XXIX. NATURAL ABILITY
A
Are we able or unable to obey the
commandments of God? This certainly
must be one of the most important questions of morals and religion. How we view God, His moral government,
and every practical doctrine of morals and religion depends on how we answer
this question. In discussing this
question, I will look at the most common view of this subject first. This view I will call the Calvinistic
view because of its popularity in early Calvinistic theology. However, theologians and members of
virtually every mainline denomination today assume this view.
1 The Calvinistic view says that
freedom and natural ability are the same.
They believe that freedom consists in the power one has to do as he
pleases. Or, in other words,
freedom is being free from anything that would prevent one from doing what he
wills. They don’t even consider the
cause of that choice, or how the person arrives at that conscious decision. According to their idea of freedom, it
doesn’t matter whether some external motive or some internal habitual bias
caused that choice. It doesn’t
matter whether some internal previous conscious decision determined that choice,
or whether it happened without a cause.
They don’t even care whether that choice is associated with something
ongoing or not; as long as there is nothing in the way to hinder that person
from pursuing and exerting his will, the man is perfectly free, according to
their primary and common idea of freedom.
Along with this freedom, they believe that two things can hinder it. One is constraint; which occurs when a
person is forced to do something contrary to his will: the other is restraint,
which is not being able to accomplish his will without being
hindered.
2 Power, ability, and freedom to do
as one wills, all mean the same thing to those who believe doctrines like this
one. So, to them, natural ability
consists in the natural and established connection between the conscious
decision and its effects. Their
definition of natural ability, or natural liberty, as they frequently call it,
completely excludes the power to will, and includes only the power or ability to
execute that will. Thus, according
to them, natural ability involves external actions only, and has nothing to do
with willing. So, when there is no
restraint or hindrance to execute our will, when there is nothing that
intervenes to prevent the natural result of our will, we have a natural ability
according to this school of thought.
3 Please understand that those of
his school believe that choices, conscious decisions, and all acts of the will
are caused, not by the sovereign power of the agent, but are caused by an
objective motive, and that there is an unavoidable connection between that
objective motive and choice, just like there is a connection between any
physical cause and its effect. As a
result, according to their view, natural ability cannot consist in the power of
willing, but must consist in the power to execute the choices that we make. As a result, these philosophers believe
that free moral agency is the power to do as one wills, or the power to execute
one’s purposes, choices, or volitions.
That this is a fundamentally false definition of natural liberty or
ability, and of free agency, we shall see later. It is also clear, that the natural
ability of this school of thought has nothing to do with morality or
immorality. Now, sin and holiness
are attributes of conscious decisions only. But the natural ability that they
believe in involves outward or muscular action only. Let us remember this as we
continue.
B
This
natural ability is no ability at all.
1 We know from our own consciousness
that our will is our faculty that makes all our decisions, and we can do
absolutely nothing without willing.
Our power or ability to will is indispensable to our acting at all. If we do not have the power or ability
to will, we do not have the power to do anything at all. All our ability or power to do things
resides in our will, and the power to will is the necessary condition of our
ability to do things. In morals and
in religion, our willing is our doing.
Our power to will is the condition of our obligation to do.
2 Many believe that our will is the
faculty that makes our decisions, and we can do nothing except as we wills to do
it, and because of this, a command to do is strictly a command to will. These people also believe that willing
and doing are the same as far as moral obligation, morals, and religion are
concerned. For now, let me simply
say that it is absurd and complete nonsense to talk about an ability to do when
you have no ability to will.
Everyone intuitively knows that we have no ability to do anything that we
are unable to will to do.
Therefore, it is foolish to talk about a natural ability to do anything
whatever, when we don’t even take into consideration our power to will. If we have no ability to will, we can’t
have an ability to do. Therefore,
the natural ability of Calvinistic theology is really no ability at
all.
3 Remember, that no matter what this
theory believes concerning our ability to do, our ability to will does not enter
into their definition of natural ability at all. But, according to them, natural ability
only involves the connection between the will and its subsequent acts, while
completely ignoring the question of how the willful act came to exist in the
first place. Can you see that the
Calvinistic natural ability is no ability at all; that this Calvinistic doctrine
is nothing but an empty name, a metaphysical theological fiction?
4 What constitutes natural inability
according to this school of thought?
(Inability: A doctrine that teaches that man cannot fulfill his moral
obligations and obey God)
This
school believes that they are naturally unable to do anything when they can’t do
it, even if they want to, because their nature won’t not allow it; or because of
some impeding defect or obstacle that is outside of their will; either in their
mind, or body, or external objects.
