Caveats

This is the final report from the 494^th MP DET. The first fifteen pages adequately encompass the transitional issues facing the ICS. Critical points are highlighted sections.

This report is a compilation of facts related to the Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS) and the institution’s development over the course of the reconstruction effort. The facts are based on statements made by the first advisory team, historical documentation and personal observation. Although there are references to many issues, the intent is not to proffer advice on the technical aspects of correctional operations. The author does not claim to have experience in corrections aside from the daily exposure to the operations within ICS since July 2003. However, twenty years of private sector experience with the development, implementation and refinement of business models within a practical environment provides more than adequate expertise in the areas of administration, operations, executive recruitment and training. Fifteen years additional experience in military leadership, training and development further contribute to the perspectives outlined in this report.

Critical issues exist pertaining to the advisory environment of ICS. Interpersonal skills and managerial methods demonstrated thus far are not appropriate to the post-war environment of Iraq. In the author’s judgment, serious consideration must be given to the current method of operations and the advisory program.

The intent of this document is to leave an historical record of events to date in order to avoid duplication of effort and replication of previous errors. Still remaining is the need to develop a national vision and, from that vision, a sound mission statement, supported by the detailed policies and procedures required of the organization. Many recommendations are made throughout the report and, read with the proper perspective, may offer solutions to a variety of challenges.

· ICS is developing in a dynamic environment and, as such, all issues related to the evolution of the system are fluid. While many aspects of the correctional service have seen significant changes since last summer, the basic foundations of an organization such as the tenets of leadership, organization and fiscal responsibility remain the same. ICS faces additional challenges: operating under a dual-management system, i.e. the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) structure v. the Iraqi structure; operating through the barriers of language, culture, and administrative disorder; and national unrest.

· Iraqi culture dictates that employees show deference to people with authority. The fact that the CPA ICS team remains the primary authority limits the willingness of key Iraqi personnel to exercise initiative or to act regularly with decisiveness. The CPA ICS team must address their current method of micro-management and incorporate Iraqi staff fully and aid in the recruiting and placement of key executive employees. Encouragement, advisement and mentorship are desperately needed at this time. ICS leaders feel intimidated due to the fact that they are threatened daily with termination.

· Management practices of one advisor are not of the sort needed by the ICS. Lacking are skill sets in motivational techniques, delegation, working with interpreters, operational organization, diplomacy, encouraging positive team dynamics, effective communication, the ability to prioritize projects and follow-up. The advisor relies on fear and intimidation as a motivator. The lack of focus for this person leads to involvement in areas out of his purview which unnecessarily delays projects, such as the three Rusafa projects. These projects are facing a two month delay and may see even longer delays as he continues to make changes.

· The civilian acting as the deputy director of operations further damages the mission with his unsafe practices. Movement is continually repeated in a predictable manner, erratic driving which results in property damage and terror amongst local citizens and movement at night are just a sample of the issues which led to the military liaisons withdrawal from direct support of his missions and of the discontent within the ranks of his own civilian teams.

· Additional critical issues still exist in the ICS related to Iraqi administration and funds planning. These issues are detailed throughout the report in highlighted or italicized fonts. The current management program is moribund. CPA ICS Management practices are leading to an increasingly obstreperous Iraqi employee group who will become increasingly unwilling to adopt recommendations for an improved prison and detention service.

DEPARTMENTAL HISTORY

· OCPA or CPA, formerly the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (ORHA) developed a mirror image of the former Iraqi ministerial system, save for certain components such as the Secret Police and Ministry of Defense. Additional departments and ministries were formed to address the needs of the Iraqi government, in the hope for a more efficient structure than previously existed. The ICS is one of those departments and was formed on June 5^th, 2003 and placed under the umbrella of Ministry of Justice (MOJ). CPA Order #10 and CPA Memorandum (not Order) #2 are the official documents that detail the department’s creation.

In order to begin understanding the transformation of this vital link in the Iraqi justice system, one must look back to the structure of a very centralized system based on Soviet-style programs. Prisons, detention centers, jails and reformatories were not under the supervision of one ministry or any single directorate. The various functionalities fell under a number of ministries as follows:

· Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA) maintained separate directorates which were responsible for:

o Prisons – (Post-Trial)

§ Adults – Males

· Long Sentence

· Short Sentence

§ Adults – Females

· Long Sentence

· Short Sentence

§ Juveniles – Males

· Sentenced as Adults

o Long Sentence

o Short Sentence

§ Juveniles – Females

· Sentenced as Adults

o Long Sentence

o Short Sentence

o Reformatories, Detention Centers and Rehabilitation Centers for Juveniles –

o Males (Pre-Trial and Post –Trial)

· Under 18

o Long Sentence

o Short Sentence

· Under 14

o Long Sentence

o Short Sentence

· Under 9

o Long Sentence

o Short Sentence

o Females (Pre-Trial and Post –Trial)

· Under 18

o Long Sentence

o Short Sentence

· Under 14

o Long Sentence

o Short Sentence

· Under 9

o Long Sentence

o Short Sentence

· Ministry of Interior (MOI) was responsible for pre-trial detention centers and police jails for all adults

· Ministry of Defense (MOD) was responsible for facilities related to military prisoners

· Secret Police maintained facilities for political prisoners

· Detention centers or cells were evident in virtually all other ministries

· Records are not available to validate all of the information outlined above. Verification was made through either a particular ministry while investigating ownership of facilities or through the verbal and written statements of employees from the various directorates. Investigations of facilities and interviews with ICS employees show that most records, related to detention or incarceration, were destroyed either prior to the war or immediately at the onset of hostilities. Supposition may be made that the destruction of records was to remove evidence of crimes against humanity, Ba’ath party affiliation or some other negative information. The supposition cannot be proven at this time. Evidence of employee records still exists in facilities across the country. The records are scattered about in damaged and looted buildings or remain only in the form of ashes and charred bits of paper.

In May 2003, meetings were held with the remaining Iraqi administrative staff in order to develop the ICS. The first director of adult corrections, Ali Ahmad Abdallah, was arrested after one of the first meetings of former “ICS” employees, on 25 May 2003. Khazi Yaseen Al-Any Taha was elected as the second director, under questionable circumstances, and named an interim director of adult corrections. Khazi Yaseen Al-Any Taha was suspended pending investigation on October 13, 2003. Khazi faced allegations such as charging for contracts, taking bribes for favored hiring preferences, and nepotism. The investigation is still underway but evidence of his crimes is lacking to date. No replacement has been identified as of this writing.

Hameed Jaber Jaboud was the acting director for the juvenile corrections department. Hameed was not up to the task and resigned in November 2003. Qaadam Ra’oof was appointed as the new director following Hameed’s resignation. Qaadam has since been demoted and reassigned due to incompetence. A replacement for the juvenile department director does not exist to date. Mona Mahdi Idhrees is the Legal Advisor for the juveniles department but has taken on a much lower profile since the receipt of many threats and after being fired upon by “unknown” assailants.

The recommendation was made to prisons’ senior advisor, William Irvine, in July 2003 that all ICS functions report to one national director and that a national structure be formed to include regional offices, etc. Salaam Kareem Hussein was named as the acting ICS director by MG (Judge) Donald Campbell, senior advisor to MOJ. (Names of Iraqis are often confused and misinterpreted so the latter part of Salaam’s name may be incorrect.) Salaam was working as an interpreter for MOJ at the time of the appointment. Salam indicated that he has no intention of seeking or accepting a permanent appointment to the post.

