Sources and Methods

• START I Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms (As of January 1, 1999)
• NRDC Nuclear Notebook @ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
• Current World Nuclear Arsenals @ CDI

North Korea is believed to have about two nuclear weapons, and a variety of potential delivery systems, including perhaps 10 Nodong-1 medium range missiles of uncertain reliability.

Under the START-1 agreement, all nuclear warheads of the former Soviet Union were withdrawn to Russia. The SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs and BLACKJACK and BEAR H Heavy Bombers to be eliminated remain in Ukraine. The SS-18 ICBMs and BEAR H Heavy Bombers in Kazakhstan were returned to Russia, as were SS-25 mobile ICBMs in Belarus.

Traditionally this type of data display would largely recapitulate American and Russian forces accountable under the then-prevailing strategic arms control agreement. This method was never entirely satisfactory, given the inevitable discrepancies between arms control counting rules and actual force deployments, but in the past it provided a useful indicator of static force postures. In recent years, however, the discrepancies between START-accountable forces and the forces actually available to American and Russian commanders have become so profound as to render a rehearsal of the START-accountable numbers rather uninteresting.

Russian bomber and ICBM numbers are according to the 01 January 1999 START data exchange, which includes all START-accountable treaty-limited items, regardless of their present operational status. Actually available Russian forces are almost certainly rather smaller than displayed here, given low maintenance rates due to financial constraints. Under the START-1 counting rules, some non-deployed Russian forces remain treaty-accountable due to incomplete deactivation, including all the SS-N-8 missiles on Delta-I submarines, two of the remaining 13 Delta-IIIs [one of which has been stricken but not dismantled, the other of which is undergoing a protracted conversion to support special operations], as well as three of the six Typhoon class submarines. The figures for Russian SLBM/SSBN forces displayed here include only actual operational nuclear delivery systems, and ignore these artifacts of the START counting rules. Evidently only one Typhoon SSBN is currently in service, of the seven extant Delta-IVs one has remained in overhaul since 1993 and two others are reportedly unfit for service.

 

US bomber and ICBM numbers are for Primary Aircraft Inventory [PAI], which excludes backup and attrition reserve aircraft as well as aircraft in depot maintenance and units no longer on alert but not completely dismantled according to START dismatlement rules. Total inventory counts, as well as START-accountable numbers, will be higher than the PAI figures given here. American B-1B bombers remain START-accountable, even though they are currently restricted to non-nuclear conventional missions. The figures for US bomber forces displayed here include only actual operational nuclear delivery systems, and ignore these artifacts of the START counting rules.

01 Jan 1999 PAI START B-52 56 204 B-1 70 91 B-2 12 20 MM-2 0 1 MM-3 500 650

 ¹The data in this fact sheet comes from the most recent aggregate MOU data exchanged by the Parties to the START Treaty. Only the more significant aggregate data is listed here and on the accompanying tables. The data under the "Total, Former USSR Parties" heading was compiled by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from the individual totals submitted by these Parties, and is provided for ease of comparison.

 Note that all data reflects specific START counting rules. Within tables, a "--" denotes that the entry is not applicable. The complete unclassified MOU data of the Parties is available upon request from the Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC  20520.

	Country	Suspected Strategic Nuclear Weapons	Suspected Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons	Suspected Total Nuclear Weapons
	China	290	120	410
	France	482	0	482
	India	60+?	0	60+?
	Israel	100+?	0	100+?
	Pakistan	15-25?	0	15-25?
	Russia	7,500	7,000-15,500	14,500-23,000
	United Kingdom	100	100	200
	United States	7,300	4,700-11,700	12,000-19,000

Go to CDI's Nuclear Weapons Database: Chinese Arsenal

Summary of French Nuclear Arsenal:

The French nuclear arsenal, largely a legacy of De Gaulle's insistance on French strategic independence, is the third largest in the world. Until 1996, it was deployed on a triad mirroring those of Russia and the United States. However, in February 1996, President Chirac announced his intention to eliminate the land-based deterrent, destroying the Hades and SSBS S3D missiles.

