III  MORAL OBLIGATION    

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                The idea of obligation, or what one should do, is an idea that comes from our reason.  It is a simple, rational concept, and, strictly speaking, obligation does not have a definition because it cannot be more simply defined.  Obligation is a term by which we express an idea that all men have, and it appears in every languages.  Everybody has ideas of right and wrong, and has words to express these ideas , and perhaps no idea among men more frequently reveals itself in words than obligation.  Obligation is difficult to define, for the simple reason that it is too well and too universally understood to need defining in any language.  However we can say that obligation is the duty, promise, or requirement imposed by the moral law.  Obligation is the constraining power of conscience or law.  It is the chord that binds one person to another.

A     The conditions of moral obligation. 
     The difference between a condition and the ground of our moral obligation is very important.  The ground of our moral obligation is the consideration that creates our obligation in the first place.  It is the fundamental reason for our obligation.  First, there are various forms of obligation.  For example, we have an obligation to choose our ultimate purpose in life, such as willing the highest good of the universe; we have an obligation to choose the necessary conditions to accomplish this end, like holiness for example; and we have an obligation to make a sincere effort to secure this goal.  The conditions of our moral obligation vary with the form of that obligation, as we shall see later.  (Ground: the foundation behind the principles believed in; basis of knowledge and beliefs; the reason for)                     

B     Every obligation must have at least one condition.  Without that condition, that form of obligation could not exist.  But the condition is not the fundamental reason for the obligation.  For example, possessing the powers of a moral agent is a condition of his obligation to choose to love others in general, as an ultimate goal for its own sake.  But the importance that this goal has, all by itself, the ground of this obligation.  This obligation could not exist without possessing the power to choose right from wrong, but possessing these powers cannot, all by itself, create the obligation to choose what is good rather than evil.  The intrinsic difference between good and evil is the ground of our obligation to will one rather than the other.

1 To have a moral obligation you must be a moral agent.  The attributes of a moral agent are intellect, sensibility, and free will.  

a     Intellect includes our mind, which is commonly considered as a faculty of our soul.  But my definition of intellect includes more than the mind.  Intellect is the faculty or power of perception or thought, the ability to reason or understand or to perceive relationships or differences. In this study, intellect also includes our reason, our conscience, and self‑consciousness.  Reason is the intuitive faculty of the intellect.  Today, the intuitive faculty of the intellect is often called intuition.  Many people today believe intuition and conscience belongs to our spirit or heart.  We generally consider reason as an attribute of our mind.  It is more a logical thought process than an intuitive understanding.  No matter how you categorize these attributes, the theology that I will present to you should not be affected.  (Heart: the seat of the affections, desires, and appetites; that which influences the will in making moral choices which in turn directs the mind to institute the chosen action; the ability to choose; the ability to know what to choose; the control center of one’s life; the motivating purpose of one’s life.)
     Reason gives us the following by direct intuition: the absolute, right and wrong; that space exists and that space is infinite; that God is perfect and God’s law is perfect, etc.  In short, reason is the faculty that is intuitively aware of our moral relationships and affirms our moral obligation to act in conformity with those moral relationships that we perceive.  (Intuitively: Capable of knowing by direct insight, knowledge from within; innate intelligence; constitutional knowledge.)  Reason is the faculty that understands all the known truths of science whether they are mathematical, philosophical, theological, or logical. 
     Conscience is the faculty or function of our mind that reveals to us whether or not our heart and life conforms to the moral law.  Conscience also awards praise for conforming, and blame for not conforming to that law.  It also affirms that conforming to the moral law deserves reward, and that not conforming to the moral law deserves punishment.  It also possesses a driving or an impulsive power, where it urges us to conform our will to God’s moral law.  It seems, in a certain sense, to possess the power of conviction. 
Consciousness is the faculty or function of self‑knowledge.  It is the faculty that reveals to us our own existence, our mental actions and states, together with the necessary attributes that belong to those actions and states.  “Consciousness is the mind in the act of knowing itself.”  By consciousness, I know that I exist.  I know that space exists.  I also know that the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts; that every event must have a cause, and many other similar truths.  I am not only aware of these basic truths, but I also am aware that these truths are necessary, and that I cannot deny or reject these truths.  I am also conscious of choosing to sit at my desk and write, and I am just as aware that a law also exists that gives me the freedom to choose to do what I am currently doing.  I know that I could have chosen not to sit and write.  I am just as conscious of affirming the freedom or the lack of freedom of my mental state as I am of the state itself.  Consciousness gives me awareness and knowledge of my existence and attributes, my mental acts and states, and all my attributes and phenomena.  In short, all my knowledge is given to me by my consciousness.  My intellect is open-minded rather than voluntary.  All the acts and states of my intellect are under physical law.  The will can com­mand the attention of my intellect.  Its thoughts, perceptions, affirmations, and all its phenom­ena are involuntary, and under physical law (which is a law that does not involve free will).  Of this, I am conscious.  Another faculty indispensable to moral agency is: 