They conclude that their natural inability consists in a lack of power to
execute their willful desires. In
the absence of the power to do what they want to do, if the willing exists and
the effect does not follow, it is only because they are unable to do what they
want to do, and this is natural inability.
They see themselves as being naturally unable to do what does not follow
naturally from their conscious decisions.
If I will to move my arm, and the muscles do not obey my will, I am
naturally unable to move my arm.
The same is true with anything else. Here, I want to remind you, that natural
inability, as well as natural ability, only belongs to our outward actions or
the things that we do. It has
nothing to do with our ability to will.
Whatever these theologians believe concerning their ability to will, I
want it to be clearly understood that their natural inability has nothing to do
with willing, but only with the effects or the results of willing. When the natural effect of willing does
not follow an act of the will, it’s because of a proper natural inability.
C
Their
natural inability is no inability at all.
By
this, I mean that as far as morals and religion are concerned, willing is the
doing, and therefore where the willing actually takes place, God considers what
is really required or prohibited as having been accomplished. But, many don’t believe this. They believe that if the will fully
complies and the planned result is not connected with his willful choice
according to the laws of nature, the man is perfectly excused because he has a
natural inability to do what is required.
However, we know that our will is all that can be directly and
immediately required by command, and other things are only required to the
degree that they are connected with our will. If, therefore, our will fully complies,
we have done our duty: and if other things do not prove to be connected with our
will, we are not responsible for them.
It is
clear that the Calvinistic notions of natural ability and inability have no
connection with moral law or moral government, and, of course, with morals and
religion. The Bible everywhere
considers the willing as the deed.
Concerning both sin and holiness, if an act of the will takes place, the
moral law and the lawgiver considers the act as having been done no matter what
impediment may have prevented the natural effect from following. Please understand and remember that the
natural inability that so many believe in is no moral inability at all. An inability to execute our willful
choices is not an inability to do our whole duty, because our moral obligation,
and of course, our duty, relates directly to only acts of our will. A natural inability must consist in an
inability to will. It is truly
amazing that so many people today fail to see that their ideas of ability and
inability has no connection with morals or religion. How can they so strongly insist that our
moral obligation depends only on acts of our will, and yet spend so much time
talking about an ability or inability to comply with a moral obligation that
relates to outward actions only?
D
Our
natural ability is identical with our free will.
1 Our moral obligation strictly concerns
only acts of our will.
2 Our moral obligation resolves itself
into an obligation to love the Lord our God with all our heart, soul, mind, and
body, and our neighbor as ourselves; in other words, to will the highest good of
others for its own sake.
3 The willing is the doing that the true
spirit of the moral law requires.
Therefore, our ability to will according to the moral law must be our
natural ability to obey God.
But:
4 This is and must be the only proper
freedom of our will, as far as moral law and religion is concerned. Whatever consists in our ability or
power to will, whether it is according to, or opposed to the requirements of
moral law, must constitute true free will.
True free will must consist in our power or ability to will either
according to, or in opposition to our moral obligation. Our moral obligation depends on our
willful acts. What free will can we
have, in relation to our moral obligation, unless our will has the power or
ability to act in conformity with our moral obligation? To say that someone is free to will,
when he does not have the power or the ability to will, is to talk
nonsense.
Many believe that our
ability to do is indispensable to our freedom to do. But if our ability to do is a
requirement for our freedom to do, must not the same be true of willing? That is, mustn’t our ability to will be
essential to our freedom to will?
Natural ability and natural freedom to will must then be the same. Please remember this because many have
explored the doctrine of a natural ability to obey God who have been great
sticklers of free will. They are
horribly inconsistent in this. They
call this ability a natural ability, because it belongs to man as a moral agent
in such a sense that without a natural ability to obey God, he could not be a
proper subject of command, of reward or punishment. That is, without this freedom or ability
we could not be a moral agent, and a proper subject of moral government. We must then, either possess this power
to obey God within us as something essential to our own nature, or we must be
able to use the power that we have to will in every situation according to our
moral obligation. Whatever we can
do, we can only do by willing.
Therefore, either we must possess the power within us to will as God
commands, or we must be able, by willing it, to use the power to make ourselves
willing. If we have the natural
power to will directly, as God requires, or by willing to use that power in
order to will, we are naturally free and able to obey the commandments of
God. Remember that our natural
ability, which is talked about so much, is nothing more or less than our free
will.