Yet in tandem with this reduction, France is undertaking a modernization of its sea-based deterrent force, with the first of a new SSBN class, the Le Triomphant, along with a new SLBM, the M-45. The controversial nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in 1995-96 was reportedly done to perfect warhead design. The French are even pressing forward with an advanced SLBM design, the M-51, complete with a stealthy, manuevering warhead called the TN-76.

The means of air delivery will remain potent, though the last French nuclear gravity bombs have been retired. The Mirage 2000N and carrier-based Super Etendard fighter-bombers are available to deliver short-range nuclear ASMP missiles. A follow-on to the current ASMP missile, dubbed the ASMP+ is under development and is slated to enter service in 2007. The new French nuclear role aircraft, the Rafale D, should be ready then as well.

The French arsenal at the moment is rife with contradictions -- while the reductions are sweeping and encouraging, the modernization program is widespread. The French would probably not engage in multilateral arms control until the U.S. and Russia came down to approximately the same warhead level.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 482

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: 0

Total Nuclear Weapons: 482

Go to CDI's Nuclear Weapons Database: French Arsenal

Note: All specifications are from recent Jane's Information Group publications (Strategic Weapon Systems, Fighting Ships, Naval Weapon Systems, and All the World's Aircraft), except "Throw-weight", and "Yield" which are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 1995-6, "Locations," and "Number Deployed" are from Arkin and Norris, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Disagreements are footnoted (with hypertext links), as are selected facts in the text.

The entries are listed as follows:

• Sea-Based Strategic Weapons
  • L'Inflexible SSBN
  • Le Triomphant SSBN
  • M-4 SLBM
  • M-45 SLBM
• Air-Based Strategic Weapons
  • Mirage 2000N
  • Super Etendard
  • ASMP SRAM
• Footnotes
• Link to Brief Summary of French Arsenal

L'Inflexible (SNLE M4) SSBN

• Year Deployed: 1973
• Displacement: 8,080 tons surfaced, 9,820 tons dived¹
• Dimensions: 128.7 meters length, 10.6 meters height, 10 meters diameter
• Propulsion: Nuclear, 1 shaft, 1 propeller
• Speed: 25 knots dived, 20 knots surfaced²
• Missiles: 16 M-4 SLBMs
• Locations: Ile Longue, Brest - 4
• Number Deployed: 4 submarines
• Primary Contractor: Direction des Constructions et Armes Navales³

These ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) were previously known as the Le Redoubtable class (and are sometimes referred to as the modified Le Redoubtable class). But when the vessel bearing that name was decommissioned in 1991, they were renamed the L'Inflexible class, after the newest vessel. The other four submarines have undergone a two and a half year modernization overhaul in the 1980s which fitted the M-4 missiles, replaced the missile launch system, installed new reactor cores, updated the sonar, and improved quieting up to the standard of the L'Inflexible. These boats are scheduled to begin retirement one already retired in 1996, with two others scheduled in 1998, and 2002 -- four new Le Triomphant SSBNs will gradually replace them.⁴

Like U.S. and British SSBNs, the French have two rotating crews for each of their missile boats, which they call Rouge (red) and Bleu (blue). The submarines usually spend two months on patrol, then return to Brest to exchange crews and perform maintainence before heading back out to sea.⁵ French policy has been to maintain three SSBNs ready at all times, with two at-sea on patrol. This was difficult with the early M-1 SLBMs and M-2 SLBMs, which had to patrol off Norway's north coast to reach inland targets in Russia. The M-4 has cut down dramatically on transit time to patrol areas, which because of range can include the western Atlantic. With the M-4 missiles, the SSBNs can even reach some targets in Russia from dockside in France.⁶ Each SSBN carries several predetermined "target dossiers" on magnetic disks. The entire complement of 16 M-4 missiles can be fired in 3-4 minutes.⁷

