The Cost Issue

A Reformer’s Case For the F-22

Many who oppose the F-22 do so primarily because of cost issues. These concerns are with good cause but they are also rather naïve. On a worldwide basis, the costs of developing and fielding high performance fighters have exploded for a variety of reasons. Many of these programs have been cancelled as a result but there should be no surprise in the fact that we are experiencing the same phenomenon here.

In Europe, the costs of developing the Eurofighter pushed average unit program costs to around $100 million per plane. The French Rafale had a similar cost growth problem. In China and Israel, indigenous fighter programs were scrapped because of uncontrollable costs. And here in America, even the vaunted F-35 JSF program recently was recalculated to the tune of a $7 BILLION cost overrun. While many promote the JSF as a cheap fighter that can take the F-22s place, the reality is that current average program costs are already at $78 million per plane and it hasn’t even left the prototype stage (give it time – it WILL break $100 million). A variety of factors are impacting fighter prices, particularly wage issues as companies struggle to pay exploding salaries for tech workers, but perhaps the most overlooked fact is the growth in testing.

As costs have gone up, governments have demanded ever increasing testing programs to verify that the aircraft is worth the money being spent. The problem is that these testing programs are hugely expensive. In the cases of the F-22 and F-35, over $20 billion is expected to be spent on each program for development and testing alone. When that amount of money is being spent up front, it becomes literally impossible to field an inexpensive aircraft of any kind much less a high performance fighter. To put that amount into perspective, if we are planning to build 500 planes and spend $20 billion in development, each plane already costs $40 million without even ordering the materials to build it – that is just development costs.

Consider for a moment the testing programs of the most recently developed fighters of the USAF. The F-15 was tested using a demonstration/validation program with a total of 180 hours of flight tests at which point it went into production. The F-16 contract was awarded based upon a competitive fly-off and entered production after roughly 100 flight test hours. The F-16 in particular is often given as an example of how an exceptional fighter can be developed at low cost. Now let’s look at the testing program of the F-22.

Currently, the F-22 has already completed over 1100 flight test hours – and no, that is not a typo. The F-22 also spent a total of three years undergoing static testing. Is it any wonder that the F-22 is as expensive as it is? The F-22 has already completed more than four times the combined flight test hours of the F-15 and F-16 and it still has over 2000 flight test hours to go! The same zero-defect mentality that has devastated the promotional system in the services has crept into the procurement process, plain and simple.

When the F-15 and F-16 went into production, each had an array of problems that took years to iron out. There is a good reason that you won’t find any F-15A/Bs or F-16A/Bs flying around in the active forces. It took nearly a decade to fix the problems of these aircraft and yet F-22 detractors are demanding 100% perfection on day one. While this is theoretically possible, it cannot be done without excessive costs. I’m not going to sit here and proclaim that the F-22 program is without fault because it isn’t but no aircraft is.

The good news is that the bulk of the F-22 programs development and testing costs are already paid for. Unlike the JSF, this money is spent and gone, whether anyone likes it or not. When F-22 detractors talk about $170 million price tags they are leaving out the fact that half of that price tag is already paid for. What we need to consider at this point is the remaining bill.

A recent evaluation of the F-22 program by a member of the House Armed Services Committee figured the unit production cost of the F-22 if it were produced at the original proposed level of 750 aircraft and the results were staggering. If we were to produce the original proposal of 750 aircraft, they would cost $74 million each to produce. This is less than the current cost to purchase new F-15Es. Even at the higher $83 million cost per unit to produce less than 400, the F-22 still will cost roughly the same as new F-15s (South Korea recently purchased F-15Es at over $100 million per plane). The elevated numbers widely reported for the F-22 are a combination of this unit production cost added to that aircraft’s share of the development and testing costs. The bottom line is what it will cost us to actually buy the planes at this point, and once production is rolling, that number will be around $83 million each at current production rates.

Contrary to the statements of F-22 detractors, the need for F-22s in the force today is actually greater than it was during the Cold War. Over the decade plus since the Cold War ended, we have witnessed an ever-increasing dependency on air transport of supplies and troops as well as increasing usage of long-range attack assets. Most predictions are that these needs will only grow in the coming years. Simply put, it doesn’t take a Su-37 Super Flanker to take out one of our very-limited-in-supply C-5s or a heavy bomber. But it will take a very long-range fighter system to protect these assets. It doesn’t take the most advanced air defense network in the world to take out these assets, but it will take an extremely capable strike fighter to protect them. The question isn’t one of whether or not we can afford the F-22 – it is one of whether or not we can afford NOT to field it.

Given our ever increasing reliance on air mobility and the plethora of proposals that will only dramatically expand on this reliance (Air Mechanization for one), we need to avoid making knee-jerk decisions on this matter. While it is true that we can maintain much of the existing F-15 fleet to 2015 and beyond, this will not be without extensive costs and modifications. Moreover, these modifications will never give the F-15 the level of performance of the F-22. We must also consider that new F-15s will still need to be purchased most years to maintain the existing fleet. This isn’t a question of whether or not to buy but of what to buy.

Realistically, by 2020 we will need to purchase a minimum of about 200 of this class of fighter either way. Much of the existing fleet has been stressed beyond the ability to extend life to the necessary years. Given that the unit production costs of these fighters are about equal, this amount is a wash either way. But to extend the life of the remaining F-15 fleet will also cost a considerable sum of money, as will the necessary upgrades. Based on the currently proposed and planned upgrades, going with the F-15 option would probably save us about $10 to $15 billion dollars in purchasing costs between now and 2020, but at what cost?

We give up supercruise, we give up thrust vectoring, we give up stealth, we give up range, and we give up sensor fusion all over less than $1 billion per year in a defense budget of more than $350 billion? Where is the logic in this train of thought? Yes, the F-22 is damned expensive but the alternative is no bargain by any stretch of the imagination. Maintaining the existing F-15 fleet to 2020 may easily cost us $25 to $30 billion dollars depending on the chosen upgrades (200 new aircraft and $30 million in upgrades to remaining 300 is the bottom-line guesstimate). A modestly increased F-22 program (500 fighters) should come in at around $40 billion to buy the planes.

As we rely more and more on air mobility, it simply makes no sense to forego the production of the F-22. Yes it is expensive, but compared to the alternative it is unquestionably worth the price.