VIII

4 The fundamental reason of our moral obligation cannot be to will the moral excellence of God. The fundamental reason is the importance of His good all by itself. If this proposed theory is true, unselfish love becomes a sin. Benevolence consists in willing the highest good of God and the universe for its own sake, in devoting our heart, our mind, our soul, and our body to this end. But this theory teaches us to either will the moral excellence of God for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, or to will His good and the good of the universe, not for its own sake, but because God is morally excellent. The benevolence theory regards happiness as the end, and holiness or moral excellence is only a condition of that end. This theory regards moral excellence as the end. Does the moral excellence of God impose an obligation on us to will His moral excellence for its own sake? If it doesn’t, it cannot be a ground of our moral obligation. Does His moral excellence impose an obligation to will His highest good, and the good of the universe, for its own sake? No, for this would be a contradiction. Remember, no one thing can be the ground of our obligation to choose any other thing for its own sake. Whatever creates an obligation to choose, because of its own nature, must be the object that we choose. Our obligation is to choose that object for its own sake.
If God’s Divine moral excellence is the ground of our obligation to choose, then God’s excellence must be the object of this choice, and unselfish love is therefore never right, but always wrong.

B Let us examine this subject further:

1 Virtue, or moral excellence, consists in conforming our will to moral law. Virtue must either be identical with good will, or it must be a moral attribute of good will or unselfish love.

2 Virtue cannot be the foundation of our moral obligation. Moral law requires love, and that love expresses everything that the moral law requires. This love is good will, and it resolves itself into our ultimate intention. On the other hand, in more common language, this love consists in the supreme devotion of our heart and soul to God and to the highest good of others. But since virtue is an attribute of that choice, it is impossible to will virtue as an ultimate end. For this would involve the absurdity of choosing a choice, or intending an intention as an end, instead of choosing the end as something on which that virtuous choice terminates. Or, if we regarded virtue as a moral attribute of love, to make virtue an ultimate end would make an attribute of a choice an ultimate end, instead of the end that virtue terminates on. This is absurd.

3 Moral worth is not the same thing as virtue but moral worth is an attribute that results from obedience. Virtue, or holiness, is a state of mind. It is an active and benevolent state of the will. Moral worth is not a state of mind, but is the result of a state of mind. We say that a man’s obedience to moral law is important in such a sense that a holy being is worthy, or deserving of good, because of his virtue or holiness. But this moral worth is not a state of mind; this moral worth is a result of love. It is an attribute or quality of character, and not a state of mind.

4 Moral worth cannot be the foundation of our moral obligation.

a What is intrinsically important for others must be the foundation of our moral obligation. The law of God requires choosing an ultimate end. This end must be important all by itself, for it is the value it has all by itself that makes us obligated to will that end. Nothing, then, can be the foundation of our moral obligation but what is good, or important all by itself.

b An ultimate good must belong only to created beings that are capable of doing good or evil. A block of marble cannot be the subject of good. Whatever is good to moral agents must involve a state of mind. It must be something that exists in our mind. Only those things that we are aware of can be an intrinsic good to us. Not everything we are aware of is an ultimate good to us, but if we are not aware of it, it cannot be an ultimate good to us. An ultimate good must involve a conscious state of mind. Whenever we become aware that what we see is intrinsically good or important, it becomes a relative good to us. But our ultimate good is a state of mind. From this it is clear, that moral worth, or good desert, cannot be the foundation of our moral obligation, because it is not a state of mind, and cannot be an ultimate good.

c The simple awareness of our moral worth is a relative good. This relative good is the satisfaction that our mind experiences when it realizes that its moral worth is a relative good. But neither the realization of our moral worth, nor the satisfaction that results from this realization, is identical with moral worth or good desert. Merit, moral worth, or good desert, is the condition of realizing our moral worth and the satisfaction that results from realizing our moral worth, and is therefore a good. But it is not, and cannot be an ultimate good. It is important, but not intrinsically important. If it weren’t for the fact that we, as moral beings, are so created, that moral worth meets a demand of our mind, and therefore produces satisfaction when we think about it. We would not reasonably regard it as a good in any sense. But since it meets a demand of our intelligence, it is a relative good, and results in ultimate good.