Ra’id Jader Khalaf is the national director of the ICS following his promotion from warden of the Al Hillah prison in Babil province. Ra’id was a very recent candidate and appointee for national director general (interviewed 18 January 2004. CPT Errol Huffman recommended Ra’id for the national director position in October of 2003. Ra’id was offered the position and approved in mid-February.

BG Juma’a Zamel is the regional director for the Baghdad facilities. Juma’a was promoted to warden of the Rusafa detention center following the dismissal of BG Ahmed A. Ahmed. Ahmed was removed after preliminary investigations indicated unethical behavior and revealed a higher level of Ba’ath Party affiliation, at lease Firq’a, than previously known.

Nadhim Rasheed Jaber was the director of training but has not come to the forefront. Mr. Abdal Hadi was the ICS Academy Director until recent allegations and strong evidence of unethical behavior dictated his suspension pending the completion of the investigation.

Sarkies Seebo Sarkies was a store keeper prior to the war but was appointed by the ICS advisors as the chief accountant of the adults department in June of 2003. Sarkies is the primary point of contact for all financial information related to ICS and for communication with the outlying areas. A recommendation was recently made to the ICS DG that Sarkies be appointed as the ICS Business Manager.

Muneer Abd al-Lateer or Yasim is the Juveniles Department chief accountant. Shaza Nema Abdul Saeed acted as the primary contact for the juvenile accounts department. All financial matters are deferred to Sarkies at this time.

Kamel Abdul Nabi Jouhar is the regional director of the southern region, appointed and vetted by the U.K. MND-SE senior advisor. Khalil Esmael Mohamed is the Deputy Director. Hannaa Mohamed Japher is the local accountant. Adel Rida Dawood is the deputy accountant.

A summary of positions and assignments that were recommended or deemed necessary for growth:

· National director – Ra’id Jader Khalaf

· Deputy director – None

· Regional directors:

o North – None

o Central – BG Juma’a Zamel

o South Central – None

o South – Kamel Abdul Nabi Jouhar

· Provincial Management – None

· Business Manager – Sarkies Seebo Sarkies

· Director of Accounts (Adults or Juveniles) – None

· Deputy Director, Internal Affairs—Ahmed Farooq Hussein Al-Azawy

· Assistant Deputy Director, IA—Badeel Kadhim Mahdi

· Deputy Director, Legal Affairs – None

· Director, Training Academy – None

o Deputy, Training (North, South Central, South, etc.) – None

· Deputies: Planning, Operations, HR, Logistics, Facilities -- None

Ra’id Khalaf, BG Juma’a Zamel, Sarkies Seebo Sarkies and area wardens currently comprise the primary ICS management team.

Little is known of the structure, if any, in the outlying provinces or governorates. MND-SE is slowly providing additional information regarding the structure in their region. Military resources, to include LTC Darwin Concon of the Civil Affairs Support Team, have endeavored to maintain ties with areas outside of Baghdad. LTC Concon has developed and implemented a plan to engage the advisors in other regions.

CPA divided Iraq into four administrative regions: North, Baghdad, South Central, and South. The accounting staff has noted that prison employees are working in Ninawa (north) and Basrah (south), absorbed from MOI and MLSA per CPA Order #10. Diyala, Babil and Dhi Qar provinces have been absorbed into MOJ however a complete reconciliation of the national labor force has not been made but is getting closer.

The northern region includes the three Kurdish provinces Dahuk, Arbil, and As Sulaymaniyah as well as Diyala, Salah Ad Din, Ninawa and At Ta’mim. Administration in the north is handled by a CPA North office. The 101^st AA as well as the Kurdish government (KRG) in the Kurdish provinces conducted ICS activities in the North. Military authority in the northern area lay with TF Olympia, part of I Corps, but the primary point is the 2^nd Infantry Division.

The Baghdad region is self-explanatory. ICS activities are administered via the Iraqi ICS management team, the national CPA ICS team, and elements of the 89^th MP Brigade. Military transfer of authority (TOA) from the 800^th MP Brigade to the 16^th(south and west) and 89^th (central/east and north) MP brigades occurred in early February of 2004.

The south-central region is comprised of Al Anbar, An Najaf, Babil, Karbala and Wasit. ICS activities are administered by the Polish forces and MND-SC, which relieved the U.S. Marines, I-MEF. MND-SC is in Al Hillah, Babil.

The southern region is comprised of Dhi Qar, Al Qadisiyah, Maysan, Al Basrah, and Al Muthanna. ICS activities are coordinated through the Multinational Division (MND-SE), primarily U.K. forces. Gareth Davies, U.K., is the senior advisor for the region. Natasha Coxen, stationed at CPA, Baghdad, is the intermediate point of contact for all southern regions and coordinates any visits to those sectors (south or south-central).

Initial military support of the prison mission came from the 18^th MP Brigade (CS) and minimal support from the 800^th MP Brigade (EPW/CI). CW4 David Ward and CSM Guyette acted as project managers for reconstruction of several Baghdad detention centers and the Abu Ghraib maximum-security prison. Early reconstruction projects had little or no details in the scope of work. Contracts were all verbal and extended from estimates and quotes. The 800^th never provided logistical, engineering or management support to the national mission and the 18^th was incapable of doing so, given their mission with the MOI.

The 800^th MP Brigade provided subordinate MP company elements and battalion headquarters in order to position soldiers in some of the facilities as guards and/or supervisors of Iraqi corrections officers. The 800^th MP Brigade never fully engaged in the mission and refused to accept reports from their liaison unit, the 494^th MP DET (BLD). One staff officer from the brigade was present at CPA for approximately four months but failed to effectively communicate pertinent information.

The 16^th and 89^th MP brigades now have responsibility; west and south of Baghdad; east and north of Baghdad, respectively, for all military police operations. The brigades are structured as combat support entities and are not well-designed for prisoner or detainee operations.

The labor force of the ICS is comprised primarily of former MLSA employees. The estimated ICS national personnel inventory is 3,233. Approximately 1,800 of that number are employed in Baghdad. Most employees were enrolled and trained in a CPA/494^th MP DET initiated ICS Academy.

CPT Michael McIntyre and MSG Don Bowen of the 494^th MP DET have extensive civilian experience from working in corrections at the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility in Terre Haute, IN. Both soldiers were the primary course developers, along with input and approval from Gary DeLand and William Irvine. The academy is currently operated entirely by Iraqi ICS employees. A director for the academy is not appointed since the removal of the incumbent, Abdal Hadi. Richard Billings, U.S., is the CPA advisor for the academy. The remaining employees in Iraq are trained at one of two other locations: Mosul and Diwaniyah. Another program was under development in Diyala but has stalled for the moment due to military assets transition. Contact was made with Iraqi management in Diyala; initial ties to Baghdad are being made.

The financial systems within Iraq remain antiquated and centralized. Budget processes are exceedingly slow but have shown recent signs of acceleration. Approval for expenditures now requires roughly the same amount of time and bureaucracy as equivalent U.S. government agencies and occasionally moves more quickly. The six-month 2003 emergency budget was comprised of $5 million in operating funds and $10 million in capital for construction and reconstruction. Although the bulk of the money was not expended by December (budgets were not approved for release until mid-September), all capital was spent or obligated by the end of 2003, the close of the fiscal year. A large percentage of the operating budget was also spent in December. Capital funds from 2003 were rolled over into 2004 in order to cover 2003 projects. Some of the 2003 operating budget was also added to 2004.

