X.  THE FOUNDATION OF OUR MORAL OBLIGATION   THE PRACTICAL TENDENCY OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES. 

I have just examined several principal theories for the purpose of preparing the way to expose the practical results of those various theories, and to show how they result in some of the most soul‑destroying errors that cripple the church and curse the world today.

A     I will begin with the theory that claims that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of our moral obligation. 
     This theory leads to a completely wrong concept of both the character of God, and the nature, purpose and design of His government.  If God’s will is the foundation of our moral obligation, then God must be an arbitrary sovereign.  This means that God is not under law Himself, and He has no rule to go by to regulate His conduct, and so there is no law by which either He or any other being can judge His moral character.  Indeed, unless He is subject to law, unless he is a subject of moral obligation, God can have no moral character, for to have moral character you must have moral law and moral obligation.  If God’s will is not under the law of His infinite reason, or if God’s will is not conformed to the law imposed upon it by His intelligence, then His will must be arbitrary in the sense that it has no regard for reason, or for the nature and relationships of moral agents.  But if God’s will is under the law of His reason, if He acts from principle, or has good and benevolent reasons for His conduct, then His will is not the foundation of His moral obligation, so His will can not be the foundation of our moral obligation.  But those reasons that motivate God to act, says that He should will in conformity to those reasons.  In other words, if the importance of His own good and that of the universe is the foundation of His moral obligation; if His reason affirms His obligation to choose this as His ultimate end, and to consecrate His infinite energies to the realization of it; and if His will is conformed to this law it follows:

1     That God’s will is not the foundation of our moral obligation.

2     That God has infinitely good and wise reasons for what He wills, says, and does.

3     That God is never arbitrary, but He always acts according to right principles, and for reasons that, when we finally know what they are, will compel our respect and even the admiration of every intelligent being in the universe.

4     That creation and providential and moral government are the necessary means to an infinitely wise and good end.  Existing evils are only unavoidably incidental to this infinitely wise and loving arrangement, and, although these evils can appear great, they are, by far, much less than what would have been if there were no creation and no government.  It is conceivable, that a plan of administration might have been adopted that would have prevented many of today’s evils; but if we admit that God has been governed by reason in selecting the end He has in view, and in using the best means to accomplish that end, it will follow that the evils that exist today are less than would have existed under any other plan of God’s administration; or at least, that the present system, with all its evils, is the best that infinite wisdom and love could adopt. 

5     These evils, therefore, do not detract from the evidence that God is wise and good; for in all these things God does not act from impulse, or malice, or some arbitrary sovereignty, but He acts according to the law of His infinite reason, and, of course, God has infinitely good and worthy reasons for what He does and what He allows to be done; reasons so good and so worthy that He could not do anything else without violating His own moral law of His own intelligence, and therefore committing infinite sin.

6     It also follows that we have reason for perfect confidence, love, and submission to His Divine will in all things.  That is, if His will is not arbitrary, but His will conforms to the law of His infinite reason, then we must also conform to God’s law.

B     Obeying all of God’s requirements is completely safe.  We can submit to all of His dealings with us, no matter how mysterious they may appear to us, because we have the assurance that all His dealings with us are perfectly wise and good.  Not only are we safe in obeying all of His requirements, but we are under an infinite obligation to obey; not because God has some arbitrary will that we must obey, but because His will reveals to us the end we should choose and the means we need to use to secure the end.  His will is law, not in the sense that the law originates arbitrarily in His will, but in the sense that the law is a revelation of, not only the end we ought to seek and the means by which that end can be secured.  Indeed this is the only proper idea of law.  Law does not impose any obligation all by itself, but the law is only a revelation of our obligation.  Law is a condition, but it is not the foundation, of our moral obligation.  The will of God is a condition of our obligation to love God, only as far as it is indispensable to our knowledge of the end we should seek, and the means we must use to secure this end.  Once we know these things, we have an obligation to love God whether God has revealed His will or not.  The truths we have just mentioned, and many other important truths, follow from the fact that the good of others, and not the arbitrary will of God, is the foundation of our moral obligation.  But none of this can be true if His will is the foundation of our obligation.  Nor can anybody who consistently believes that God’s will is the foundation of his obligation, believe any truth of the law or gospel.  No, he cannot have a correct concept of one truth of God’s moral government.  Let me prove this.  