5 The relationship between moral excellence, worth, merit, desert, and moral obligation.

a We have seen, that moral excellence, worth, etc., can never be the foundation of our moral obligation; because none of these have in it the element of the intrinsic, or ultimate good. Therefore, a moral agent can never be under any obligation to will or choose them as an ultimate end.

b Worth, merit, good desert, etc., cannot be a distinct ground of our moral obligation. In order to say that it is a ground of our obligation, we would have to ignore the importance of good. All obligations must refer to choosing an object for its own sake, with the necessary conditions and means. The importance of the end is the foundation of our obligation to choose both the end and the conditions and means necessary to secure that end. If it wasn’t for the importance that the end has all by itself there could be no obligation to will the conditions and means needed to accomplish that end.

c Whenever we see something that is a necessary condition or means of securing an intrinsically important end, this perceived relationship is the condition of our obligation to will it. Our obligation must be based on the importance of the end, and conditioned on the perceived relationship of that object to that end. We all know that the ultimate good and blessings of our neighbors should be conditioned on their holiness and moral worth. Because of what our reason demands, our reason can never affirm our moral obligation to will that moral agents be blessed except on the condition of their virtue. We know that it is fit, suitable, and proper, that virtue, good desert, merit, holiness, etc., should be rewarded as blessings. To be blessed is a good all by itself and we should will it for that reason, and moral agents are under an obligation to will that all beings capable of doing good may be blessed. But we are not under obligation to will that every moral being should be blessed, except on the condition of their holiness and moral worth. The relationship that holiness, merit, good desert, etc., has to moral obligation, is this: these things supply the conditions of our obligation to will the actual happiness of those beings that are holy. We must base our obligation on the importance of the good that we are to will to them. For it is absurd to say that we are, or can be, under any obligation to will good to them as an ultimate end, and yet say that the obligation should not be based on the importance of the good itself. If it wasn’t for the importance of their good, we would have no more obligation to will good to them than evil. The good or blessedness is the end that we are under obligation to will. But our obligation to will an ultimate end cannot possibly be based on anything other than the importance of that end. Suppose someone says, that in the case of merit, our obligation is based on merit, and only conditioned on the importance of the good that I am to will. This would be to make merit the end willed, and good only a condition, or means. This would be absurd.

d To make merit the ground of our obligation, and the good that is willed only a condition, amounts to this: I perceive merit, whereupon I affirm my obligation to will what? Certainly I don’t will good to those who are deserving because of its importance to them, nor from my hearts desire to see them blessed for their own sake, but because of their merit. But what do they merit? Why, good, or blessings. It is good, or blessedness, that I am to will to them, and I am to will their good, for its own importance. The obligation, then, must be based on the importance of the end, that is, their good, and only conditioned by merit.

C Let me answer some objections.

1 The first objection is, that, if virtue merits or deserves anything, this implies a corresponding obligation, and so merit must be the ground of our obligation to give what is merited. But this objection assumes that the assumption is true. It assumes that the word merit means what it cannot mean. Let the objector remember that he believes that his moral obligation is based on his ultimate intention. That ultimate intention must find the basis of its obligation exclusively in its object. Now, if merit is the ground of our obligation, then merit must be the object of our ultimate intention. Merit must be willed for its own sake. But is this the thing that is deserved, merited? Does a meritorious being deserve that his merit should be willed for its own sake? Indeed, is this what he deserves? We understandingly speak of merit, the merit of good and of evil. Can a being deserve that his merit should be chosen for the sake of merit? If not, then it is impossible that merit could be a ground of our obligation, for remember that whatever is the ground of our obligation should be chosen for its own sake. But, if merit deserves good, it is obvious that the importance of the good is the ground, and merit is only a condition of our obligation to will the actual enjoyment of the good by the meritorious individual. Thus, merit only changes the form of our obligation. If an individual is wicked, I should will his good as important all by itself, and I should will that he would comply with the necessary conditions of happiness, and as a result, actually enjoy happiness. If he is virtuous, I still will his good for its own importance; and, since he has complied with the conditions of enjoyment, that he may actually enjoy happiness. In both cases, I am bound to will his good for the same fundamental reason, namely, its importance. Neither the fact nor the ground of my obligation to will his good is changed by his virtue; only the form of my obligation is changed. I may be under obligation to will evil to a particular being, but in this case I am not bound to will the evil for its own sake, and therefore, not as an end. I should sometimes will the punishment of the guilty, not for the sake of punishment, but for the sake of the public good; and the importance of the good to be promoted is the ground of my obligation. The punishment is only a condition of my obligation in that form. If merit was a ground of my obligation, then merit should be chosen for its own sake. It would follow from this, that ill desert should be chosen for its own sake, as well as good desert. But who will pretend that ill desert should be willed for its own sake? But, if this can’t be true, then it follows that desert, either good or bad, is not a ground of our obligation, and that is not an object of our ultimate choice, or of our choice at all. It is only a means to an end.