Department facility or real estate inventories are incomplete. Twelve facilities were budgeted for in 2003, including the only two known juvenile centers in the country. An additional twenty-six facilities, ten of which were to be juvenile centers, were added to the 2004 budget proposal. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) declined to accept the proposal and countered with an offer/mandate of less than one third the original projections. A supplemental needs report was developed which morphed into the U.S. Supplemental request, funded by the U.S. taxpayer. These funds were based on Iraqi costs and did not account for international contractors or the associated increase in costs. The Supplemental was developed in less than one month, with little or no guidance, and could not be altered to reflect the true nature of the request package.

The suggestion was made that one-hundred-fifty or more facilities may have existed prior to the war. Assessments have not been made nor has anyone discovered these facilities due to a lack of human resources, time and other assets.

Operations are still managed by the CPA advisory team rather than by an Iraqi executive office. As additional civilian experts arrive, the senior advisory team should be able to focus on the national issues and mentorship required for a new Iraqi executive team. Support and encouragement of the appointed director general and the development of a national team are keys to the timely hand-over of Iraqi responsibility. The ICS must have an Iraqi national structure and the advisory team must relinquish some control and authority in order to ensure the success of the service.

More attention must be given to the national dimension (outside of Baghdad) of the ICS and all regional programs must be drawn together to form a consistent set of policies and procedures.

Procedures are currently based primarily on U.S. corrections systems in the central region. The advisory team recently reproduced the Arizona Department of Corrections manuals and had them translated into Arabic for use by the ICS. Use of the material may be helpful as a guideline but historical precedent indicates that the intent is to use the documents verbatim.

U.S. military systems are used as a model in the north and U.K. systems are utilized in the south. International input has been minimal with the exception of Guido Scuncio’s recent injection into the process of refining a transportation directorate program. Further international diversification of the advisory staff is necessary in order for ICS to be viewed as legitimate by the international community.

Comprehensive national departmental policies have not been developed or disseminated to date. Iraqis have not been involved in policy development discussions to date; they should be brought into the process once the executive level is recruited and appointed.

Once again, CPA advisors must take on the national task at hand rather than focus on Baghdad and must integrate an indigenous executive staff rather than retain full operational control and authority.

Appointing an Iraqi national management team and providing them with mentorship, coaching and advisement will aid in expediting reconstruction activities, personnel recruitment, training, policy reformation, etc.

If CPA ICS develops and fosters a closer working relationship with military forces (16^th and 89^th MPs, 2^nd ID, MND (SC and SE): U.K., Spain and Poland) as well as with other CPA offices (provincial headquarters, governorate teams, etc.) and the KRG, then a more functional, autonomous and fully developed ICS will result.

Alienation or exclusion of these groups will serve no purpose other than to slow the developmental progress of the ICS and ensure a return to business as usual such as before the war.

Chapter
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ICS Human Resources and Administration Report

Vision and Mission

Administrative Mission

The administrative mission of the CPA Prisons Department Advisory Team is to develop an efficient organizational structure and make appointments to that structure through the Iraqi Ministry of Justice that shall manage and operate a national correctional service in a manner that is tolerant and humane towards detainees and prisoners, utilizing methods equal to or greater than the United Nations’ Minimum Standards for the Treatment of Prisoners.

Mission Components

Structure does not exist within the Iraqi Correctional Services (ICS). The newly appointed director general is formulating an organizational structure. Ra’id is struggling with the task but one of the CPA advisors is coaching him through the process.

One of the many tasks facing the Prison Team is to develop a cohesive and comprehensive management framework. To properly complete the task, several issues must be addressed:

1) Identify and reconcile the existing personnel inventory across the country

2) Vet employees via investigation and interviews while remaining aware of possible hidden agendas held by investigators tasked with such a duty

3) Identify candidates for high-ranking leadership positions

4) Assist the ICS with the formulation and publication of organizational charts for:

· The national headquarters

· Regional offices

· Provincial offices

· Individual facilities

5) Appoint key personnel

6) Train key personnel in the areas of administration, operations, recruiting, vetting, appointing and training their staff

7) Redefine the system after the complete collapse and fill the vacuum caused by the departure of senior management (affiliated as high-ranking Ba’ath party members), the release of all the country’s prisoners in October of 2002 and the destruction incurred by the war and looting

Once all key personnel are appointed they must be integrated into the ministry infrastructure and fully supported in their mission to rebuild the organization. Accountability for the actions of key leaders must be maintained and appropriate corrective measures implemented in a timely manner. The key to the success of the ICS lay with the new leadership. All efforts aimed at the reconstruction of the department will fail if initial buy-in is not sought out from the Iraqi team. Further to the success of the ICS, all program execution, physical facility improvements, and recommendations for change must be implemented through the Iraqi leadership in order to ensure success.

Fully invested Iraqi partners are best equipped to help westerners avoid unnecessary delays in the effort to develop a tolerant and humane correctional service. Cultural differences, language barriers, and governmental bureaucracy cannot be overlooked as significant factors in the overall process.

Iraqi law is still in full force and effect except where specifically noted as rescinded, replaced or modified by CPA Orders, etc. See the CPA intranet web site or world-wide-web page for specific details at:

http://intranet.orha.centcom.mil/CPAORD/New_CPA.htm Arabic and English versions present

http://iraqcoalition.org/regulations/index.html#Regulations Arabic and English versions present

Vision Process

The ICS is in desperate need of a national vision. A vision may not be attainable at this time but CPA advisors and Iraqi partners must formulate a plan to develop a vision over the coming months and years. While a mission statement will go a long way toward defining the immediate tasks at hand, a vision will provide a long-term road map for what the institution must do to evolve as an industry leader and prime example of proper correctional systems implementation relative to the international community. Iraqis must be seen as the key developers, even if the product is largely that of CPA. Excluding Iraqis will lead to failure in the long-term. This process has not yet started.

· The ICS director, along with the Minster of Justice, should form a strategy to achieve the goals of providing for a secure Iraq. These goals must account for a change in Iraqi demographics:

n Population constitution

n Population increases or decreases

n Population density shifts

n Trends in criminal activity

n Advancements in psychological care and treatment

n Religious views and the diversity of those views

n Societal philosophy on serious offenders and moderate offenders

n Classification of offenders

A vision is vital to the continued humane operations and international legitimacy of the national corrections services.

In order to aid the Iraqi leadership in their efforts to develop and act upon a national vision, plans must be made in concert with their activities. Short-term, near-term, and long-term plans must be structured in such a way as to paint a picture of what the future must hold for the institution. The CPA advisory team must develop a basic vision for the system. The Iraqis must believe in the basic vision and endorse it as their own.

The CPA vision must not be restrictive or incongruous with Iraqi culture or customs else it is doomed to irrelevance. Iraqis can help avoid such a problem.

CPA Advisory Team Issues

CPA as a whole has endured a high turnover rate since the inception of ORHA and transition into CPA. ICS was not immune. The first team was comprised of several individuals:

· William Irvine, Senior Advisor, U.K.

· Terry Stewart, Prisons Advisor, U.S.

· Larry DuBois, Prisons Advisor, U.S.

· O. Lane McCotter, Prisons Advisor, U.S.

· Gary DeLand, Prisons Advisor, U.S.

· Ken Grant, Financial Advisor, U.K.

The first group of advisors was relegated to the duty of opening operational facilities. The task was far from the original intent: to assist and advise in the reopening of the existing correctional service facilities. The situation led to the need for quick deals and verbal contracts to refurbish centers. The change in focus and priorities led to the neglect of the administrative structure. Prior to their change in mission, the team conducted an assessment and left an extensive report detailing their initial view of the system and of certain facilities. The report is on file.

