IX.   THE FOUNDATION OF OUR MORAL OBLIGATION – Other Theories. 

 

A     Let us now consider the philosophy that teaches that moral order is the foundation of our moral obligation.  But what is moral order? 
     The advocates of this theory define moral order to be ‘something that is fit, proper, and suitable’.  According to their theory, moral order is the same thing as right.  In their view, moral order must be either identical with law or with virtue.  Moral order must be either an idea of what is fit, what is right, what is proper, and what is suitable, or it must consist in conforming our will to this idea of moral order or law, which is virtue.  There is no way that right can possibility be the end we aim at, and to which we should consecrate ourselves.  If moral order is not the same thing as right, I don’t know what is; and all that I can say is, that anything that is not identical with the highest good of God and of the universe, cannot be the end that moral agents should aim at, and  cannot be the foundation of our moral obligation.  However, if by moral order, they mean that state of the universe in which all law is universally obeyed, and, as a result, a state of universal good, then this theory is only another variation of the true one.  It is basically the same as willing the highest good of the universe, with the conditions and means thereof.
     If they mean that moral order is a state of things in which either all law is obeyed, or in which the disobedient are punished for the sake of promoting the public good; then, again it is only another variation of the true theory.  Willing moral order in this situation, is simply willing the highest good of the universe for its own sake, with the conditions and means thereof. 
     But if we say that moral order means what is proper, suitable, in the sense of the physical or moral law, it is absurd to claim that moral order is the foundation of our moral obligation.  If moral order is to be the ground of our obligation, it must be identical with the object of our ultimate choice. 
     Does God require us to love moral order for its own sake?  Is loving moral order the same as loving God and our neighbor?  “You shall will moral order with all your heart, and with all your soul!”  Is this the meaning of the moral law?  According to this theory, love would be sin because it you would not be living for the right end.    

B     Many today believe that the nature and relationships of moral beings are the true foundation of our moral obligation. 
     The advocates of this theory confuse various conditions of our moral obligation with the foundation of our moral obligation.  The nature and relationships that we have with each other, and with the universe, are conditions of our obligation to will the good of others, but it is not the foundation of our obligation.  What!  Our nature and relationships the foundation of our obligation to choose an ultimate end!  Then this end must be our nature and relationships.  This is absurd.  Our nature and relationships being what they are, our highest good is known to us to be of infinite importance.  But it is and must be the importance of our end, and not our nature and relationships, that imposes an obligation upon us to will the highest good of the universe as an ultimate end.               

C    If our nature and relationships are the ground of our moral obligation, then our nature and relationships must be the great object of our ultimate choice, and we should will our nature and relationships for their own sake, and not for the sake of any good that results from our nature and relationships.  You see, the ground of our obligation to put forth an ultimate choice must be identical with the object of this choice.  The object that we choose imposes an obligation by virtue of its own nature.  The nature and relationships of moral beings are conditions of our obligation to fulfill certain duties to each other. 
     For example, the relationship between a parent and a child is a condition of their obligation to work together to promote each other’s particular good, to govern and provide for, on the part of the parent, and to obey, etc., on the part of the child.  But the importance of the good that is sought by both parent and child must be the ground, and their relationship is only the condition of those particular forms of obligation.  This is true in every situation.  Relationships can never be a ground of our obligation to choose, unless the relationship is the object of our choice.  The various duties of life are willful acts and not ultimate acts.  Our obligation to perform these duties is based on the intrinsic nature of the good that results from doing them.  The various relationships we have in life are only conditions of our obligation to promote particular forms of good, and the good of particular individuals. 
     Writers on this subject often fall into the error of confusing various conditions with the foundation of moral obligation. 
     Being a moral agent, that is, possessing free will is a condition, but it is not the foundation of our obligation.  Light, or the knowledge of what is intrinsically important for others, is a condition, but light is not the foundation of our moral obligation.  What is intrinsically important is the foundation of our obligation; and light, or the ability to see what is intrinsically important, is only a condition of our moral obligation.  So the nature and relationships of moral beings are only conditions of their obligation to will each other’s good.  Light, or knowledge of the importance of their happiness is also a condition.  But it is the importance alone that is the foundation of our obligation.  Therefore, it is a tremendous error to believe that the known nature and relationships of moral agents are the true foundation of our moral obligation.  

