Should We Wait For the Next Generation?
Many F-22 detractors base their arguments on the idea of foregoing the F-22 for some notionally better idea in the future. This idea, while inviting, is not without its own sets of problems. While it is widely believed, and with good reason, that the F-15 is the best fighter in the world, that doesn’t mean one hill of beans if it cannot perform the missions that are required in modern warfare. If recent actions in the Balkans and even to some degree actions in Iraq are any indication, the F-15 cannot meet our CURRENT requirements much less future ones. It may be the best, but it isn’t good enough.
We need to start with an honest evaluation of the aircraft and the mission. We need to quit looking at equipment through Cold War eyes and identify what is and is not required of an air superiority fighter today. Many claim they are doing just this when they criticize the F-22. Unfortunately, nobody seems to get it right. Let’s start with the mission.
The concept of air superiority is basically to own the sky. Most only see the air-to-air combat aspect of this but it goes much, much deeper. In the modern era, air superiority consists of four distinct components: protecting air assets from airborne threats, protecting air assets from surface-to-air threats, protecting surface assets from airborne threats, and protecting surface assets from long-range surface-to-surface threats. Let’s look at these four missions, see what it takes to perform them, and then identify what we need in an air superiority fighter.
Most military reformers consider the protection of air assets from airborne threats to be no longer applicable in modern defense. They have been far too successful in spreading this tremendous falsehood. It is highly unlikely that we will ever again see air battles of the kind that occurred in WWII, Korea, or Vietnam. What keeps this mission critical today is our reliance on airmobile forces and heavy bombers for conducting war. Aircraft like the C-5, C-17, B-52, and B-2 are virtually defenseless against any modern fighter. We also must recognize that fighters performing in this role will more often than not be outnumbered significantly due to logistical restraints.
A fighter performing this role is going to require a number of characteristics. First, it’s going to need a lot of range. No light fighters need apply for this job; they simply do not have the fuel capacity for long-range escort. It will need a lot of missile payload; it isn’t as though setting down to re-arm at a nearby field is going to be an option. It’s going to require very powerful radar; stealth really doesn’t matter when you’re flying alongside a radar cross-section that would make the Titanic blush. And finally it must be an outstanding fighter in general, with exceptional maneuverability and speed; it is going to have to be able to survive when significantly outnumbered.
Next is combating the surface-to-air threat. This is viewed by most to be our primary air combat mission in the modern era, and this is a pretty accurate view. But what is equally accurate is that existing assets are all but incapable of performing the mission against modern AA systems.
This mission requires some exceptional capabilities. First, you again need a lot of speed and maneuverability as you’re going to get shot at – a lot. And your speed needs to come without afterburners due to modern IRST systems. Stealth can be beneficial here against some systems, but definitely not all. A robust jamming system is a definite requirement as is a quality decoy system of chaffs, flares, and towed decoys. Since aircraft performing this mission work in teams, data linking of sensor information would be ideal so that the pilot playing possum can focus on escaping missiles without having to radio coordinates to the accompanying strike craft. These aircraft will require a visually guided weapon system like Maverick, in addition to video-guided bombs, to combat the current trend of hiding AA systems among civilian areas. JDAM and cluster munitions will be adequate for hitting softer targets while HARM can handle suppressing enemy radars.
These two missions enable us to bring in the ground forces necessary to prosecute the war. At this point, we must protect the ground forces as well as the air assets. For this job, we need a number of characteristics. The idea here is to take out the enemy’s air forces while they are still on the ground in enemy territory, and to intercept any aircraft we miss or that we hadn’t planned on fighting against. For starters, the aircraft will again need a lot of speed, but maneuverability is no longer a huge issue. It will require long range to reach enemy airfields and to intercept bombers outside of their weapons range. Payload is going to vary quite a bit. In the interceptor role, this fighter will need some medium-to-long range missiles, but it won’t require an awful lot of them. Attacking enemy airfields is a heavy strike mission. Some airfields will require very heavy bunker busting munitions while others will require a volume approach of numerous smaller bombs or cluster munitions. This won’t require a lot of precision, but it will require some. Visually guided rounds will suffice for knocking out reinforced hangars and command centers, but since airfields don’t move very fast, JDAM and unguided rounds will be fine for the rest. Stealth could come in handy here so that you can take out the runways before the enemy aircraft can take off. You also want an aircraft that can penetrate heavy threats to get at command and control centers. For the interceptor role and for those flying CAP, good radar will go a long way.