Team members were scheduled for three month contracts. Terry Stewart and Larry DuBois left prior to contract closure. Gary DeLand and O. Lane McCotter completed their contracts and Lane actually extended to the end of Gary’s contract and beyond. William Irvine had planned to extend at least until November of 2003 but a family emergency required that he depart in early September. Ken Grant extended until August of 2004 and currently works with MOJ in Basrah.

The summer of 2003 saw no more than any two advisors present in the country at one time with rare exception. Often there was only one advisor present. A selection of the 494^th MP DET was sent to augment the department by July 10^th, 2003. Two soldiers were chosen for their corrections experience, one for investigative skills and an engineering background, one for financial and administrative experience and one soldier as a specialist in administrative/clerical duties.

The second group of advisors arrived in mid-September and was comprised of:

· Terry Bartlett, Senior Advisor, U.S.

· John Armstrong, Prisons Advisor, U.S.

· Chuck Ryan, Prisons Advisor, U.S.

· Richard Billings, Prisons Advisor, U.S.

The group is slated to be in-country through March of 2004 with some minor variations and extension possibilities. All are apparently extended through at least May 2004.

Terry Bartlett is currently the ICS Director, John Armstrong is the Deputy Director for Planning/Projects, Chuck Ryan is the Deputy Director for Operations, and Richard Billings is the Director of the ICS Academy. As the titles indicate, the team is not engaged in an advisory capacity. Iraqi counterparts are limited in number and were just recently posted to their positions.

Five subject matter experts (SMEs) of the one-hundred-seven SMEs requested arrived in early January 2004. One or two have cancelled their contracts and are returning home. Another nineteen SMEs arrived in mid-January. The intent is to divide the SMEs into groups that will be placed in facilities across the country. They will be assigned the duties of wardens, assistant wardens, and so forth. As the position titles indicate, an inappropriate view of the mission still exists. Current grumblings among the SMEs indicate a potential attrition rate of 50%-80%. Approximately thirty (30) more SMEs are scheduled to arrive as of the date of this report. An additional thirty (30) are slated for arrival in another week. All of these individuals will be assigned duties within various facilities across the country. Some of the SMEs will be part of an administrative team and business management team. The senior advisor attempted many times to bring these staff members on board only to be rebuked by the supporting agencies. The staff would have greatly reduced the mundane issues related to managing so many individuals and their logistical needs. The increase in staff would have allowed for a better division of tasks and would have afforded the advisors the chance to look at the national issues rather than focus on local problems.

An in-processing and orientation team as well as a support system might alleviate the attrition challenge. Accurate briefings prior to deployment will also ensure that reality and expectations are more closely aligned. The greatest challenge facing the advisory team is the interpersonal dynamics of the group as a whole.

A positive change in the interpersonal communications, particularly those of the deputy director of operations, will improve SME retention but more importantly, the changes will be best directed toward interactions with the Iraqi employees and with military representatives. Stress management or anger management sessions will suit this individual well.

No amount of emphasis can be over-exaggerated when describing the damage done by the deputy director of operations. Iraqis, as anyone, are belittled and humiliated when they are yelled at or dressed-down in front of their peers and subordinates. Daily threats of termination are unacceptable. Termination (without due cause) is not a viable alternative for civilian advisors at this stage of Iraqi development. Misperceptions or deceptions regarding military activities have eroded trust and cooperation between military and civilian counterparts.

Potential advisor candidates should be screened and briefed based on the lessons learned from the interaction of current advisors with others in this operation.

The foremost objective of CPA to remember is the intent of the CPA reconstruction effort: to provide support to Iraq as the country engages in rebuilding after the war and some thirty-five years of neglect of the infrastructure and personnel resources. Aside from the physical reconstruction, the aim is to identify individuals capable of operating agencies such as the correctional service.

To date, little effort has been put forth by the CPA ICS office in promoting an independent and self-sufficient agency. Current practices are as follows:

· Operations and focus are Baghdad-centric

· Program development is based on a U.S.-centric model

· Micro-management of day-to-day operations stifles any individual development or elevation from within the Iraqi rank-and-file

· Regional offices and agencies are not integrated into a consistent national program

· Agency interaction is limited and curbed; specifically, information is not shared regularly, from either direction, between regional offices, military channels or the national civilian advisory group

The first step to correct these problematic areas is to immediately develop, recruit, vet, and appoint executive management at the national, regional and provincial levels. Once this national system is place, a lot of work can be “powered down” to the most appropriate levels and multiply the capabilities of the ICS exponentially. Twenty to forty Iraqi/Arabic-speaking directors and leaders, given training and mentorship, assigned across the country will certainly accomplish more than three or four foreign nationals in one or two locations.

Once the management staff is in place, many actions can take place simultaneously and the advisory teams can focus on the larger issues, such as integrating the entire country into one consistent system and looking at the Kurdish Question of merging their systems with the rest of the country.

Chapter
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ICS Human Resources and Administration Report

Organizational Structure

Organizational Structure Recommendations

The Iraqi ICS employees do possess old organizational charts depicting the former structure of the various departments. Ra’id Khalaf is reviewing the chart at this time. The CPA advisors may have some chart in process at this time. Regardless, a reporting structure must be emplaced and published. A copy of the Iraqi chart (in Arabic) is included in the file copy of this document.

The issues in Chapter 1 must be addressed before any coherent plan can be fully developed. In the meantime, basic “org charts,” such as the following examples, can be utilized to help the Iraqis structure the ICS and “see” where they each fit in the service: Organization Chart

Organization Chart

Although there are a number of details to be worked out and formalized in these charts, a basic implementation now, with continued review and refinement, will go a long way in helping the Iraqis take ownership of the ICS. The Iraqi management can certainly manage a great deal of the refinement process, given advice regarding alternative programs and systems development. Human Resources, Training, Administration, etc. are all pre-requisite areas, and should be reflected at all levels of the service. The charts shown above are just basic guidelines and are not intended to be comprehensive or fill the page with minutiae.

Chapter
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ICS Human Resources and Administration Report

Planning:

Short Term—

Development of national structure, regional and provincial management, staffing requirements, and national policy; ensure minimum capacity requirements are developed or maintained

Near Term—

Refinement of training development and national policy as well as prisoner rehabilitation programs (adult and juvenile); expanded development of physical facilities to meet projected needs

Long Term—

Development or refinement and implementation of programs: rehabilitation, vocational training, adult and juvenile education, and prisoner productivity (furniture manufacture, textiles, vocational training, etc.); improvement of existing facilities or retirement of obsolete structures and completion of modern facilities

ICS is still in the short term phase and, as of yet, has been unable to address the near and long term phases or the management structure of the country. The training program is currently under review for expansion to an eight (8) week program from the current three (3) week program.

The aforementioned planning issues need to be addressed in concert with the Iraqi stake-holders as soon as reasonably possible.

Chapter
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ICS Human Resources and Administration Report

Personnel Management

Needs Assessment

Personnel Inventory—

The Iraqi administrative office completed a reconciliation of employees with classifications, assignments and vacancies. Inventories of areas outside Baghdad are incomplete at this time although Basrah recently provided a listing of the ICS employees in that region. The reconciliation is required prior to hiring new staff and prior to making promotions or position changes.

Staffing Plans—

The Iraqi national leadership must be identified and then mentored in these areas. The plans should be easy to understand with a “system-in-a-box” approach that allows the management to readily identify their needs based on prisoner capacity and classification of inmates.