Unlike the British, who developed a sea-based deterrent with significant U.S. aid, the French did it largely on their own. While there was much sharing of nuclear design and test data with the United Kingdom, including the outright sale of SLBMs, there was little such cooperation with the French. In the spirit of Charles de Gaulle's independent force de frappe, and its later incarnation, the force d'dissuasion, the French embarked on constructing their own nuclear triad. Little American aid was forthcoming during initial development, though there was some U.S. nuclear aid after 1972, after the French had developed their first generation of weapons. French SSBNs and SLBMs consequently have lagged at least a generation behind the U.S. Today the U.S. is sharing testing and simulation data with the French to maintain their arsenal under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.⁸

With President Chirac's announcement in February, 1996 of the elimination of the S-3 IRBMs, as well as other recent reductions, the SSBNs will play an even larger role in France's nuclear deterrent. In addition to destroying the S-3 silos on the Plateau d'Albion, the short-range Hades missile (follow-on to the retired Pluton) will be eliminated as well, as have Jaguar and Mirage IVP aircraft from the nuclear role. However in an interesting counterpoint to these reductions, France is going ahead with modernization of its remaining nuclear forces in the next decade, including a new short-range attack missile, the ASMP+, a new SLBM, the M-51, and equipping the new fighter-bomber, the Rafale D, for the nuclear role. The French policy brings some welcome reductions, but the modernization program seems excessive given the lack of an enemy.

• Year Deployed: 1996
• Displacement: 12,640 tons surfaced, 14,335 tons dived dived⁹
• Dimensions: 138 meters length, 12.5 meters height, 17 meters diameter
• Propulsion: Nuclear K-15 reactor, 1 shaft, pump jet propulsor¹⁰
• Speed: 25 knots dived dived¹¹
• Missiles: 16 M-45 SLBMs
• Locations: Ile Longe, Brest - 1
• Number Deployed: 1 submarine
• Primary Contractor: Direction des Constructions et Armes Navales¹²

The Le Triomphant boats are the latest addition to the French missile submarine force, the FOST (Force Oceanique Strategique). They are referred to as the SNLE-NG (SSBN, New Generation). A class of six was originally planned, but that was reduced to four. There was widespread speculation that this total might be further reduced to three, but President Chirac has reaffirmed that four Le Triomphants will be built. These submarines are a replacement for the aging L'Inflexible class of SSBNs. The first of the class was expected to conduct its first patrol by the end of 1996. The second boat is scheduled to become operational in 1999, the third in 2001, and the fourth in 2005.¹³

The Le Triomphant class will be quieter than its predecessor, heavier, able to dive deeper, and have more advanced computers and software.¹⁴ It is built of HLES 100 steel, and capable of diving to 500 meters, twice that of its predecessor. Much though has been given to quieting, and the radiated noise level has been described as "less than that of the sea bottom noise ... reduced to a few millionths of Watts."¹⁵

The Le Triomphants will initially use the M-45 SLBM with TN-75 warhead, but are planned to use a new missile, the M-51, which is under development. The proposed M-51 SLBM is a very long term project; backfitting of the Le Triomphant class to carry the proposed M-51 is scheduled to begin in 2010. Four boat loads of M-51s were originally to be ordered but this number will likely be reduced to three to rotate among the four planned submarines. In addition to torpedoes for self-defense, the Le Triomphants also carry an unknown number of SM-39 Exocets.¹⁶

• Year Deployed: 1985
• Dimensions: 11.05 meters length, 1.93 meters diameter¹⁷
• Weight: 35,000 kilograms
• Propulsion: Three stage solid-fuel
• Throw-weight: Unknown
• Range: 4,000 kilometers¹⁸
• Guidance: Inertial plus computer payload control¹⁹
• Circular Error Probable: Unknown
• Warhead: 6 x MRVs, TN-70/1
• Yield: 150 kilotons
• Locations: 4 L'Inflexible SSBNs
• Number Deployed: 48 missiles
• Primary Contractor: Aerospatiale, Space and Strategic Systems Division

