Muslims and Post Tsunami Operational
Management Structure

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

In the first week of March I telephoned a leading Muslim political leader to inquire about
the envisaged Post - Tsunami Joint mechanism. My intention was to write an article about
how the Muslims were being sidelined in the discussions over the setting up of that
structure. The Muslim politicos response was lukewarm and was something like this.

A Muslim peace secretariat had been set up and was  interacting  with the Government
and Norway over this matter. The President had informed the Secretariat that discussions
had not reached a decisive stage yet. If and when the talks reach a decisive phase the
Muslims will be taken on board. Moreover Kumaratunga had also assured some Muslim
leaders that the interests and aspirations of the community will be accommodated when
the mechanism was finalised. I was told that any article at that point of time was
premature and could even be counterproductive. In short I was requested not to write
then.. So I did not. But now the same person is agitated over what is happening. There
are frantic requests for something to be written. Unfortunately it appears that its too late
now. Its all over but the shouting.

The joint mechanism issue began hotting up over the weeks and began stirring up quite
a lot of controversy. Muslim leaders however kept a low public stance on the issue. I do
not know whether they were engaged in covert negotiations. Overtly there seemed very
little movement on the matter. There were two cabinet ministers, three ministers and two -
deputy ministers from North - Eastern Muslim Parliamentarians. Some of them made
reassuring noises periodically. A familiar refrain was that President Kumaratunga would
be fair by the Muslims.

Rauff Hakeem made some critical comments. He issued warnings that the Muslim tsunami
victims required urgent assistance. He  said that the Muslims should not be overlooked or
sidelined in the setting up of a post - tsunami structure. There were veiled references to
those holding office in the present government being ineffective.  As it became clear that
Muslim aspirations were being overlooked Hakeem called for broader Muslim unity to
address the issue.Yet Hakeem too was not very effective or forceful in getting the
hopelessly divided Muslim politicians rally round these views. In short the mainstream
Muslim poloiticians seemed apathetic.

Some voices among Muslim scribes however were unhappy and alert to what was
unfolding. Some writers in the Tamil media constantly referred to the danger of Muslims
being short changed. They urged broader Muslim unity and action over this. From these
comments by Muslim journalists in the Tamil media one was able to gather that there
were three schools of thought.

One felt that Muslims will be included in the talks at the appropriate time. The Muslims
could voice their aspirations then and obtain their rightful place in the proposed structure
then. The second  strand of opinion had a naive almost childlike faith in Kumaratunga.
She would not let us down and will ensure that we have a proper role, they felt. Besides
the Muslim secretariat was active on this  they believed. The third school was opposed to
the joint mechanism proposal. But they felt that the JVP and JHU will scuttle it. Why fret
over something that was not going to see the light of day? was their viewpoint.

As a result of all this practically very little was done by mainstream Muslim politicians over
securing a  proper place for Muslims in the post - tsunami scheme of things. The hapless
Muslim victims of tsunami were seething at the slow and tardy progress of relief and
reconstruction. The 200 metre limit for the N- E as opposed to the lesser limits for the
South was seen as blatant discrimination. The lack of available land was another
drawback. The state media kept churning out propaganda about how the South was
"progressing" in tsunami reconstruction.

This perception that the South was progressing in contrast to the languishing East fuelled
much resentment among ordinary Muslim victims of the tsunami. Many demonstrations
protesting the slow and discriminatory treatment were held. The most notable being in
Maruthamunai where the affected people turned up in huge numbers. An unusually lsrge
number of Muslim women participated. This indicated the extent of feelings among even
the generally "conservative" Muslim women. Even as these feelings of desperation grew
among affected Muslims the powers that be seemed unconcerned. The indifferent  
conduct of Athaullah being a striking example.

