Telegram, Hans von Wangenheim, Constantinople (8) 9 January 1915

The well-known Russian Socialist and publicist, Dr. Helphand, one of the main leaders of the last Russian Revolution, who was exiled from Russia and has, on several occasions, been expelled from Germany, has for some time been active here as a writer, concerning himself chiefly with questions of Turkish economics. Since the beginning of the war, Parvus�s attitude has been definitely pro-German. He is helping Dr. Zimmer in his support of the Ukrainian movement and he also rendered useful services in the founding of Batsarias�s newspaper in Bucharest. In a conversation with me, which he had requested through Zimmer, Parvus said that the Russian Democrats could only achieve their aim by the total destruction of Czarism and the division of Russia into smaller states. On the other hand, Germany would not be completely successful if it were not possible to kindle a major revolution in Russia. However, there would still be a danger to Germany from Russia, even after the war, if the Russian Empire were not divided into a number of separate parts. The interests of the German government were therefore identical with those of the Russian revolutionaries, who were already at work. However, there was as yet a lack of cohesion between the various factions. The Mensheviks had not yet joined forces with the Bolsheviks, who had already gone into action. He saw it as his task to create a unity and to organize the rising on a broad basis. To achieve this, a congress of the leaders would first of all be needed—possibly in Geneva. He was prepared to take the necessary first steps to this end, but would need considerable sums of money for the purpose. He therefore requested an opportunity of presenting his plans in Berlin. He confidently expected an Imperial Circular holding out to the [German] Social Democrats the prospect of an immediate improvement in primary schools and in average working hours, as a reward for their patriotic attitude, to have a considerable effect not only on German Socialists serving in the Army, but also on Russians sharing his own political opinions. Parvus has today traveled via Sofia and Bucharest to Vienna, where he will have discussion with Russian revolutionaries. Dr. Zimmer will arrive in Berlin at the same time as Parvus, and will be available to arrange meetings with him.

In Parvus�s opinion, action must be taken quickly, so that the new Russian recruits will arrive at the front already contaminated. Wangenheim.

Title(s) Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918;
documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Edited by Z. A. B. Zeman.
London, New York : Oxford University Press, 1958, # 1, pages 1-2.

From The Immediate Origins of the War by Pierre Renouvin, 1928

On 22nd July [1914], Enver Pasha made direct advances to the Ambassador ; Turkey could not remain isolated, for �she needed the support of one of the groups of Great Powers.� Only a minority of the Turkish national Committee favored the Entente, which held the strongest position in the Mediterranean. The majority was favorable to the Triple Alliance, �which was more powerful from the military point of view.� Turkey must make a choice. Enver Pasha decided to seek at once for an agreement with Bulgaria, as the first step toward the Triple Alliance. Would the Central Powers be willing to grant Turkey their patronage ? If they refused, �the friends of the Triple Entente on the Committee would gain the upper hand.�

Ambassador Wangenheim received these offers with surprising coolness. He considered them dangerous from the point of view of Turkey herself : �The economic recuperation of the country would be put at stake by an alliance.� And furthermore, the political considerations were even more serious, for Turkey would have to defend her eastern frontier against an attack by Russia. The Ambassador felt that �the Triple Alliance Governments would presumably be reluctant to burden themselves with obligations in return for which Turkey as yet was able to offer no satisfactory equivalent.�

In Berlin, however, the Emperor became quite irritated ; �Rot!� hoe noted down in the margin of the report. A refusal or a snub would amount to her going over to Russo-Gallia, and our influence would be gone for once and all!� Would the burden be too heavy? �Let him first join them to us, the rest will take care of itself!� And the Emperor concluded with a definite order: �Wangenheim must express himself to the Turks in relation to a connection with the Triple Alliance with unmistakably plain compliance, and receive their desires and report them! Under no circumstances at all can we afford to turn them away.�

Upon receiving these �peremptory orders,� Wangenheim yielded. He accepted the Turkish offer, and began negotiations on the twenty-sixth [July]. On the following evening the Grand Vizier proposed to give the alliance the character of a secret treaty, both defensive and offensive, �between Germany and Turkey against Russia.� The secret would be kept even from the other Turkish Ministers. Upon this basis, the German Chancellery at once prepared the draft of a treaty, in five articles . . . But Bethmann took care not to assume any unnecessary obligation : the treaty would become inoperative �in case no war should take place between Germany and Russia� as a result of the Austro-Serbian conflict. This last point was rejected by the Grand Vizier. After incurring the displeasure of Russia by engaging in these negotiations, he did not wish to run the risk of finding himself alone against her. He therefore asked that the treaty should be concluded for a period of at least four years. Berlin acceded to this request on 31st July.

Nothing was now lacking but the exchange of signatures. Wangenheim became more insistent, for he feared lest the news of Russian general mobilization might disturb the Turks and lead them to change their decision. Authorization to sign the treaty reached him on the morning of 1st August, subject to the condition, however, that Turkey should undertake some �action against Russia worthy of that name.� The treaty was signed on the following day, and was to be ratified within a month.

Hardly had the decision been made when the whole question was reopened. Enver Pasha had felt obliged to disclose the secret to several of his colleagues, who protested against the extent of the obligations, and who demanded a promise of some sort of compensation. Germany consented. On 6th August, in an additional clause, she promised to obtain for Turkey at the end of the war the abolition of the Capitulation Treaties, a war indemnity, and a rectification of her boundaries in Asia.