2 In support of the theory we are examining, some people say that the Bible represents the goodness of God as a reason for loving Him, or as a foundation of our obligation to love Him.
To this I answer, the Bible mentions the goodness of God as a reason for loving Him, but it does not assume that this reason is the foundation of our obligation to love Him. The question is, in what sense does the Bible mention the goodness of God as a reason for loving Him? Is it that the goodness of God is the foundation of our obligation, or is the goodness of God only a condition of our obligation to will His actual happiness in particular? Is His goodness a distinct ground of our obligation to love Him? But what is this love that His goodness places us under an obligation to exercise love to Him? It is agreed, that this love cannot be an emotion. It must consist in willing something to Him.

3 Some say, that our obligation is to treat our Heavenly Father as worthy. But I ask, worthy of what? Is He worthy of anything? If so, what is it? For is this the thing that I should will to Him? Is He merely worthy that I should will His worthiness for its own sake? This must be, if His worthiness is the ground of my obligation; for whatever is the ground of my obligation to choose must be the object of my choice. Why, He is worthy of blessing, honor, and praise. But these must all be embraced in one single word, love. The law has forever decided that the focus of our whole duty to God is love. The law of God, as revealed in the two precepts, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might” covers the entire ground of our moral obligation (Deut. 6:5) It is clearly and repeatedly taught in the Bible, that loving our God and our neighbor is the fulfilling of the law.

a We must admit that this love consists in willing something to God and our neighbor. What, then, do we will to them? The command is, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Matt. 19:19) This does not say anything about the character of my neighbor. It is the importance of His interests, of His good, that the law requires me to consider. It does not require me to simply love my righteous neighbor, nor does it require me to love my righteous neighbor more than I love my wicked neighbor. It is my neighbor that I am to love. That is, I am to will his good, or his good, with all the conditions and means at my disposal, according to their importance. If the law considered the virtue of my neighbor as a distinct ground of our obligation, the law would have to be changed to read as follows: “If you are righteous, and your neighbor is as righteous as you are, you shall love him as yourself, and not your wicked neighbor.” In fact, this was the attitude of the Jewish rabbis who were rebuked by Christ when He said, “You have heard that it was said, `You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who spitefully use you and persecute you, that you may be sons of your Father in heaven; for He makes His sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust. For if you love those who love you, what reward have you? Do not even the tax collectors do the same?” (Matt. 5:43‑46) The truth is, the law only knows one ground of moral obligation. It requires us to love our God and our neighbor. This love is goodwill. What else can we possibly will to God and our neighbor but their highest good, with all the conditions and means thereof?

b This is all that can be of any importance to our neighbor, and all that we can or should will to them under any circumstances whatsoever. When we have willed this to them, we have done our whole duty to them. “Love is the fulfilling of the law” (Romans 13:10) We owe them nothing more. They can have nothing more. The law requires us to love God and our neighbor because of the importance of the good willed, no matter what their character may be; that is, this good must be willed to God and our neighbor whether they are holy or unholy, simply because of the importance of the good that this love has all by itself.