E
Our human will is free; therefore, we
have the power or ability to do all our duty.
1 The moral government of God everywhere
assumes and implies that our will is free and that we are naturally able to obey
God. Every command, every threat,
every expostulation, and every denunciation in the Bible implies and
assumes this. The Bible does not
insult our intelligence in this assumption because:
2 Our mind naturally assumes our
free will as a first truth. First
truths are truths that every moral agent assumes. We assume first truths even though we
may rarely think about them. It is
a universal law to assume the truths of cause and effect, the existence and the
infinity of space, the existence and infinity of duration, and many other
truths. Every moral agent assumes
these things whether they are aware of them or not. And even if we deny any one or all of
these first truths, we know that they are true anyway, and we automatically
assume these truths in all our practical judgments. Thus, even if we deny the law and the
doctrine of cause and effect, as some do in theory; we know that we
automatically assume its truth.
Without this assumption, we could not think of doing anything, even
though most of the time, we do not think about this law at all. Nor are we directly aware that we assume
that there is such a law. We always
act on this assumption, and most of the time we are unaware of it. Everything we do is nothing more than
the exercise of our own reason and a practical acknowledgment of the truth,
which in theory we may deny.
It is
the same with free will, and with natural ability. If we did not assume that we have free
will, we would never think of attempting to do anything. We would not so much as think of our
moral obligation, concerning either others or ourselves unless we first assume
that our will is free. In all our
judgments concerning our own moral character and the character of others, we
naturally assume that our will is free, that we are naturally able to obey
God. Although we may not be aware
of this assumption, although we may seldom make our free will the direct subject
of our thoughts or attention, and even though we may deny its reality and
strenuously try to maintain the opposite, we nevertheless, even in our very
denial and endeavors, assume that we are free. We can never reject this truth in our
practical judgments. We all assume
it. We all must assume it. Whenever we choose in one direction, we
must always assume, whether we are aware of the assumption or not, that we have
the power to choose in the opposite direction. If we did not assume this, we could
never think about choosing between two ways or objects. The very ideas of right and wrong, of
the praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of human beings, implies that those who
have these ideas automatically assume universal free will, or that we have the
natural ability, as moral agents, to obey God. If this assumption did not exist, it
would be impossible (from its own nature and laws) for us to affirm our moral
obligation, to know right from wrong, or know the praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness of each and every one of us.
I know that
philosophers and theologians have, in theory, denied the doctrine of natural
ability or liberty in the sense in which I have defined it; and I also know,
that with all their theorizing, they assume, just like everybody else, that man
is free in the sense that he has the freedom or power to will as God
commands. I know that if it weren’t
for this assumption, the human mind could no more establish their
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness than it could direct the motions of a
windmill. Men have often made this
assumption without even being aware of it.
People, have assumed that the things they choose to do are right and
wrong without seeing and understanding the conditions of their assumption. But the fact is, this assumption is
buried deep in our minds as a first truth, that we are free in the sense of
being naturally able to obey God: and this assumption is a necessary condition
of the affirmation that moral character belongs to
man.
F
What constitutes moral inability,
according to those who believe the Calvinistic theory?
I will discuss their
views of moral inability first, because from this we can easily determine what
their views of moral ability are.
Basically, they believe that moral ability and inability is identical
with what they call moral necessity.
By moral necessity, they mean those necessary connections and
consequences that comes from motives, and the connection that there is in many
situations between those motives and certain conscious decisions and
actions. It is in this sense that I
will use the phrase “moral necessity” in the following discussion. By natural necessity, I mean the
necessity that men find themselves under through the force of natural
causes. Moral causes are habits and
dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and influences.
Thus, people placed in
certain circumstances naturally become subjects of particular sensations. They feel pain when somebody injures
their bodies. They see objects that
people present to them in a clear light when their eyes are open. In the same way, they agree to the truth
of certain propositions as soon as they understand the terms; such as two and
two equals four, black is not white, two parallel lines can never cross one
another, a person will fall down when there is nothing to support him, etc. But, there are several things that may
be noted concerning these two kinds of necessity.
1 A moral necessity may be as
absolute as natural necessity. That
is, a moral effect will result from its moral cause just like a natural effect
will result from its natural cause.
Now, we can argue whether the strongest motives determines what we will
choose, or whether our will ever resists our strongest motive, or whether our
will can ever oppose our strongest present inclination, but in some cases the
motive presented to us may be so powerful that we will willfully respond to that
motive. When motives or previous
biases are very strong, it is very difficult to go against them. And if they are even stronger, the
difficulty becomes greater.