Salaries and Wages, Benefits—

This is a centrally directed function, by Ministry of Finance, that requires all advisors to give input and advice how to best retain qualified employees and encourage ethical conduct. Past practices at prisons and detention facilities included “shakedowns” of relatives and visitors to supplement the meager wages of corrections officers. Current perceptions in ICS hold that employment within the system is very dangerous and should be compensated accordingly, across all position assignments. Hazardous duty pay was introduced and authorized for the various security sectors; however, the application of the incentive pay is still under review. Current policy is to compensate only those people in “guard” positions. Negotiations are still under way to authorize 130,000 ID per month for all ICS employees.

Recruiting, Vetting and Appointments—

The lack of records and lack of reliable translation teams makes the process of vetting difficult. Due diligence must be exercised in the observation of activities within all facilities and at all levels. Difficulties related to appointing a reliable team should not detract from the necessity or value of hiring Iraqis into these positions. The more quickly day-to-day operations can be handed off to the Iraqi team, the more quickly clear and objective observation and investigation can occur.

Training Management—

ICS’ Training Academy is currently run entirely by Iraqis. The course of instruction is a combination of BOP and U.S. Army, MP, 95C training programs. Additional refinement is required to bring the program in line with cultural and societal needs. The program requires expansion to incorporate increased human rights training, emergency and First Aid training, transportation issues, and a comprehensive On the Job Training program (OJT) with qualified Field Training Officers (FTOs). All of the training programs need to be disseminated throughout Iraq and offered in accessible regional training sites. Training inspection teams should be coordinated in order to ensure proper and consistent training is conducted at these academies. The OJT should reinforce the lessons learned at the academy. A process must be developed to ensure that those skills are exercised daily; corrections officers will revert to past practices if observation and reinforcement are not maintained.

“Shakedowns” (cell searches), a regular occurrence in most modern prison systems are not performed regularly. The transition of military forces out of the facilities and lack of SMEs or motivated SMEs has resulted in several security lapses. 494^th MP soldiers have noted broken windows, holes in cell walls, food in the cells, medications, excess prisoner supplies and other problems in the occupied cells of Rusafa, Kadimiyah, Salhya and Abu Ghraib. The issues were addressed and corrected on the spot. Current practices do not indicate a positive trend in this area over the long-term.

In addition to requiring all ICS employees to graduate from the academy, a professional development program should be programmed for the long-term development of staff thereby increasing the size of the recruiting pool for positions of increasing responsibility. This was definitely not the case under the former regime. Previous practices often saw absolutely unqualified and corrupt individuals appointed to the highest positions solely due to their political affiliation and support of the Ba’ath party. This practice will return if not addressed now.

Chapter
5

ICS Emergency Funding Program Report

Reconciliation of Expenditures

Financial Mission

On July 8^th, 2003 CPT Errol Huffman was directed to assist the CPA ICS and Iraqi ICS. Upon arrival, the first assignment was the task of reconciling the Emergency Funding Program, financed through the CPA Program Review Board (PRB) process. The task of reconciliation was formidable at best and was compounded further by the necessity to redirect personal efforts, partially, to the operational and administrative aspects of the prison department. A summary of mission points is as follows:

1. Reconcile expenditures from the PRB funds

2. Emplace financial controls for the disbursement of funds

3. Liaise with and advise the Iraqi accounting staff

4. Advise the Iraqi national management team on administrative matters

Fund History

PRB funds were requested by Prisons Department as early as May 2003. A total of sixteen requests were submitted/approved/drawn for a total of $6,765,796 U.S. Of that amount, representatives of the 101st AA in the CPA northern region drew $2.9M. The central CPA office drew $3,865,796.[1]

PRB Funding Summary

n 15 and 49 – Al Hillah Prison Reconstruction for $126,623; $9,180 for a generator

n 47 and 223 – Baghdad Central Maximum Security Prison (aka Abu Ghraib) reconstruction for $172,000 and $1,755,500, respectively

n 48 and 174 – Khadimiyah Detention Center reconstruction for $92,909 and $22,500, respectively. PRB #174 has not been drawn to date and is closed.

n 50; 199, 353 – Rusafa Detention Center Reconstruction for $66,140, $22,190, and $25,800, respectively

n 120 – Karkh Juvenile Detention Center Reconstruction for $48,000.

n 135; 136; 137; 198; 370 – Operational Funding packages for equipping and starting prisons. PR values are $199,350, $198,000, $199,380, $101,970, and $810,754, respectively.

n 186 – Badush Prison for $2,900,000

n 336 – Istakhbarat (a.k.a. Section 5, Al Sharba Al Hamsa and Eisenbarrett) Maximum Security Prison for $38,000

PRB funds are separate from the Iraqi budget, contrary to initial descriptions and explanations by Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Program Review Board, and the ICS advisors.

Five additional requests were submitted to the PRB and declined. The refusal of consideration was due to the recently released Iraqi budgets. These budget funds did not move freely during the initial stages and are still slow in movement. Due to variances in estimates, etc. the advisory team directed that Emergency Funds be used in a manner not consistent with the original requests.

All PRB requests were prepared and submitted by either O.Lane McCotter, U.S. corrections expert or William Irvine, Senior Prisons Advisor. Requests were submitted with documentation required by the PRB, i.e. estimates of work to be performed or FEST assessments. Although the detail was lacking, the PRB accepted these estimates and, thusly, endorsed any contract awarded based on those estimates. This was not in accordance with Iraqi law but was supported by CPA. Many payment issues linger due to these inconsistent procurement practices.

Reconciliation

Certain assumptions must be made in order to accept the reconciliation of the emergency funds. These assumptions are addressed in the Financial Environment section of this report. A breakout of the funds drawn, listed above, contrasted with the receipts and payment register entries and compared to the cash-on-hand gives a rudimentary picture of the cash flow. The cash-on-hand is as follows:

1) $15,000 in an Al Hillah bank account; former account signatories were Larry DuBois and O. Lane McCotter. The funds were rolled into an MOJ account in Babil at the turn of the new fiscal year. The funds have been disbursed and are not counted as on-hand.

2) $181,008 in cash at CPA plus $6,000 left from the Section 5 PRB

3) $558,186 in the Rafidain Bank, Al Mansour branch: all funds were combined by MOF, despite protestations. The accounts were recently separated again.

4) $2,444,800 in Mosul; the assumption is that the 101^st AA has maintained 100% accountability of the funds in that region

5) $2,491,178 U.S. remains in the ICS bank account from 2003 and was rolled into the 2004 budget in the last week.

The total PRB cash-on-hand in Iraq, as listed above and excluding the budget, equals $3,190,014.

Fund Draws, Receipts and Cash

Contrasting the PRB draws with the cash inventory indicates an expenditure of $3,625,782 in cash or checks. An inventory of all receipts and the payment register identifies $3,625,782 in expenditures resulting in a $0 variance within the cash inventory.

National Draws	Total PRB Draws	Cash-On-Hand	Cash Spent	Receipts	Variance
	$6,815,796	$3,190,014	$3,625,782	$3,625,782	$0

· Table. National funds reconciliation.

Regional Draws	PRB Draws	Cash-On-Hand	Cash Spent	Receipts	Variance
Northern Region	$2,900,000	$2,444,800	$455,200	$455,200	0
Central Region	$3,819,173	$745,214	$3,073,959	$3,073,959	0
South-Central Region	$96,623	$0	$96,623	$96,623	0

· Table. Regional funds reconciliation.

Reconciliation of Emergency Funds

Ken Grant, Finance and Administration advisor, noted a variance of approximately ($180) prior to 16 July 2003. Reconciliation of funds from 16 July 2003 forward remained at a $0 variance until a +$300 surplus was noted on 1 October 2003.[2] An entry of cash returned was made to adjust back to a $0 variance.