D    The next theory that demands our attention is the theory that teaches that our moral obligation is based on the idea of duty.  According to this philosophy, the end to which a moral agent should aim is his duty.  He must in all things “aim at doing his duty.”  Or, in other words, he must always be aware of his obligation, and aim at accomplishing it. 

1     It should be obvious that this theory is only another form of the Rightarian theory.  By intending to do their duty, we must understand that the advocates of this theory adopt a resolution or philosophy to regulate their lives.  And this resolution is to obey God, to serve God, to do at all times what appears to be right in their own eyes, to meet the demands of their conscience, to obey the law, to carry out their obligation, etc.  I have mentioned all these things because it is common to hear this theory expressed in so many different ways like these.  When giving instructions to inquiring sinners, nothing is more common than for those who profess to be spiritual guides to assume the truth of this philosophy, and give instructions accordingly.  These philosophers, or theologians, will say to sinners: Make up your mind to serve the Lord; resolve to do your whole duty, and do it all the time; resolve to obey God in all things, resolve to keep all His commandments; resolve to deny yourselves, to forsake sin, to love the Lord with all your heart and your neighbor as yourself.  They often represent regeneration as consisting in a resolution or a purpose. 

2     Wording like this, which is very common and almost universal among Rightarian philosophers, demonstrates that they consider virtue or obedience to God as consisting in adopting a philosophy for living.  With them, duty is some great idea they must realize.  All these different expressions mean the same thing, namely, “Will the right for the sake of what is right.”  Now I cannot but believe that this philosophy is far from the truth, and lies at the very foundation of much of the spurious and radical religion that curses the church and the world today.  This philosophy gives birth to one form of selfishness, which it calls religion, but it also gives birth to another form of selfishness, in some respects more God like, but not one bit less selfish, God dishonoring, and soul destroying.  The nearest that we can say that this philosophy approaches true morality or religion, is, that if the one who forms this resolution understands himself, he will resolve to become truly moral instead of really becoming moral.  But this is absurd and impossible, and the one who makes such a resolution does not understand what he is talking about when he believes that he is forming or cherishing a resolution to do his duty. 

3     Think about it.  He intends to do his duty!  But to do his duty he must form and cherish an ultimate intention.  To intend to do his duty is only to intend to intend.  But simply intending is not doing his duty.  He intends to serve God, but intending to serve God is not serving God.  No matter what he intends, he is neither truly moral nor religious, until he really intends the same end that God intends; and this is not to do his duty, nor to do right, nor to comply with his moral obligation, nor to keep a conscience void of offence, nor to deny himself, nor any similar things.        

4     God aims at, as well as intends, the highest good of Himself and the universe as an ultimate end, and this is doing His duty.  It is not resolving or intending to do His duty, but it is actually doing it.  It is not resolving to do what is right for the sake of right, but it is truly doing what is right.  It is not resolving to serve God and the universe, but is actually rendering that service.  It is not resolving to love, but it is genuinely loving His neighbor as Himself.  It is not resolving to be benevolent, but it is definitely being benevolent.  It is not resolving to deny self, but it is certainly denying self. 
     A man may resolve to serve God without any true idea of what it means to serve Him.  If he had the idea of what the law of God requires him to choose clearly before his mind, he would not talk about resolving to consecrate himself to God, resolving to do his duty, resolving to do right, resolving to serve God, resolving to keep a conscience void of offense, and resolving to do other similar things.   

5     If he sees that serving God is nothing less than consecrating himself to the same end that God consecrates Himself, and loving God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself,  he would see that his resolutions were worthless.  If he chooses to will or choose the highest good of God and of the universe as his ultimate end; devotes his whole being, substance, time, and influence to this end; he would see that such resolutions were totally absurd and merely evaded the claims of God.  All virtue resolves itself into consecrating oneself to the highest good of God and the universe.  This, and only this, is true morality.  This is identical with that true love to God and man that the law of God requires.  This is his duty.  This is serving God.  This is keeping a conscience void of offense.  This, and only this, is right.  But if you intend or resolve to do this, you only intend to intend, instead of immediately intending and doing what God requires.  You are resolving to love God and your neighbor, instead of really loving Him, you are choosing to choose the highest good of God and of the universe, instead of really choosing it. 

6     It is one thing for a man who actually loves God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself, to resolve to regulate his outward life by the law of God, and a totally different thing to intend to love God or to intend His highest glory and good.  Resolutions may result in outward actions, but it is totally absurd to intend or resolve to form an ultimate intention. 

