VI

1 Because moral law legislates directly over our voluntary actions only, moral obligation relates to our ultimate intention. Our ultimate intention consists in choosing its object for its own sake. We must find our reasons for choosing an ultimate intention within the ultimate intention itself. The intrinsic nature and importance of our ultimate intention must impose an obligation for us to choose it for its own sake. Therefore, this importance is the ground, and the only possible ground, of our obligation to choose it for its own sake. It would be our duty to will the highest good of God and of the universe, even if God was to will that we should not. Therefore, the belief that the sovereign will of God is the ground of our obligation has no foundation. Our obligation to do what? Why to love God and our neighbor. However, that is to will what is best for them. And does God’s will create this obligation? Should we be under no such obligation to love God and our neighbor if God had not commanded us to love Him and our neighbor? Are we to will this good, not because of its own importance to God and our neighbor, but simply because God commands it?
Of course not. But what consistency is there in believing that unselfish love is a universal duty, and at the same time believe that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of our obligation. How can men believe that the highest good of others should be chosen for its own sake, and that this importance is therefore the ground of their obligation, and yet, at the same time, they claim that the will of God is the ground of their obligation? Why, if the will of God is the ground of our obligation, then unselfish love is sin. If the will of God creates our obligation, then the will of God, and not the interest and good of God, should be our purpose in life. Then God should be consecrated to His own will instead of to His own highest good. This makes true love in God, and in all beings, sin. According to their theory, a purely arbitrary will and sovereignty in God has more importance than His highest good of the whole universe. But observe,

2     Moral obligation relates to our ultimate intention, or our choice of an end.
     The foundation, or fundamental reason for choosing something, is that the nature of the thing itself that makes it obligatory to choose it. Our choice should terminate on this reason.
     Therefore, our reason and our end are identical.
     Now if the will of God is the foundation of our obligation, the will of God must also be the ultimate end of our choice. However, it is impossible for us to will or choose God’s will as an ultimate end. God’s will reveals a law which is a rule for us to choose or intend. God’s will requires that we must choose something as an ultimate end, or for its own importance. This end cannot be God’s will, His commandment, or the law itself. Does God will that I should choose His willing as an ultimate end? Impossible! It is a clear contradiction to say that our moral obligation relates directly to our choice of an end for its own importance, and then turn around and say that the will of God is the foundation or reason for our obligation. This is stating, in the same breath, that the importance of the end that God requires us to choose is the reason, or the foundation of our obligation to choose it, and yet that this is not the reason, but that the will of God is the reason.
     Willing can never be an end. God cannot will our willing as an end. Nor can He will His willing as an end. Willing or choosing, must always imply an end that is willed which is completely separate from the willing itself. Willing, cannot be willed as an ultimate end for two reasons:

a Because we must regard the end on which any choice terminates, and not the choice itself, as the end.

b Because choosing or willing has no importance all by itself, it’s importance lives in the end that is willed or chosen.

3 The will of God cannot be the foundation of the moral obligation of all created moral agents. God has moral character, and He is virtuous. This implies that God Himself is a subject of moral obligation, for virtue is compliance with moral obligation. Virtue is obeying moral obligation. If God is a subject of moral obligation, there must be some reason independent of His own will why He wills as He does. There must be some reason that imposes an obligation on Him to will as He does. His will, then, is not the fundamental reason of our obligation; but the foundation of our obligation must be the reason why God wills as he does concerning our conduct.

4 If the will of God is the foundation of our moral obligation, He could, simply by willing it, change the nature of virtue and vice, which is absurd.

5 If the will of God is the foundation of our moral obligation, He not only could change the nature of virtue and vice, but He would have every right to do so; because if there is nothing behind His will that binds Him to any moral obligation, He has every right, at any time, to do what he pleases. He could make malevolence a virtue and benevolence a vice. If His will is the ground of His obligation, then His will creates the right, and whatever He wills, would be right, simply and only because He wills it.

6 If the will of God is the foundation of our moral obligation, we would have no standard to judge the moral character of His actions, and we wouldn’t be able to know whether God is worthy of praise or blame. If the will of God is the foundation of our moral obligation, if God was a wicked being, and if He required all His creatures to be selfish instead of being benevolent, He would be just as virtuous and worthy of praise as He is now; for this theory says, that His sovereign will creates right, and as a result, whatever He wills, whether it is good or bad, would be right, simply because He willed it.