1     Can anyone who believes that God’s will is the foundation of our moral obligation believe that God’s will is wise and good, unless he admits that God’s will is subject to the law of His reason?  If he believes that God’s will is the foundation of our moral obligation, he must either deny that God’s will is evidence of what is wise and good (which he won’t do), or he must maintain the absurd statement that whatever God wills is wise and good simply because God wills it; and if God decides to do something completely opposite to what He is doing, it would still be equally wise and good.  But, any reasonable moral agent should find this statement ridiculous.

2     If this person believes that God’s sovereign will is the foundation of his moral obligation, he cannot regard God as having any moral character because there is no standard for him to judge what God wills and does.  His own statement suggests that God has no intelligent or reasonable rule of action, and, therefore, God has no moral character based on the supposition that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of our moral obligation.  Therefore, God is not a moral agent, and can have no idea of the moral character of His own actions; for, based on the supposition in question, His actions have no moral character.  Any one, therefore, who believes that God is not a subject of moral law imposed on Him by His own reason, but instead believes that His sovereign will is the foundation of our moral obligation, must, if he is consistent, deny that God has any moral character.  He must also deny that God is an intelligent being, or else he must admit that God is infinitely wicked for not conforming His will to the law of His reason; and for not being guided by His infinite reason, instead of setting up an arbitrary sovereign will.

3     He who believes that God’s sovereign will is the foundation of our moral obligation, if he is consistent in his thinking, cannot provide any reason for either confidence in Him or submission to Him.  If God does not have any good reasons for what He commands, why should we obey Him?  If He doesn’t have good and wise reasons for what He says and does, why should we submit to Him?  Will the answer be that if we refuse, we refuse at our peril, and therefore, we feel like we have to submit to God, even if God does not have reasons for what He does and requires?  Based on this theory, it is impossible for anyone to submit to God with their whole heart.  If we know that God does not have any good and wise reasons for His commands and his conduct, it becomes naturally impossible, from the laws of our nature, to do anything more than pretend to obey and submit to Him.  Some will even pretend to be Christians and play church.  The Bible calls this paying lip service.  The condition of our heart‑obedience to God’s requirement and the condition for submitting to His Providence is the assumption that He has good and wise reasons for everything He says and does.  But if you assume that God doesn’t have any good and wise reasons for what He says and does, you make true heart‑obedience, confidence, and submission impossible.  It is perfectly clear, therefore, that anyone who believes this false theory has wrong ideas about God, His law, the gospel, and moral government.  It is impossible for that person  to have an intelligent piety.  His religion, if he has any at all, must be sheer superstition, since he doesn’t know the true God, or the true reason why he should love, believe, obey, or submit to Him.  In short, he knows nothing about the nature of true religion, and has no concept of what constitutes virtue.  I am not saying that one, who says they believe that God’s sovereign will is the foundation of our moral obligation has no true knowledge of God, or no true religion.  No, many are so purely theorists on this subject, and so happily inconsistent with themselves, that they actually have, after all, a practical judgment in favor of the truth.  They don’t see the logical consequences of their theory, and, of course, they do not embrace those logical consequences, and this happy inconsistency is an indispensable condition of their salvation.  