c But while the law requires that we should will this good to all of God’s creation, as a possible and intrinsic good no matter what their character is like; the law cannot, and does not require us to will that God, or any moral agent in particular, shall be actually blessed just because he is holy. Our obligation to the unholy is to will that they might become holy. Our obligation to the holy is to will that they may be perfectly blessed. Virtue only modifies the form, but virtue does not change the ground of our obligation. The Bible represents love to our enemies as one of the highest forms of virtue: “But God demonstrates His own love toward us, in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us.” (Romans 5:8) But if our love for our enemies is a high and an valuable form of virtue, it must only be because the true spirit of the law requires the same love to them as to others, in spite of the many reasons not to love them. Who sees that the virtue of the atonement would be just as great if it had been made for the friends, instead of the enemies of God? And suppose God was supremely selfish and an unreasonable enemy of man, who would not see that any good will that we exercise towards Him would be just as praiseworthy as it is now. Now if God were unjustly our enemy, wouldn’t a hearty good will towards Him in such a situation be a striking and important demonstration of virtue? In such a situation, we could not will His actual happiness, but we might and should be under an infinite obligation to will that He might become holy, and, as a result, be perfectly blessed. We would be under an obligation to will His good in such a sense, that should He become holy, we would will His actual happiness, without any change in our ultimate choice or intention, and without any change in us that would imply an increase of virtue.

d So, the same is true of our neighbor: we are required to will his good, even if he is wicked, in such a way that we would need no new intention or ultimate choice to will his actual blessedness, should he become holy. We may be as holy in loving a sinner, and in seeking his salvation while he is a sinner, as in willing his good after he is converted and becomes a saint. God was just as virtuous in loving the world and seeking to save a world that was sinking in sin, as He is in loving those in the world who are holy. The fact is, if we truly love our neighbor as ourselves and we truly will the highest good of everybody with the conditions and means of their happiness, it naturally follows that when one becomes holy we shall love him with the love that wills his highest actual blessedness as a good all by itself. Then we shall will that he be blessed because we see that he has fulfilled the necessary conditions and made himself worthy of being blessed. There is no increased virtue in God when a sinner repents, to exercise complacent love toward him. Complacency is unselfish. Complacency is contemplated in its relationship to holy beings. (Complacency is a satisfaction in the conduct of one who is obedient. Complacent love is the kind of love a father would exercise towards his children who have satisfied him by their obedience.) God, prophets, apostles, martyrs, and saints, in all ages, are as virtuous in their self‑denying and untiring labors to save the wicked, as they are in their complacent love for the saints.

e This is the universal doctrine of the Bible. This doctrine totally agrees with the spirit and letter of the law. “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Matt. 19:19), no matter what his character might be. This is the doctrine of reason, and agrees with the convictions of all mankind. Since this is true, it follows that virtue is not a distinct ground of our moral obligation, but only modifies the form of our obligation. We are under a moral obligation to will that our neighbor be blessed on the condition of his holiness. We should will his good or blessedness for its own importance, no matter what his character might be; but we should will that an individual in particular should be blessed by God, only on the condition of his holiness. The importance of our love for our neighbor is the foundation of our obligation, and his holiness does not change the fact, but only changes the form of our obligation, and it conditions our obligation to will his actual enjoyment of perfect happiness in particular. When, therefore, the Bible calls on us to love God for His goodness, it does not and cannot mean to assign God’s goodness as the fundamental reason for loving Him, or the foundation of our obligation to will His good; for it would be absurd to believe that His good must be willed, not because of its own importance, but because He is good. If wasn’t for its importance, we could just as easily affirm our obligation to will evil as good to Him.

f Now the Bible assumes all first truths of reason. It is a first truth of reason that God’s good is of infinite importance, and therefore, God’s good should be willed as a possible good no matter what His character might be. However, it should be willed as an actual reality on condition of His holiness. Now the Bible does just this. The Bible says that God’s holiness is real and infinite, and calls on us to love Him, or to will His good, for that reason. But the Bible does not claim that His holiness is the foundation of our obligation to will His good in any such sense that we would not be under any obligation to will it with all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, if He was not holy. His holiness only conditions our love for Him.

g The law only looks at the importance of the end to be willed. The law requires us to will the good of God with all our heart, etc., as the supreme good no matter what God’s character might be. If this was not true, it could not be moral law. If this was not true, God’s interest would be the supreme good, and if God’s interest were the supreme good, we would be under infinite obligation to will whatever His interest might be, whether it was holy or sinful. Then on condition of His holiness, we would be obligated to will the actual existence of His perfect and infinite happiness. Once we gain the knowledge of His holiness, the obligation is instantly imposed, to will His highest good as an existing good.