7 If the will of God is the foundation of our moral obligation, He has no standard by which to judge His own character, since He has no rule but His own will to compare His own actions.

8 If the will of God is the foundation of our moral obligation, He is not a subject of moral obligation. But,

9 If God is not a subject of moral obligation, He has no moral character; for virtue and vice are nothing more than conformity or nonconformity to moral obligation. God’s will, as expressed in His law, is the rule of duty to His moral agents. It defines and marks out the path of His duty, but the fundamental reason why moral agents should obey God’s will, is clearly not in the will of God itself.

10 The will of no being can be law. Moral law is an idea that comes from God’s Divine reason, and it is not based in the will of God or any other being. If the will of any being was declared to be law, that being could not possibly will wrong; for whatever He willed would be right, simply because He willed it.

11 But let us bring this philosophy into the light of Divine revelation. “To the law and to the testimony! If they do not speak according to this word, it is because there is no light in them” (Isaiah 8:20)
The law of God, or the moral law, requires that we shall love God with all our heart, and we shall love our neighbor as ourselves. Now it is clear that this love that is required is not simply an emotional love, but it consists in choosing, willing, intending, that is, in choosing something because of its own importance. This is choosing an ultimate end. Now what is this end? Is it the will or command of God? Are we to will as an ultimate end, that God should will so that we should will the same thing? What can be more absurd, self‑contradictory, and ridiculous than this? But, what is this loving, willing, choosing, intending, that is required by the law? We are commanded to love God and our neighbor. What can this be, other than to will the highest good of God and our neighbor? This is infinitely important all by itself. This must be the end to which we commit our hearts and lives, and nothing can possibly be law that requires choosing any other ultimate end.

B But many say that we know we must obey God’s will, without reference to any other reason than it is His will; and this, they say, proves that His will is the foundation of our moral obligation. To this I reply:

1 Our reason declares that we should will what God commands, but it does not and cannot assign His will as the foundation of our obligation. His whole will concerning our duty, is summed up in the two precepts of the law. These two precepts require universal good willing to everything that exists, or loving God with all our heart, mind, soul, and body, and loving our neighbor as ourselves. We know from these two precepts that we should will the highest good of God and of the universe for its own sake, or for its own importance. Reason declares that this is what we should will. And can we be so self‑contradictory that we believe that we should will the good of God and of the universe for its own importance, yet not for this reason, but because God wills that we should will it? Impossible!

2 However, in this objection, the objector refers to some outward act, which is only a means of the end that we choose, but it is not the end itself. But, concerning any act whatever, even his objection falls apart. For example, lets say that God requires me to work and pray for the salvation of souls. Now I feel that I must obey His command, not as an arbitrary, but as a requirement that infallibly reveals one of the many means of securing that great and ultimate end which I am to will for its own importance. I should regard His commandment as being wise and benevolent, and it is only because I see that it is wise that I affirm my obligation to obey Him. Should God command me to choose, as an ultimate end, or for its own importance, something that my reason tells me has no importance, I could not possibly affirm my obligation to obey Him. Should He command me to do something that my reason tells me is unwise and malevolent, it would be impossible for me to affirm my obligation to obey Him. This proves, beyond a doubt, that reason does not consider His command as the foundation of our obligation, but only as infallible proof that His commands are wise, loving, and good, in themselves, and that is the reason He commands them.

3 If God’s will is the foundation of our moral obligation, He might command me to violate and trample down all the laws of my existence, and to be the enemy of all good, and I would have to obey Him. This is absurd. This brings us to conclude that he who believes that moral obligation relates to choosing an end for its own importance, and still claims that the will of God is the foundation of our moral obligation, contradicts 1) his own admissions, 2) his reason, and 3) Divine revelation. This theory is grossly inconsistent and nonsensical. It overlooks the very nature of moral law as reasonable, that is it originates in God’ reason and then God implants it into our reason. This makes moral law consist in arbitrary willing.

C Paley’s Theory of Self‑interest. This theory makes self‑interest the ground of our moral obligation. Upon this theory I remark:

1 If self‑interest is the ground of our moral obligation, then self‑interest is the end that we must choose for its own sake. Therefore, to be virtuous I must intend my own self-interest as the supreme good. Therefore, according to this theory, unselfish love is sin. If you live for the good of God and the universe, you are wrong, because it is not devoted to the right end. This theory believes that self‑interest is the end that we should live for. This makes selfishness virtue, and unselfish love, vice. These two theories are totally opposite. This theory of self-interest embraces the wrong view of this subject. If Dr. Paley is right, anyone who believes that loving God with all our heart and our neighbor as ourselves, must be fundamentally wrong.