Therefore, if they continue to become stronger up to a certain degree, it
might make the difficulty so great that it could be completely impossible to
overcome it, because whatever power men may have to overcome difficulties, that
power is not infinite, and so our power can’t go beyond certain limits. A certain man can overcome ten degrees
of temptation of this kind with twenty degrees of strength because the degrees
of strength are greater than the degrees of temptation. But if the temptation was increased to
thirty, or a hundred, or to a thousand degrees, and yet his strength is not
increased at all, he won’t be able to overcome the temptation. Therefore, we must admit that there is a
sure and perfect connection between moral causes and effects; and this is what I
call moral necessity.
2 The representatives of the
Calvinistic school of thought believe that moral inability consists, either
a In
the presence of motives that force an opposing choice, or
b In the absence of the necessary motives
to
1)
Cause
the choice required by the moral law, or
2)
To
overcome an opposing choice.
3 This school further believes that
moral inability consists in the opposition or the lack of an inclination or
choice that God requires. For when
a person is unable to will or choose something because a motive is defective, it
is the same thing as being unable to choose something because of a lack of an
inclination, or the presence of a contrary inclination.
If a prevalent
contrary inclination is present, it is, according to them:
a Because
there are certain reasons that demand this contrary inclination; and
b Because
there are not enough motives present in the mind to overcome these opposing
motives and inclinations. There are
not enough motives to make the will determine or choose in the direction of
God’s law. By inclination, they
mean choice or conscious decision.
This is clear from what they believe concerning all of this. No one who is familiar with their
writings will deny this. According
to their theory, it follows that the choice is the same as the greatest apparent
good is. And, by the greatest
apparent good, they mean a sense of what is the most
agreeable.
4 Indeed, their theory confuses
desire and will, making them the same thing. They believe our mind possesses two
primary faculties, our will and our understanding. They confuse our emotions with acts of
our will. They believe that our
strongest desire is always identical with our willful choice. When we have a lack of an inclination or
desire, or a lack of the sense of what is the most agreeable, there is a moral
inability according to this Calvinistic philosophy. This lack of the strongest desire,
inclination, or sense of what is most agreeable, happens because:
a Of
the presence of such motives that requires an opposite desire, choice, etc.; and
b Of
the lack of such objective motives that would awaken this required desire, or
necessitate this inclination or sense of the most agreeable.
5 In other words, when a conscious
decision or a choice that is consistent with God’s law, does not exist, it is,
a Because
an opposite choice exists because of the presence of a certain motive; or
b Because
of a lack of sufficiently strong objective motives to bring about the required
choice. Many people today believe
that the motive, and not the agent, is the cause of all our willful
actions. With them, the will is
always influenced in its choice by motives in the same way that physical effects
are produced by their causes.
Let
us continue with what they believe.
Please allow me to quote from the writings of President Edwards. “The difference is that every act of the
will has some cause, and as a result has a necessary connection with that
cause. And so every act of the will
is excited by some motive, because, if the mind, in willing the way it does, has
no motive to excite it, then it has no end to pursue, and so it will aim at
nothing and seek nothing. And, if
it seeks nothing, then it does not go after anything, or exert any inclination
or preference towards anything. For
the mind to will something, and for it to go after something by an act of
preference and inclination, is the same thing.
“But if every act of
the will is produced by a motive, then that motive is the cause of the act. If acts of the will are produced by
motives, then those motives are the causes of those acts of will that are
produced. And if so, the existence
of the acts of the will is the effect of their motives. Motives do nothing, as motives or
inducements, except by their influence; and whatever is done by their influence
is the result of them. For that is
the idea of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence of
something else.
“And if willful acts
are the results of their motives, then they must be connected with their
motives; every effect and event must be connected with something that is the
proper ground and reason of its existence.
Thus it is clear that willing is necessary, and is not from any
self‑determining power within the will.”
6 Therefore, according to this
school, moral inability consists in
a A
lack of an inclination, desire, or sense of the most agreeable, or
b The strength of an opposite desire or an
opposite sense of the most agreeable.
This lack of inclination, desire etc., or this opposing inclination,
desire, etc., is identical with an opposing choice. This opposing choice, or the lack of the
required choice, inclination, or sense of the most agreeable is due to:
1)
Motives
that are present that require the opposite choice; and
2)
The
absence of sufficient motives to produce or necessitate the appropriate choices.
