Publisher New York, E. P. Dutton and company, 1921.
Description 2 v. fronts., plates, ports., maps (part fold.; in pockets) 24 cm.
Language English
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