2 According to this theory, I must treat my own interests as supremely important, when my own interests are really infinitely less important than the interests of God. Thus I am under a moral obligation to prefer an infinitely less good because it is my own, to an infinitely greater good that belongs to God. This is exactly what every sinner on earth and in hell does.

3 But, let us examine this theory in the light of God’s revealed law. If this philosophy is correct, the law should read, “You shall love yourself supremely, and God and your neighbor not at all.” For Dr. Paley believes that the only reason for our obligation is self‑interest. If this is true, then I am under an obligation to love myself, and never under any obligation or duty to love God or my neighbor. Paley says, “it is the usefulness of any rule by itself that constitutes the obligation of it” (Paley’s Moral Philos., book 2, chap. 6) Again, he says, “And let it be asked why I am obligated to keep my word?” And the answer will be, “because I am urged to do so by a violent motive, namely, the expectation of being after this life rewarded if I do so, or punished if I do not” (Paley’s Moral Philos., book 2, chap. 3) Thus, it appears that it is the usefulness of a rule to myself only, that constitutes the ground of my obligation to obey it.
But even if you deny this, you still can’t deny that Dr. Paley maintains that self‑interest is the ground of our moral obligation. If this is the foundation of our moral obligation, whether Paley or any one else believes that it is true, then the moral law should read, “You shall love yourself supremely, and God and your neighbor subordinately,” or, in other words, “You shall love yourself as an end, and God and your neighbor, only as a means of promoting your own interests.” If this theory is true, all the commands in the Bible need to be changed. Instead of the command, “Whatever you do, do it heartily unto the Lord” (Col. 3:23), it should read, “Whatever you do, do it heartily unto yourself.” Instead of the command, Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God.” (1 Cor. 10:31), it should read, “Do all to secure your own interest.”

4 Should someone claim that this school would say that the meaning of these precepts are, “Do all for the glory of God to secure your own interests.” I answer: That statement is a contradiction. To do it for the glory of God is one thing; to do it to secure your own interest is a totally different and opposite thing. To do it for the glory of God is to make His glory your end. But to do it to secure your own interest is to make your own interest the end. (Glory: the act of praising, adoring, honoring, and giving thanks; the awe-inspiring splendor and majesty of God; the excellence of God; to ‘glorify; God is to render Him excellent by our conduct)

5 Now, let us look at this theory in the light of the what the Bible says about the conditions of salvation. “So likewise, whoever of you does not forsake all that he has cannot be My disciple.” (Luke 14:33) If Paley’s theory is true, it should read: “Except a man makes his own interest the supreme end of pursuit, he cannot be My disciple.” Again, “If any man will come after Me, let him deny himself and take up his cross” (Matt. 16:24), etc. To conform to Paley’s theory, this should read: “If any man will come after Me, let him not deny himself, but cherish and supremely seek his own interest.” I could quote any passages might be quoted, as any Bible student knows.

6 However, let us examine this theory in the light of other passages in scripture. “It is more blessed to give than to receive” (Acts 20:35) This, according to the theory we are opposing, should read, “It is more blessed to receive than to give.” “Charity (love) seeks not her own” (1 Cor. 13:5) This should read, “Charity seeks her own.” “No man (that is, no righteous man) lives for himself” (Romans 14:7) This should read, “Every (righteous) man lives for himself.”

7 We can examine this theory in the light of the spirit and example of Christ. “Even Christ pleased not himself” (Romans 15:3) This should read, “if Christ was holy and did His duty, Even Christ pleased Himself,” or we could say it this way, “even Christ sought His own interests.” “I seek not My own glory, but the glory of Him who sent Me.” (John 8:50) This should read, “I seek not the glory of Him who sent Me, but My own glory.” But enough, you can easily see that this is a selfish philosophy, and the exact opposite of the truth of God.