7     Please remember, true morality and religion do not belong to our outward actions, but they belong to our ultimate intentions.  It is amazing and horrifying to witness the alarming extent that this inaccurate philosophy has corrupted and is corrupting the church of God.  Kant and others have conceived of a philosophy that is subversive to all true love of God and man, and they teach a religion of sayings and resolutions instead of a religion of love.  It is a philosophy that teaches that the moral law is completely different from and may be opposite to the law of unselfish love.  The fact is, this philosophy teaches that our duty and what is right belongs to mere outward actions.  This must be, for this philosophy could even be more confusing if they talked about resolving or intending to form an ultimate intention.  But when those who believe that this philosophy is true, give instructions to the anxious sinner, their instructions will immedi­ately dry off his tears, and in all probability lead him to settle down in a religion of resolutions instead of a religion of love.  This philosophy will immediately dry up the most genuine and powerful religious revival, and run it down into a mere revival of a heartless, Christ less, loveless philosophy.  It is much easier to persuade anxious sinners to resolve to do their duty, to resolve to love God, than it is to persuade them to really do their duty, and to really love God with all their heart and with all their soul, and their neighbor as themselves.

E      It is now time for us to consider that philosophy which teaches that the founda­tion of our moral obligation is complex. 
     This theory maintains that there can be several distinct grounds of our moral obligation; that the highest good of others is only one of several grounds of our moral obligation, while right, moral order, the nature and relationships of moral agents, merit and demerit, truth, duty, and many other similar things, are all distinct grounds of our moral obligation, and that each one of them can, by itself, impose moral obligation.  The advocates of this theory, seeing that it is inconsistent with the doctrine that moral obligation is based on the ultimate choice of our intention, seem determined to give up the position that our obligation is determined by choosing an ultimate end.  They claim that our moral obligation is based on the ultimate actions of our will.  By the ultimate actions of our will they mean how the will treats everything according to its own nature and character, which is treating everything we know according to whatever is exactly suited to itself.  For example, they say that we should regard and treat what is right as right because it is right.  We should regard truth as truth because it is truth, virtue as virtue, merit as merit, demerit as demerit, the useful as useful, the beautiful as beautiful, and the good or important as important.  In other words, we should regard each for its own sake; that in each situation, the action of our will is ultimate in the sense that its action terminates on these objects as ultimate ends.  In other words, all our willful acts, or conscious decisions, are ultimate if they treat things according to their nature and character, or according to what they are all by themselves. 

1     Now concerning this theory, let me ask:  What do they mean when they say that our will takes that attitude concerning  anything that is suited to its nature and character?  Are there any actions of our will other than conscious decisions, choices, preferences, or intentions?  Aren’t all the actions of our will summed up in these?  If there are any actions of our will other than these, are they intelligent actions?  If so, what are those actions of our will that don’t consist in choosing an end or the means to an end or in efforts to secure an end?  Can there be any intelligent acts of our will that have nothing to do with either an end or a means to that end?  Can there be moral acts of our will when there is no choice or intention?  If we choose or intend, don’t we have to choose or intend either an end or a means?  What then, can they mean by an ultimate action of will that is different from an ultimate choice or intention?  Can we make a choice without having an object to choose?  If we have an object to choose, shouldn’t we choose this object either as an end or as a means to an end?  If we choose an object as an ultimate end, how does this differ from an ultimate intention?  If we choose this object as a means, how can we regard this as an ultimate action of our will?  What are these people thinking about when they say that there are acts of our will that are not acts of choice or conscious decision?  I don’t know what they are thinking about.  But if all acts of our will either consists in willing or unwilling, that is in either choosing or refusing to choose those objects that are placed before us, how can there be any intelligent act of our will that is not either choosing an end, or a means to an end, or an effort to secure an end?  Can moral law require any other action of our will than to choose?  What other actions of our will are possible to us?  Whatever moral law requires, it can only require us to make willful choices.  It can only require us to choose either an end or a means to an end.  It cannot require us to choose as an ultimate end, anything that is not worthy of choice all by itself, nor can it require us to choose, as a means, anything that does not have a relationship to that end.