h It is impossible that goodness, virtue, good desert, or merit, should be a distinct ground or a foundation of our moral obligation in such a sense as to impose or increase our obligation. It has been shown that none of these things can be an ultimate good and impose an obligation to choose itself as an ultimate end, or for its own importance. However, if goodness, virtue, or merit can impose a moral obligation to will, it must be an obligation to will itself as an ultimate end. But this we have seen cannot be, therefore these things cannot be a distinct ground or foundation of our moral obligation.

i The law does not make virtue, good desert, or merit, the ground of our moral obligation, and require us to love them and to will them as an ultimate end but the law does require us to love God and our neighbor as an ultimate good. It requires us to will God’s goodness, good desert, worthiness, merit, as conditions of His highest good, and of the good of the universe; but it is absurd to say that it requires us to will any of these things as an ultimate end when these things are only conditions. The only thing that can impose a moral obligation is an ultimate and an intrinsic good, for if it imposes a moral obligation, it must be an obligation to choose itself for what it is in and of itself.

j All obligation must relate to choosing either an end or a means to that end. Our obligation to choose a means to an end is based on the importance of the end. Whatever, then, imposes a moral obligation must be an ultimate end. It must possess something that makes us choose it as an intrinsic and ultimate good. Thus, we have seen that, virtue, merit, etc., cannot be a foundation of our moral obligation. However, these things can condition our obligation to love God and our neighbor. However, we are always under an infinite obligation to love God and to will His good with all our power, because of the importance of His good, whether He is holy or sinful. If God is holy, we are under obligation to will His actual happiness with all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, no more, no less. We are required to do this because of the importance of His happiness, no matter what His character might be. The fact is, we can do no more, and are not under any obligation to do more, than to will His good with all our powers, and this we must to do for its own sake. Our obligation is to will His good with all our strength, by virtue of its own importance, and it cannot be increased by any other consideration than our increased knowledge of its importance, which increases our ability.

4 But, some say, that favors received impose an obligation to exercise gratitude; that the benefactor himself imposes an obligation on our part to treat him as a benefactor.

a Answer: I suppose that this objection considers this relationship as being virtuous, that is, that the benefactor is truly virtuous and not selfish in his favors. If not, then the relationship cannot change our obligation at all.

b If the benefactor has, in his giving, obeyed the law of love, I am under obligation to exercise gratitude toward him. But what is gratitude? Gratitude is not simply an emotion or feeling; for emotion that comes from the soul is involuntary, and strictly speaking, it lacks morality. Gratitude, when spoken of as a virtue, must be an act of the will. An obligation to be grateful must be an obligation to will something to the benefactor. But what am I under obligation to will to a benefactor, other than his actual highest good? I am grateful to him because I love Him. If it is God, I am under obligation to will His actual and infinite happiness with all my heart and with all my soul. If it is my neighbor, I am bound to love him as myself, that is, to will his actual good as I will my own. What else can either God or man possess or enjoy, and what else can I be under obligation to will to them? Nothing else!

c If any philosophy does not agree with the law and the testimony that we are talking about here, it is because there is no light in it. The virtuous relationship of the benefactor modifies my obligation, just as any other virtue does. Whenever we perceive virtue in any being, this supplies the condition upon which we are bound to will his actual highest good. He has done his duty. He has complied with his obligation in the relationship he perpetuates. He is truthful, upright, benevolent, just, and merciful. No matter what particular form of virtue he presents to me it is evidence that he is holy. All these things are precisely the same as far as my obligation extends. I am, independent of my knowledge of his character, under an obligation to will his highest good for his own sake, which is to will that he may fulfill all the conditions, and thereupon enjoy perfect happiness. But I am not under obligation to will his actual enjoyment of blessedness until I have evidence of his virtue. This evidence supplies the condition from which I am under obligation to will his actual enjoyment or highest good. This is my whole obligation. It is all he can have, and it is all I can do. All the conclusions of this theory that I am examining, are based on incorrect views of moral obligation. This theory that the goodness of God is the foundation of our moral obligation is based on a false and anti‑scriptural philosophies that contradicts the law of God, and sets up another rule of moral obligation.

