Tigers get a taste of their own bitter medicine

By D. B. S. Jeyaraj

Humpty Dumpty had a great fall
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has had a great fall!

For the first time in many years the Tigers feel threatened and beleaguered. The organisation that revels in terrorising others particularly those of the Sri Lankan Tamil community through violence finds itself at the receiving end.

In a remarkable reversal of roles a motley group of various anti-Tiger Tamil elements aided and abetted by the security and intelligence networks of the state is providing the LTTE a taste of its own bitter medicine. Naturally the Tigers are not relishing it.

Karuna factor

The Karuna factor dismissed derisively by the Tigers and their sycophants is looming large on the eastern horizon. Karuna himself shuttles between Sri Lanka and a southeastern country where his family resides. He left Sri Lanka last on May 6. Some say he has now returned.

In any case, as this column stated earlier, Karuna is now a brand name. A large number of Tiger cadres loyal to him are now in the Eastern Province and Polonnaruwa District. They are kept in different units in different locations. They are functionally autonomous but are helped and to some extent logistically supported by the security network.

Sri Lankan military intelligence provides some guidance and direction. It also exercises some amount of control and restraint. The espionage agency of at least one country has provided financial aid.

The Karuna faction and Karuna himself received a boost through the tie up with the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) led by Gnanasekaran alias Paranthan Rajan. Though Rajan himself is under house arrest in Seyyaaru in Tamil Nadu, several of his cadres based in Bangalore, Salem, Sengalpattu, etc., have returned and are returning to Sri Lanka. They have joined forces with Karuna in the east. The killing of a senior ENDLF cadre, 'Kanthan' at Soruvil by the Tigers some months ago is an indicator of this union.

The Karuna faction is formally known as Tamil Eelam Makkal Viduthalaip Puligal (TEMVP). After teaming up with the ENDLF, a broader front known as Tamil Eelam Illiya Viduthalai Munnani (Tamil Eelam United Liberation Front) was formed. Some former members of the PLOTE Mohan group and Razeek Group too have joined this front.

PLOTE and ENDLF input has helped to set up several pro-Karuna websites in the West. In addition the Tamil Broadcasting Corporation radio headed by ENDLF stalwart Ramarajan has also been sympathetic to Karuna.

Fund raising

More importantly, large numbers of eastern Tamil expatriates are slowly rallying around Karuna. There is much clandestine fund raising. This naturally has led to some corruption and the TEMVP had to issue a public warning to be watchful about charlatans raising funds in Karuna's name.

The real impact however has been on ground. The Karuna-Rajan combine with some level of support from forces of the state has been conducting a hit and run campaign against the Tigers in the east. Of course the LTTE too is doing its own bloodletting. Yet the LTTE has been on the decline in this dirty, shady war. The LTTE finds it difficult to even maintain a presence in the eastern littoral controlled by the security forces.

A few months back the LTTE withdrew most northern cadres based in the east. Then they closed down all their political offices in the east and withdrew their 'unarmed cadres.'

The LTTE now stays in areas controlled by it but has reduced mobility and visibility to a great extent. Karuna cadres have penetrated Trincomalee too and recently killed a senior Sea Tiger commander, 'Tikkan.' An interesting phenomenon was the absence of a harthal in Batticaloa-Ampara Districts for Tikkan. This is because the LTTE lacks the 'political' apparatus to mobilise such a harthal in those districts.

Karuna, on the other hand, has resumed publication of the east based Tamil newspaper Thamil Alai (Tamil wave). On the other hand, the LTTE's east based edition of the Eelanatham is more of a web paper now.

The Karuna-Rajan combine has started moving into Vavuniya and Mannar Districts too. It is slowly establishing units there. The LTTE is now strengthening its Wanni defences considerably. The Karuna-Rajan combine is not strong enough to take on the LTTE in direct combat. But they are powerful enough to conduct an effective guerilla campaign.

In the event of war, the combine will be legitimised and fight alongside as an auxiliary force. It appears that the Tigers fear infiltration and possible invasion into their heartland. The LTTE is now very much on the defensive. It continues to make threatening noises about possible war until and unless these 'paramilitary' (mentioning Karuna is anathema) forces are disbanded.

