VII.   THE FOUNDATION OF OUR MORAL OBLIGATION  - The theory of Right as the foundation of obligation.              

A     What is right?  When used in a moral sense right means fit, proper, suitable, or agreeable to the nature and relationships of moral agents.  Right, in a moral sense, is a choice, or an intention, and it is an intention that conforms to moral law.  The question before us is, what is the ground of our obligation to make a choice or an intention?  Rightarians say that right is the ground of our moral obligation. 
     This is the answer many philosophers and theologians today give to the question of what is right.  But what do they mean?  They claim that right, in a moral sense, pertains, primarily and strictly, only to our intentions.  They say that our obligation pertains primarily and strictly to our ultimate choice or intention, and less strictly to choosing those conditions and those means to secure the object of our ultimate choice.  Now, what do they mean by the word ‘right’ when they regard right as being the ground of our obligation?  According to them, right can be both objective and subjective. 

1     Objectively, right has been recently defined to consist in a proper or a right relationship that exists between the ultimate choice and its object (Mahan’s Moral Philosophy).  For example, they believe the nature or the importance of the highest good of God and of the universe creates a right relationship between it and its choice, and this relationship is the ground of all our obligations.

2     Subjectively, right is synonymous with righteousness, honesty, and virtue.  It is an attribute of the person who willfully conforms to the moral law.  Right is a word that expresses the moral quality, the element, or the attribute of that ultimate intention that the law of God requires.  In other words, it is our heart conforming to the law of objective right.  This designates the moral character of that state of heart.  (Righteousness: right action, conformity to divine or moral law.  A disposition to deal rightly with every moral being)

B     Some choose to regard subjective right as consisting in the state of the heart, and others insist that right is only an element, attribute, or quality of this state of heart, or of this ultimate intention.  It doesn’t matter. 
     The ancient Greek and Roman philosophers believed in this theory.  It was the theory of Kant, and the theory of the transcendental school in Europe and America.  Cousin in the 1800’s, in agreeing with the views of Kant, states the theory in these words: “Do right for the sake of the right, or rather, will the right for the sake of the right.  Morality has to do with the intentions” (Enunciation of Moral Law Elements of Psychology, p. 162)  These philosophers regard right as the foundation of our moral obligation.  “Will what is right for the sake of what is right.”  This must mean that one must will what is right as an ultimate end, that is, for its own sake.  Let us examine this very popular philosophy, first, in the light of its own principles, and secondly in the light of revelation.

1     Cousin has given us a critical definition of the exact position and teaching of Rightarians.  They believe that subjective right is the ground of our moral obligation.  But subjective right, or righteousness, can never be a ground of our moral obligation.  Yet, the Rightarian believes that the right relationship that exists between our choice and an object that is valuable all by itself is the ground of our obligation to choose that object. 
     This writer strenuously maintains, that the reason for our ultimate choice must be based exclusively in the object that we choose, in other words, that our ultimate choice is choosing the object for its own sake, or for what is right in the object itself.  He also repeatedly insists, that the ground of our obligation is, and must be based exclusively on the object that we ultimately choose, and also that the ground of our obligation is the consideration, based on the object we choose, which compels our reason to affirm our obligation to choose it for its own sake.  But all of this contradicts his own Rightarian theory.

2     If the ground of our obligation to make an ultimate choice must be based on the nature of the object that we choose, how can it consist in the relationship that exists between our choice and the object we choose?  It can’t.  This relationship is not intrinsic on the object that we choose. 
     Our obligation is to choose the object of our ultimate choice, not for the sake of the relationship that exists between our choice and its object, but exclusively for the sake of the object itself.  The relationship does not create the object that we choose, but the object we choose creates the relationship.  Choosing the object itself because of its importance creates both a right relationship and the obligation to choose that object for its own sake.  Whatever creates the right relationship must also create the obligation.  It is absurd to say that the importance of the object creates a right relationship between itself and the choice, and yet it does not impose or create an obligation to choose that object for its own sake.  Because we should choose that object for its own sake, and not because of the relationship between our choice and that object, the nature of the object must be the ground of our obligation.