The positive variance may be attributed to the acceptance of “change” returned to the CPA office and safe, following local economy purchases, but not logged in the register.

PRB funds were redirected from original projects that came in under the estimated costs. The funds were used to finance projects that were underestimated, i.e. the manufacture and purchase of prisoner bunk beds.

Financial Environment

The period following the war was a well-covered time of chaos and disorganization. The period is the same timeframe that the initial funding processes and expenditures were initiated. A number of factors can be identified that led to difficulty in maintaining transparency of the accounting process:

n Sole sourcing

n Verbal contracts

n Unorthodox receipting procedures

n Arabic receipts

n Lack of detail on receipts

n Lack of project managers

n Lack of detail in project descriptions or scopes of work

n Obligations paid in cash

n Records kept in a disorganized fashion

n Lack of a project tracking matrix

In order to clarify the process as it existed in early July 2003, Sarkies Seebo Sarkies, chief accountant for the adult corrections department, and CPT Errol Huffman made and implemented plans to secure the Emergency Funds in a Prisons Department bank account. The objective was in keeping with the Ministry of Finance directives to turn over control of financial processes to the proper Iraqi staff and to secure the funds outside of OCPA[3]. After many unsuccessful attempts[4], $2,150,000 was deposited into an account. The remaining $975,754[5] was used to pay immediate expenses and to leave approximately $250,000 available for the recurring payment of the Rusafa complex food service contract or any other critical expenses necessary to the operation of the prisons. The cash was retained upon the insistence of Gary DeLand, acting senior advisor for the prisons department, and in agreement with MG Donald Campbell, senior advisor for the Ministry of Justice.

The fiscal problems were further exacerbated by the lack of financial records in the PRB office[6] and the Comptroller’s Office[7]. Identifying the actual funds drawn is a task nigh on impossible, save for the institutional memory and the piecemeal records assembled within the Prisons Department. In fact, the aforementioned offices accepted documentation from this office in order to update their own records. Prior to updating the Comptroller’s office, several messages were issued requesting that ICS draw over $3M in funds already obtained.

Reconstruction of the financial picture took over 2 ½ months. Receipts were kept in folders, binders, boxes, desk drawers, and journals. The receipts were in the form of napkins, Post-It notes, scraps of paper and amateur receipt forms.

Although the reconciliation of the funds has been completed, there are a number of receipts that must be obtained in order to consider the issue closed. These receipts should match up with the Payment Sheet disbursements, i.e. the $92,909 disbursement for the contracts at Khadimiyah detention center. Chief David Ward, 18^th MP Brigade, signed for and spent the money for Kadimiyah and still has those receipts.

Financial Analysis and Recommendations

The +$300 variance annotated in the reconciliation document could not be accounted for by any individual on staff. Only two viable options can explain the additional funds: 1) that a vendor was short-changed upon payment, highly unlikely, given the nature of the count-out processes; 2) that cash was returned to the safe after the purchase of goods and not logged into the payment register. The latter seems to be the most likely occurrence.

Given the information provided by the Comptroller’s office, the Program Review Board, and the records of the Prisons Department, there will not be any material findings in an audit of the department’s finances. Gross negligence is not evident in the disbursement of funds.

Future financial operations dealing with the U.S. Supplemental Budget or any non-Iraqi budget funds must adhere to proper accounting procedures (GAAP or its international equivalent) and financial management refined, to wit:

· Maintain up-to-date postings on the disbursement register

· Improve receipt processes:

o Full name of payee (a minimum of four names) and disbursement agent’s name written legibly

o Signatures of both parties

o Company name and current contact information (phone, address, e-mail, etc.)

o Date of transaction

o Itemized listing and details of goods and/or services

§ Description with reasonable clarity

§ Unit cost

§ Extended cost

§ Total cost

§ Iraqi dinar exchange rate to the U.S. dollar

· Develop and maintain a project matrix: utilizing the CPA Project Tracker Database located at http://cpa-infoent.orha.centcom.mil/iraqcpa/login.jsp

· Ensure proper tender and contract measures are followed

o Financial penalties for failure to meet contract obligations; graduated to reflect any degree of failure: time, quantity, quality and that these details are specified within the contract

· Assign a project manager to each endeavor

· Coordinate prior planning in order to avoid hasty solutions that create the potential for loss of positive control

· Develop and maintain a project file for each facility to include:

o Assessment package

§ FEST assessments, if available

§ Contractor bids

o Financial package

§ Funding approval and funding level

§ Funds draw and account balance

§ Outstanding contracts

§ Contracts due or Accounts Payable

§ Change orders with funding approvals

o Contract package

§ Specific in nature and tailored to each project

§ Phase completion dates

§ Material specifications

§ Labor specifications, e.g. 24 hour site construction

o Facility design and specification package

o Point of Contact (POC) package

· Develop a standard punch-list and tailor to each project

· Ensure all progress payments are properly documented:

o Contractor progress statement and certificate on file

o Final work completion statement or certificate and warranty signed and on file

o Labor and materials list on file

· Release funds only after all parties are satisfied with project results

· Follow Iraqi finance practices and processes

Following the procedures outlined above will curb the development of additional financial puzzles. The importance of following proper accounting procedures cannot be emphasized enough and must be enforced to maintain transparency in the actions of the Prisons Department, Ministry of Justice, and Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

The continuation of Iraqi control inasmuch as the administration and distribution of the ICS budget is concerned will ensure that proper accounting of the Iraqi budget, 2004 and beyond, is maintained.

Chapter
6

ICS 2003 Six-Month Emergency Budget

Methodology

Research of the basic needs for prisoners and guards yielded general cost estimates for prison and detention operations. The first CPA advisory team contributed estimates based on their past experiences in corrections operations. Iraqi input was not utilized in the formulation of this budget. Ken Grant initiated the emergency budget and was assisted by the military with the refinement of the budget to meet Ministry of Finance requirements and then the execution of those funds.

Anecdotal evidence of local costs and quotes from vendors further developed the financial needs assessment.

Although the budget was delineated by department and by facility (those identified for immediate operations), Iraqi accounting practice was and is to centralize the funds into one account.

The 2003 budget was divided, per direction of this office, into separate accounts for the Juvenile Department and the Adults Department. The practice was rescinded in 2004 per direction of CPA advisor Chuck Ryan, acting Deputy Director of Operations. All funds are now in a central account.

Chapter
7

ICS 2004 Calendar/Fiscal Year Budget

Methodology and Iraqi Budget Practices

A similar method was used for the 2004 budget as with the six-month emergency budget of 2003. The preparation cycles (2003 and 2004 budgets) were back-to-back which resulted in a lack of historical spending patterns to utilize as a baseline.

ICS accounting input was utilized much more efficiently and saw the ICS team present the 2004 budget proposal to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in August of 2003. MOF denied the proposal due to low revenue projections for the country in 2004. Apparently there were guidelines issued regarding Iraq’s revenue projections for 2004 and what ministries were to expect in regard to their budget allocations. The guidelines were not disseminated widely to ministry offices, therefore, the budget had to be re-calculated quickly to meet MOF guidance. The agreed upon counter-proposal was less than one third of the projected needs (based on facility project forecasts of Gary DeLand). These projections were based on loose assumptions and the desire to ensure that additional funding was secured for future projects yet to be identified.

The U.S. Supplemental Budget sprang from this shortfall assessment, although that was not communicated initially as the intent. The supplemental allocation to ICS is a reflection of the shortfall in Iraq’s ability to fund its own services and, as such, is based on Iraqi market realities at the time. Had those directing the supplemental budget process been more forthcoming with the intent of the package, all ministries would have produced a more realistic package. Given that the assets required for such an endeavor were not in-country at the time, the supplemental was a wishful hope for funds rather than a reflection of true needs assessments.