7
Here
then we have the philosophy of this school. A person is unable to choose what God
requires him to choose, when,
a
There
are motives present that produces an opposite choice; and,
b When
there are no such motives in the mind to produce the required choice that are
stronger than any existing and opposing desires or inclinations.
This is the moral
inability of the Calvinists.
G
Their
moral inability to obey God is nothing more than either real disobedience or a
natural inability to obey.
1 If we understand
Calvinists to mean that moral inability consists:
a In
the presence of such motives as to require an opposite choice; and:
b In
the absence of sufficient motives to necessitate a
choice
c
Then
their moral inability is really a natural inability. They call this inability a moral
inability, because it is an inability of the will. But, our will is the only faculty that
determines whether we do right or wrong.
If we can do anything at all, we can do it only by willing, and whatever
we cannot accomplish by willing, we cannot accomplish at all. An inability to will then must be a
natural inability. We are, by
nature, unable to do what we are unable to will to do. Besides, according to them, moral
obligation, strictly, only depends on acts of the will, and willing is the doing
that the moral law either prohibits or requires. Then, if we are unable to will
something, we must be unable to do that thing. If we are unable to will, as God
requires, we must be unable to do what He requires, and this surely is a proper,
and the only proper natural inability.
2 But, if this school
maintains that a moral inability to obey God consists in a lack of choosing what
God requires, or in a choice which is opposed to God’s requirement, then what
they believe is nothing more than disobedience, and their moral inability to
obey is really disobedience. We can
only base our obedience and disobedience on acts of our will. If the required state of our will
exists, there is obedience. If it
does not exist, there is disobedience.
Therefore, by their own admission and beliefs, if they believe that their
moral inability is a state of the will, which is opposed to the law and will of
God, this moral inability is nothing more than disobedience to God. Their moral inability to obey is really
disobedience. It is not merely the
cause of present or future disobedience, but it really constitutes all present
disobedience.
H
What
constitutes moral ability according to this school?
1 According to them moral ability is
the opposite of moral inability.
Moral ability, according to them, consists in willing plus its
cause. That is, their moral ability
to obey God consists in that inclination, desire, choice, or conscious decision
which God requires together with its cause. Or, it consists in the presence of such
motives that are so strong that they direct the will to consent to those
motives. This is as exact a
statement of their views as I can give you. According to this, a man is morally able
to do what he must do; he is morally able to will because he can’t help but will
to do. He is morally able to will
this way because he is caused or forced to will by the presence of such motives
as are, according to them, “permanently connected” with his will by a law of
nature. But this leads us to the
conclusion:
2 Their moral ability to
obey God is nothing more than either real obedience or a natural inability to
disobey.
Strictly speaking,
their moral ability includes both the state of will that is required by the law
of God, and also the cause of this state, which is, the presence of such motives
that provides the choice that God requires. The agent is then able to will because
he is caused to will. Or more
strictly, his ability and his willing are identical. According to them, his moral ability to
will and thus his willing, and the presence of the motives that cause this
willing, are identical. This is
philosophical nonsense! I wouldn’t
treat these notions as ridiculous, if they weren’t ridiculous, or if I could
treat them in any other way, and still do any kind of justice to them. If it sounds ridiculous when I clearly
state their theory, it’s not my fault.
It is fault of the theory itself.
I know it is difficult for you, as it is to me, to connect anything this
ridiculous with so many churches.
But, if an error has entered into and perplexed the church, surely God
desires to raise up those who are willing to go forward to clear up this matter
and blot out the error from under heaven.
Thus,
when we closely examine this theory, this long established and highly honored
fog bank vanishes away; and we find that this popular difference between moral
and natural ability and inability is “a thing of naught” (Isaiah 29:21)
I
I
will now state what I consider are the fundamental errors that this school of
thought makes on the subject of ability.
1 They deny that moral
agents are the cause of their own actions.
They start with the just assumption that every event is an effect,
and every event must have some cause.