2     Next, let’s examine this theory in the light of God’s revealed law.  The law is fulfilled in one word; love.  Now, God’s will cannot be the foundation of our moral obligation.  Our moral obligation must be based on the nature of that thing which moral law requires us to choose.  Unless there is something in the nature of that thing which moral law requires us to will that makes it worthy for us to choose it, we are under no obligation to choose it.  We must admit that the love required by the law of God must consist in an act of our will, and not in mere emotions.  Now, does this love embrace several distinct ultimate ends?  If so, how can they all be expressed in one word love?  Notice, that the law only requires that we love our God and our neighbor as an ultimate end.  This willful love must terminate on God and our neighbor.  The law says nothing about willing what is right for the sake of the right, or willing truth for the sake of the truth, or beauty for the sake of beauty, or virtue for the sake of virtue, or moral order for its own sake, or the nature and relationships of moral agents for their own sake.  Nor can anything like this be implied in the command to love God and our neighbor.  All these and many other things are conditions and means of the highest good of God and our neighbor.  Actually, the law, in requiring us to will the highest good of God and our neighbor as an ultimate end, requires us to will all these things as necessary conditions and means. 
     The end, which the revealed law requires us to will, is very simple.  It only requires us to love God and our neighbor.  One word expresses our moral obligation, love.  Now the word ‘love’ cannot have such a complex meaning that it includes several distinct and ultimate objects of love.  This love is to terminate on God and our neighbor, and not on abstractions, nor on inanimate things.  I am against any philosophy that contradicts God’s revealed law, and teaches that we are to love anything other than God and our neighbor for its own sake, or that anything else must be chosen as an ultimate end other than the highest good of God and our neighbor.  In other words, I completely object to any philosophy that demands anything from a moral agent that is not expressed or implied in perfect love towards God and His universe.  If any philosophy does not agree with the word and with the testimony of God, it is because there is no light in it.  God’s revealed law knows only one ground or foundation of our moral obligation.  It requires only one thing: an attitude of our will toward God and our neighbor that is in harmony with the importance of their highest good; that God’s moral worth shall be willed as a condition of His own good, and that His actual and perfect happiness shall be willed for its own sake, and because He is worthy; that our neighbor’s moral worth shall be willed as an indispensable condition of his happiness, and that if our neighbor is worthy of happiness, his actual and highest happiness shall also be willed.  This law knows only one end which we all must seek, and treats all so‑called ultimate actions of our will that do not terminate on the good of God and our neighbor as worthless.  Our ultimate choice, with choosing all the conditions and means of the highest good of God and the universe, is all that the revealed law recognizes as coming within the scope of its legislation.  It requires nothing more and nothing less.

F     But there is another form of the complex theory of moral obligation that I must discuss before I wrap up this subject. 

1     This view maintains that what is important to our existence is the only ground of our moral obligation, and that, in every possible situation, we must intend what is important to our existence as an end, in order for our intention to be virtuous.  In this respect, this theory maintains that the foundation of our moral obligation is simply a unit.  But this view also maintains that there are several ultimate goods that are intrinsically good or important in themselves, and therefore, should be chosen for their own sake, or as an ultimate end; that to choose any of these as an ultimate end is virtue. 

2     This theory admits that happiness is a good, and that we should will happiness for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, but it maintains that virtue is an ultimate good; that right is an ultimate good; that the just and the true are ultimate goods; in short that realizing any reasonable idea, or turning any reasonable idea into reality is an ultimate good.  For example: there has existed in the mind of God from eternity past certain ideas of what is good or important, what is right, just, beautiful, true, useful, and holy.  The realization of these ideas, according to this theory, was the end that God aimed at or intended when He created the universe.  He aimed at realizing these ideas, or these ultimate ends for their own sake, and viewed the concrete realization of every one of these ideas as a separate and ultimate good: and as sure as God is virtuous, so surely, says this theory, an intention on our part to realize these ideas for the sake of their realization is virtue.  This makes the foundation of our moral obligation complex, in the sense that to will what is good, important, right, true, just, virtuous, beautiful, useful, etc., for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, is virtue; and there is more than one virtuous ultimate choice or intention.  Thus, any one of several distinct things may be intended as an ultimate end with equal virtue.  The soul may, at one moment, totally consecrate itself to one end, that is, to one ultimate good, and later, it can consecrate itself to another end.  Sometimes it may will one good as an ultimate end, and sometimes it may will another good as an ultimate end, and that person would still be just as virtuous.  But, what does the supreme and ultimate good consist in?  

3     Good may be natural or moral.  Natural good is important.  Moral good is virtue.  Moral good is in a certain sense a natural good, that is, it is important as a means of a natural good; but the advo­cates of this theory believe that moral good is important all by itself.