Individuals responsible for administration of the Supplemental Funds enter an environment with neither the historical evidence of the initial process nor access to the initial authors of the request. The fund administrators may wonder why the requests fail to account for overseas procurement, design costs, contingency fees, shipping or a number of other issues relevant in the U.S., the U.K. etc.

The 2004 ICS budget was agreed to include the equivalent of U.S. $40 million in operating and U.S. $62.2 million capital. The figures translate to 60 billion Iraqi Dinars for operating costs and 93.3 billion Iraqi Dinars for capital expenses; these numbers are what were agreed upon at the September 2003 budget hearings. The ICS budget was combined with the Justice budget, per Iraqi law, and submitted as one package by Mike Dittoe to David Oliver, senior advisor to MOF. Concerns were voiced at the time that the capital and operating for Justice appeared to be low; ICS was eager to ensure that the budget figures mentioned above would not be used to supplement an MOJ shortfall.

Miscellaneous points of interest regarding Iraqi budget practices:

· MOF creates the projected ministry allocations

· Additional requirements not met by the MOF forecast must be presented to the MOF director general by the concerned ministry’s director general

· Iraqi budgets are broken down into nine (9) sections or Parts

o Sections 1 and 9 are related to personnel wages and benefits

o Sections 2 through 5 are the primary operating expense areas

o Section 8 is the capital projects (reconstruction and construction) area

o Sections 6 and 7 are not used by ICS (transfer expenses and foreign obligations

· Approved Section totals cannot be changed without significant approval processes

· Sections are further divided into Items

· Item totals may be transferred from one line to another line with relative ease within a Section

· MOF usually allocates budget funds by quarter; current practice has been by month due to a lack of ministry spending plans; allocations must be delineated by province per department needs; in the absence of direction by the national offices, MOF will allocate based on requests from outlying provinces and historical spending patterns; a lack of planning in the hope that MOF will do the work may result in undesirable outcomes

· MOF does not automatically allocate funds based on a department or ministry budget; low spending levels will decrease the allocation unless specific spend plans are submitted to show where and when funds will be disbursed

· Payments from the budget are made by check; a minimum of three signatories are required to validate a check; checks must be approved by MOF; a check, once signed, is presentable and due in full to the Payee under Iraqi law, regardless of fund balances

· Projects may be initiated through the Ministry of Housing and Construction; a 25% surcharge is typical; regardless of whether a department uses MoH&C or takes on their own projects, the following bullets apply:

· All new reconstruction or construction projects, beginning with the 2004 budget, must be pre-approved by the Planning office, a department of MOF. Projects must include at a minimum:

o Plans and designs

o Cost estimates

o Justification of the Project

o Proof of property ownership

· Once the initial approval is given, additional steps must be taken:

o Advertisement of project

o Development of contract terms

o Acceptance of bids or tenders (site meetings, etc. must be conducted with potential vendors)

o Opening of sealed bids and award of contract

o Signature of contract with specific terms (time, materials, plans, labor, warranty, etc.)

o Down-payments and progress payments may be made; engineer statements and contractor affidavits are required to certify the progress

o Final payment (typically the final 10%) will be retained by the department for one year from project completion; the 10% withholding is a “warranty” charge to ensure the quality of a project’s work

Chapter
8

Donors’ Requirements and Needs Assessment

Several lists of prison items were submitted to the international community in order to solicit donations of goods as well as funds.

South Korea donated buses, vans and computers, among other items.

Japan pledged generators.

A complete list of the submission is included in this chapter as well as the Information Technology “wants” assessment and all other lists. Little verification of the donor items status exists. The only solid verification for the 494^th MP DET came from Ahnshik Kim, former prison advisor from South Korea, regarding the vehicles and PCs.

Chapter
9

ICS Facility Administration Report

ICS Estate Inventory

Facility Rehabilitation

Reconstruction

New Construction

Adults v. Juveniles

Maintenance Programs

Emergency Repairs

Routine Maintenance

Plumbing and Sewage

Masonry

Metal Working

Property Acquisition

Facility Inventory Packages

Motor Pool and Transportation Operations

ICS Estate Inventory

NAME, PROVINCE

CAPACITY (STATUS)

· Badush (Mosul Regional Correctional Facility), Ninawa 2,462 (count is all three pods; pod C of 204 beds is operating)

· Observation House (Mosul Juvenile Detention Facility), Ninawa 200

· The New Transportation Jail , Ninawa 250

· Arbil Prison (Train Station Prison) 350

· Arbil Women's and Youth Prison 30/80

· Al Sulaymaniyah Prison 320

· Al Sulaymaniyah Women’s and Youth Facility 100

· Dahuk Central Prison (Kurdish Territory) ~1,500 (at least six months before completion but likely longer)

· Dahuk Prison “A” (currently pre- and post-trial) 150

· Dahuk Prison “B” 80

· Dahuk Women’s and Youth Facility 25/100

· Istakhbarat (a.k.a. Section 5, Eisenbarrett, Al Sharba Al Hamsa), Baghdad

To be maximum security 200

· Kadimiyah, Baghdad 350

· Al Karkh (Juvenile), Baghdad 200

· Rusafa 1, Baghdad 300

· Rusafa 2, Baghdad 300

· Rusafa 3 (Females), Baghdad 100

· Rusafa 4 (a.k.a. Al Katoul), Baghdad Under construction: about 90 days out 500

· Rusafa Annex (5), Baghdad Under construction: about 90 days out 500

· Academy and Administration at Rusafa (between 1 and 4), Baghdad Construction near completion

· Presence at Al Karkh and Ar Rashad Hospitals (Ar Rashad is for the mentally ill)

· Dawoodie, former Administrative HQs, Baghdad

· Abu Ghraib Maximum Security Prison, Baghdad ~2,000

· Khan Bani Sa’ad, Diyala Construction not started 2,880

· Al Hillah, Baghdad 750

· Al Amarah, Maysan Under Construction 600

· Basrah Central (a.k.a. Military Barracks), Basrah 1,200

· Al Ma’qil, Basrah 225

· An Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar 300

· Ad Diwaniyah, Qadisiyah 300 (currently under expansion to 700)

· Karbala: still with MOI

· Al Kut, Wasit: still with MOI

· Ash Shatrah, Qadisiyah: still with MOI

· Suk Ash Shuiyukh, Qadisiyah: still with MOI

Chapter
10

ICS Facility Rehabilitation

Initial rehabilitation efforts were not of the highest quality due to the emergency nature of the reconstruction effort in the beginning. CPT Stoelting has worked with contractors to alter work specifications and completion requirements in an attempt to improve otherwise unacceptable results. The facilities have seen a marked improvement due to his supervisory efforts.

Adjustments were made to agreements as CPT Huffman worked with the Iraqi management team, contractors and legal representatives to renegotiate prices where improvement to the work was not possible or continued affiliation with the contractor was not acceptable.

CPT Stoelting has continually recommended the use of pre-fabricated systems in the reconstruction or construction of correctional facilities. The recommendations have not met with acceptance or further discussion to date. The process would certainly reduce costs, ensure consistency and ensure timely construction as well as remove the human error factor.

The CPA Advisory team drafted a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with MOI on 14 December, 2003, in order to outline the steps required to transfer all assets, personnel and funds to MOJ as facilities are identified. The document will be translated into Arabic and published nationally in the near future. Another MOA for MLSA or any other pertinent ministries may be necessary in the near future.