The M-4 is the fourth SLBM, or MSBS (Mer-Sol-Balistique-Strategique - Sea to Ground Strategic Ballistic missile), deployed by the French. It has a relatively short range, and is comparable to the American Polaris and Poseidon SLBMs. First tested in 1981, the missile was deployed on the five L'Inflexible (modified L'Redoubtable) boats, which were modified in the 1980's to carry it.²⁰

The M-4 represents a significant increase over its predecessor, the M-20, particularly in terms of range (4,000 kilometers compared to 3,000 kilometers) as well as warheads (6 compared to 1). Accuracy is assumed to have improved from the M-20's 1000 meter CEP as well, though details are unknown. The M-4's six warheads are believed to have a limited independent targeting capability. The warhead "footprint" of the M-4 has been reported as capable attacking targets within a 150x350 kilometers area.²¹

A primary goal of the M-4 was defeating the upgraded Soviet ABM system. To this end, the TN-70/-71 warheads were "extremely hardened" to resist EMP effects from nearby nuclear blasts, and were miniaturized. With U.S. aid, the French were able to space (using explosive charges to propel the warheads away from the central missile bus) the incoming warheads so that a Soviet ABM nuclear blast would only destroy one of the missile's six warheads. 96 of the earlier TN-70 warheads were manufactured (missiles carrying the TN-70 are sometimes referred to as the M-4A). An improved variant, the TN-71, has a lower radar cross section and is reported as more survivable against ABM defenses -- 288 warheads were manufactured (missiles with the TN-71 are sometimes called the M-4B)²²

The M-4 was briefly considered as a replacement for France's S-3 IRBMs, but that plan, as well as the S-3's, has been scrapped. The last M-4 will be retired with the last L'Inflexible SSBN, expected in 2002.

• Year Deployed: 1996
• Dimensions: 11.05 meters length, 1.93 meters diameter²³
• Weight: 35,000 kilograms
• Propulsion: Three stage solid-fuel
• Throw-weight: Unknown
• Range: 5,300 kilometers²⁴
• Guidance: Inertial
• Circular Error Probable: Unknown
• Warhead: 6 x MIRVs, TN-75
• Yield: 100 kilotons
• Locations: 1 Le Triomphant submarine
• Number Deployed: 16 missiles
• Primary Contractor: Aerospatiale, Space and Strategic Systems Division

The M-45 is an upgraded SLBM which will be equipped on the new Le Triomphant SSBNs. Compared to its predecessor, the M-4, the M-45 has upgraded electronics, reentry vehicle, and warhead. The reentry vehicle is coated with a new material and precisely designed shape, has a high reentry speed, and is accompanied by advanced penetration aids to defeat ABM defenses. The new TN-75 warhead is miniaturized and hardened against EMP effects. The TN-75 warhead has been described as "almost invisible" for its stealth characteristics.²⁵ The talk of ABM defenses and SDI in the 1980s spurred the design to be resistant to such measures. As President Chirac stated, the French nuclear tests at Muroroa Atoll in 1995-6 in part stemmed from the need to test this new warhead design. The M-45 is expected to be deployed until 2010-15, when a follow-on M-5 SLBM will be deployed in its place. .²⁶

The proposed follow-on to the M-45, the fifth generation M-5, has been in the design stages since 1988. The greatly increased range of the proposed M-5 over the M-45 (11,000 kilometers versus 5,300 kilometers) represents a large increase in capability. The M-5 will also carry modern penetration aids tailored to defeat upgrades to the Moscow ABM system.²⁷ The missile will even be hardened against laser weapons based on space platforms. The M-5's proposed TN-76 warhead has been described as stealthy and having maneuvering reentry vehicle technology (MARV) -- it will be able to spin and maneuver in flight. However, given that France cannot test such a new warhead under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it may settle for deploying the M-45's tested TN-75 warhead instead. It can carry a maximum of 12 warheads, but will likely to carry less (probably six) given the relaxed world security situation.²⁸