b     Sensibility.  This is the faculty of feeling, commonly known today as our emotions, but it also includes physical sensations.  It is our capacity for physical sensation, our power to respond to stimuli, our ability to feel.  All sensation, desire, emotion, passion, pain, pleasure, and in short, every kind and degree of feeling, as the term feeling is commonly used, is a phenome­non of our sensibility.  (Phenomenon: something visible or directly observable, as an appearance, action, change, or occurrence of any kind; any unusual occurrence or an inexplicable fact)  This faculty supplies the condition of the idea of what is important, and hence of right and wrong, and of moral obligation.  Experiencing pleasure or happiness gives us the idea of what is important, just as the perception of mass develops the idea of space.  If it wasn’t for this faculty, our mind could have no idea of that is important; our mind would have no idea of our moral obligation to will that is important.  Neither would we know right and wrong, or have any idea of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.  Self‑love comes from our sensibility.  It belongs to our emotion.  It consists in a constitutional desire for happiness, and implies a corresponding dread of misery.  Through this constitutional tendency, our rational idea of the importance of happiness is first developed.  There is no doubt that animals experience joy, but we have no evidence that they possess the faculty of reason in the sense in which I have defined the term.  As a result, they don’t have a rational concept of the importance of enjoyment.  They seek enjoyment from the impulses of their animal nature, without having any concept of moral law, obligation, right or wrong.  (Intrinsic: belonging to the real nature of a thing; essential; inherent; not dependent on external circumstances; the importance of an object or act.)
     But we do know that moral agents have these ideas.  Self‑love is constitutional.  Gratifying self-love is the condition that follows from the development of the reason’s idea of what is intrinsically important to one’s existence.  This idea develops the idea of moral law, the idea that we should choose and seek this intrinsic good for its own sake. 
     Our sensibility, like our intellect, is a passive faculty.  All our physical sensations and emotions are under physical laws.  I am conscious that I cannot, by any direct effort, feel when and as I will.  The sensibility is so closely related to our intellect that when our intellect is intensely occupied with certain thoughts, our emotions can also be easily affected, and certain feelings are automatically produced.  I am aware that when certain conditions are fulfilled, I will have certain feelings, and than when these conditions are not fulfilled, I cannot possess those feelings.  I know by consciousness that my feelings and all the states and phenomena of my sensibility are only indirectly under the control of my will.  By willing, I can direct my intellect to consider certain subjects, and in this way alone, I can change my feelings.  So, on the other hand, if certain feelings exist in my sensibility which I want to suppress, I know that I cannot annihilate them by directly willing them out of existence, but, if I divert my attention away from the cause of these feelings, they will cease to exist in time.  Thus, feeling is only indirectly under the control of my will. 