Adding further  worry were the sinister designs to "Buddhisise" Muslim coastal areas.
Buddha statues appeared in Pottuvil and Ulla. It was clear that they had the backing of
the security forces and the Saffron clad politicians. When a hartal was held in Pottuvil
force was unleashed on the Muslim demonstrators. When Hakeem raised the issue in
Parliament some MP's in yellow and orange robes responded on chauvinist lines. They
said that Sri Lanka was a Sinhala Buddhist Country and that they had every right to
implant Statues of Buddha anywhere they wanted.

Another source of worry were plans to relocate Muslims. Tourism related Commercial
enterprises were eying coastal areas in the Pottuvil - Arugam bay area. Muslim
inhabitants were prevented from returning to their homes and businesses while entire
tracts of coastal lands were to be given over to tourism oriented businesses. Thus Muslim
resentment was building up.Rightly or wrongly there was a general impression that plans
were afoot to  use the "tsunami" as an excuse to remove the Muslims from their coastal
enclaves and acquire their property. Also relocating them elsewhere would dilute their
political strength. These Muslim feelings of insecurity were not restricted to the East
alone. Even those of Hambantota and Weligama were suspicious about relocation
schemes.

The relationship with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was another problem. Some
attempts were made at rapprochement and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization even
completed projects for some Muslims. The LTTE also iniated dialogue wil local Muslim
religious dignitaries. Yet the climate did not improve much. The betrayal of the
Prabakharan - Hakeem accord of April 13th 2002, the refusal of top LTTE leaders to
meet with Muslim political leaders, the friction over resettlement etc were stumbling
blocks. More importantly news reports that the LTTE was reluctant to accommodate the
Muslims on an equal basis in the joint mechanism structure were extremely troubling. This
was seen as a denial of Muslim identity and independence as a separate entity. Fears
were also entertained that the tigers too were conspiring to drive Muslims away from the
littoral described poetically as :Eluvaankarai" (Shore of the rising sun).

Under these circumstances the Muslims particularly those affected by the tsunami began
looking forward to the setting up of a special structure for tsunami relief with increasing
expectation as well as trepidation. Given a choice the Muslims like most tsunami victims
would only have wanted early and speedy relief and rehabilitation. They were not
particularly enamoured of a joint mechanism or whatever with the LTTE to be the chief
provider of relief. They may very well have welcomed a Government or Non -
Government agency to have performed the task. Since the aid providing donor
community wanted a Govt - LTTE body to be the accredited mechanism the Muslims too
reluctantly opted for it through necessity and not free choice. Even as the community
awaited the setting up of such a structure it was anxious about how it was going to work
and what role would be given the Muslims.

The Muslims felt and quite rightly too that they were entitled to some special status in the
tsunami relief mechanism as they were the most affected single ethnic community.
Technically this was incorrect. The most affected single entity was the Batticaloa Burgher
community. The Batti burghers mostly of Portugese descent were affected in Kalmunai.
Komari, Dutch Bar and other places of Batticaloa. According to one survey 58% of the
tiny community were victimised. Though this figure is proportionally large the numbers of
the community being small made the overall figure minimal in contrast with the Sinhala,
Tamil or Muslim victims. Among the three major ethnicities  the Muslims were most
affected in number and proportion.

It is an incontrovertible fact of life in Sri Lanka that large concentrations of Muslims
inhabit the coastal regions. There are historical, geographical and economic reasons for
this. So when the tsunami struck the coastal Muslims naturally suffered more. Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress Secretary - General and Parliamentarian Hassan Ali in a speech made
on May 6th this year revealed some mind boggling statistics in this respect. Excerpts from
 what he said then -

" The fact remains that it was the Muslim community that was worst affected in the
December 26, 2004 tsunami, especially the Muslim community of Ampara district in the
Eastern province. In Ampara district of the total 7300 people dead or missing due to
tsunami 4292 were Muslims . Similarly of the 27605 houses damaged in Ampara district,
16327 are houses of Muslims . Loss of properties on the same ratio has been suffered
by the Ampara district Muslims. Of the total number of 37988 displaced in the district,
24464 are Muslims. It is for this reason that we demand that an equal place should be
given to the M uslims in whatever infrastructure facilities are provided.

