Lucius, Stockholm, 15 June 1917
[ excerpts ]

Scheidemann was yesterday received by the Minister . . . I saw Herr Lindman immediately afterwards . . . Lindman is of the opinion that the most important thing is that the discussions should go on ; whether in Petrograd or here, or with Scheidemann�s group or the minority, he says, is only of secondary importance. I am now of the opinion, shared by Janson, Baake, and others, that it is essential to try to bring our Socialists into direct contact with the Russian representatives . . . Since . . . Branting has behaved with such hostility at the discussions, it would be advisable to exclude him . . . . It will not be difficult to make the Russian Socialists, and our own, understand that Branting is not really a Socialist at all . . . .

Gratifying news is that a representative of the Russian Workers� and Soldiers� Council has already arrived. He is called Weinberg. . . . . When the English and the French now see that we are rally negotiating with the Russians . . . they will . . . grow extremely uneasy and will do everything they can still to take part in the conference, in spite of everything. I refuse to believe that the French government will succeed, in the long run, in preventing its Socialists from taking part in the discussions, here or in Petrograd, by refusing them passports. The strikes in France are already thoroughly revolutionary in character, and the property-owning classes are now growing really anxious. Wallenberg, with whom I always maintain contact because of his excellent connexions with high banking circles in London and Paris, always says that the Frenchman would rather be shot than parted from his money. In Lindman�s opinion, the most unfavourable factor is the situation in England. Lloyd George simply does not care about the fact that a continuation of the war might also bring about the revolution and sweep away the monarchy. In fact Lindman even believes that this is Lloyd George�s aim, not only in England, but in all the other monarchies as well.

Even though the preliminary negotiations have not achieved much, I . . . belive that the stone will now go on rolling and that we shall make direct contact with the Russians, without Branting�s being able to disturb our people here. It is very fortunate that Troelstra is now also going to Petrograd. The representatives of the Petrograd Telegraph Agency, Studiakov, whom I knew well in Petrograd as correspondent for the Vossische Zeitung, has recently been trying to contact me.

Yesterday there were fairly definite reports of the growth of the revolutionary movement in Italy circulating here. In Wallenberg� opinion, it is only a matter of time before the revolution breaks out there.

The Social Democratic deputy Lindblad, who had breakfast with me yesterday, will have the honour of speaking to Your Excellency about the coal question which Janson also discussed in his personal latter. I regard an arrangement of this kind as so important, from a political point of view, that, in our discussion with Janson yesterday, I firmly rejected the objections raised by Dr. Warburg, who only considers matters from the commercial angle. This business must go through, quite regardless of whether or not it suits Herr Boetzow and whatever the other people are called.

N.B. Huysmanns has received a telegram from Petrograd, saying that the representatives of the Worker�s and Soldiers� Council will be arriving here at the end of the month as no agreement could be reached otherwise because of the poor communications.

Title(s) Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918;
documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Edited by Z. A. B. Zeman.
London, New York : Oxford University Press, 1958, # 63, pages 61-3.

From Germany's Aims in the First World War by Fritz Fischer, 1967

Germany�s underestimate of the U.S.A. arose from the fatal ignorance of America�s power potential and American mentality . . . [S]ome few experts . . . who were acquainted with American conditions did issue grave warnings . . .  These included Bernsdorff himself and the two bankers, Max Warburg and Bernhard Dernburg, who had been sent to the U.S.A. at the beginning of the war on a special mission. . . .

( page 307 )

 

In January, 1917 Warburg, concerned over the future of Germany and the consequences of the United States� entry into the war, had written to Zimmermann, urging once more, most earnestly, that Germany should make an unambiguous declaration on Belgian independence, as the only possible chance left of avoiding a breach with America if unrestricted submarine warfare were initiated. Instead, Bethmann Hollweg had tried to re-activate his Flemish policy. When the decision in favour of unrestricted submarine warfare had been taken and the breach with America seemed imminent, he thought the time had come to play the Flemish card openly, obviously in the hope of impressing President Wilson as Warburg had suggested. . . .

( page 444 )

Fritz Fischer, Germany's aims in the First World War.
With introd. by Hajo Holborn and James Joll.
New York : Norton, 1967.