4     Another deadly consequence of this theory is that those who adhere to it will give false instruc­tions to inquiring sinners.  Indeed, if they are ministers, the whole logical foundation of their instructions is false.  They must not only represent God to their hearers as an absolute and arbitrary sovereign, but they must represent religion as consisting in submitting to an arbitrary sovereignty.  If sinners ask “what must we do to be saved?” these teachers must basically answer, “you must cast yourselves on the sovereignty of a God whose law is solely an expres­sion of His arbitrary will, and whose every requirement and purpose is based on His arbitrary sovereignty”.  This is the God whom they must love, in whom they must believe, and whom they must serve with a willing mind.  How infinitely different such instructions are from those that would be given by someone who knows the truth.  The born-again believer would represent God to an inquiring sinner as infinitely reasonable in all His requirements, and in all His ways.  He would represent the sovereignty of God as consisting, not in some arbitrary will, but in unselfish love that is directed by infinite knowledge to promote the highest good of others.  He would represent God’s law, not as the expression of His arbitrary will, but as having its foundation in the self‑existing nature of God, and in the nature of moral agents, he would represent God’s law; as being the very rule which agrees with the nature and relationships of all moral agents.  He would tell the sinner that the requirements of the law are not arbitrary, but it the very thing God requires is indispensable to our highest good.  He will say that God does not make up the rules as He pleases, but He requires what He does because it is required in the very nature of things; and His requirements do not create right, but He requires only something that is naturally and necessarily right.  These and many similar things would irresistibly commend the character of God to the human mind as worthy to be trusted, and as someone to whom submission is infallibly safe and infinitely reasonable. 
     The fact is, the idea of arbitrary sovereignty is shocking and revolting, not only to the human heart, but also to the human mind.  Religion, based on the concept that God’s character, sovereignty, and govern­ment is arbitrary, must be sheer superstition or gross fanaticism. 

5Next, let’s glance at the legitimate results of the theory of the selfish school.  This theory teaches that our own interest is the foundation of our moral obligation.  In talking with a distinguished defender of this philosophy, I asked the theorist to define moral obligation, and this was the definition he gave: “It is the obligation of a moral agent to seek his own happiness.”  Let me make a few remarks about the results that happen when people believe such nonsense.

6     This theory directly and inevitably leads to the confirmation and increase of sin in the soul.  All sin resolves itself into a spirit of self‑seeking, or into a desire to seek good to self, which is based on condition of its relationship to self, rather than seeking good impartially and unselfishly.  This philosophy treats this spirit of self‑seeking as virtue, and only requires that, in our efforts to secure our own happiness, we should not interfere with the rights of others in seeking their happiness.  But here we may ask, when these philosophers insist that virtue consists in willing our own happiness, and that in seeking it, we must respect the rights and happiness of others, do they mean that we are to have a positive, or a negative regard for the rights and happiness of others?  If they mean that we are to have a positive regard for others’ rights and happiness, then they are denying their theory, and accepting the true one, which is that the happiness of each one shall be esteemed according to its importance, or for its own sake?  In other words, that we should be love unselfishly? 
     But if they mean that we are to regard our neighbor’s happiness negatively, that is, don’t hinder it, what is this but the most absurd thing conceivable?  What!  I don’t need to care for my neighbor’s happiness, I don’t need to will my neighbor’s happiness as a good all by itself, and for its own importance, and yet I must take care not to hinder it.  But why?  Why, because his good is just as important as my own.  Now, if this is a good reason why I should not hinder his happiness, it is also a good reason why I should will his happiness positively and unselfishly; which is the same thing as the true theory.  But if this isn’t a sufficient reason to impose an obligation to will our neighbor’s happiness positively, it can never impose obligation to avoid hindering it, and I may then pursue my own happiness in my own way without the slightest concern for others. 