Which brings us to protecting against the surface-to-surface threat. Here, we’re talking Scud hunting. The nature of this threat is that we’re looking for a needle in what is generally a very big haystack. This mission can get pretty tricky, and this is another area where we come up short in a big way with our current capabilities. Patriot can only do so much; as with enemy fighters, it’s a lot better to take them out before they get off the ground.
Again, the premiums here are range and speed. Payload doesn’t need to be much for this task, as the fuel in the targeted missiles tends to get the rest of the work done. The trick is finding the target. You need very good radar that can function in two primary roles: ground search and counter-battery. The ground search mode will help to locate the launchers before firing while the counter-battery mode can pinpoint where a missile or large rocket came from. If you’re lucky (and it isn’t going to happen very often), the fighter may be within range to use an AAM against the missile. For the rest of the mission, unguided cluster rounds and visually guided Mavericks and light bombs will suffice.
Today we use four different aircraft in various combinations to perform these four tasks: the F-15C, the F-15E, the F-117, and the F-16J. But if you look closely at these four missions, they are very related to one another. All of them require long range and speed. Most require flexible payload options, but this role doesn’t require the full PGM capabilities of typical strike platforms. Half require stealth while all require good, multimode radar. Exceptional maneuverability is mandatory for two of the missions. But a key aspect of these four tasks is that they are not all required to be performed at the same time. You don’t have to defend surface assets until they enter the theater; but the assets can’t enter the theater until the anti-air threats are destroyed. Consequently, it would be beneficial to have one platform that can perform all of the tasks; otherwise you end up with a situation as in Desert Storm where numerous fighters ended up sitting around with no mission to perform. Which brings me to why I support the F-22.
The F-22 is not without faults by any stretch of the imagination. But it is ideally suited to take on these four roles for total air supremacy. It has the maneuverability, the speed, and the range to meet each requirement. It also has the radar and computer power to handle the variety of missions necessary for true air superiority. The only things it is lacking are the visual guidance systems and the weapons, all of which can be put together rather quickly. Our current blend of platforms cannot perform all four jobs and no other single platform can perform all four jobs. Any future system to perform all four would be nothing more than another F-22; it would have to have all of the traits and characteristics of the F-22 to get it done. And do you seriously believe that any plane performing in this complete air superiority role is going to be any cheaper than the $83 million unit production cost of the F-22?
I think that a large part of the confusion about why we need the F-22 is related to a general misunderstanding of how we fight our wars. In the 20th century, we have largely taken a strategic approach to every conflict, even though not all of the conflicts have been strategic in nature. We need to clearly define which conflicts are of what type.
Personally, I view a strategic conflict as one that is about tangible assets. These are often characterized by one nation invading another. The World Wars and Desert Storm are examples of strategic combat. By their nature, strategic fights come with clearly defined goals and methods. Fronts will be established in a strategic conflict and the goal of the fighting is typically to remove one nations armed force from another. In this setting, each side will hold a clearly defined area within which to operate.
Tactical combat, on the other hand, is a very different beast. Tactical conflict is less about assets and more about ideas and human will. Civil wars and most low-intensity conflicts are tactical operations. Vietnam, Korea, post-war actions in Iraq, and our involvement in the Balkans are examples of tactical combat. Here, no clearly defined boundaries or areas of operation really exist. The battlefield is fluid with forces spread around individual smaller areas such as bases and camps.
