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March 2002 Twenty-Fourth Edition By: Concerned Citizens
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Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Denies Linehan
Dennis Linehan filed his petition for habeas corpus seeking release from his civil commitment under the Minnesota Sexually Dangerous Person Act, Minn. Stat. �� 253B.02, subd. 18c, 253B. 18, subds. 2-3, 253B.185 (2002) (SDP Act). The District Court denied the petition, but issued a certificate of appealability on whether Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), requires proof of an ability to control one�s behavior in order to commit an individual as a sexually dangerous person. Linehan appealed, arguing that the SDP Act and his civil commitment under it is unconstitutional.
Linehan also argued that the SDP Act does not meet federal substantive due process standards because it requires less proof of volitional impairment than that demanded by Hendricks, as clarified in Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002), and that indeterminate civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person is unconstitu-tional because the state did not provide proof of volitional impairment at his commitment proceedings. The state argues that the SDP Act, as interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, meets constitutional standards, that these standards require a finding of volitional impairment, and that Linehan�s commitment is constitutional because he has demonstrated serious difficulty controlling his sexual impulses.
When a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, an application for a writ of habeas corpus can only be granted where the state court adjudication:
1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the state court proceedings.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. �2254(d) (2002) (AEDPA).
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal laws if a state court reached a conclusion �opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law� or confronted �facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent� and reached the opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court has unreasonably applied clearly established federal law if it �identi-fied that principle to the facts of the [petitioner�s] case.� Id. At 413. Habeas relief cannot be granted just because a federal court concludes that the state court erred in its application of federal law; the test is whether the state court�s application was �unreasonable.� See id at 411.
Linehan argued that Linehan IV applied a rule contradicting the governing law set in Hendricks and Crane, that difference is thus not due the Minnesota decision, and that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals should exercise its independent judgment about the constitutional issues.
Linehan argued that the SDP Act failed to meet constitutional requirements because the �lack of adequate control� standard is broader than the test set by the Supreme Court. Linehan argued that the SDP Act does not adequately distinguish those eligible for commitment from �the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case,� Crane, 122, S. Ct. at 870, and that what is required is something closer to a �special and serious� lack of ability to control standard. Id.
In Linehan�s view the �utter lack of control� standard formulated in the 1939 Pearson case sufficiently distinguishes between a dangerous recidivist and the dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment.
Linehan argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court�s rejection in Linehan IV is contrary to the �special and serious inability to control� standard established in Hendricks, and clarified in Crane. Linehan also claimed that through judicial interpretation the Pearson standard became a more flexible test and does not conflict with Crane-Hendricks. As an illustration he cited In re Blodgett, 510 N.W. 2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994) (PP Act requires a �volitional dysfunction which grossly impairs judgment and behavior with respect to the sex drive.�)
The state argued that the issue in this case is whether the Minnesota Supreme Court in Linehan IV unrea-sonably applied the governing law. It says AEDPA mandates deference to state court decisions and requires a habeas court to focus on �whether the state court�s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.� See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. It maintains that the SDP Act has been sufficiently narrowed to meet constitutional requirements and, therefore, the state�s decision cannot fail to meet AEDPA�s reasonable standard. The state argued that the SDP Act�s three requirements for commitment -- past course of harmful sexual conduct, proof of a disorder that results in a lack of adequate ability to control behavior, and high like-lihood of engaging in future harmful sexual conduct -- work in combination to ensure that only a small portion of sex offenders released from prison qualify for commitment under this standard. The state also contends that the Pearson standard is equivalent to the absolute lack of control standard rejected as �unworkable� by the Supreme Court. See Crane, 122 S. Ct. at 870.
(NOTE: Citizens For Reform disagrees with the state�s contention and believes that the law is far to broad. One only need look at the growing numbers now being detained at the MSOP sites to understand that more than a small portion are committed under the Preventative Detention Laws of Minnesota. However, due to the Minne-sota budget deficit of $4.5 billion, the detention may be temporarily unhurried.)
The Eighth Circuit of Appeals states that the certificate of appealability in this case framed the issue in terms of the proof required by Hendricks, Linehan argues that Crane must also be considered because it makes more clear what the Supreme Court intended in Hendricks. The state responded that the Minnesota Supreme Court only had Hendricks to consider when it decided Linehan IV and that Hendricks should be the sole focus here. It points out that Crane was only �decided after Linehan filed his habeas corpus peti-tion� and argues that the clearly established federal law the Minnesota Supreme Court had to apply did not include Crane. [Emphasis Added]
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet discussed Crane, but it recently denied review of an intermediate appellate decision which rejected that Crane announced a different and more demanding standard than Hendricks. See In re Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied, No C4-00-748 (Minn. S. Ct. October 29, 2002).