3     But the writer who presented the position of the Rightarians that I mentioned earlier, says that “the mind, in judging an act to be right or wrong, does not take into account either the object or the act by itself, but both together, in their intrinsic relations, as the ground of its affirmation.”  However, the nature of our ultimate choice to love our neighbor as ourselves, for example, and the nature of its object, the good of others for example, have an intrinsic relationship with each other.  Now, they form a ground of our obligation to choose what?  Are we to choose the object because of the relationship between our choice and that object?  No!  Our choice and the object we choose only forms a ground of our obligation to choose the good for its own sake, solely for the sake of the value that good has all by itself.  Our ultimate choice is choosing an object for its own sake, or for what is valuable in the object itself.  The ground of our obligation to make an ultimate choice must be found in the object we choose.  But, the object we choose, in this situation, is the good of others, and not the nature of our choice and the nature of the good of others, together with the right relationship that exists between them.  Our obligation reveals the ground or foundation of our obligation.  Our obligation is to choose the good of others for its own sake.  Therefore, the ground of our obligation must be the intrinsic nature of the object we choose.  The nature of our choice, the relationship of our choice, and the good, are all conditions, but none of these form the ground of our obligation.  If this writer simply remembered his own definition of ultimate intention, he never could have made the statement we have just examined.  That the law requires us to love God willfully and unselfishly, and to love our neighbor as ourselves, any reasonable person knows deep down in his heart.  But if the Rightarian theory is true, then unselfish love is sin because this theory claims that it is the right, and not the good of others, that is the end for which God and all moral agents should live for.  According to this theory, unselfish love for God and our neighbor can never be our duty.  It can never be right, but it must be wrong.  Why?  Because they say that if we are supposed to will good, wet must will that good, not  because it is good all by itself, but because of the right relationship that exists between our choice and the good.  Therefore, to will the good for its own sake would be sin.  This would not be willing the right end because we would be willing the good and not the right as an ultimate end.  This theory is opposite to our theory.  Both cannot be true.  Let us now examine this philosophy in the light of the oracles of God.

4     First of all, let’s look at this theory, in the light of the moral law.  Our Lord summed up the whole law in one statement: “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might.”  (Deut. 6:5)  Paul says: “For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.”  (Gal. 5:14)  Now from this we must admit that the love that the law requires is not a mere emotional love, but this love consists in willing, choosing, or intending; that it consists in choosing an ultimate end, or in choosing something for its own sake or for its importance.  What is this that the law requires us to will to God and our neighbor?  Is it to will to love our God and to love our neighbor, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the right relationship that exists between our choice and that love?  This is absurd.  Besides, what has this to do with loving God and our neighbor?  To will the good of God and our neighbor because of the relationship in question, is not the same as willfully loving God and our neighbor.  You are not willing their good for their own sake, but you are willing their good solely because of the relationship that exists between your willing and the object willed.  Suppose someone said that the law requires us to will the good, or highest happiness of God and our neighbor, because it is right.  This is impossible.  To will the happiness of God and our neighbor, in any proper sense, is to will it for its own sake, or as an ultimate end.  But one shouldn’t will it simply because it is right.  To will the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake, or because of its importance, is right.  But to will it for the sake of the right relationship between the willing and the object is not right.  It is not willing it for the right reason.  The law of God does not and cannot require us to love right more than we are to love God and our neighbor.  What!  That right is more important than the highest good of God and of the universe?  Impossible!  It is impossible that the moral law should require anything other than to will the highest good of the universe as an ultimate end, i.e., for its own sake.  It is a first truth of reason that this is the most important thing possible or conceivable.  There is no way we can possibly require anything else to be chosen as an ultimate end.  According to this philosophy, the revealed law should read: “You shall love the right for its own sake, with all your heart and with all your soul.”  The fact is, the law requires us to love God supremely and love our neighbor and ourselves equally.  It says nothing, and implies nothing, about doing right for the sake of right.  Rightarianism rejects God’s Divine law, and it substitutes in its place a completely different rule for us to obey: a rule that rejects the claims of God, and exalts right to the throne. 