c      Moral agency implies possessing of free will.  Free will is the power to choose or refuse to comply with moral obligation.  Free will implies the power to reason and decide for ourselves, and to exercise our own sovereignty in every moral decision that we make.  That we cannot be under any moral obligation to do what is impossible is a first truth of reason.  But, our power to perform or do anything lies in our will.  If we cannot will, we cannot do anything.  Our freedom must consist in our power to will. 
     Our outward actions and our mental states are connected with the actions of our will by a physical law.  If I will to move my muscles, they must move, unless I am paralyzed, or unless some physical resistance opposes me that overcomes the power of my conscious decisions.  The physical results of my choices are always under a necessary physical law, and unless our will is free, we have no freedom; and if we have no freedom we are not moral agents, that is, we can’t perform any moral act or possess a moral character.  Free will then, must be a condition of moral agency, and of course, of moral obligation.  (Moral character: A continuing state of activity or conduct that takes place in the experiences and consciousnesses of moral beings.  Moral character is moral action or personal action.  It is not something behind the will that causes action, but is the action of the will itself.  It is the thoughts we think, the attitudes we have, and the things we say  and do that constitute our moral character.  Moral character must be a voluntary choice of the person involved, as distinguished from a constitutional trait or a natural attribute.  If moral character is something fixed or something that controls our will in one direction or in another, then virtue or blame disappears, the law of cause and effect takes over, and moral action ceases to exist.)
     Our conscience tells us that physical laws govern of our reason and our sensibility, and it also tells us that freedom is an attribute of the actions of our will.  I am as conscious of the fact that I could will differently from what I do in everything that I do, as I am of the fact that, concerning the truths that I know intuitively, I cannot think contrary to the way I think now.  I am as inwardly aware that I am free in willing as I am aware that I am not free or voluntary in my feelings and intuitions. 
     Knowing that we have complete free will is a necessary condition of affirming our obligation.  For example, no man can claim that he must undo all the acts of his past life, and to live his life over again.  He cannot believe that he is under any obligation to undo his past works, simply because he inwardly knows that such a thing is impossible.  However, he must acknowledge that he must repent and obey God in the future, because he is inwardly aware that he is able to do this.  Being aware that he is able to comply with any requirement is a necessary condition of his obligation to comply with that requirement.  No moral agent can inwardly believe that he is obligated to perform any impossibility.

2     A second condition of moral obligation is light, or enough knowledge of our moral relationships that develops the idea of our obligation.  This implies:  

a     That we perceive or have an idea of what is important all by itself.

b     That we acknowledge that we must will what is important for its own sake. 
     Before I can acknowledge my obligation to will, I must see that the thing I am required to will is an ultimate end that is worthy of being chosen.  I must have an object to choose.  I must see something in that object which makes it worthy to choose it.  Now, everything must be willed either as an end or a means to that end.  I cannot be under any obligation to will the means to an end until I know the end.  I cannot know an end, or I cannot know what I can choose as an ultimate end, until I know that the end is important all by itself. 
     I cannot know whether it is right or wrong to choose or refuse a certain end until I know if that end is important all by itself.  It is impossible for me to choose an end as an ultimate end, until I see that it is important all by itself, because choosing something as an end is nothing more than choosing it for its own importance.  Moral obligation, therefore, must always imply 1) the knowledge that the good of God and of the universe is important all by itself, and 2) the conviction that the good of God and of the universe needs to be chosen for its own sake.  It is impossible that the idea of right and wrong develops before the idea of that is important develops.  Right and wrong strictly relates to our intentions only.  Intention is the motive, or reason why behind an act.  It also means to purpose or intend to accomplish something as a goal.  Intention implies that an end exists.  Now something that we choose as an ultimate end must be chosen for its own sake.  Until we are able to comprehend the end, we cannot affirm our obligation to choose it.  As a result, no idea of right or wrong concerning that end can exist until our mind develops a clear picture of that end.  The idea of what is important all by itself must be developed first.  Then, as the idea of what is important all by itself is developed, our intelligence affirms our obligation to will it, that is, that it is right to will that end, and wrong not to will it. 
     It is impossible that the idea of our moral obligation should be developed under any other conditions than the conditions I’ve just mentioned.  The conditions of our moral obligation are 1) that we possess the powers of a moral agent, and 2) that we develop the idea of a) what is important, b) moral obligation, and 3) right and wrong. 
     Our obligation to choose the proper means to this end.  The holiness of God and the holiness of all moral agents for example, must be based on knowing that these are means, or conditions.  In other words, seeing the relationship that these means have to the end must be a condition of our obligation to will their existence.  Seeing the relationship these conditions have to the end is the condition of our obligation to will them.  The relationship of holiness to happiness, for example, could not make us will the existence of holiness without reference to the importance that happiness has all by itself as the fundamental reason for willing holiness as a means to happiness (which is the end in this example).  The ground of our obligation to will the existence of holiness as a means to happiness is the importance of happiness all by itself.  But, what we perceive of this relationship of holiness to happiness is a condition of our obligation.  Without this relationship that we perceive, our obligation could not exist, yet this perceived relationship doesn’t create our obligation.  Suppose that holiness is the means of happiness, yet no obligation to will holiness because of this relationship could exist if it weren’t for the importance of happiness all by itself.  (Holiness: a love of right; obeying the spiritual enlightenment that one has from a right intention of heart; intelligence applied to our various relations in proper portion and esteem.  Holiness in the Christian is not the substituted righteousness and obedience of Christ, but is an actual righteousness based on a right relationship with Christ.)

