THE CASSINO BATTLES IN RETROSPECT
The world�s attention was attracted to the Italian theatre of war through the tough German resistance on the Cassino front, which cost the Allies three whole months for an advance of fifteen kilometers, then there was the equally stubborn German resistance in Cassino itself, where for three months the Allies vainly tried to break through. Moreover, at that time this was the only European land activity of the Western Allies. . . .
( page 218 )
The idea that Germany could capitulate to the Western powers alone was, of course, ridiculous. The Russian and Anglo-American armies would inevitably effect a junction. This occurred slowly and, understandably, with some conflict of interest, but there were also peaceable agreements. The military lines reached by the victorious powers could not have any political meaning. [?] If any political consequences resulted from these positions, this was due to the primacy of political over military policy with both the Eastern and the Western Allies. At this stage there was already clear evidence of Russia�s power politics and expansionism. Yet in the west the Combined Chiefs of Staff were still using the language of military guidance in their directives to Eisenhower while the Soviet Union was planning the subjugation of the Russian-occupied areas, which they were not prepared to give up. The significance of this was appreciated by Chruchill—possibly without full realization of the possibilities—when he wrote to Roosevelt that he had little doubt that the Soviet leaders were surprised and alarmed at the speed of advance of the Western Allies. He suggested that it was all the more important to effect a junction with the Russian forces as far east as possible, and if the circumstances permitted, to march into Berlin. And he returned to this theme in a message to the President on April 1st 1945; �If (the Russian armies) also take Berlin, will not their impression that they have been the
overwhelming contributor to one common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds, and may this not lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future?�*
Stalin sent a telegram to Eisenhower stating that he was in agreement with the latter�s attack objectives of Dresden and Regensburg, and adding: �. . . . . Berlin has lost its former strategic importance. The Soviet High Command therefore plans to allot secondary forces in the direction of Berlin�.†
Comment Stalin was in the habit of assuming that every one word of his would be believed, by some, at least, that is ; it seems that he was not very much mistaken. — (WPT)
To reproach the Russians for these developments would be tantamount to a lack of judgment. To them it must have seemed quite reasonable that they should have priority in presenting their demands to the defeated Germans. Hitler had attacked their land after despicably breaking his word, and for years they had borne the greatest sacrifices. The Soviet government felt that it owed its people a fair reward for their victory.
Comment Wrote the mass-murderer Molotov, � . . . . the Soviet Union. . . . is bearing the brunt of the war against Germany . . . �*, and that was exactly true at the time. But the Kremlin command had no regard for �its people� other than such a slogan being one of the propaganda items. — (WPT)
* Letter from Molotov v to British Ambassador on 22nd March, 1945, quoted in Ehrman, Vol. VI., p. 124. [Senger und Etterlin, op. cit. p. 324.]
To-day the greater part of the German people again forms part of the Western world, and it is tragic that this part is powerless to help the oppressed minority to gain its freedom and powerless to liberate the satellite peoples, whom Hitter�s war has left under Soviet domination.
It was the British Prime Minister who saw the situation most clearly. . . .
* Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI., p. 407.
† Ehrman, Vol. VI., p. 147.
pages 324-5.