According to 2001 census, in the Kalutara district 84 percent of the total 8.8 paercent
Muslim population is living along the coastal areas . Similarly in Galle 88 percent of the
total 3.6 percent Muslim population, in Matara 80.5 percent of the 2.9 percent Muslim
population an d in Hambantota 92 percent of the total 2.4 Muslim population are living
along the sea coast. tage Muslims whatshave 27In the Northern and Eastern coastal belt
, 75 percent of the total 41.6 percent Muslims live- close to the sea in fishing villages. In
all districts island-wide affected by tsunami 75 to 99 percent Muslims are living along the
sea coast.

In Ampara district in the North-East, 75 percent of the total 41.6 Muslim population is
living along the coastal belt. In Batticalao, 99 percent of the total 36.1 Muslim population
is living along the sea coast. In Trincomalee 77 percent of the total 39.6 percent Muslims
is living in the coastal belt.
It is grieving and shocking to note that the Muslim community which was worst affected in
the tsunami is being pushed to third place in post-tsunami relief and rehabilitation
assistance , merely due to political reasons. This has shattered our anticipations and
hopes that we could rebuild the nation unitedly . The current state of affairs in this regard
is quite contrary to what President Chandrika Kumaratrunga , Prime Minister Mahinda
Rajapase and other senior government politicians said in the aftermath of the natural
disaster.

He warned that the Muslim community was receiving step-motherly treatment and if this
situation continued the repercussions would be worse than what is being experienced
due to the 20 year long civil strife".

If this is what Hassan Ali said then some statistics published in the Tamil daily "Virakesari"
also provided a picture of the magnitude of the Muslim predicament. Muslims constitute
eight per cent  or about 1.7 million of Sri Lanka's 20 million people, but  they account for
40.8 per cent of the dead in the December 26, 2004   tsunami. Out of the total of 30,718
people killed in the island, 12,562 were Muslims. Amparai district in southeastern Sri
Lanka accounted for 7258 (58  per cent) of the total Muslim dead, according to statistics
published by  the Tamil daily Virakesari .

    The overall island-wide figure for the missing is 5815. Out of this, 1980   (34 per cent)
are Muslims. Of the 14,998 injured, 7285 (48.5 per cent) are  Muslims.  The tsunami
displaced 230,700 persons island-wide. Out of this, 41,671 (18  per cent) were Muslims.
85,833 houses were fully damaged, out of which Muslim houses accounted for  21,751
(25.3 per cent). Out of the 36,616 houses partially damaged, 12,207   (33.3 per cent)
belonged to Muslims.

Thus it is crystal clear that the Muslims have suffered tremendously > According to one
estimate the Muslim lives  lost  amount to one percent of their total population. So it was
nothing but just and fair for the community to expect representation in any tsunami
related decision making body in proportions commensurate to the loss and damage
suffered. Moreover such an arrangement was practical too in more than one way. Yet the
Muslim political leaders either due to their "Perunthanmai" (greatness) or "Pelaveenam"
(weakness) failed to keep tabs on what was happening and assert their claim. This was a
pronounced fault of those Muslim cabinet ministers, ministers and deputy ministers  from
the East  - Ferial Ashraff , Athaullah, Majeed, Ameer Ali, Rishard Badurdeen, Anwer
Ismail and Segu Issadeen.

So when the joint mechanism talks reached a conclusive stage the Muslims found
themselves short changed considerably. The mechanism is heavily weighed in favour of
the LTTE as opposed to the heavily affected Muslims. In the first place it is not going to
be a tripartite agreement according to Vidar Helgessen. Only the Government and LTTE
will be signatories. The tigers are being given a role in areas in the East that are not
under LTTE control. An important tier of the mechanism the regional community will have
ten members. These will be five LTTE nominees, Three Muslim party nominees and two
government nominees. Thus the Muslims affected more in the East proprtionally will not
have  representation accordingly in this crucial tier which will approve, reject, prioritise
and allocate projects.