4     Good may be absolute or relative.  Absolute good is that good which is important all by itself.  Relative good is that good which is important as a means to an end.  Relative good is not important all by itself, but it is important because of its relationship to absolute good.  Absolute good may also be a relative good, that is, it may tend to perpetuate itself.  Absolute good is also an ultimate good.  An ultimate good is that good in which all relative good terminates.  Ultimate good is that good to which all relative good perpetuates the relationship of a means or condition.  Relative good is not important all by itself, but it is only important because of its relationship to the ultimate good.     

G    The point on which I take issue with those who believe that the foundation is complex is that they claim that enjoyment, blessedness, or mental satisfaction, etc., can be an ultimate good. 

1     I mentioned before, that what is important all by itself must not only belong to and be inseparable from people with feelings and emotions, but that the ultimate absolute good must involve a state of mind.  It must be something that is found in one’s consciousness!  We must know what is important.  Take away the mind, and how can a person know what is good? 

2     I need to say that the ultimate good cannot consist in the choice itself or in a voluntary state of mind.  The thing that we choose must be our ultimate choice.  We can never choose the choice itself as an ultimate end.  Now the law requires that we should love our neighbor.  This love is a willful love.  What is this that we are to will to our neighbor that we call love?  Why, we are to will what is in their best interest, that is best or good for them.  Wrapped up in this is their happiness, or enjoyment.  People admit that happiness, or enjoyment, or mental satisfaction, is a good, an absolute and ultimate good.  All men assume it.  All men seek enjoyment.  That happiness is the only absolute and ultimate good is a first truth.  If it weren’t for this ultimate good, there could be no activity, no reason to act, no object to choose.  Enjoyment is, in fact, the ultimate good.  Enjoyment is the result of our existence and action.  God possessed it from His existence, His attrib­utes, His activity, and His virtue.  His powers are so interrelated that God must be infinitely happy, because it results from the proper exercise of His attributes and His will.  Happiness results from obedience to both physical and moral law.  It also shows that government is not an end, but a means to the end.  It also shows that the end is happiness, and the means is obedi­ence to the law.        

3     Our ultimate good cannot be moral law.  Moral law is an idea of our reason.  Moral law and moral government propose an end that we must secure by means of the law.  The law cannot be its own end.  Law cannot require the subject to seek it as an ultimate end.  This is absurd.  The moral law is nothing other than our reason’s idea of how we should will and act.  This idea of how we should will and act is suitable to and demanded by our nature, relationships, needs, and circumstances.  Once we understand our nature, relationships, circumstances, and needs, our reason naturally declares that we should choose a certain end, that we should consecrate ourselves to promote this end for its own sake.  That end cannot be the law itself.  The law is a simple and pure idea of our reason, and can never be the supreme, intrinsic, absolute, and ultimate good.

4     Nor can obedience to the law be the ultimate end that either the law or the lawgiver aims at.  The law requires us to act in reference to an end.  This means we already will an end; but our willing, and the end we will, cannot be the same.  The action that is required, and the end, or the reason why we act, cannot be the same.  Obedience to the law cannot be our ultimate end.  Neither the law or the government says any such thing.  Obedience is one thing; the end that obedience secures is another thing.  Obedience must be a means or condition; and whatever the law and obedience intend to secure must be the ultimate end of obedience. 
     The law and the lawgiver aim to promote the highest good of the universe.  This must be the end or purpose of both moral law and moral government.  Law and obedience must be the means or conditions to this end.  To deny this is to deny the very nature of moral law, and to lose sight of the true and only goal of moral government.  Nothing can be moral law, and nothing can be moral government, that does not propose the highest good of moral beings as its ultimate end.  But if the highest good is the goal of law and government, it must be the end that both the ruler and the subject aim for.  And the highest good of moral beings must be the foundation of our moral obligation.  The highest good of moral beings must be good or important all by itself.  If the highest good of moral beings is not good or important all by itself, how could moral law require it to be sought after or chosen as an ultimate end, how can there be any obligation to choose it as an ultimate end.

H    But what do people mean when they say that the right, the just, the true, etc., are ultimate goods and ends to be chosen for their own sake?  First, these things can be either objective or subjective.  Objective right, truth, justice, etc., are only ideas, and cannot be good or important by themselves.  Subjective right, truth, justice, etc., is the same thing as saying righteousness, truthful­ness, and justness.  These are virtues.  In order for these to be virtues, they must reside in an active state in our will.  They must stimulate our will into making choices or intentions.  But we have already seen that these things can’t be an end, or something important all by themselves. 