Chapter
11

Maintenance Programs

Programs do not currently exist. New purchases by the Iraqis generally include a warranty and one year maintenance program.

All other programs are addressed on a case-by-case basis.

A limited staff of engineers, plumbers, electricians, and other skilled laborers are employed with ICS.

Chapter
12

Property Acquisition

Government property and facilities are still largely un-documented. COL Aswell of CJTF-7 is the current property management coordinator. Requests for facilities are channeled through his office for official recognition. The form required follows on the next three pages.

A memorandum of understanding (MOU) exists between Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Ministry of Justice, ICS. The MOU reinforces CPA Order #10 and the mandate for ministries to transfer assets (facilities, personnel, budget funds, vehicles, furnishings, etc.) from the losing ministry to the gaining department or ministry.

APPLICATION TO USE PUBLIC PROPERTY

(CPA/ORD/06 Jul 2003/ FMT )

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to receive authorization to use public property, please provide the following information, all questions must be answered, and submit this application to Facility Management Team, CPA HQS Rm. B103/ 914.360.4677/ . E-mail applications to [email protected]. Based on the information provided, the Facility Manager will determine, based on the CPA Administrator’s priorities and policies, whether to allocate the property and whether it will be Category 1 property subject to a Letter of Authority or Category 2 property subject to a License.

APPLICATIONS MUST BE TYPED AND EVERY QUESTION MUST BE ANSWERED TO THE BEST OF THE APPLICANT’S KNOWLEDGE OR IT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED.

DATE OF APPLICATION:

DATE REQUIRED TO OCCUPY PROPERTY:

I. APPLICANT INFORMATION:

1. Organization:

2. Describe the nature of legal organization and, as applicable, the percentage of private and public ownership:

3. If a private entity, describe the activities of the private entity:

4. Name of the Action Individual who represents the entity (include title, phone number, and other contact information):

5. If multiple organizations will be sharing a property, please provide the above information for each organization that will use the property. Include the conditions or terms of the sharing arrangements:

II. PROPERTY INFORMATION:

6. Provide the grid coordinates for the property:

7. Provide an approximate size of building requested (square meters).

8. Provide the number of parking spaces:

9. a. Provide a written description of the property.

b. If a building, state the number of stories/floors.

c. Describe what the building is made of (i.e., brick, concrete, steel, etc.).

d. Provide information on any major thoroughfares and public services located nearby, such as hospitals, courts, or police stations.

10. Provide a description of the conditions of any building or other structures on the property (any other assessments or surveys that have been done on the property or the structure should be provided as attachments):

11. Provide any available information that identifies the property as public property. Provide information on what the property was used for under the former regime. It is important to include the government entity that is the registered owner of the property, a description of the prior use of the property, and any other situational details that you can ascertain.

12. Provide an inventory of any movable property. This includes any furnishings and equipment. Describe the condition of each item as good, fair, or poor:

13. Provide a description of why this property was chosen and whether any other properties were considered:

14. If any other properties were considered, provide a description of why they were not the preferred properties:

15. If there are any current occupants in the property, how many are there and what organization, if any, are they associated with?

III. USE INFORMATION:

16. Describe any capital improvement plan(s) for the property. This includes costs, timing, and resources and supplies for capital improvements:

17. What type of activities will be conducted on the property?

18. How many people are expected to use the building?

SIGNED BY: __________________________________________________

PHONE NUMBER ______________________________________________

Signature of Directorate, Brigade Commander, Senior Advisor to the Minister or Agency Head is Required.

Chapter
13

Facility Inventory Packages - Logistics

CPT Brent Stoelting and CPT Errol Huffman developed a basic start-up list of items necessary for correctional facility operations.

The Iraqi team has purchased a store of these items and maintains the supplies for distribution throughout the central region. The Iraqis are new to the concept of supplies replenishment. Stores attendants generally assume they must keep what is listed in their inventories at all times. The Iraqis are slowly learning that these supplies are consumed and must be reordered as they are used.

CPT Stoelting identified existing supply specialists working in the ICS and guided them to refine and implement their supply acquisition and distribution systems.

Iraqis run the logistics operations entirely. Military assets are occasionally required to remind staff of supply needs and to “jump start” the system from time to time.

Weapons are a continuing problem. All ICS employees are issued an ID badge. The badge also serves as a weapons permit for use while at work. The badges must be checked and updated to ensure that only those with a need (COs) carry a weapon. Many employees desire hand guns. No need for side arm is apparent at this time. All employees want permission to carry weapons while in transit to their homes or work. This is not a departmental concern at the moment as the military mandated that such practices are illegal.

ID badge machines are available on the local economy. Cost for a badge system is about $2,600. The system appears to be sufficient to ICS’ needs but is not endorsed by the advisory team at this time. Badges are currently made with a PC, digital camera, laminator and printer. Overseas purchases can run from $5,000 to $50,000 per unit with no guarantee of repair parts availability or system support. The local option seems to be the best solution, particularly when considering the number of units that will need to be deployed over time.

ICS purchased a total of ten generators: seven each 300kv and two each 150kv. Two of the 300kv generators were sent to Abu Ghraib prison to power the medical wing and the operating inmate pods.

Iraqi law requires that all purchasing tasks go through committees assigned for each purchase. The members will then go to the various markets to find the best mix of quality and price. Contracts, such as catering or maintenance, are advertised then a minimum of three bids are reviewed. After meeting the vendors, the sealed bids are opened, discussed and an acceptance is made of the winning vendor. A contract is drafted after the award.

Chapter
14

Motor Pool and Transportation Operations

Guido Scuncio, prison advisor from Italy, is a prisoner transportation expert. Guido is currently defining the transportation directorate requirements with the Iraqi responsible for prisoner movements.

A need for weapons was identified and twenty-five AK-47s were issued for transportation needs.

Fuel is not an easily obtained commodity at this time. The ICS management team was give authority to advertise for the construction of “fuel depots” at Rusafa and then other sites around the country. The National Oil Company will be the supplier of these fuels, benzene and diesel. The tanks will most likely be on towers and gravity feed due to the sporadic electricity service. There are seven in-ground tanks behind the Rusafa complex. Three to four of those tanks belong to the ICS per CPA order #10. BG Juma’a worked out the details of the fuel depot sharing with MOI (which tanks and how many tanks). Buckets are currently used to retrieve the fuel from the Rusafa ground tanks.

CPA purchased eight Nissan mini-buses in August 2003 for $15,000. Six of the buses were outfitted with minimal screen and bar security packages at an additional cost of $500. ICS purchased another twenty vehicles to include mini-buses, small pick-up trucks, and sedans and pump trucks for septic tank maintenance.

Additional mini-buses, ten each, and passenger vans, eight each, are being donated by South Korea.

[1] See PR and Spending Reconciliation in Appendix A

[2] See ICS Emergency Funding Register, Appendix B

[3] Funds from PRBs were to be drawn upon approval; however, a secure location was not offered in any form other than in that of an Iraqi bank account. See emails and memoranda in Appendix C.

[4] The Rafidain Bank, Al Mansour branch manager repeatedly refused to accept the cash until, by happenstance, Jacob Nell, CPA Ministry of Finance, intervened whilst at the bank and forced the manager to accept the deposit or face penalties to be imposed by CPA.

[5] See the ICS Emergency Funding Register in Appendix B for specific payment information.

[6] See emails and spreadsheet from the PRB in Appendix D for examples of inconsistency.

[7] See emails and notes per Comptroller Appendix E. The Comptroller was not able to provide a spreadsheet upon request that detailed specific transactions.