This is what the LTTE mouthpiece, Tamilnet had to say in a report dated July 20: "LTTE's Political Head S. P. Tamilselvan, after meeting with a Norwegian delegation Wednesday morning in Kilinochchi, told the press that the ceasefire monitors did not bring any new message that will improve the deteriorating ground conditions in the north east. He accused Colombo and the Sri Lankan armed forces for nurturing and promoting paramilitary groups in the Sri Lanka Army held areas of the north east in violation of Clause 1.8 of the CFA. 'We stressed to Norwegian delegation the urgency of disarming the paramilitaries according to the terms of the CFA,' Tamilselvan told the reporters."

The Norwegian delegation comprised of Norwegian Deputy Ambassador, Oddvar Laegreid, Head, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Hagrup Haukland and other Norwegian embassy and SLMM officials, sources in Wanni said.

"The responsibility of bringing the situation to normalcy lies entirely in the hands of the government of Sri Lanka and its armed forces," Tamilselvan told the press.

Paramilitary activities

The activities of the paramilitary groups - killings of civilians and the LTTE's political cadres are taking place within the Sri Lanka Army occupied areas, the LTTE's Political Head said.

"The paramilitaries can be effectively and immediately controlled if Colombo is seriously committed to the ceasefire agreement and the peace process," Tamilselvan told the reporters.

He added the Tigers have repeatedly pointed out to Colombo, as stipulated in Clause 1.8 of the Ceasefire Agreement, that the paramilitaries must be disarmed and vacated from the army occupied areas of the Tamil homeland in the north east.

"This very basic clause of the ceasefire agreement needs to be respected in both word and deed and given due respect by Colombo and its armed forces. The killings of civilians and our unarmed political cadres in the army held areas must be stopped and a safe environment created for our unarmed political officials and cadres to engage in political work," he said.

"Once again, this is what we had to point out to the ceasefire monitors," Tamilselvan told the press.

He further said the LTTE respects and understands the concerns of the international community and the efforts of the Norwegian facilitators in the peace process, but said the responsibility lies entirely with Colombo as it has not taken or implemented any concrete measure to implement the above-mentioned clause in the ceasefire agreement.

"We have taken note that the international community also has expressed this concern to Colombo," he said.

Tamilselvan's ironic stance

What is interestingly ironic about Tamilselvan's stance is that this is exactly what all those supportive of human rights, democracy and pluralism have been entreating the Tigers since the ceasefire. The ceasefire accord of February 23, 2002 has clauses forbidding certain activity:

Neither party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as:

a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units;

b) Aerial bombardment:

c) Offensive naval operations

d) It also stipulated that " Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the government of Sri Lanka by D-day + 30 days at the latest. The government of Sri Lanka shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the government of Sri Lanka armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.

Now the LTTE wants the ceasefire agreement to be implemented strictly. But it was the LTTE that began violating the ceasefire in letter and spirit by killing members of Tamil groups opposed to them in the north east.

When concerned parties raised the issue, the LTTE mocked them. Now the same LTTE says, "The killings of civilians and our unarmed political cadres in the Sri Lanka Army held areas must be stopped and a safe environment created for our unarmed political officials and cadres to engage in political work." How the times have changed!

Killings done by the LTTE

When the LTTE was asked about killings done by the LTTE in government controlled areas, Thamilselvan disclaimed responsibility saying they were the responsibility of the government. Now the same LTTE finds its cadres killed in government areas. So they are treating the matter seriously and protesting.

Even on the Karuna issue, the LTTE now describes the faction as 'paramilitary' and wants the government to disband it. But when the split occurred the LTTE called it an internal matter and announced they would resolve it without outside involvement. So everyone kept out and the Tigers commenced a killing spree. Tamilselvan called Karuna a "madman" and a "single individual." Now the wheel has turned full cycle. The LTTE wants governmental intervention.

But will the government oblige? Technically provisions of the ceasefire do not apply to Karuna. His faction did not exist at the time of the ceasefire. So the disbanding of 'paramilitary forces' clause cannot be invoked against him. Furthermore he is still not a paramilitary force. He could be one if and when war breaks out. Also the bulk of his armed cadres are in Polonnaruwa not the north east. So the ceasefire clause about disbanding paramilitaries in the north east will not apply to him.

Seperate entity

The LTTE called Karuna a renegade once. That is what he is still. A renegade heading a renegade faction. He begged the Norwegians to facilitate a treaty between him and Colombo so that peace could be ensured in the east. This was denied then. So now if Karuna is to be curtailed he will have to be recognised formally as a separate entity. He should be allowed to enter the democratic mainstream. Then he could be made subject to some checks and controls. Will the LTTE agree to it? This column does not think so.