1     We know that realizing ideas of right, and truth, and justice, of beauty, of fitness, of moral order, etc., are indispensable as conditions and means of our highest good and that our enjoyment comes from realizing these ideas.  This satisfaction then must be the end on which God’s intention must have terminated, and on which our intention must terminate as an end.  (Fitness: Appropriate, suitable)

2     The enjoyment that God receives from realizing His own ideas must be infinite.  He must have intended them as the supreme good.

3     If there is more than one ultimate good, we would either have to regard those goods as one, or we would have to consecrate ourselves to one and later on, consecrate ourselves to another; sometimes we would consecrate ourselves to what is beautiful, sometimes to what is just, and then again to what is right, then to what useful, to what is true, etc.

4     But, how important is something beautiful, besides the emotional enjoyment we receive from it? Something that is beautiful meets a demand of our existence, and therefore, it provides satisfaction.  But, in what other sense could something beautiful be regarded as good?  The idea that beauty is useful cannot be an idea of an ultimate end, for an ultimate end implies that something is important all by itself to which something beautiful is useful only as a means.  How important is truth, right, just, etc., aside from the pleasure or mental satisfaction that we receive from these things?  How important would the entire universe be, if nobody had the emotions to enjoy it?

5     Suppose that everything in the universe exists just like it does today, except there is no mental satisfaction or enjoyment, and that there is absolutely no enjoyment of any kind in anything, any more than there is in a block of granite, of what importance would anything be?  And to what, or to whom, would it be important?  Our mind, without any ability to enjoy, can neither know nor be the subject of good or evil any more than a slab of marble can be the subject of good or evil.  Truth, in such a situation, could no more be a good to us than we could be a good to truth; light would no more be a good to our eye, than the eye a good to light.  Nothing in the universe could either give or receive the least amount of satisfaction or dissatisfaction.  Neither natural nor moral good or evil could excite the least emotion or mental satisfaction.  A block of marble might just as well be the subject of good as anything else, based on this supposition.  (Supposition: a supposed, or assumed truth that is used to explain or support a particular philosophy, or theological position)  

6     It is obvious that all creation, where the law is obeyed, tends to one end, and that end is happiness or enjoyment.  This demonstrates that enjoyment was the end that God aimed at when He created the universe.  Again, it is clear that God is trying to realize all the other ideas of His reason for the sake of, and as a means of, realizing those ideas that are important to others.  In fact, happiness is the result of seeing all those ideas fulfilled.  Happiness then, must have been the end that God intended.       

I        It makes no sense to say that, “if enjoyment is the only ground of our moral obligation, we should be indifferent to the means”.  This objection assumes that in seeking an end for its own importance, we must be indifferent as to how we obtain that end; that is, whether it is obtained in a way that is possible or impossible, right or wrong.  This objection overlooks the fact that from the laws of our own existence, it is impossible for us to will the end without also willing the appropriate means to that end.  Also, we cannot possibly regard any other conditions of the happiness of moral agents as possible, than holiness and conforming to the law of our existence.  Enjoyment results from having the different demands of our existence met.  One demand of our reason and conscience is that happiness is a by-product of holiness.  It is therefore naturally impossible for a moral agent to be satisfied with the happiness or enjoyment of moral agents, except on the condition that they are holy.

J      However, these philosophers insist that we regard all these different ideas of our reason as goods in themselves.  For example: I have the idea of beauty.  I behold a rose.  Seeing the beauty of the rose gives me instant pleasure.  Now, I consider this idea of beauty as a good.  I experience pleasure whenever I look at it and smell it, and whenever I think about it.  These philosophers turn around and say that this pleasure demonstrates that it is a good to me; and this good is in the very nature of the object, and must be regarded as a good all by itself.  To this, let me say that, the presence of the rose is a good to me, but it is not an ultimate good.  It is only a means of pleasure for me.  The rose is not a good all by itself.  If no one could see it, or smell it, to whom would it be a good?  How can it be a good, except in the sense that it gives satisfaction to the beholder?  The good must lie in the satisfaction of the rose, and not in the rose itself. 

