IV.   THE EXTENT OF OUR MORAL OBLIGATION. 

A     Moral obligation cannot directly extend to the following:

1     Not to external or muscular action.  Muscular actions are connected with the actions of our will by a law of cause and effect.  (Cause and effect; A cause is a physical or moral force which brings about a certain result.  An effect is the certain result of a specific cause)   If I will to move my muscles, they must move, unless the nerves that control my voluntary motion are paralyzed, or some resistance is offered to muscular motion that overpowers the strength of my will.  It is generally understood and agreed that moral obligation does not directly extend to bodily or outward actions. 

2     Not to the states of our sensibility.  I have already said that we are aware that our feelings and emotions are not voluntary, but involuntary.  Moral obligation cannot, therefore, directly extend to them. 

3     Not to states of our intellect.  The phenomena of our mind are involuntary.  It is impossible that moral obligation should extend directly to any involuntary act or state of our mind. 

4     Not to unintelligent acts of our will.  There are many unintelligent acts of our will, that moral obligation cannot extend to.  For example, the conscious decisions of maniacs, or of infants before their reason is developed.  They must at birth, possess free will, just like they possess motion or muscular action.  The conscious decisions of sleepwalkers are also involuntary.  Purely instinctive conscious decisions must also come under the category of unintelligent acts of will.  For example: a bee lights on my hand, I instantly and instinctively shake him off.  I touch a hot iron, and instinctively move my hand.  Indeed many actions of my will are under the influence of pure instinct, and automati­cally respond before my mind can decide to will or not to will.  These surely cannot have moral character, and of course, moral obligation cannot extend to them. 

B     Moral obligation must directly extend to the following:  

1     To intelligent acts of our will.  These acts must be free.  There are three types of intelligent acts of our will:

a     The choice of some object for its own sake, i.e., because of its own nature, or for reasons found exclusively in the object itself, as, for example, the happiness of everything that exists.  These are called ultimate choices, or intentions.

b     The choice of the conditions and means to secure the object that we choose as an ultimate end.  For example, holiness, as the condition or means for happiness.

c      Conscious decisions, executive efforts, or willful conduct to secure our ultimate goal in life.  Our obligation must extend to these three actions of our will.  Strictly speaking, our obligation only extends directly to our ultimate intention. 
     The choice of an end requires choosing the known conditions and means to secure this end.  I am free to give up, at any moment, my choice of an end, but as long as I persevere in my choice or my ultimate intention, I am not free to refuse the known necessary conditions and means to my end.  If I do, I must relinquish my choice of that end.  My desire to choose that end may remain, but the actual choice of that end cannot remain when my will knowingly rejects the known necessary conditions and means to that end.  In this situation, my will prefers to let the end go, rather than to choose it and use the necessary conditions and means to accomplish that end.  Choosing the known conditions and means, together with executive willful decisions, is implied in my ultimate intention or in my choice of an end. 
     As soon as we perceive what is good or important, he know we are obligated to choose it.  This knowledge is direct, universal, absolute, and without condition.  Therefore, our obligation to make our ultimate choice is, in the strictest sense direct, absolute, and universal. 
     Our obligation to choose holiness as the means of happiness, is indirect in the sense that is conditioned, first, on our obligation to choose happiness as a good end, and second, on the knowledge that holiness is the necessary means of happiness.  Our obligation to put forth willful conscious decisions is also indirect in the sense that our obligation is first conditioned on our obligation to choose an object as an ultimate end, and, second, on the need for such conscious decisions. 
     Our obligation to choose an object for its own sake, implies our obligation to reject its opposite; and our obligation to choose the conditions of an intrinsically important object for its own sake, implies an obligation to reject the conditions or means of the opposite of this object.  Also, our obligation to use the necessary means, to secure an object that is important all by itself, implies an obligation to use whatever means, if necessary and possible, to prevent the opposite of this end.  For example: our obligation to will happiness for its own importance implies our obligation to reject misery, as an intrinsic evil.  Obligation to will the conditions of happiness implies our obligation to reject the conditions of misery.  Our obligation to use whatever means to promote happiness implies our obligation to use whatever means, if necessary and practical, to prevent misery. 
     Refusing is only choosing in an opposite direction.  Please notice that a choice implies an object chosen, and this object should be regarded as being important all by itself.  Since a choice must be an intelligent act, our mind must have a reason for that choice.  We cannot choose without a reason or without an object to choose.  The ultimate reason that we have for choosing is, in fact, the object that we should choose; and where there is no reason, there is no object to choose.  