7     If this theory is true, then sinful and holy beings are the same as far as their ultimate intention is concerned.  They have precisely the same end in view, and the difference only lies in the means that they use to promote their own happiness.  Sinners know they are seeking their own happiness.  If moral agents are under obligation to seek their own happiness as the supreme end of life, it follows, that holy beings also seek their own happiness as the supreme end of life.  So that holy and sinful beings are the same as far as the end for which they live is concerned; the only difference is in the different means they use of to promote this end.  But notice, the supporters of this philosophy can’t give any reason why they use different means, only that they differ in their choice of means.  Remember, this philosophy denies that we are required to have a positive and unselfish regard for our neighbor’s interest; and, of course, love does not prevent the holy from using the same means as the wicked.  Where, therefore, is the difference in their character, although they do use different means?  I say again, there is no difference.  There really is and can be no difference in character between them unless this difference is because love reigns in the heart of one, and selfishness reigns in the heart of the other.  According to theier theory, the only thing that is right is their intention to promote their own happiness; and what is wrong or right depends on whether they intend to promote this result selfishly or not.  For if our moral obligation is based on our ultimate intention only, it follows that our ultimate intention is right or wrong all by itself, and all other things are right or wrong as they proceed from a right or wrong ultimate intention.  This must be true. 
     Furthermore, if our own happiness is the foundation of our moral obligation, it follows that this is the ultimate end that we aim for, and we base our concept of right or wrong on whether it promotes our own happiness or not.  Furthermore, everything else must be right or wrong to us as it proceeds from our intention.  Based on this theory, we must do whatever, in our own eyes, promotes our own happiness, not because of its importance as a part of the good of the universe, but simply because it is our own happiness.  To seek happiness as a part of universal happiness, and not because it is our own, would be to act on the true theory, or the theory of unselfish love, which this theory denies.

8     If I believe in this theory, I cannot love God supremely, or my neighbor as myself.  If I love God and my neighbor, it would only be because it’s a means to promote my own happiness, which is not loving God or my neighbor, but loving myself supremely.

9     This theory teaches radical errors concerning the character and the government of God.  The defenders of this theory hold fundamentally false views concerning holiness and virtue in God and man.  They don’t know the difference between virtue and vice.

10          The teachers of this theory fatally mislead all who follow their instructions.  In preaching, they can only appeal to people’s hopes and fears.  All their instructions confirm selfishness.  The motives they present stirs up zeal within themselves to secure their own happiness.  If they pray, it will only be to implore the help of God to accomplish their own selfish ends.  This theory blinds its advocates to the fundamental truths of morality and religion, and it is hardly conceivable that one could more efficiently serve the devil than by accepting this philosophy.

C    Let us now look into the natural and necessary results of utilitarianism.  This theory teaches that the usefulness of an action or of a choice makes it obligatory for us to choose that action or choice.  That is, I am required to will good, not for the importance of the good all by itself; but because willing good tends to produce good.  I am required to choose an end, not because of the importance of that end, but because willing it tends to secure that end.  The absurdity of this theory has been sufficiently exposed.  We only need to look at the results of this theory. 
     This theory naturally draws our attention away from our ultimate intention.  Indeed, it seems that those who support this theory must have only outward actions in mind when they maintain that the tendency of an action is the reason for our obligation to do it.  It’s hard to believe that they should insist that the reason for choosing an ultimate end should be the tendency that the choice has to secure that end.  This is so obvious a contradiction that it is difficult to believe that they have any ultimate intention in mind when they make such a statement.  An ultimate end is always chosen for its own importance, and not because the choice tends to secure it.  How, then, is it possible for them to believe that the tendency of a choice to secure an ultimate end is the reason for our obligation to make that choice?  But, if they don’t have their eyes on the ultimate intention when they speak of moral obligation, they are talking about an obligation, which is without morality.  A true utilitarian, therefore, cannot have the right concept of the nature of morality or virtue.  He cannot consistently believe that virtue consists in willing the highest good of God and of the universe as an ultimate end, or for its own sake.  On the other hand, he must confine his ideas of moral obligation to willful and outward actions that have no morality, and he gives totally false reasons for the tendency of these actions to secure an end, that have nothing to do with the importance of the end that those actions tend to secure.