The choices and conscious decisions of moral agents are the effects of
some cause. What is that
cause? They assume that every act
of our will must have been caused either by a preceding act of the will, or by
an objective motive. By deductive
reasoning, they easily show that their first hypothesis is absurd, and assume
the truth of the second. But, how
do they know that the sovereign power of the agent is not the cause? Their argument against the sovereign
power of the agent amounts to nothing, because they base their whole doctrine on
a false assumption. If we are aware
of anything, we are aware of the fact that we originate our own choices. Yet, these people rightly believe that
they themselves originate and are the proper cause of their own choices. In their practical judgments, they
assume that all moral agents are the cause of their own actions, or they never
could have had any idea of what moral agency and accountability is. But in theory, they adopt the capital
error of denying the very truth that they assume in their practical judgments,
which is that we originate our own choices. This error is fundamental. Every definition of a moral agent that
denies or overlooks the fact that he is the cause of his own choices is
radically defective. It drops out
of the definition the very element that is essential for freedom and
accountability. Once they deny the
proper causing agent of moral agents, they have to give a false definition of
free moral agency. They rightly
regard the choices of moral agents as effects, but they look in the wrong
direction for the cause. When they
theorize, instead of heeding the affirmation of their own mind that the power of
free will is a prerequisite of our moral agency, they assume the direct
opposite. They look for the cause
of all willful acts outside of the agent.
Thus, they deny the validity of the testimony of their own reason, and
reduce moral agents to mere machines.
It is no wonder that such a major error, defended today with so much
energy, should render generations of professing Christians ineffective and
worthless.
2 Many people today,
believe our soul possesses only two primary faculties, our understanding and our
will. They consider all our
desires, emotions, affections, appetites, and passions as voluntary, and
consisting in acts of our will.
This confuses our emotional states with acts of our will. Because they are aware that our
emotions, which they call affections, desires, appetites and passions, are so
related to their appropriate objects that they are easily excited by them
whenever they are present or when we think about them, and assuming that our
emotions are voluntary states of mind, or actions of our will, they very
naturally conclude that our will is governed by objective motives. Once they assume that our soul has only
two faculties, understanding and will, and that every state of feeling must be a
voluntary state or an act of our will, and once they are aware that our
feelings, desires, affections, appetites and passions, are excited when we think
about their related objects, they can come to no other conclusion than that our
will is determined by motives.
J
I will now present another theological
plan of inability and its philosophy.
1 This philosophy
properly distinguishes between our will and emotions. It sees our soul as consisting of, a)
our mind, b) our will, and c) our emotions. This philosophy does not always break
down the soul into these three sections, or call them by the same names that I
used, but if I understand them, the promoters of this philosophy believe in
their existence by whatever name they choose to call them.
2 This philosophy also
believes that the states of our mind and our emotions are passive and
involuntary.
3 It believes that our
free will is a condition of our moral agency.
4 It also teaches that
our will is free, and consequently that we are free moral agents.
5 It teaches that our
will controls our outward life and directly controls the attention of our mind,
and indirectly controls many of our emotions, desires, affections, appetites,
and passions.
6 This philosophy
teaches that we have the ability to obey God as far as acts of our will are
concerned, and also as far as those acts and states of mind that are under the
direct or indirect control of our will are concerned.
7 But, these theologians
believe that our moral obligation extends beyond our moral agency and beyond the
sphere of our ability. They believe
that free will is essential to our moral agency; that free will or moral agency
does not limit our moral obligation; that moral agency and moral obligation are
not coextensive; and as a result, moral obligation is not limited by our ability
or by moral agency.
8 This philosophy
believes that our moral obligation extends to those states of our mind that lie
completely beyond or outside of the control of our will. It says that our moral obligation
extends not only to voluntary acts and states that come within the direct or
indirect control of our will but it also insists that those mental states that
lie completely beyond our will’s direct or indirect control come within the
realm of our moral legislation and obligation. Therefore, our ability does not limit
our obligation.
9 It seems as if
theologians invented this philosophy to reconcile the doctrine of original sin
with moral obligation. Assuming
that original sin is a doctrine of Divine revelation, it takes the bold and
uncompromising stand that moral obligation extends beyond moral agency and
ability into the region of those mental states that lie entirely outside of the
will’s direct or indirect control.
10 With
this bold assumption, the supporters of this philosophy attempt to support it by
an appeal to the necessary convictions of men and to the authority of the
Bible. They allege that the
instinctive judgments of men, as well as the Bible everywhere, assume that their
philosophy is true.
11 They
admit that a physical inability is inconsistent with moral obligation: but they
of course they deny that the inability that they believe is physical.
K This
brings me to briefly consider the claims of this philosophy of inability.
1 These people assume
that the instinctive universal judgments of men, together with the Bible, prove
that our moral obligation and our moral character extend to the states of mind
in question. They admit that they
must rely on the teachings of the Bible.
They also admit that the instinctive judgments of all men must be
true. But, they don’t admit that
this is either a doctrine of the Bible or a first truth of reason. In fact, they deny both. Neither reason nor Divine revelation
supports the moral character of any state of mind that lies completely beyond
both the direct and the indirect control of our will. Now we cannot allow this philosophy
treat this assumption as if it was true.