2     I have said that moral obligation directly involves our intention only.  This is a first truth of reason, which is universally assumed by all moral agents.  We can see this from the following considerations:

a     Very young children universally know and assume this truth.  They always feel justified, when they are accused of doing something wrong, by saying, “I didn’t mean to,” or if they are accused of some short coming, they will say, “I wanted to do it” or “I meant to do it.”  If this is true, they then can assume that they have been justified.  They know that if mommy or daddy believes, than they have a sufficient excuse to justify their behavior.

b     Every moral agent considers this excuse as justification, if they can sincerely and truly make this excuse. 

c      It is a common saying that we should judge others by their motives, that is, by their intentions.  This is true.  If a man intends evil, though, by chance, he does us good, he is not excused.  We hold him guilty of the crime that he intended to do.  Therefore, if he intends to do us good, and, by chance, he does us evil, we do not, and we cannot condemn him.  We can’t blame him because his intention was to do us good. 
     However, we may blame him for other things connected with the situation.  He may have come to our help too late, or he may have been to blame for not coming when a different result would have followed; or we may blame him for not being better qualified to help us .  We may be able to blame him for many things connected with the transaction, but for a sincere, and of course, a hearty attempt to do us good, he is not guilty, nor can he be, no matter what the results are.  If he honestly intended to do us good, it is impossible that he should not have used the best means in his power at the time.  This is implied in an honest intention.  And if he did this, our reason cannot pronounce him guilty, for our reason must judge him by his intentions. 

d     Courts of criminal law have always, in every enlightened country, assumed this as a first truth.  They always inquire into the intention, and judge accordingly.  

e     The universally acknowledged truth, that lunatics are not moral agents and responsible for their conduct, is an illustration of the fact that the truth we are considering is regarded, and assumed, as a first truth of reason. 

f        The Bible everywhere either expresses or implies this truth.  “For if there is first a willing mind, it is accepted according to what one has, and not according to what he does not have.”  (2 Cor. 8:12) 
Again, “For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.”  (Gal. 5:14) 
     Now this cannot be true, if the spirit of the law does not directly involve intentions only.  If the spirit of the law extends directly to thoughts, emotions, and outward actions, it cannot be truly said that love is the fulfilling of the law.  (Spirit of the law: the reason or motive for keeping the law, the principle behind it)
     Love must be voluntary, for how could an involuntary love be an obligation?  The spirit of the Bible everywhere relates true unselfish love to our intention.  If our intention is right, or if we have a willing mind, it is accepted as obedience.  But if our mind is not a willing mind, that is, if our intention is wrong, then no outward act is regarded as obedient.  The scriptures always regard the willing as the doing.  “But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.”  (Matt. 5:28)  So, if one honestly intends to perform a service for God, which, after all, he is unable to perform, he is regarded as having virtually done it, and is rewarded accordingly.  This is the doctrine of the Bible. 

3     We have seen that choosing an ultimate end implies (as long as the choice continues), choosing the known conditions and means to that end, and choosing an end also implies exercising our will to secure that end.  Our choice of the conditions and the means to secure that end, and also our willful conduct to secure it, must get their character from our ultimate choice or intention, which leads to willful conduct.  This shows that moral obligation primarily and directly extends, only to our ultimate intention or choice of an end, though really, but less directly, to our choice of the conditions and means, and also to our willful conduct. 
     In the most strict and proper sense, our obligation belongs to our ultimate intention, and only in a less strict and proper sense, to our proximate intentions. 
    An ultimate end is an object chosen for its own sake. 
    A proximate end is an object chosen as a condition or means of securing an ultimate end. 
    An ultimate end is an object chosen because of its own nature and importance. 
    A proximate end is an object chosen for the sake of the end, and on condition of its relation­ship as a means to that end. 
     For example:  A student works to earn money, to buy books, to get an education, to preach the gospel, to save souls, and to please God.  Another works to earn money, to buy books, to get an education, to preach the gospel, to secure a salary and his own ease and popularity.  The first student loves God and souls, and seeks, as his ultimate end, the happiness of others, and the glory and gratification of God.  The second student loves himself supremely and his ultimate end is his own gratification.  Now the proximate ends, or the immediate objects of pursuit, in these two situations, are the same, while their ultimate ends are completely opposite.  Their first goal is to earn some money.  Their next goal is to buy books; and so we follow them, until we can see their ultimate end, before we learn the moral character of what they are doing.  The means they are using, that is, their immediate goals or proximate ends they pursue, are the same, but the ultimate ends that they aim at are completely different.  Every moral agent, as soon as he sees the ultimate ends of each student, must pronounce the first student virtuous, and the second student sinful in his pursuits.  One is benevolent and the other is selfish.  From this illustration, we see that, strictly speaking, moral character and moral obligation, relate directly to our ultimate intention only.  We shall see later that our obligation also extends, but less directly, to the use of means to achieve that end.  