Instead the LTTE will be hoping for Kumaratunga now or Wickremesinghe in the future to cave in to Tiger demands and enable the LTTE as was done in April 2004 to unleash savage bloodshed against Karuna's men. It may also hope that Norway as usual would silently sanction that orgy.

Events have moved too far for such a development. Kumaratunga or even Wickremesinghe would find a security force rebellion on their hands if they tried to sacrifice Karuna again without a quid pro quo from the LTTE.

After the April fiasco the 'intelligence' has realised the potential of Karuna. The country at large has seen the effectiveness of this hit and run campaign in recent times. Even the international community including Oslo has seen that the only effective countervailing pressure on the LTTE is this faction.

The "renegades" have succeeded in making the Tiger tuck its tail in between its legs. It would be a very foolish decision for Colombo if it sacrifices Karuna to the Tigers without adequate return.

Sadly for the Tigers their credibility is at an abysmal low. No one trusts them. So Karuna cannot be sacrificed on the strength of LTTE assurances. There must be firmer commitment of bona fides. Furthermore, there must be concrete proof of its genuineness as ground reality. Will the LTTE make such a genuine shift? Not very likely.

Moreover, the induction of the ENDLF into this situation and the slow relocation of cadres from India to Sri Lanka suggest there is an international dimension to this too. Thanks to Rajan's alignment Karuna is no longer alone in this world of 'international intrigue.' Other forces are also backing Karuna. So it may not be as simple as the LTTE thinks for Colombo to jettison Karuna.

Overcoming the Karuna threat

The LTTE may even be thinking of war as one way to overcome the Karuna threat and regain the east. The current reality is that the LTTE has become increasingly alienated from the eastern Tamil people. Even if there is no tidal wave of support for Karuna, it is the regional satrap who retains more clout in his home territory vis a vis the LTTE.

If war breaks out, the LTTE may be counting on the security forces to commit human rights violations on a massive scale. Clashes with Muslims too could be engineered. This may inculcate an us-versus-them mindset within the eastern Tamils towards the Sinhala and Muslim people of the region.

If that happens and a sense of community consciousness coupled with a feeling of insecurity pervades the eastern Tamils, they would increasingly turn towards an armed Tamil entity for protection. Since Karuna will be aligned to the security forces he may not be able to provide that so the Tamil people may have to turn towards the LTTE.

Karuna's alignment with the security forces could affect his standing with the community in a war situation. He could be seen as a collaborator and traitor towards his people. This situation could help the LTTE to regain and consolidate its hold over the eastern Tamil people.

Risk of being overrun

Though this is a likely scenario, the situation is too dicey for the LTTE to rely on this as a definite one. Given the balance of forces and the resentment in the east towards the LTTE, the Tigers run the risk of being overrun in the initial stages of the conflict itself.

The LTTE priority will be defending the Wanni. Batticaloa and Ampara are not strategically as important as that. So the forces deployed in the east will be comparatively smaller. If Karuna succeeds in driving out the LTTE from the region and then establishes a no-conflict situation in the east, then the Tigers would find themselves well and truly deflated.

So the LTTE, despite its war rhetoric, is very much circumscribed. The four co chairs in a hard statement have called upon both parties to stop the killings. They have first and foremost asked the LTTE to stop all killings and then pressured the government. It has not been one sided on the government alone as Tamilselvan is trying to project.

Beaten at its own game

The LTTE began this violence and continues to engage in it. It is only when it is beaten at its own game that the LTTE shouts and appeals. Even then it is blind to its own faults and seeks to blame the government and the paramilitary forces.

If the LTTE really wants eastern bloodshed to end and guarantee its security then it will have to come to terms with Karuna. This column anticipated this type of situation and urged the LTTE at the beginning of the split to make peace with Karuna. This was not followed and Tiger propagandists attacked this column saying the Karuna problem was a mere bubble to the great 'thalaiver.'

Now the chances of rapprochement with Karuna are remote. Karuna is strong and on a good wicket. The only option for the LTTE is to recongnise Karuna, accept him as a legitimate entity in the east and bind him down to an Oslo facilitated ceasefire agreement and then honour it.

Unless the LTTE is willing to do this, it has no way of meeting the Karuna threat. In the meantime the LTTE can demonstrate its sincerity and commitment towards genuine peace by desisting from violence. It can respect the four co chairs and stop its killings.

Let the LTTE follow Tamilselvan's words and stop the "killings of civilians and unarmed political cadres in the Sri Lanka Army held areas" and create "a safe environment for all unarmed political officials and cadres to engage in political work."

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