D    This is the proper place to speak about the doctrine of appropriateness.  This is a doctrine strenuously maintained by Utilitarians, and strenuously opposed by Rightarians.  The doctrine of appropriate­ness says that whatever is appropriate is right.  This doctrine says that the appropriateness of an action is the foundation of our obligation to do it.  It is easy to see that this is the same thing as saying that the usefulness of an action is the reason why we should do it.  Because usefulness, tendency, and appropriateness, are only conditions of our obligation to obey, these things can never be the foundation of our obligation.  The foundation of our obligation is always the importance of the end to which our conscious decisions, actions, or measures, are only means to that end.  I am not surprised that Rightarians object to this, although I do wonder at the reason why, which is, that they believe that any action or conscious decision (other than an ultimate intention) can be right or wrong by itself without any consideration whether it is appropriate or useful.  This is absurd, and contradicts their own doctrine that moral obligation belongs strictly to our ultimate intention.  If moral obligation belongs only to our ultimate intention, then nothing but our ultimate intention can be right or wrong all by itself.  And, everything else, that is, all our willful and outward actions must be right or wrong as they proceed from a right or wrong ultimate intention.  This is the only way Rightarians can accept their doctrine of appropriateness, namely, that it relates exclusively to willful and outward actions.  And, this they can admit only because they assume that willful and outward actions have no moral character all by themselves, but are right or wrong only because they proceed from a right or wrong ultimate intention.  All schools that believe that the doctrine that moral obligation concerns our ultimate intention only, must deny that anything can be either right or wrong outside of an ultimate intention.   

1     Furthermore, if they believe that the doctrine that moral obligation concerns our ultimate intention only they must also believe that any usefulness, appropriateness, or tendency to promote an ultimate end, are conditions of their obligation to make those conscious decisions and actions as means to that end.  Not only that, they must also believe that their obligation to use those means must be based on the importance of the end, and not in the tendency of the means to secure their end; for unless the end is important all by itself, the tendency of the means to secure that end can impose no obligation to use those means.  Tendency, utility, appropriateness, then, are only conditions of our obligation to use a means, but tendency or appropriateness can never be the foundation of our moral obligation.  Our obligation concerning what we do is always based on the importance of the end that what we do is a means to that end, and our obligation is conditioned on the tendency of the means to secure that end.

2     An ultimate end can never be chosen simply because it is appropriate.  Our ultimate end must be chosen for its own sake.  Our ultimate intention is right or wrong all by itself, and no question of its usefulness, appropriateness, or tendency has anything to do with our obligation to choose that end.  There is only one ultimate reason for this choice, namely, the importance of the end all by itself.  It is true, then, that whatever is appropriate is right only on the condition that it is appropriate.  The question then, “Is it appropriate?” Concerning our outward action, it is always appropriate because our obligation to act turns on the condition that it is appropriate.  But concerning our ultimate intention, or choosing an ultimate end, questioning the appropriateness of our choice or intention is never proper, because our obligation is based only on the importance of the end.  We possess the powers of moral agents.  We have the ability to perceive the end on which our intention should terminate, and that end is the good of everything that exists in the universe.  But the error of the utilitarian, who says that appropriateness is the foundation of our moral obligation, is fundamental, for, in fact, what they say cannot be true in any situation whatever.  I say again, that all schools who believe that moral obligation depends on our ultimate intention only, must, if they are consistent, maintain that things like usefulness, or appropriateness, are only conditions of our obligation to perform any outward action.  

3     Therefore, in practice or in daily life, what is appropriate must have a place.  Therefore, those who cry out against what is appropriate don’t know what they are talking about.  However, it is impossible to proceed in practice with the utilitarian philosophy.  The utilitarian philosophy teaches that the tendency of whatever we do to secure good, and not the importance of the good, is the foundation of our obligation to do it.  But, this is absurd.  For unless we assume that the importance of the end is the foundation of our obligation to choose it, it is impossible to affirm our obligation to do anything to secure that end.  The folly and the danger of utilitarianism is that it overlooks the true foundation of our moral obligation, and, as a result, it overlooks the true nature of virtue or holiness.  A utilitarian cannot have a clue what virtue or happiness is.  The teachings of a utilitarian are filled with errors.  Instead of representing virtue as consisting in unselfish love, or in consecrating our soul to the highest good of others for its own sake, the utilitarian must represent virtue as consisting completely in works and in using various means to promote good.  In other words, they put their faith in works that consist only in willful and outward actions that, strictly speaking, have no moral character in them.  Thus, consistent utilitarianism repeatedly teaches fundamen­tally false ideas of the nature of virtue.  Of course, they must also teach equally wrong ideas concern­ing the character of God, the spirit and meaning of His law, the nature of repentance, of sin, of regeneration and, in short, of every practical doctrine of the Bible. 