The Muslims will be on par with the Govt and LTTE in the high level committee that
allocates and monitors finance. This will have a representative each from all three
entities. Then there are the district committees which will formulate and implement
projects. There the committees will reflect the population affected. So the Muslims are
entitled to their share theoretically at least. Besides there are some minority safeguards.
The high level committee  must work by consensus. If that is not possible a "suspension
of cooperation" state is possible. If this state continues all money allocated will revert
back to the fund and ultimately to the treasury. In the case of the regional committee two
members can veto a decision. If it is re - submitted then a seven membermajority is
required.

Despite these safeguards the Muslim community is extremely unhappy. Ever since
Norwegian deputy foreign minister told a Muslim maulavi delegation very bluntly that  the
joint mechanism agreement is not tripartite and that Muslims cannot be  a signatory the
Eastern Muslims are bitter and angry. Various demonstrations, meetings, seminars etc
are being held. Eastern Muslim Politicians are frantically appealing to the Government
and LTTE. Kumaratunga is telling them to trust her. Thamilselvan tries to deflect blame
on Kumaratunga and Colombo in turn blames Kilinochchi and Oslo. It is clear from
Thamilselvans statement that they will see to the Muslims interests after signing the
agreement with the Government that the tigers are not in favour of any tripartite set up.
Likewise Kumaratungas statements also indicate that  Muslims will not be signatory to any
agreement.

This is what hurts and angers Muslims most. As Rauff Hakeem observed to the BBC the
issue now is not about equal representation alone but about equal status and respect.
The Muslims affected most in the tsunami feel they are entitled to third party status in this
mechanism They have a genuine grievance that they were deprived of separate third
pary status in the peace talks. Now even in the tsunami mechanism they are being
denied equal status despite being the most affected single largest community in the
disaster. Another worrying aspect in this is the expectation that the tsunami structure
principle may be extended in the future to any interim arrangement connected to the
peace process. The Muslims do not want to be left out again.

The Muslim position in the post - tsunami mechanism is certainly an improvement on the
community's state in the Indo - Lanka accord or the ceasefire agreement. The former
ignored them totally. The latter took specific note but failed to provide any particular
status. During peace talks Hakeem participated in the first round as part of the
Government team. Thereafter he represented Muslims at the talks. The Hakone
declaration guaranteed third - party status for the Muslims. From Wickremasinghe to
Pirapakaran the Muslims were promised a lot. But very little was delivered. The Muslim
problems were not taken up. And then the talks collapsed.

Compared to that situation the Muslims are relatively better off. This time the Muslims
have been recognized as a viable entity. They have an equal position in the high level
committee and an equitable share in all district committees. It is only in the regional  
committee that they have been deprived of their due place. Even there some safeguards
are in place. It is also possible that the Government or LTTE or possibly both could
nominate a Muslim. If so the level of representation could increase. Despite the flaws
there is no doubt that the Muslims have for the first time been accepted in practice or at a
de facto level by the Government and LTTE as a third party in North - Eastern affairs.

But the crux of the matter for the Muslims is their being ignored as a signatory to the
agreement. This relegates them to an inferior status. The hurt felt by the Muslim psyche
is to a great extent symbolic but it certainly goes beyond that. The rationale in keeping
Muslims out of initial discussions during the peace talks was that preliminary talks had to
be between warring parties . The Muslims were not a warring party. But now it is all about
tsunami relief. The Muslims are the most affected. How then can the community be left
out as a signatory? Moreover the Muslims are also the single largest ethnicity in the
Eastern Province as well as the Trincomalee and Amparai districts. A great injury has
been done to the Muslims in this respect.