K     But it is asked; “don’t I desire the rose for its own sake”?  I answer, yes; you desire it for its own sake, but you do not and cannot choose it for its own sake, but you choose it to satisfy your desire.  All desires terminate on their respective objects.  The desire for food terminates on food; thirst terminates on drink, etc.  These things are so closely related to your appetites that you desire them for their own sakes.  But you cannot choose them for their own sakes.  Do you see the difference?  These things are, and must be, chosen as a means of gratifying your respective desires.  To choose them simply in obedience to your own desire is selfishness.  But the gratification is a good, and a part of universal good.  Our reason, therefore, urges and demands that we should choose these things as a means of good to us.

1     When you choose one of these things out of obedience to moral law, and you don’t seek its gratification out of proportion to its relative importance, and when you don’t choose it simply because it gratifies you, your choice is holy.  Experiencing different ideas and thoughts that originate in our reason will produce enjoyment in most situations.  Our mind views these ideas as a good, but not as an ultimate good.  The ultimate good is the satisfaction we get from perceiving these ideas. 

2     Seeing moral or physical beauty gives us satisfaction.  We consider moral and physical beauty good, but we do not consider it an ultimate good.  Moral and physical beauty are relative goods only.  If it wasn’t for the pleasure they give us, we could not connect these with the idea of good.  Our mental eye might see order, physical and moral beauty, or anything else; but these things would no more be good to us than their opposites because, If it wasn’t for the pleasure they give us, our idea of what is good or important could not exist, and as a result, virtue or moral beauty could not exist.  Our idea of what is important must exist before virtue can exist.  First the idea of what is important develops.  Then, the idea of our moral obligation develops.  Finally, we develop the idea of right and wrong, and as a result, virtue becomes possible.  First, there must be something that we can choose that we regard as important all by itself before we can have any idea that God wants us to choose it as an end.  This object that we choose cannot be virtue or moral beauty, for this would mean that we had the idea of virtue or of moral beauty before we had idea of our moral obligation, or our idea of right and wrong.  This can’t be.  We must have the idea that there is an ultimate good, and choosing that good would be virtue, before the idea of virtue, or of right or wrong, can exist.  The idea of what is important, or what is an ultimate good, must develop before the ideas of virtue, moral obligation, and right and wrong develop.  It is absurd to say that we can consider virtue as an ultimate good, when in fact; the very idea of virtue cannot exist until after God presents the idea of an ultimate good to us.  Then, once God presents that good to us, we see that we must have a moral obligation to will it for its own sake, and we also see that choosing it would be virtue.

3     Virtue is morally beautiful.  Moral worth is morally beautiful.  Beauty is an attribute or element of holiness, virtue, moral worth, and right character.  However, beauty is not identical with holiness or moral worth; any more than the beauty of a rose, and the rose are identical.  The rose is beautiful.  Beauty is one of its attributes.  Therefore, virtue is morally beautiful.  But the beauty of the rose cannot be an ultimate good.  (For one thing a rose is not a state of mind)

L     We are tempted to say that moral worth is an ultimate good; but moral worth is only a relative good.  Moral worth meets a demand of our existence, and thus produces satisfaction.  When we say that moral worth is a good all by itself, we make that statement only because we experience a satisfaction when we think about it.  At the same time, we erroneously say that we consider it a good all by itself completely independent of its results.  We only say this because we are satisfied when we think about it.  Thus we see:

1     That the importance of whatever we choose as our ultimate choice cannot be a foundation of our obligation to choose that object, for this would transfer the ground of our obligation from what is in the object that we choose to the importance of our choice.  As I have said, the importance of our choice is a condition of our obligation to choose that object, but it can never be the foundation of our obligation; for the importance of our choice is not the reason that we choose that object.

2     The moral character of an object that we choose cannot be a foundation of our obligation to choose that object.  To say, that the moral character of our choice is the ground of our obligation to choose that object, is to transfer the ground of our obligation to choose an object from the object that we choose to the character of the choice itself.

3     The relationship we have with our neighbor cannot be the ground of our obligation to will good to Him, because the ground of our obligation to will good to our neighbor must be in the nature of the good itself, and not in the relationship between one being and another.  We may find in our relationships, reasons to seek to promote the good of particular individuals; but in every situation, the nature of the good itself is the ground of our obligation.  

4     The relationship between the object we choose and the choice we make is not the ground of our obligation.  The relationship between our choice and the object we choose depends on the importance of that object.  The relationship that moral fitness has between our choice and the object we choose, we don’t find in the object we choose, and it must there be in order for a relationship to be a ground of our obligation.  