E     The practical bearings and the tendency of Rightarianism.
     Please remember that this philosophy teaches that right is the foundation of our moral obligation.  With its advocates, virtue consists in willing right for the sake of right, instead of loving the Lord with all their hearts and their neighbor as themselves.  They believe that virtue consists in willing our good for the sake of right, and not for the sake of good; or, in other words, the foundation of our obligation consists in the rightness of the relationship that exists between the choice and the good.  This right is the ultimate end to be aimed at in all things, instead of the highest good of others for its own sake. 

1     If the Rightarian theory is true, there must be a law of right that is opposed to the law of love or benevolence.  The advocates of this theory often assume that such a law exists.  They speak about many things as being right or wrong all by themselves, completely independent of the law of love.  In fact they go so far as to claim that it is possible that doing right could result in universal misery; and that, in such a situation, we would still be under an obligation to do right, even though universal misery would result.  They assume that right has absolutely no relationship to willing the highest good of others for its own sake.  They assume that the law of right is not only separate from the law of love, but it may be directly opposed to it; that a moral agent might be under an obligation to will, as an ultimate end, something that he knows must promote and secure universal misery.  Rightarians sternly maintain that right must be right, and that virtue must be virtue, as though this result was produced automatically.  What is this but claiming that moral law may require moral agents to set their hearts on and consecrate themselves to that that must be subversive to the good of the entire universe?  And what is this but assuming that moral law may require a course of willing and acting which is entirely inconsistent with the nature and relationships of moral agents?  Thus, their idea of virtue and love may not only be different but also may be opposite to true love.  According to their doctrine, unselfish love in some situations may be considered sin.  This is not only opposed to our reason, but I’m sure you can’t hardly think of a more important or dangerous error in morals or philosophy can hardly be conceived. 
     Nothing but unselfish love is or can be right as an ultimate choice.  Only something that requires the highest good of God and of the universe can be moral law.  This should be chosen as an ultimate end.  We know loving God and our neighbor is right.  Rightarianism overlooks and misrepresents the very nature of moral law.  Let any one contemplate the grossness of this absurdity that maintains that moral law may require a course of willing that results in universal and perfect misery.  What then would moral law have to do with the nature and relationships of moral agents, except to mock, insult, and trample them under foot?  Moral law is, and must be, the law of nature that is suited to the nature and relationships of moral agents.  But can that law be suited to the nature and relationships of moral agents that requires a course of action that can result in universal misery?  Rightarianism then, not only overlooks, but also flatly contradicts, the very nature of moral law, and sets up its own law of right in direct opposition to the law of nature. 

2     This philosophy naturally leads to fanaticism. 
     Conceiving as it does that right may be distinct from, and is often opposed to true love, it scoffs at the idea of asking what the highest good demands.  This philosophy insists that certain things are right or wrong all by themselves, without considering what the highest good demands.  They’ve established, in their minds, a law of right that is separate from, and perhaps, at times, opposed to true unselfish love.  What frightful conduct could this philosophy lead to?  This is indeed a law of fanaticism.  The tendency of this philosophy is illustrated in the spirit of many reformers who are bitterly contending for a right that will do nobody any good.

3     This philosophy teaches a false morality and a false religion.  It exalts above God what appears to be right, and represents virtue as consisting in the love of right instead of the love of God.  It exhorts men to will what right for the sake of what is right, instead of willing the good of others for the sake of the good.  It teaches us to ask, “How shall I do right?” instead of, “How shall I do good?”  “What is right?” instead of, “What will most promote the good of the universe?”  Now something that most promotes the highest good of others is right.  To intend the highest good of God and of the universe is right.  To use the necessary means to promote this end is right; and whatever means are used is right because what we do is designed to promote the highest good of God and of the universe.  But Rightarianism points to an opposite course.  It says: “Will what is right for the sake of what is right.  Do not ask “what can I do for the highest good of others”, for you should have nothing to do with this; your business is to will what is right for the sake of what is right.” 
     If you ask how you are to know what is right, your question does not direct you to the law of love as the only standard, but it directs you to some abstract idea of right, as an ultimate rule, which has no regard for the law of love.  It tells you that right is right simply because it is right, and not because right conforms to the law of unselfish love.  Certainly, such teaching is radically false, and subversive of all sound morality and true religion.