( pages 321 � 323 )

 

. . . It was not until the end of October, after securing a loan from Germany, that Turkey carried out the promise she had made on 2nd August.

Only then was the German Government able to proceed with the political scheme which was, in its opinion, the chief advantage of the Turkish alliance : �To excite the fanaticism of Islam . . . to send out a Mussulman call to arms in the English colonies . . . to foment insurrection in India, Egypt and the Caucasus.�

( page 325 )

The immediate origins of the war (28th June--4th August 1914)
Translated by Theodore Carswell Hume. With a pref. by Charles Seymour.
New York : H. Fertig, 1969.

From Germany's Aims in the First World War by Fritz Fischer, 1967

. . . Constantinople . . . was the most important advanced post for the revolutionising of the Near East and Africa, and also of the Caucasus and south Russia.

The experienced ambassador in Constantinople. Freiherr von Wangenheim, was entirely in accord with the line of imperial world policy, as represented by Zimmermann. Wangenheim�s personal conduct of his office in Constantinople has often been criticized as too easy-going, but he strongly supported the revolutionary activities ; indeed, he complained with point and emphasis that they ought to have been better prepared before war broke out. His greatest personal achievement in the field was to discover the German-Russian revolutionary Alexander Helphand, who wrote under the pseudonym of Parvus. Wangenheim had him sent to Berlin and put on the job of �undermining� Russia.

( page 124)

Fritz Fischer, Germany's aims in the First World War.
With introd. by Hajo Holborn and James Joll.
New York : Norton, 1967..

From Atatürk, Andrew Mango, 1999

. . . The commanders of the Ottoman armed forces agreed with the German military attaché in Istanbul, that German officers had to be put in positions of command in order to carry out the reforms which they deemed necessary.

The German ambassador in Istanbul, Baron von Wangenheim, was first approached . . . on 23 January 1913. The agreement of the German emperor was communicated . . . on 17 July 1913, and a contract defining the functions of the German mission was signed on 27 October . . . A Prussian officer, Otto Liman von Sanders, was appointed head of the German �military reform mission� . . .  On January 1914, he was promoted General in the German army and . . . Marshal in the Ottoman service . . .

. . . On 2 January 1914 . . . Enver [Pasha] had been appointed war minister. . . .

Enver�s first action was to abolish the army council, and to retire a large number of officers . . .

( pages 124-5 )

 

The fact that Enver�s grandiose designs could only be realized at the expense of Russia, Britain and France, helped draw him into the orbit of Germany. On 22 July [1914], only a few days before the outbreak of the World War, Enver told the German ambassador von Wangenheim that the Ottoman government wished to conclude an alliance with his country, and that a German refusal would strengthen the hand of Ottoman ministers who favoured the Entente. A similar proposal was made . . . to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Marquess Pallavicini. Both ambassadors had considerable reservations, fearing that the proposed alliance would add to their countries� burdens. But they were overruled by the Kaiser.

( page 133 )

Woodstock & New York : Overlook Press, 2000.

İnönü, İsmet, 1884-1973. Title Hat�ralar / İsmet İnönü ; yay�ma haz�rlayan, Sabahattin Selek. Edition 1ci bas�m. Publisher Ankara : Bilgi Yay�nevi, 1985- Description v. : ill., maps, ports. ; 24 cm. Series Bilgi yay�nlar�. Özel dizi ;21 Note Originally published as: Hat�ralar�m. İstanbul : Burçak Yay�nlar�, 1969-

Renouvin, Pierre, 1893-1974. Uniform Title [ Origines imm�diates de la guerre. English] Title The immediate origins of the war (28th June--4th August 1914) Translated by Theodore Carswell Hume. With a pref. by Charles Seymour. Publisher New York, H. Fertig, 1969 [c1928] Description xiv, 395 p. 23 cm. Note Translation of Les origines imm�diates de la guerre. Note Bibliography: p. [357]-372. Language English

Renouvin, Pierre, 1893-1974. Uniform Title [ Origines imme�diates de la guerre. English] Title The immediate origins of the war (28th June--4th August 1914) by Pierre Renouvin ... translated by Theodore Carswell Hume, with a preface by Charles Seymour. Publisher New Haven : Yale University Press; London, H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1928. Description xiv p., 1 L., 395 p. 25 cm. Note "Published on the foundation established in memory of Calvin Chapin of the class of 1788 Yale College." "Translated and reproduced by special permission of the French society of war history." Translation of Les origines imme�diates de la querre. Note "A brief bibliography": p. [357]-372. Language English

Renouvin, Pierre, 1893-1974. Title Les origines imme�diates de la guerre (28 juin-4 août 1914) Edition 2.e�d., rev. ... Publisher Paris : A. Costes, 1927. Description 326 p., 1 l. 22 cm.

Renouvin, Pierre, 1893-1974. Title Les origines imm�diates de la guerre (28 juin-4 ao�t 1914) Publisher Paris, A. Costes, 1925. Description xvi, 277 p., 1 �. 23 cm. Series Publications de la Soci�t� de l'histoire de la guerre. Troisie�me s�rie Language French