Let them show, if they can, that the alleged truth is either a doctrine
of the Bible or a first truth of reason.
Both reason and revelation assumes that our moral obligation and moral
character extend to acts of our will, and to all those outward acts or mental
states that lie within its direct or its indirect control. But beyond this, they don’t! Men are aware of their moral obligation
concerning these acts and states of mind.
They know they are guilty when they fail to comply with their moral
obligation. Who ever blamed himself
for pain, when he received a blow, or got a toothache, or stomach cramps that
wasn’t his fault?
2 Let us look into the
nature of this inability. Please
notice, this school admits that a physical inability is inconsistent with moral
obligation; in other words, that a physical ability is a condition of moral
obligation. But what is a physical
inability? The primary definition
of the word physical, given by Webster, is, “pertaining to nature, or natural
objects”. A physical
inability then, in the primary sense of the term physical, is an inability of
nature. It may be either a material
or a mental inability; that is, it may be either an inability of the body or an
inability of the physical mind.
This
school admits that all human ability resides in our will. Therefore, a proper inability of nature
to perform anything that does not come within the sphere of the direct or
indirect control of our will does exist.
Therefore, it is obvious that the inability they fight for must be a
proper natural inability, or an inability of nature. This they fully admit and maintain. However, they do not call this a
physical inability because, by their own admissions, it would overthrow their
favorite doctrine. It seems like
they want to assume that a physical inability must be a moral inability. But, where is the authority for such an
assumption? There is no authority
for it! A proper inability of
nature must be a physical inability, not a moral inability. It doesn’t matter at all whether the
inability belongs to the physical body or to the mind. If it is constitutional, and properly an
inability of nature, it is nonsense to deny that this is a physical inability,
or to maintain that it can be consistent with our moral obligation. It is foolish to reply that this
inability, though a real inability of nature, is not physical but moral, and
thus it is a sinful inability.
Beloved, this argument assumes that the assumption is true. You can’t do that!
3 This school of
theology maintains that this inability was created when Adam first sinned. His first sin plunged him and all his
descendants, by a natural law, into a total inability of nature to render any
obedience to God. With this first
sin, Adam inherited a nature “completely sinful in every faculty and part of
both the body and the soul”. This
constitutional sinfulness is the inability that this theory teaches. But notice, they claim that it is not a
physical inability, because it is a sinful inability! This is an important theological
distinction! It’s truly
amazing! But, if this inability is
sinful, it is important to ask, whose sin is it? Who is to blame for it? Why, they tell us that this sin is the
sin of the one who inherited it by the natural law of descent from parent to
child without his knowledge or consent.
This sinful nature, which we receive before we are born, and has nothing
to do with committing any actual transgressions, the entire human race worthy of
and exposed to the wrath and curse of God forever. A natural or physical law transmits this
sinfulness down to us from Adam, but it is not a physical inability. It is something that we inherit and
belongs to every individual and is part of both our body and our soul. A physical law from parent to child
transmits it. Therefore, it must be
something physical.
But, they tell us that
it can’t be a physical inability, because first, it is sinful, and second,
because a physical inability is inconsistent with moral obligation. Here, then, we have their reasons for
claiming that this is not a physical inability: because if it was physical, it
would make moral obligation impossible, and therefore it would not be
sinful. But, they say that it is
sinful, therefore it cannot be physical.
But, how do we know that it is sinful? Why, they tell us that the instinctive
judgments of men, and the Bible everywhere affirms and assumes that it is
sinful. They tell us, that both the
instinctive judgments of men and the Bible affirm and assume, both the inability
in question and the sinfulness of it: “that we should be able, but we are
not”. In other words, they say that
God must condemn us for this inability of nature that God forces on us without
our knowledge or consent so that we now deserve the wrath and curse of God
forever. We are under a moral
obligation not to have this sinful nature.
We deserve damnation for having it.
Certainly, we are unable to put it away, and we never had any part
whatsoever in its existence. But so
what? They tell us, “moral
obligation is not limited by our ability.”
They say that, the fact that we are as unable to change our nature, as we
are to create a world, is no reason why we should not be under an obligation to
do it, since “moral obligation does not imply ability of any kind to do what we
are under obligation to do!” Just
as I was about to expose the folly and absurdity of these assertions, they
stopped me! They told me that I am
not allowed to reason on this subject.