5     “Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God.”  (1 Cor. 10:31)  The glory of God is of infinite importance to Him, and to the universe, and for this reason we should promote His glory.  What is required is doing it.  The spirit of the requirement is this: Aim to spread abroad the glory of God as the means of securing the highest good of the universe.  Why?  For the sake of the importance that this good has all by itself, and not for the sake of the relationship that exists between the willing and the object. 

6     “Therefore, as we have opportunity, let us do good to all, especially to those who are of the household of faith” (Gal. 6:10)  Here again, we are to do good for the sake of the good.  

7     Take those commands in scripture to pray and labor for the salvation of souls for example.  When we pray, preach, and converse, must we aim at what is right, must the love of right and not the love of God and souls influence us?  When I am engaged in prayer, and I travail night and day for souls, and have an eye so focused on the good of souls and on the glory of God, and I am so swallowed up with my subject that I don’t have any time to think of what is right; am I all wrong?  Must I pray because it is right, and do all I do, and suffer all I suffer, not because of my love for God and my love for my fellow man, but because it is right?  Who does not know, that to intend what is right for the sake of the right in all these things, instead of focusing on the good of others, is not true religion?

8     Examine this philosophy in the light of what the scripture says: “For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him should not perish but have everlasting life” (John 3:16)  Now, are we to understand that God gave His Son, not because of any regard for the good of souls for their own sake, but for the sake of what is right?  Did He give His Son to die for what is right, or did Christ die to make the salvation of souls possible for the sake of those souls?  Did Christ give Himself to work, suffer, and die for what is right, or because of His love for souls?  Did the prophets, and apostles, and martyrs, and all the saints throughout all the ages, will what is right for the sake of the right, or did they labor, suffer, and die for God and souls because of their love for them? 

9     However, let us look at another passage, which those who support this philosophy love to quote: “Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right” (Eph. 6:1)  Now what is the spirit of this requirement?  What does it mean to obey our parents?  What must the child intend for its own sake?  Must he will good to God and his parents, and obey his parents as the means of securing the highest good, or must he will what is right as an end all by itself, for the sake of the right regardless of the good of God or of the universe? 
     It is right to will the highest good of God and of the universe, to use all the necessary means available, and to fulfill all the necessary conditions of His highest good.  For children to obey their parents is one of those means, and for this reason it is right, and under no other condition can it be required.  But, some say that children acknowledge their obligation to obey their parents, without being aware that their obedience has any relationship to the good of others.  This is wrong.  The child, if he is a moral agent and really affirms his moral obligation, not only acknowledges his obligation to obey his parents, but he must see the end that his choice or intention should terminate on.  If he really makes an intelligent affirmation, he should will an end; and this end is not and cannot be the right.  He knows that he should will his parents’ happiness, and his own happiness, and the happiness of the world, and the happiness of God; and he knows that obedience to his parents is a means to this end.  The fact is that it is a first truth of reason that he should will the good of his parents and the good of everybody.  He also knows that obedience to his parents is a necessary means to this end.  If he does not know these things, it is impossible for him to be a moral agent, to make any intelligent affirmation at all.  He is no better than the animals that are completely motivated by hope, fear, and instinct.  An ox or a dog, which gives some indication of knowing that they should obey us, affirms as much moral obligation as a child who has not yet developed in his mind, the idea of what is good, or important for others.  Children cannot be aware of their moral obligation before the idea of what is intrinsically important is developed in their minds.  But this theory assumes that children have the idea of right developed before the idea of that is important.  This can’t be.  The end they should choose must be understood by their mind before the child can have an idea of hiss moral obligation to choose that end, or before we can have an idea of right or wrong or, of choosing or not choosing what is right.  The idea of what is good or important must develop before the ideas of right and moral obligation develop.  The law of God cannot develop in the mind of any child who has no knowledge or idea of what is important, and who has, and can have, no reference to the good of others in obeying his parents.  