d According to this objection that says that favors received imposes an obligation to exercise gratitude, if gratitude is a moral act, it is an ultimate intention, and so my intention must terminate on gratitude, and I must find my reasons for the ground of my obligation exclusively in gratitude. Well, if this is true, then if the relationship of my benefactor to me is the ground of my obligation to exercise gratitude, gratitude must then consist in willing this relationship for its own sake, and not in willing anything to the benefactor. This is absurd. Gratitude must consist in willing good to the benefactor, and not in willing gratitude for its own sake, and that the ground of my obligation must be the importance of loving my neighbor by willing good to him, and thus gratitude is only a condition of my obligation to will his enjoyment of good in particular.

e It is now said, in reply to this, that the “question is not, what is gratitude, but, why should we exercise it?” This question is trying to determine the ground of our obligation. The object of gratitude must be genuine. But who can tell what is the ground of our obligation to exercise gratitude until we know who or what the object of our gratitude is, and, as a result, we know what gratitude is? This objection maintains that the gratitude of my benefactor is a ground of my obligation to put forth an ultimate choice. According to this objection, if this gratitude is the ground of my obligation, it must be the object chosen for its own sake. This would be to exercise gratitude to the benefactor, to will gratitude to the benefactor for the sake of gratitude; not for his sake as a good to him; not for my sake as a good to me; but for its own sake.

5 But it is also insisted that when we attempt to give a reason why we are under any kind of moral obligation (like we should love God), they all agree in mentioning God’s moral excellence as the reason for that obligation.

a I answer: The only reason why anyone believes that he must assign the moral excellence of God as the foundation of his obligation to will good to Him is that he loosely confuses the conditions of his obligation (which is God’s moral excellence), with the foundation of his obligation (which is to will it for its own sake, or as a possible good). If it was not for the known importance of God’s highest good, we could just as easily affirm our obligation to will evil as good to Him. But if God’s moral excellence is the foundation of our moral obligation, if God was not morally excellent, then our moral obligation could no longer exist in such a situation.

b Every moral agent should will the highest good of God and of the entire universe for its own sake. This is a truth of reason. Our reason can give no other reason for willing their good as an ultimate end than its importance; and to will something for any other reason is absurd and self‑contradictory. Our obligation to will the good of everything that exists as an end implies our obligation to will its actual existence in everything and to everybody, when all the necessary conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are fulfilled in God, and therefore it is on this condition that our reason affirms our obligation to will His actual and highest happiness for its own sake, its importance being the fundamental reason for our obligation to will it as an end, and God’s moral excellence is a condition of our obligation to will His highest happiness in particular.

c Suppose I existed, and I had the idea of happiness and its importance developed, together with an idea of all its necessary conditions; but I did not know that anybody else existed, and yet I knew that their existence and happiness is possible; in this case I should be under an obligation to will or wish that beings might exist so that they could be blessed. Now suppose that I complied with this obligation. Suppose I willed or wished that God would create beings so they could be blessed. My virtue is just as real and just as great as if they really existed and I willed their actual happiness, provided my idea of its importance was as clear as if I knew they existed. Now suppose I suddenly discovered that they existed. I won’t have to make a new ultimate choice in willing their actual happiness. Thus, I would remain benevolent even though this new knowledge gives me a better idea of the importance of what I willed before. Willing their happiness now will not make me any more virtuous than when I willed their happiness as a possible good without knowing whether they would ever exist or not.

d The Bible was written in everyday language. It is a truth of reason that the good of God is of infinite importance, and therefore His good should be willed for its own sake. It is also true that virtue is an indispensable condition of fulfilling the demands of God’s own reason and conscience. If virtue is also a condition of our obligation to will it, we might expect the Bible to exhort and require us to love God and mention His virtue as the reason for our obligation, rather than the importance of His good as the foundation of our obligation. But because the foundation of our moral obligation is a truth of reason, it does not need to be received by revelation. Remember, the Bible assumes all truths of reason. The Bible assumes that you know that virtue is a condition of His good, and that we are under no obligation to love Him except on the condition of His holiness. But the fact that this condition is fulfilled in God, that is, that God is holy, needs to be impressed on us, and therefore the Bible announces it as a reason or condition of our obligation to love Him, that is, to will His happiness.

e We naturally and properly view God’s moral excellence as a condition, but it is not the foundation of our obligation to receive His revealed will as our law. If we did not assume the honesty of God’s will, we could not affirm our obligation to receive it as a rule of duty. This assumption is a condition of our obligation, and we naturally think about it when our obligation to obey God is affirmed. But the importance and importance of the interest that He requires us to seek, is the ground of our obligation.