We need to recognize the conflicts in our past for what they were. It is relatively easy to see that in strategic conflicts, we are generally very successful while in tactical conflicts we usually fail. There is a perfectly reasonable explanation for why this continues to happen to this day. Strategic warfare is about assets, and therefore will inevitably be determined by attrition. When you are fighting for a specific material good, there is a point at which the price of obtaining the good exceeds its value. Strategic wars last until one side loses more than it is willing to lose, at which point that nation will surrender. This is why people who study our past successes and failures inevitably determine that quantity is more important than quality; every strategic war we’ve fought in, we’ve won.
Tactical conflicts cannot be won in this manner. When a person takes up arms to support a belief, by definition he is demonstrating that this belief is more valuable to that person than life. No amount of bullets, bombs, or other munitions is going to change that belief. Quite the contrary, they are more likely than not to strengthen the persons resolve in the belief. Consequently, tactical warfare must be limited in nature. It must be rapid, precise, and strong, but it must be limited. Overwhelming force in a tactical conflict gives noncombatants a reason to join up with the individual we are attempting to fight.
With this in mind, now consider the requirements of air combat in these warfare settings. Obviously, different systems and methods are going to be required in order to successfully engage in each of these types of combat.
In a strategic conflict, the outcome will be determined by attrition and there is a clearly defined battle area. Because of this, a fighter that can support strategic warfare needs to be available in large quantities. It won’t need a lot of range as battle areas are defined and we control an area from which to operate. Systems such as Patriot and THAAD can provide the majority of our air superiority needs in a strategic setting. We can establish land supply routes because we hold land with which to do this. We can disperse our fighters throughout the area we hold because we control roads for transporting fuel and supplies and these same roads can even serve as runways if we desire. In this setting, two of the four air superiority missions are handled by other systems while a third is greatly decreased because we don’t need to transport troops and supplies by air.
In a tactical scenario, we have a very different situation. Now, we do not control large amounts of area so we are limited to operating from bases and camps. Supplies must be transported by air to avoid enemy ground forces. We can’t effectively deploy Patriot or THAAD because we no longer have clearly defined operating areas. We also have to limit the number of assets used in theater because of these restricted operating areas.
What this all means is that we have very different fighter needs depending on the type of conflict we are engaging in. In a strategic conflict, we need a cheap fighter in large numbers that doesn’t necessarily require extensive capabilities. We want it to be low-maintenance, versatile, and capable of operating from outside of a traditional airfield to maximize our options. It won’t require a lot of range or payload, nor will it require stealth, advanced avionics, or even precision weapons. It needs to be a capable fighter but most of its missions will be ground attacks to support our forces on the front lines. Our enemy will have a clearly defined area too, in which it will have extensive anti-air capabilities. Long-range, deep strikes are not going to be an option here, but they won’t be required either to win the war, as attrition will determine the final outcome.
In a tactical conflict, it’s a whole different ballgame. Now the fighter force has to carry the entire air superiority mission. Our forces are dispersed and therefore cannot be adequately protected by Patriot or THAAD. Supplies and troops will travel by air; failure to protect these airborne supply lines means guaranteed failure in battle. Fewer fighters will be available and they cannot be stationed near the front because a front doesn’t even exist. They will be required to operate from established fields kept back from the combat to avoid short-range missiles. Long-range strikes will be mandatory to support the force. This plane will require greater range, greater payload, very advanced capabilities, and the speed to get to and from the fight rapidly in order to re-engage.
The general consensus is that the days of strategic warfare are largely over. Warfare has become so devastating that few things in this world are worth the price that modern combat can demand. Future conflicts will predominantly be tactical, low-intensity actions. This does not, however, mean that we do not require the ability to fight the strategic fight. While the need is greatly diminished, it is the job of our armed forces to protect this nation against all threats. To ignore the potential of a future strategic conflict would be disastrous. Consequently, we need the F-22 to fight the tactical wars of today and tomorrow. All other air combat needs can and SHOULD be addressed by the F-16 and ground attack platforms.
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