C    To what conduct and mental states does moral obligation indirectly extend:  

1     The muscles of the body are, directly under the control of our will.  I will to move, and my muscles must move, unless there is some physical obstruction that is strong enough to overcome the strength of my will. 

2     My intellect is also directly under the control of my will.  I am aware that I can control and direct my attention as I please, and think on one subject or another.  

3     I am aware that my emotions are only indirectly controlled by my will.  Only by directing my attention and thoughts to those subjects that excite my feelings can produce feelings.  

D    The way is now prepared for me to say:  

1     Our obligation extends indirectly to all intelligent acts of our will.

2     Our moral obligation extends indirectly, to our outward or bodily actions.  These are often required in the word of God.  The reason is, that our bodily actions are connected with the actions of our will by a law of cause and effect.  If our will is right, proper outward actions must follow, (see the exceptions above) and therefore such actions may reasonably be required.  But, if something happens that interferes, so that our outward action does not follow our choice or intention, then the Bible accepts our will for the deed.  “For if there is first a willing mind, it is accepted according to what one has, and not according to what he does not have” (2 Cor. 8:12)  

3     Moral obligation extends, but less directly, to emotional states, so that certain emotions or feelings result from certain outward actions, because our emotions are connected with the actions of our will by a law of cause and effect.  But, when our emotions are exhausted, or when for any reason, the right action of our will does not produce the required feelings, it is accepted on the principle mentioned in 2 Cor. 8:12)  

4     Moral obligation also indirectly extends to our mental states; and so the Bible, to a certain extent, holds us responsible for our thoughts and opinions.  The Bible everywhere assumes, that if our heart is right, our thoughts and opinions will also correspond with the state of our heart: “If anyone wants to do His will, he shall know concerning the doctrine, whether it is from God or whether I speak on My own authority.”  (John 7:17)  “The lamp of the body is the eye.  Therefore, when your eye is good, your whole body also is full of light.  But when your eye is bad, your body also is full of darkness” (Luke 11:34)    

5     The word of God everywhere assumes that all virtue or vice belongs to our heart or intention.  Where our heart is right, everything else is regarded as right; and where our heart is wrong, everything else is regarded as wrong.  It is on this assumption that the doctrine of total depravity rests.  We cannot deny that the vilest sinners do many things outwardly that the law of God requires.  Now, these sinners may appear virtuous, but when we see that their intention is found selfish, we know that they are sinful even though they conform to the letter of the law of God. 

6     The fact is, moral agents are so constituted that it is impossible for them not to judge themselves, as well as others, by their subjective motives or intentions.  Moral agents cannot but assume it as a first truth, that a man’s character is as his intention is.  Moral obligation relates directly to intention only.  

7     Moral obligation then, indirectly extends to everything about us, over which our will has direct or indirect control.  Strictly speaking, moral law legislates over our intention only, yet in a lesser sense, moral law legislates over our whole being, inasmuch as all our powers are directly or indirectly connected with our intention, by a law of cause and effect.  Strictly speaking, moral character belongs to our intention alone.  Our outward action, or any state of our mind, or emotions, has no moral element or quality that belongs to it.  Yet, in common language, which is sufficiently accurate for most practical purposes, we speak about thought, feeling, and outward action as being holy or unholy.  By this, however, we really mean, that the agent is holy or unholy, is praiseworthy or blameworthy in his exercises and actions, because they believe that these actions come from the state or attitude of his will.