6 Many believe that when men first wake up to a sense of their moral obligation, they consider the moral excellence of God as being the reason for their obligation, and if this knowledge does not awaken their sense of obligation, nothing else can or will.

a I answer: The only possible reason why men ever believe this, is because they think that religion consists in feelings of self-satisfaction in God, and are trying to stir up these emotions. If they think that religion basically consists in these emotions, they will, of course, believe that they are under an obligation to arouse these feelings, and they will surely take whatever course is necessary to awaken their sense of obligation to exercise those emotions. But they are wrong concerning their obligation and they do not understand the true nature of religion. If they would realize that true religion consists willing the highest good of God and of the universe for its own sake, they would resort to regarding God’s moral excellence as only one more reason for willing good to Him.

b If men are often wrong concerning their sense of obligation, it is because they love to feel and they love to have a self‑righteous satisfaction in feeling satisfied with God, and they will do whatever it takes to awaken these feelings while forgetting that the first thing we should do is willfully love God with all our hearts. A purely selfish being may be greatly affected by the great goodness and kindness of God towards him. I knew a man who was a very stingy person, as far as all benevolent giving and doing things for God and the world is concerned, who resorted to an emotional religion, and he was often emotionally affected by the goodness of God. He could complain about and denounce all who did not feel as he felt. But ask him for a dollar to help any benevolent enterprise, and he would evade your request, and instead, ask you how you feel, whether you are engaged in religion, etc.

7 Why does the Bible, and why do we so often present the character of God and of Christ as a means of awakening a sense of moral obligation and of inducing virtue?

a Answer: Because it leads men to consider the infinite importance of those interests which we should will. Presenting the example of God and of Christ is the highest moral means that can be used. God’s example and Christ’s example are the most impressive and efficient ways in which God can declare His views, and present to us the infinite importance of those interests upon which all our hearts should be set. For example, nothing can place the infinite importance of our soul in a stronger light than the example of what God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost has done.

b Nothing can bring about a more important sense of our obligation to will the glory of the Father and the salvation of souls, than the example of Christ. His example is His loudest preaching. His example is His clearest, most impressive demonstration; not merely of His own goodness, but of the intrinsic and infinite importance of the interests He sought and which we should seek also. It is the love, the care, the self‑denial, and the example of God, in His efforts to secure the great ends of unselfish love, that hold these interests before us in the strongest light, and thus births a sense of obligation within us to seek the same end. But please notice that it is not just thinking about the goodness of God that awakens this sense of obligation, but it is thinking about the importance of those interests that He seeks, in the light of His painstaking example that awakens this sense of obligation. This gives us a desire to will what He wills. Suppose, for example, that I demonstrate the greatest concern and zeal for the salvation of souls; it would not be thinking about my goodness that would quicken in a bystander a sense of obligation to save his own soul, but it would be my zeal, and life, and spirit that would have the strongest tendency to arouse in him a sense of the infinite importance of the soul, and thus quicken his sense of obligation. If I saw many people rushing to extinguish a house on fire, I would not be thinking about their goodness, but I would think about their interests that are at stake and that would quicken a sense of obligation within me to quickly come to their aid.

c Revelation impress us with the fact that God is holy, and of course it calls on us, in view of His holiness, to love and worship Him. But in doing this, it does not, cannot mean that His holiness is the foundation of our obligation to will His good as an ultimate end.

d Our obligation, when viewed apart from His character, is to will or wish that God might fulfill all the conditions of perfect happiness, and on that condition, that He might actually enjoy perfect and infinite satisfaction. But seeing, that He meets the demands of His own intelligence and the intelligence of the universe, and that He voluntarily fulfills all the necessary conditions of His highest good, we begin to realize how infinitely important it is for us to will His actual and most perfect and eternal happiness.