Adding insult to injury is the stupid remark made by Vidar Helgessen that the Muslims are
divided and so there is a problem as to who should represent the community in signing
the document. It is certainly correct that the Muslims are divided greatly. This lack of unity
leading to a weakening of the most authentic Muslim party the Muslim Congress has
been a major impediment to the community's strong assertion of its rights in the tsunami
set up. But then this lack of unity cannot be an excuse to deny the Muslims their rightful
place and share. Deciding upon their representative is up to the Muslims. It is certainly
not Vidars business.

The disunity argument will not wash either. However divided they may be all Muslim
politicians are of one mind in this matter. Be it Hakeem. Ferial, Athaullah, Rishard, Najib
or Myon Mustapha all Muslim factions want the community to be an equal signatory.
There are no contrary views here. Therefore when it comes to signing an accepted
choice is quite possible. For one thing there is ex - diplomat and Human rights
commissioner Javid Yusoof. He is the Muslim peace secretariat director and acceptable
to all shades of Muslim opinion. He is the most obvious choice as the other signatories
too will be Government and LTTE officials and not those of the hierarchy. Failing this
Muslim clerics could decide on someone. Furthermore the seven  directly elected 9not
national list)  Muslims from the North - East could vote on someone. In any case some
Muslim consensus is necessary to nominate representatives to the mechanism. The
Muslims must decide on their representatives. Neither the Govt or LTTE can be allowed
to do so.

The Muslim political leaders began stirring only at a very late stage.  Some Muslim
leaders like Hashim and Mustapha have observed that Muslim leaders  woke up too late.
Meetings between Kumaratunga and Ashraff and Hakeem have not been successful in
this regard. The Muslims have been presented a fait accompli. What the Muslim leadrs
will do now remains to be seen. They could unite and protest vehemently. Ashraff and
Athaullah and others could leave the Government which I very much doubt they will.
Instead of resigning on principle they would in the words of Dr. Colvin R de Silva resign
themselves to fate. Hakeem may engineer some protest. But his position in the
community is rather weak. Unless the Muslims unite and present a common front on this
matter no change is possible.

On the other hand the Muslim leaders could accept what seems inevitable and adjust
accordingly. They should unite and ensure that strong and efficient Muslim nominees are
appointed to all tiers of the proposed structure. The community could harness all
available resources and back the Muslim representatives in the mechanism. At the same
time they should keep on pressuring the Government and LTTE to recognize their rightful
share and rights. For this some real unity is necessary. The divisive Muslim politics
should cease. If they do not take heed I would not be surprised if other forces cut the
ground from under their feet.

It is possible that the Muslims may adopt a pragmatic approach to the exercise despite
their heartburn over being deprived of proper status in the signing of the mechanism.
Given the Muslim representation at ministerial level the Muslims could focus on the
mechanism and see that it works well. If the P-TOMS gets going and the  Muslims get
their fair share of tsunami relief and reconstruction their grievance over equal third party
status may diminish over a period of time. On the other hand if the Muslims find
themselves being sidelined in the P-TOMS implementation then theur anger will increase.
They would attribute this sorry plight to the fact of being denied their rights at the
inception of the P-TOMS itself. This no doubt will have its political repercussions.

Though the P-TOMS document has been signed and tabled in Parliament the matter
does  not over as far as the Muslim community is concerned. Nothing is ever settled
unless it is settled right.Whatever the reasons given denying the Muslims an equal
stastus in the proposed mechanism is unjust and unfair. It is morally. legally and even
practically wrong. The Government, LTTE and Norway even at this late stage should
revise their stance. The Muslims do not want Sinhala or Tamil charity but only what is
legitimately due to them. Besides there is the question of Muslim self - respect and
related symbolism. All right thinking Sinhala and Tamil people must prevail upon the
power structures to award equal status to the Muslims. It is no concession but an inherent
right of the tsunami affected Muslim people that needs to be recongnized and honoured.

Source: http://www.tamilweek.com