4     As we have seen earlier, this philosophy does not represent virtue as consisting in the love of God, or of Christ, or of our neighbor.  Consistency must require the supporters of this doctrine to give fundamentally false instructions to inquiring sinners.  Instead of representing God and all holy beings as devoted to the public good, and instead of exhorting sinners to love God and their neighbor, this philosophy represents God and holy beings as consecrated to right for the sake of right.  They must encourage sinners, who ask what they shall do to be saved, to will the right for the sake of the right, to love the right, to deify right, and fall down and worship it.  There is a lot of this false morality and religion in the world and in the church.  The unsaved are great sticklers for this religion, and often exhibit as much of it as some Rightarian professors of religion do.  It is a severe, stern, loveless, Godless, Christ less philosophy, and its obvious inconsistencies prevent its advocates from making much progress in promoting it to the world.  The law of right, when conceived of as being independent from the law of love, is a perfect strait‑jacket, an iron collar, and a snare of death.

a     This philosophy represents war, slavery, the death penalty, and many similar things as wrong because they connect these things with selfishness.  Anything that includes and implies selfishness is wrong.  All war waged for selfish purposes is wrong.  But war waged for benevolent purposes, or war required by the law of love, and engaged in for a benevolent purpose, is neither wrong all by itself, nor wrong in any proper sense.  Holding anyone in bondage for selfish reasons is wrong all by itself, but holding a person in bondage in obedience to the law of love is not wrong but right.  And this is true with everything else.  Therefore, anytime they insist that all war, all slavery, the death penalty, the killing of animals, eating meat, or anything else is wrong all by itself; they insist that those things imply selfishness.  But Rightarianism will insist that all war, all slavery, and so many other things are wrong all by themselves without any regard to their relationship to the law of love. 
     Any philosophy that assumes the existence of a law of right that is different from the law of love, must teach many doctrines that are at war with both reason and revelation.  It sets men in chase of a philosophical abstraction as the supreme end of life, instead of the concrete reality of the highest good of God and the universe.  It preys on the human soul, and turns into solid iron all its tender emotions.

b     Let’s look at a person who is supremely devoted to an abstraction as his goal in life.  He wills the right for the sake of the right.  He wills the good of others because of the relationship of rightness that exists between his choice and its object.  For this he lives, and moves, and has his being.  What sort of religion is this?  Now I am not insinuating that professed Rightarians pursue their theory to its extreme limits, or that they manifest the spirit that it naturally produces.  No, I am very happy in acknowledging that with many, and perhaps with most of them, it is so purely a theory, that they are not greatly influenced by it in practice.  Many of them I regard as excellent people, and I am happy to count them among my dearest and most valued friends.  But I speak about this philosophy with its natural results, when it is embraced not merely as a theory, but when it becomes adopted by the heart as their goal in life.  It is only in such cases that its natural and legitimate fruits appear.  Remember that only conforming to moral law is right.  Remember that moral law is the law of nature, or the law based on the nature and relationships of moral agents.  Remember that the law that requires just that course of willing and action that naturally secures the highest good of all moral agents.  Remember that moral law requires this course of willing and acting for the sake of the end in which naturally and governmentally results, and requires that this end shall be aimed at or intended by all moral agents as the supreme good and the only ultimate end of life.  I say, only think about these truths, and you will never talk of a right, or a virtue, or a law, or an obedience that results in universal misery; nor will you even conceive that such a thing is possible.

F     Finally, I come to the consideration of the practical bearings of the true theory of the foundation of our moral obligation, namely, that the nature and importance of the highest good of God and of the universe is the sole foundation of our moral obligation.  