C    Conditions of our obligation to exercise willful conscious decisions. 
     Our busy lives are made up in efforts to secure some ultimate end that our heart is set on.  These forms of obligation relate to willful decisions that lead to outward conduct.  Conscious decisions, designed as willful acts, always assume that these acts are designed to secure an end that has already been chosen.  Our obligation to put forth an effort to secure an end must be conditioned on whether the effort is not only possible but also whether there is some proper purpose in that effort.  If we don’t have to promote the end we choose by any efforts of ours, or if such efforts are impossible for us, or if we see that they are useless, there can be no obligation to do them. 
     When our mind sees that the end (the good of others, for example) is important all by itself, our mind must either choose or refuse it.  Indifference at this point is naturally impossible.  The mind must choose one way or the other.  Our will must either embrace or reject it.  Our reason must affirm our obligation to choose what is intrinsically important for its own sake, and not because choosing it will secure it.  Nor does the real choice of the end imply a purpose or an obligation to put forth conscious decisions to secure that end, except on condition that we see that such acts are necessary to secure our end. 
     Your choice of an ultimate end cannot be simply to secure any object because your will must choose or refuse an object independently of the tendency your choice has to secure that object.  You realize that you have a need to choose an object, your reason affirms that it is right, proper, suitable, or that your will should choose what is good or important, and not refuse it because of how important it is all by itself.  Do not worry about whether choosing what is good will secure what you choose.  But, you must exercise a conscious decision with the purpose of securing your object, and of course, this conscious decision cannot exist unless you have a purpose, and you can’t have a purpose unless your mind assumes that your efforts are possible, important, and the useful. 

D    Man is a subject of moral obligation.  He has a mind and feelings.  He has the powers of knowing and feeling.  In theory, man’s free will has been denied.  Yet even those who deny free will have, in their decisions, assumed that the human will is free, as well and as fully as the most staunch defenders of free will.  Indeed, nobody ever did or can, in practice, call into question our free will, without justly incurring the charge of insanity.  Every moral agent automatically knows that he has free will.  He can no more hide this fact from himself, or reason himself out of the conviction of its truth, than he can convince himself to deny his own existence.  He may deny his existence and free will, but he knows both.  That he is free is a well-known truth.  And he knows this by virtue of the constitution of his own being. 
     Man is also conscious of possessing the powers of a moral agent.  He also has the idea of what is important all by itself, of right and of wrong.  Nothing else is necessary to make man a subject of moral obligation.  Man admits that he is under moral obligation.  He cannot doubt it.  He totally and automatically admits, that he is as praiseworthy or blameworthy as he is loving or selfish.  Every man assumes that he as well as all other men of sound mind are under moral obligation.  This assumption is irresistible, as well as universal. 
     Even if this truth is questioned in theory, as long as our reason exists, it remains a truth, and there can be no escape from this truth.  The spontaneous, universal, and irresistible knowledge that men of sound mind are praiseworthy or blameworthy, depending on whether they are selfish or benevolent, shows beyond all doubt, that all men see themselves and others, as subjects of moral obligation.