C    It is one thing to have the right intention and another thing to intend the right as an end.  For example, I can choose my own gratification as an end, which is wrong.  But I am not choosing the wrong as an end.  A drunk chooses to gratify his appetite for strong drink as an end, that is, for its own sake.  This is wrong.  But the wrong choice does not terminate on the wrong; the wrong choice terminates on the gratification.  He does not choose the liquor because it is wrong, but in spite of the fact that it is wrong.  To love God is right, but to believe that we should love God because it is right is absurd.  It is to believe that we should love God because of a regard for right rather than a regard for God Himself.  This is absurd.  To love or will the good of my neighbor is right.  But to will what is right, instead of the good of my neighbor, is not right.  It is loving what we think is right instead of loving my neighbor, which is not right.  

1     But some may object, saying that they are aware that they should will what is right.  This is wrong.  I am aware that I should will the good of God and of everything He created.  This is right.  But this is not choosing what is right as an end.  But, suppose they still insist that we know that we affirm our obligation to will and do many things simply because it is right to will and to do.  To this I reply that at the time that we act, the reason that is in my mind may be the fact that what I am doing is right, but the fact that it is right is a condition and can never be the ground of my obligation.  The act itself must be a condition and a means to that end.  In an ultimate choice, our mind can never think that the relationship of the rightness between the choice and its object is the ground of our obligation.  Nor can our mind think that the relationship of the rightness between the means and its object is the ground of our obligation to choose them.  Our mind assumes that the importance of the end creates both our obligation to choose, and the relationship between the object we choose and our ultimate choice.  The fact is, our mind naturally assumes the importance of the end, and so we usually act without even thinking about our obligation to will the good for its own sake together with all the known conditions and means.  Therefore, whenever our mind perceives a condition, or a means of doing good, it naturally affirms our obligation to choose it.  This is the same thing as affirming the rightness of such a choice.  The rightness of the choice is often the thing that we immediately think about, but the assumption is that this obliga­tion is created by the nature of the object to which this thing perpetuates the relationship of a condition or a means.

2     However, someone may say, “I am aware that I should will the good of others, because it is right.”  Now, this is saying that I will the good of others, as a means, and the right as an end!  This is making the fact that ‘it is right’ the supreme good, and the good of others as only a means to that end.  This is absurd.  But then to turn around and say that my obligation is to will the good of God and my neighbor because it is right, is a contradiction.  It is the same as saying that I should love God and my neighbor as an ultimate end, and yet I should not intend the good of God and my neighbor, but I should intend what is right.  

3     But some say, “I should love God out of respect for my obligation; that I should will it, because I am required to will it.”  In other words, that in loving God and my neighbor, I must intend to comply with my obligation; and this is identical with intending the right.  If my end is to do my duty, then I do not do it.  For what is my obligation?  Why, my obligation is to love, or will the good of God and my neighbor as an end, or for its own importance.  Now, in order to do my duty, I must intend the good of God and my neighbor as an end.  That is, I must intend something that I am under an obligation to intend.  But I am not under an obligation to intend the right, simply because it is right, nor do my duty simply because it is my duty, but my obligation is to intend the good of God and my neighbor.  Therefore, to do my duty, I must not intend the right, but I must intend the good of God and my neighbor.  I say again, to intend what is good or important is right, but to intend what is right is not right.  