Mirage 2000N

• Year Deployed: 1988
• Dimensions: 14.55 meters length, 5.15 meters height, 9.13 meters wingspan²⁹
• Weight: empty - 7,600 kilograms, max takeoff - 17,000 kilograms³⁰
• Propulsion: SNECMA M53-P2 turbofan
• Speed: Mach 2.2
• Range: (hi-lo-hi) 1,205 kilometers³¹
• Maximum Loadout: 1 ASMP (plus two Magic conventional air defense missiles)
• Weapon Load: 6,300 kilograms³²
• Locations: Luxeil 30 aircraft (2 squadrons), Istres - 15 aircraft (1 squadron)
• Number Deployed: 45 aircraft
• Primary Contractor: Dassault Aviation

The Mirage 2000N (Nucleaire) is the nuclear strike component of France's Force Aerienne Strategique (FAS). It is the seventh generation of Mirage combat aircraft. The Mirage 2000N is a two-seater, single engine, delta wing, low altitude penetration variant. The first batch became operational in 1988, with production ending in 1993. Some of the earlier models have been fitted for a dual-use conventional ground-attack capability. To carry out their mission, they are fitted with terrain-following radar, two inertial guidance platforms, two Magic self-defense missiles, and a ECM jamming suite.³³

In 1989 the number of deployed nuclear-armed Mirage 2000N aircraft was cut from 75 aircraft in five squadrons to 45 aircraft in three squadrons. Before 1991, they were armed with the AN-52 nuclear gravity bomb, but with its retirement, they carry the ASMP short-range attack missile. France no longer has any nuclear gravity bombs.³⁴

With the retirement of the Mirage IVP strike aircraft in July 1996, the Mirage 2000N has become the sole French land-based nuclear-armed aircraft. Mirage IVPs had been on ground alert since 1964, with nine four plane squadrons deployed at nine separate bases -- one Mirage IVP at each base was ready to take off with 15 minutes' notice. The Mirage 2000N will likely be replaced by the next generation fighter/bomber, the Rafale. The Rafale D is slated to take up the nuclear role in 2005.³⁵

• Year Deployed: 1980
• Dimensions: 14.31 meters length, 3.86 meters height, 9.60 meters wingspan
• Weight: empty - 6,500 kilograms, maximum takeoff - 9,450-12,000 kilograms³⁶
• Propulsion: SNECMA Atar 8K-50 non-afterburning turbojet
• Speed: Approximately Mach 1
• Range: (hi-lo-high) 850 kilometers³⁷
• Maximum Loadout: 1 ASMP
• Weapon Load: 2,100 kilograms³⁸
• Locations: Aircraft carrier Foch
• Number Deployed: 24 aircraft
• Primary Contractor: Dassault-Breguet

In addition to missile submarines and ground-based strike aircraft, the French retain a nuclear capability based on their two aircraft carriers. Since the U.S., Russia, and Britain have removed such weapons, and China is not suspected to have them, France is the only nuclear power remaining with deployed, naval-based, non-SLBM nuclear weapons. This capability is based France's Clemenceau class carriers, the Clemenceau (R98) and Foch (R99), which have Toulon as their home port. Referred to by the French as PANs (Porte-Avions Nucleaire) the carriers are equipped with a varying number of Super Etendard nuclear-capable strike aircraft. Since 1988, only the 20 aircraft assigned to the Foch have carried nuclear weapons, since only that carrier was modified to handle the ASMP missile. Previously, both carriers were equipped to carry the AN-52 nuclear bomb, since retired.³⁹ The Super Etendards in the nuclear role were reduced from 50-55 airplanes to 24, with 20 ASMPs allocated to them. The new de Gaulle-class carrier is scheduled for deployment in 1998 (with a second planned but not yet ordered), and will also carry Super Etendards and later nuclear-capable Rafale strike aircraft.⁴⁰