D The Utilitarian philosophy.
This theory maintains that the usefulness of an act or a choice determines if we should do it or not. That is, the usefulness of an act is the foundation of our moral obligation; that the tendency of any act, choice, or intention to secure a good or important end, is the foundation of our obligation to exercise that choice or intention. Let me reply to this theory:

1 That Utilitarians must agree with everyone else that it is our duty to will the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake; and that the importance of this good creates our obligation to willfully love God and our neighbor and to promote unselfish love; that the tendency of choosing the best interests of God and our neighbor, would be neither useful nor obligatory if it wasn’t for its importance. How, then, can they believe that the tendency of choosing an object, instead of the importance of that object, should be a ground of our obligation. It is absurd to say that the foundation of our obligation to choose a certain end must be found, not in the importance of the end itself, but in the tendency of the intention to secure our end. The tendency is only as important as the end is important. It is, and must be, the importance that the end has, and not the tendency of an intention to secure that end, that constitutes the foundation of our obligation to choose that end.

2 We have seen that the foundation of our obligation to will or choose any end must consist in the importance that the end has all by itself, and only this importance can require us to choose something as an ultimate end. To say anything else is to contradict yourself. It is the same as saying, that you should choose something as an end, and yet, not as an end, but for some other reason, which is the tendency of your choice to secure that end. Here, you claim, in the same breath, that the thing you intend to secure should be your end, your goal, that is, you can choose it for its own importance, and yet not as an end or for its own importance, but for an entirely different reason, which is the tendency that the choice has to secure it.

3 But the very definition of this theory implies its absurdity. One must choose something that tends to secure good. But why secure good rather than evil? The answer is, because good is important. Ah! Here then we have another reason, which is the true reason, which is that we choose something that is good because it is good all by itself. Our obligation to use whatever means are necessary to do good may be conditioned on the tendency of those means to secure the end, but the obligation to use those means is based solely in the importance of the end we have chosen.

4 Does the law require us to love God and our neighbor, because loving God and our neighbor tends to the good either of God or, our neighbor, or ourselves? Is it the tendency or usefulness of love that makes us obligated to love one another? What? To will good because willing what is good will do good? But why do good? What is this love? The love required by the law of God is not a mere emotion or feeling, but it is a love that wills, chooses, and intends. This love must be our goal our purpose in life. This love must be our reason for living. What, then, should we intend as an end, or for its own sake? Is the tendency of love, or the usefulness of our ultimate intention, supposed to be the end that we must intend? It must be, if Utilitarianism is true. Utilitarianism is the philosophical doctrine that advocates the greatest good for the greatest number of people.

5 According to this theory, when the law requires that we love God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves, they declare that we are not to will, choose, or intend the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake, but because of the tendency that the intention has to promote the good of God, our neighbor and ourselves. But, I don’t care what the tendency of love or intention is, its usefulness depends on the importance of the end that it tends to promote. Suppose love or intention tends to promote its end; this is a useful tendency only because the end is important all by itself. It is silly to say that we are required to love God and others, not because of the importance of their good, but because love tends to promote their good. This represents the law as requiring love, not to God and our neighbor as an end, but to tendency as an end. The law in this case should read thus: “You shall love the usefulness or tendency of love with all your heart.”
If this theory is true, this is the spirit and meaning of the law: “You shall love the Lord and your neighbor, that is, you shall choose their good, not for its own sake, but because choosing it tends to promote it.” This is absurd. Why promote it for any other reason than for its own importance? If the law of God requires an ultimate intention, it makes no sense to affirm that the intention should terminate on its own tendency as an end.

6 But some people say that we are aware of affirming our obligation to do many things on the ground that those things are useful, or because they tend to promote good.
Answer: Yes, we are aware of affirming our obligation to do many things on the condition that they tend to promote good, but we can never claim that our obligation is based on this tendency. I am under an obligation to use whatever means are available to promote good for the sake of its own importance, but not for the sake of the tendency that the means has to promote good! This would be absurd. Let me say again, that the obligation to use a means may be conditioned by the perceived tendency, but it is never based on this tendency. Our ultimate intention has no such condition. The importance of our ultimate intention that we perceive imposes an obligation without any reference to the tendency of the intention.

7 But, suppose some Utilitarian denies that our moral obligation depends on our ultimate intention only, and he maintains that our moral obligation also depends on those willful decisions and actions that are the means to our ultimate end, and therefore they conclude that the foundation of our moral obligation, concerning all those conscious decisions and actions is their tendency to secure an important end. This would not at all relieve the problems with utilitarianism; for in this situation the tendency could only be a condition of our obligation, while the fundamental reason for our obligation must still be the importance of the end. A tendency to promote an end can impose no obligation. Our end must be intrinsically important, and this alone imposes our obligation to choose that end, and to use whatever means are necessary to promote that end. On condition that we perceive something is as a means to achieve this end, for the sake of the end alone, we are under a moral obligation to use those means.