1     If this theory is true, then the whole subject of our moral obligation becomes perfectly simple and understandable.  It becomes so simple that “the wayfaring man, though a fool, cannot err therein”.  (Isaiah 35:8)  Every moral agent knows, in every possible situation, what is right, and he can never be wrong about his real duty.

2     His duty is to will this end with all the conditions and means that he is aware of.  Focusing on this end with a single eye, and doing what appears to him to be what is best to secure this end, he does his duty.  If he is wrong concerning what is the best means of securing this end, still, if his intention comes from a heart full of unselfish love, he does not sin.  He has done right, for he has willed as he should, and he has acted outwardly thinking that he was obeying under the best light he could obtain.  This is his duty.  He is not wrong about his duty; because it was his duty to will as he intended, and under the circumstances, to act as he acted.  How else should he act?  

3     If a moral agent can know what his purpose or his goal in life is, he can always know whether he is right or wrong.  The only thing a moral agent needs to know for sure is whether he lives for the right end, and in this, he will know whether he is honest or dishonest.  If he would simply ask at anytime, “what is right” or “what is my duty”, he won’t need to wait for a reply.  It is right for him to intend the highest good of others as an end.  If he honestly intends the highest good of others as an end, he cannot be wrong about his duty, for if he honestly intends the highest good of others as an end he really performs his whole duty.  With this honest intention, it is impossible that he should not use whatever means are available to promote this end according to the best light he has.  This is right!  A single eye to the highest good of God and the universe is the whole of morality, and, based on this theory, moral law, moral government, moral obliga­tion, virtue, vice, and the whole subject of morals and religion become simple and perfect.  If this theory is true, no honest mind can ever mistake his path of duty.  To intend the highest good of others is right and his duty.  No mind is honest that is not steadily pursuing this end.  But in the honest pursuit of this goal, there can be no sin and no mistaking his path of duty.  All he does is act according to his honest convictions.  This is his duty, and this is right.  So, based on this theory, no one who is truly honest in pursuing the highest good of others ever did or can mistake his duty in any such sense as to commit sin.        

4     I have spoken with great plainness from a long cherished concern for the honor of truth and for the good of others.  Should any of you ever take the trouble to look into this subject in its length and breadth, and study the various systems of philosophy, and take the trouble to trace out their practical results, as they are actually developed in the opinions and practices of men, you certainly would not be at a loss to account for the theological and philosophical fogs that so bewilder the world today.  What else can be expected from so many confusing opinions that cloud the fundamental questions of morals and religion?  Why so do many profess to be Christians and yet there is so little real practical Christian love in the world?  Multitudes of professing Christians seem to have no idea that love constitutes true religion; that nothing else does; and that selfishness is sin and it is totally incompatible with religion.  They live in their self‑indulgences, and dream of heaven.  This would not be possible if the true idea of religion, that it consists in sympathy with the love of God, was fully developed in their minds. 

5     I will no longer dwell on the damage that is produced by those other theories that I examined.  What I have said will suffice as an illustration of the importance of being well‑established in this fundamental truth.  It is heart wrenching to see what false conceptions multitudes entertain in regard to the real spirit and meaning of the law and gospel of God, and, consequently, of the nature of holiness.  (Conception: the function or process of forming or understanding ideas, or notions, or concepts)

6     In dismissing this subject, I would like to say, that any system of moral philosophy that does not correctly define a moral action, and does not correctly define the real ground of our obligation, must be fundamentally defective.  In fact, it must be dangerous and deadly.  But let moral action be clearly and correctly defined, let the true ground of our obligation be clearly and correctly stated; and let both these be kept constantly in view, and such a system would be of incalculable importance.  It would be easily understandable, and force conviction on every intelligent listener.  But I am not aware that any such system exists.  As far as I know, they are all faulty in their definition of a moral action.  They do not focus on the ultimate intention and keep it there as being the seat of moral character, from which the character of all our actions are derived; or they soon forget this fact, and treat what we do as right or wrong, without reference to the ultimate intention.  I believe they have all failed in not clearly defining the true ground of our obligation, and, as a result, they all are faulty in their definition of virtue.