The Super-Etendard is a single-seat, single-engine, all-weather, fighter/bomber. Production ended in 1983. It is the successor to France's previous carrier-based strike aircraft, the Etendard IV-M. It was supposed to have great commonality with its predecessor, but the addition of a more powerful engine, improved aerodynamic features, and other enhanced capabilities gave it a 90% new design. It is designed for a low to medium altitude flight profile, and is capable of in-flight refueling. It should be noted that an export version sold to the Argentines launched the Exocet which sunk the British destroyer HMS Sheffield in the Falklands War.⁴¹

• Year Deployed: 1986
• Dimensions: 5.38 meters length, .38 meters diameter⁴²
• Weight: 860 kilograms⁴³
• Propulsion: Solid propellant booster and ramjet
• Throw-weight: Unknown
• Speed: Mach 2⁴⁴
• Range: 250 kilometers
• Guidance: Inertial and terrain mapping
• Circular Error Probable: 350-400 meters⁴⁵
• Warhead: TN-81
• Yield: 300 kilotons
• Locations: 45 Mirage 2000Ns and 20 Super Etendards
• Number Deployed: 65 missiles
• Primary Contractor: Aerospatiale, Space and Strategic Systems Division

The ASMP (Air-Sol Moyenne Portee -- medium-range air to surface missile) appears to be the French analogue of the recently retired U.S. short-range attack missile (SRAM). The ASMP replaced the AN-22 gravity bomb, and gave the French nuclear-armed fighter-bombers a standoff capability against heavily defended targets. The ASMP was designated for carriage by the Mirage 2000N, Mirage IVP (recently retired), and Super Etendard.

The wingless ASMP uses a solid fuel booster initially to reach speeds of approximately Mach 2 within five seconds, then switches to a ramjet for the remainder of the flight. Range depends upon the altitude of the firing platform, with a 250 miles range at high altitude, down to a minimum of 80 kilometers at low levels. The missile is programmed prior to takeoff via data cassette with specific launch and target parameters, although the missile receives a last-minute guidance update before firing.⁴⁶

80 ASMP missiles were ordered. 18 were allocated to the Mirage IVP strike aircraft, which have since been retired. The missile was designed with a 20 year lifespan in mind, which would mean it would retire in 2006 (though it would not be surprising if this were extended).⁴⁷ A stealthy, longer-ranged (800-1200 kilometers) ASLP was proposed in 1989, but with the security climate, such an upgrade is unlikely. Instead, President Chirac has announced France will pursue an "ASMP+" program, a missile with an extended range of 500 kilometers.⁴⁸

¹ L'Inflexible displacement is listed as 8,174 tons surfaced, 9,144 tons submerged in Robert Norris, Andrew Burrows, and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder; Westview Press - National Resources Defense Council, 1994), p. 294.

² L'Inflexible speed is given as 27 knots submerged in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p.294.

³ Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 294.

⁴ Jane's Fighting Ships 1996-7 (London: Jane's Information Group, 1996), p. 211.

⁵ Joshua Handler and William Arkin, Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: A Complete Inventory, Neptune Papers, No. 2 (Washington, DC: Greenpeace and Institute for Policy Studies, 1988), p. 29.

⁶ British American Security Information Council, French Nuclear Policy Since the Fall of the Wall (Washington, DC: BASIC, 1993), p. 13.

⁷ Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, pp. 294-5.

⁸ BASIC, French Nuclear Policy Since the Fall of the Wall, p. 6.

⁹ Le Triomphant displacement listed as 14,120 tons submerged in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 298.

¹⁰ Le Triomphant propulsion system listed as large diameter propellor as opposed to pump jet propulsor in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 298.

¹¹ Le Triomphant listed as about 30 knots dived in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 298.

¹² Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 298.

¹³ William Arkin and Robert Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1996), p. 65.

¹⁴ Yves Boyer, "French and British Nuclear Forces in an Era of Uncertainty," in Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World, eds. Garrity and Maaranen, p. 113.

¹⁵ Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 299.

¹⁶ Jane's Fighting Ships, 1996-7, pp. 211.

¹⁷ M-4 listed as 11.07 meters length and 1.95 meters diameter in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 303.

¹⁸ M-4 range listed as 5,000 kilometers in International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1995-6 (London: IISS, 1995), p. 288.