4     Let’s say, someone says, “there are many situations, where I know I have a moral obligation to do right, even when I can give no other reason for performing my duty than the fact that it is right.  For example, when I see virtue; I know, that I should love that virtue.”  Now, there is no reference to the good of others in this statement.  Is not willing the right for the sake of right, and loving virtue for the sake of virtue, the same thing?  But what does it mean to love virtue?  There is a significant feeling of delight or satisfaction in it.  Moral obligation, strictly speaking, relates to our ultimate intention only.  What, then, do I mean by saying that I should love virtue?  What is virtue?  Virtue is an attribute of our ultimate intention.  However, what is loving virtue?  Loving virtue consists in willing its existence.  Loving virtue is loving virtue as an end, or for its own sake, and not out of any regard to the good of others.  But this is absurd, and a contradiction.  To love virtue is to will its existence as an end.  But, in order to have virtue, or to be virtuous, you must intend an end that is virtuous.  Now, according to the theory of Rightarians, if to love virtue is to will its existence as an end, for its own sake, then I affirm my obligation to intend the intention of a virtuous being as an end, instead of intending the same end that he does.  This is absurd.  Intending an intention is worthless.  It is neither naturally good nor morally good, no matter what end is intended.  Without an end that is chosen, the intention is neither right nor wrong.  It is therefore impossible to choose our intention as an end, without reference to the end we intend to choose.  To love virtue, then, is to love or will the end upon which our virtuous intention terminates, namely, the good of others.  To love virtue is to will its existence for the sake of the end that virtue has in view.  Virtue is intending or choosing a virtuous end.  Loving virtue is willing that the virtuous intention should exist for the sake of its end.  Take away the end, and who could will the intention?  Without the end, virtue could not exist.  Therefore, in the situation we’ve discussed, I can’t declare my obligation to will, or intend, without any reference to the good of others.  

5     But again, some say that “when I contemplate the moral excellence of God, I affirm my obligation to love Him solely for His goodness, without any reference to the good of others, and for no other reason than because it is right to love God”.  However, to love God because of His moral excellence is not the same as loving Him because it is right.  You are contradicting yourself if you talk about loving God for His moral excellence, because it is right.  It is the same as saying; I love God because He is morally worthy, yet not really for this reason, but because it is right.  To love God for His moral worth is to will good to Him for its own sake on the condition that He deserves it.  But to will His moral worth simply because it is right, is to will the right as an ultimate end, to have a supreme regard for right, instead of a supreme regard for the good of God.    

a     But why should Rightarians bring these objections forward?  Because they all assume that moral obligation refers to something other than an ultimate intention.  Rightarians believe that impartial love is a universal duty; that this love consists in willing the highest good of others in general, for its own sake and that this good, by virtue of its own nature imposes an obligation on our part to choose it for its own sake, and for this reason it is right to choose it.  But in spite of all this, they most inconsistently state that the right to choose it is the ground of our obligation.  Consistency must compel them to deny that impartial love ever is, or can be, duty and right.  They will not abandon their nonsensical teaching choosing right is the ground of their obligation. 

b     Consistent Rightarianism is a Godless, Christ less, loveless philosophy.  This Kant saw and acknowledged.  He called it pure legalism, that is, Kant understood the law as imposing an obligation by virtue of its own nature, instead of the importance of the end, which the law requires moral agents to choose.  However, Kant loses sight of the end, and does not recognize any end at all.  He makes a broad distinction between morality and religion.  Morality consists, according to him, in adopting the maxim, “Do right for the sake of what is right,” or, “Act at all times upon a maxim that is proper for universal law.”  Kant says that adopting this maxim is morality.  But once he adopts this maxim, his mind goes abroad to carry this maxim into practice.  Kant finds that God and His creation exists, and he sees that it is right to intend their good.  He calls this intention to do what is good, religion.  Thus, he says, ethics leads to or results in religion (See Kant, on Religion).  But, when we look at God and everything that exists, we feel prompted to ask, “Are we to will their good as an end, for its own sake, or because it is right?  If we are to will their well being for its own sake, where then is the maxim, “Will the right for the sake of the right?”  For if we are to will the good, not as an ultimate end, but for the sake of the right, then right is the end that is preferred over the highest good of God and of the universe.  It is impossible that this should be religion.  Even Kant himself admits that this is not religion.

c      But enough of this cold and loveless philosophy.  Since it exalts right above all that is of God, and subverts all the teachings of the Bible, it cannot be a light thing to be deluded by it.  However, it is remarkable and interesting to see Christian Rightarians without being aware of their inconsistency, so often confuse this philosophy with the teaching that good will for others constitutes virtue.  Numerous examples of it occur everywhere in their writings, which demonstrate that Rightarianism is with them only a theory that “plays round the head but never comes near the heart.”