5     The importance of an object that we choose can never be a ground of our obligation to choose that object, for we cannot place the importance of an object in the object itself.  An object is important for reasons that lie outside of that object.  However, the importance of an object may be a condition of our obligation to choose it, as a condition of securing an object that is important all by itself.

6     The idea of our duty cannot be a ground of our obligation.  The idea of our duty is only a condition of our obligation, but never a foundation of our obligation, because we cannot base this idea in the object that we say is our duty to choose. 

7     Seeing certain relationships that exist between individuals cannot be a ground of our moral obligation, although it is a condition of our obligation to do certain things for them.  Neither the relationship itself, nor knowing the importance of that relationship, is the foundation from which we claim to be under an obligation to will or do good for them.  Neither the relationship nor seeing this relationship can be a ground of our moral obligation.  

8     Knowing our obligation cannot be a ground, although it is a condition of our obligation.  We know our obligation because of how important that object is and not because of what we know about it.  

9     The sovereign will of God is never our foundation, although His will is often a condition of certain forms of obligation.  If we know that an object is important, then we must choose it, whether God requires it or not. 
     God’s revealed will is always a condition of our obligation, whenever He has to give us a revelation so we can understand the importance of any object that we choose.  But God’s will is not based on the object that He commands us to will, and so His will cannot be a ground of our obligation.  

10     The moral excellence of anyone can never be a foundation of our obligation to will good to him; for we cannot place his morally excellent character in the good we will to him.  The importance of that good must, all by itself, be the ground of our obligation, and his good character is only a condition of our obligation to will his enjoyment of good in particular.  Good character can never be a ground of our obligation.  We cannot choose anything that we don’t base exclusively in the object that we choose.  Therefore, if moral excellence is the ground of our obligation to choose it as our ultimate choice, then we have to make moral excellence our ultimate choice.  This is silly.  

11     Right can never be a ground of our obligation, unless right itself is the object that we must choose for its own sake. 

12     The tendency to do well can never be a ground of our obligation, although it is a condition of our obligation to will good to someone.  We cannot base this tendency on the good that we should will, and therefore this tendency cannot be a ground of our obligation.

13     No one thing can be a ground of our obligation to choose something else as an ultimate end, because the reasons for choosing something as an ultimate end must be based in the thing itself, and not in something else.

14     From the fact that only our ultimate choice or intention is right or wrong all by itself, and that all willful choices, or acts, originate and get their character from our ultimate intention, it follows that: 

a     Any willful decision that we make intending to secure an intrinsically important end, is right; otherwise, that decision is wrong.

b     We condition our obligation to perform or to execute conscious decisions on how important that decision is; but we do not base our obligation to perform or to execute conscious decisions on how important that decision is. 

c      Outward conduct that proceeds from a right intention is right.  Outward conduct that proceeds from a wrong intention is wrong.

d     How right any outward act is depends on how useful we believe that act is.  We must assume that the act is useful as a condition of our obligation to perform that act, and its usefulness is a condition of it being right. 

e     It also follows that, whenever we decide that it is our duty to perform any outward act whatso­ever without any regard to whether it is useful, but simply because we think it is right, we deceive ourselves.  It is impossible that our outward conduct can be right if we don’t consider whether it is useful in its tendency to promote an important end.

f        It also follows that it is a gross error to believe that if an act appears right, then we should do it without even considering whether that act has a tendency to do good or evil.  Your act cannot possibly be right if you make this assumption.  When God requires certain conscious decisions, we know that what we decide to do tends to secure the highest good, and that, if we do these things to secure that good, we are right.  But, when God has not revealed what we are supposed to do, we are not to decide such questions by looking at how right an act appears without any regard to the good tendency of such acts.  For whether an act is right depends on their whether we truly believe that act will result in good. 
     But some say that a moral agent may sometimes be under an obligation to will evil instead of good to others.  My reply is that it can never be the duty of a moral agent to will evil to anyone for its own sake, or as an ultimate end.  The character and governmental relations of anyone may be such that it may be his duty to will his punishment to promote the public good.  But in this case good is the end willed, and misery only a means.  So, it may be the duty of a moral agent to will the temporary misery of even a holy being to promote the public interests.  This was the situation with the sufferings of Christ.  The Father willed His temporary misery, to promote the public good.  But in all situations when it is duty to will misery, and these situations are not very common, it is only as a means or condition of good to the public, or to the individual, and not as an ultimate end.