I will deceive others and myself if I listen to the “miserable logic of
my reason”. Instead, we rely on the
intuitive affirmations of reason and the Bible. That is where we must lodge our
appeal. O.K. The Bible defines sin as a transgression
of the law. What law have we
violated in inheriting this nature?
What law requires us to have a different nature from something that we
possess? Does reason affirm that we
are deserving of the wrath and curse of God forever, for inheriting a sinful
nature from Adam?
What law of reason
have we transgressed in inheriting this nature? Reason cannot condemn us, unless we have
violated some law that our reason can recognize as such. Our reason indignantly rebukes such
nonsense. Does the Bible hold us
responsible for impossibilities?
Does the Bible require of us to do those things that we cannot do by
willing to do it? No, but the Bible
does say that “For if there is first a willing mind, it is accepted according to
what one has, and not according to what he does not have.” (2 Cor. 8:12) This passage means that if one wills as
God directs, he has thereby met his entire obligation; that he has done all that
is naturally possible for him, and therefore nothing more is required. In this passage, the Bible clearly
limits our obligation by our ability.
We have repeatedly seen this in earlier lectures. The law also limits our obligation by
our ability. It only requires that
we should love the Lord our God with all our strength, that is, with all our
ability, and to love our neighbor as ourselves.
Does reason hold us
responsible for impossibilities, or affirm our obligation to do or be what it is
impossible for us to do and be? No
indeed! Our reason never did and
never can condemn us for our nature.
Our reason can never hold us worthy of the wrath and curse of God simply
for possessing a human nature.
Nothing is more shocking and revolting to our reason, than the
assumptions that this philosophy in question makes. Every man’s conscious must agree with
this.
But, isn’t it true
that some condemn themselves for their “sinful” nature and judge themselves to
be worthy of the wrath and curse of God forever for its sinfulness? The framers of the Westminster
Confession of Faith think so.
Imagine! Moral agents
condemning themselves and judging themselves worthy of the wrath and curse of
God forever for possessing a nature given to them by a natural law without their
knowledge or consent! This can
never happen. However, is it true
that we instinctively affirm our obligation that we are able to obey God; while,
at the same time, we affirm that we are not able? I answer, no. We know that we are under obligation,
because deep down in our heart lies the assumption that we are able to comply
with God’s requirements. We know we
are able to obey simply by exercising our will to control our outward life
directly, and to control the states of our mind and our emotions either directly
or indirectly. We base our
knowledge of our obligation on this awareness. We also base our praiseworthiness and
blameworthiness concerning these acts and states of mind on this awareness. If it weren’t for the fact that we are
aware of our ability, no knowledge of our moral obligation, or of our
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, would be possible.
But, don’t those who
affirm both their inability and their obligation deceive themselves? I answer, yes. It is common for people to overlook
assumptions that lie deep in their hearts.
It is true that God requires from men, especially under the gospel, what
they are unable to do directly in their own strength. In other words, God requires that they
rely on His strength, to open their hearts up to receive His grace as the
condition of being what He requires them to be. In spite of this, we cannot cay that God
requires any more than we are able to do.
God requires us to rely on His strength. We certainly have the power to do
this. He requires us to rely on His
grace and strength, and thereby to rise up to a higher knowledge of Himself, and
to a higher state of holiness than would otherwise be possible for us. The direct requirement is to believe, to
rely on His strength, to receive the Holy Spirit, or to receive Christ who
stands at the door and knocks and waits for you to let Him in. The indirect requirement is to rise to a
higher degree of the knowledge of God, and to spiritual attainments that are
impossible for us in our own strength.
We have the ability to obey the direct commands directly and the indirect
commands indirectly. That is, we
are able by the virtue of our nature, together with the grace of the Holy
Spirit, to comply with all the requirements of God. So that, in fact, there is no proper
inability involved here.
But aren’t people
often aware of there is a lot of problems that prevents us from rendering to God
all that we affirm ourselves under obligation to render? I answer, yes. But strictly speaking, they must admit
their direct or indirect ability as a condition of affirming their
obligation. These problems, which
comes from their physical depravity and the power of temptation from without, is
the foundation or cause of the spiritual warfare that the Scriptures mention,
and which all Christians are aware of.
But, the Bible abundantly teaches, that through grace we are able to be
more than conquerors. If we are
able to be conquerors through grace, we are able to avail ourselves of the
provisions of grace, so that there is no proper inability in this
situation. No matter how great the
problems may be, we are able through Christ to overcome them all. This we must and do assume as a
condition of our moral obligation.