Realities of the Joint Strike Fighter

A Reformer’s Case For the F-22

Probably the hottest program in aviation today is the Joint Strike Fighter. People hold this aircraft in such high regard that there is talk of an all-JSF force and how JSF will dominate the combat aviation market for decades. What is striking about all the hype is the utter lack of any basis in reality. When given anything more than a cursory glance, the JSF is a highly troubled program that could very well devastate the armed forces of the US before ever engaging an enemy.

The biggest problem that jumps right out from the JSF program is the costs. While touted as a cheap fighter with tremendous capabilities, it is anything but in its current design. Based upon the most recent cost figures for purchasing the actual planes and the cost of the development contract to Lockheed Martin ($25 billion), the JSF program should cost a total of roughly $135 billion. But as anyone who has been following the JSF program knows, the Pentagon is budgeting over $220 billion and the GAO says that even that number is low. While the Air Force, Navy, and Marines continue to talk about aircraft that cost $31 million and $38 million, the reality is that the average unit cost of the program is currently $78 million and very little of the development costs of this price have been paid.

The great mystery for which no one seems to have an answer and most don’t seem to care is what is the other $85+ billion for? Where is it going? Why is it in the defense budget as costs for the JSF program if the JSF program doesn’t cost that much? Simply put, it DOES cost that much and the price is likely to rise dramatically in the coming years. Historically, the Pentagon always gives a low-ball price tag to any new program only to claim innocence as costs spiral seemingly out of control. The F-22 is also a damned expensive plane but at least the numbers added up even if you didn’t like them.

Another problem with the JSF program is the capabilities, or more importantly the lack thereof. This program isn’t even out of the prototype stage and people already have this thing firing lasers, working as jammers, operating as interceptors, and all kinds of other roles it was never designed to perform. The JSF was supposed to be a simple, cheap strike fighter platform. It features a limited payload and a somewhat limited range. It has advanced radar and electronics but it is still a light fighter and subject to the limitations of that design. The problem is that all of these additions that everyone wants (because the JSF has so little designed into it) cost money and lots of it. Already there is talk of the Navy reducing their planned JSF purchase by 200 planes. As more and more capabilities are added to the JSF, costs will inevitably spin out of control. Given how much money is already budgeted to the JSF program, this could easily kill the fighter.

Reality is that the primary aircraft that the JSF is to replace are still in production. Making matters worse, the JSF’s top two customers do not consider it a high priority as both understand full well that the JSF can never be the do-it-all plane that some envision. As it is currently planned, the JSF offers nothing more than stealth and sensor fusion over what can currently be fielded in new F-16s and F-18s. AESA radar and improved engines are already in the works for both programs. A longer-range version of the F-16 is already available. None of these planes offer thrust vectoring to enhance maneuverability or supercruise so those aren’t issues either. Unlike the F-22, the JSF is not replacing an aircraft that is considered high maintenance and a burden on the respective force. It also isn’t intended to address pressing concerns relating to performance. It isn’t resolving concerns of obsolescence either as parts are hardly an issue for aircraft still being produced. Only one customer is expected to significantly gain from fielding the JSF – the Marine Corps.

Unless the current design is radically changed, the JSF offers virtually no advantage at all over a modernized F-16. While it is expected to have greater range than an F-18 it is also expected to have significantly less payload. Is a modest amount of stealth and a sensor fusion capability really worth what is currently planned for buying the JSF, especially when in some cases the payload will be half of the aircraft it is replacing? Is it any wonder that the Marines are the only serious supporter of this program in the US?

By purchasing modern versions of the F-18 and F-16, we could save about $100 billion and still build the Marine Corps version of the JSF. No matter how one looks at that number, the armed forces could use that money a lot better on other programs than on stealth and sensor fusion especially since the Air Force fully intends to fight to the death, literally if necessary, to keep the F-22. There is enough money available to meet virtually every aircraft-funding shortfall across the services buried within the JSF program. Moreover, we could save even more as the Air Force has numerous young F-16s that could be placed in storage now as attrition reserve and reducing the number purchased (200 have already been placed there in case the JSF program fails, the Air Force has that much confidence in JSF). Similar gains could be made by applying the same reduction to further F-18 production that the Navy plans to make with the JSF.

At current prices (including a little extra for upgrades) the Air Force could purchase 1400 F-16s ($30 million each) while the Navy bought 480 F-18s ($40 million each) for a combined total of about $62 billion. If we assume a per unit production cost of $100 million per Marine version, which is significantly higher than what it would likely end up, we would save about $113 billion of what is currently budgeted for JSF. With this money we could buy…

100 C-17s for about $30 billion

600 CH-53Es for roughly $24 billion

200 KC-33As for about $24 billion

1000 MH-60s for around $20 billion

… and still have $15 billion in change to pay for increasing the F-22 program to 500 planes. This would also resolve the growing concern with some that Lockheed Martin’s control over both the F-22 and F-35 programs will result in their being the only fighter producer in the US.

The correct choice could not possibly be more clear. But just in case there are still any doubts in your mind, view the table below and ask yourself a few questions. Which option is better for our armed forces? Which option is better for our abilities to fight the future asymmetric conflicts? Which option is better for maintaining our industrial base? Which option is a better buy for the taxpaying public? Option 2 will save us a whopping $15 billion while Option 3 will cost as much as current plans.

Option 1 – Stay the Course	Option 2 – Cut the F-22	Option 3 – Cut the JSF
300 F-22s	500 F-15s	500 F-22s
2900 F-35s	2900 F-35s	1400 F-16s
	Save $15 billion	480 F-18s
		480 F-35s
		100 C-17s
		600 CH-53Es
		200 KC-33As
		1000 MH-60s