¹⁹ M-4 guidance described as inertial with star-fix or transit satellite update in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 303.

²⁰ "M-4,"Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, (London: Jane's Information Group, 1990).

²¹ Max Walmer, Strategic Weapons (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1988), p. 60.

²² Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, pp. 218-9, 255.

²³ Listed as 11.07 meters length and 1.95 meters diameter in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 303.

²⁴ M-45 range listed as 6,000 kilometers in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 304.

²⁵ Handler and Arkin, Nuclear Warships, p. 29.

²⁶ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1996), p. 65.

²⁷ "M-5," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.

²⁸ Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, pp. 260, 306.

²⁹ Mirage 2000N length listed as 14.94 meters and 5.20 meters height in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 283.

³⁰ Mirage 2000N empty weight is listed as 7,900 kilograms, maximum takeoff weight is 16,500 kilograms in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 283.

³¹ Radius of action listed as 690 kilometers in IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 288, also listed as 2,778 kilometers in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 283.

³² In IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 288.

³³ Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1996-7, (London: Jane's Information Group, 1996), p. 83.

³⁴ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1996), pp. 65-6.

³⁵ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1996), p. 66.

³⁶ Super Etendard empty weight listed as 6,250 kilometers, maximum takeoff weight listed as 11,900 kilograms in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 321.

³⁷ Super Etendard radius of action listed as 650 kilometers in IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 289, also combat radius listed as 700 kilometers at low level in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 321.

³⁸ In IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 288.

³⁹ BASIC, French Nuclear Policy Since the Fall of the Wall, p. 18.

⁴⁰ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1996), p. 66.

⁴¹ Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1982-3, (London: Jane's Information Group, 1982), p. 65.

⁴² ASMP diameter listed as .35 meters in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 287.

⁴³ ASMP weight listed as 840 kilograms in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 287.

⁴⁴ ASMP speed quoted as high as Mach 4 in Walmer, Strategic Weapons, p.40), quoted as Mach 2.5-2.7 in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 230.

⁴⁵ ASMP CEP estimated in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 288.

⁴⁶ Walmer, Strategic Weapons, p. 40.

⁴⁷ Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 230.

⁴⁸ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1996), p. 66.

Summary of India's Possible Nuclear Delivery Systems: N/A

Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 0

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: 60+

Total Nuclear Weapons: 60+

Note: The entries are listed as follows:

• Land-Based Weapons
  • Prithvi
  • Agni
• Air-Based Weapons
  • Jaguar (Shamsher)
  • MiG-27 Flogger (Bahadur)
• Footnotes
• Link to Brief Summary of Israel's Possible Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

Prithvi

• Year Deployed: 1995¹
• Dimensions: 9.0 meters length, 1.1 meters diameter
• Weight: 4,000 kilograms
• Propulsion: Single stage liquid propellent
• Throw-weight: Army version - 1,000 kilograms Air Force version 500 kilograms
• Range: Army version - 150 kilometers, Air Force version 250 kilometers
• Guidance: Inertial
• Circular Error Probable: 250 meters
• Warhead: Single
• Yield: Conventional, chemical, or nuclear possible
• Locations: Kashmir and Punjab, on the border with Pakistan²
• Number Deployed: 25 Air Force missiles, 75 Army missiles³
• Primary Contractor: Bharat Dynamics

The Prithvi ("earth" in Indian) short-range missile began design in 1983, and was first test fired in February 1988. India may have had outside assistance in building the missile, as there are unconfirmed reports of a European company aiding development. The propulsion system is based on the Soviet SA-2 surface to air missile.⁴ The missile has a distinctive appearance, with four delta-shaped wings midway down the fuselage. It is based near the border with Pakistan, on eight wheeled Kolos Tetra trucks, which can raise the missile for launch.⁵

The Prithvi uses a volatile liquid fuel launch mode -- it must be fueled immediately prior to launch. Given this significant disadvantage, a solid-fueled version may be under development. While the CEP (circular error probable) is 250 meters, there have been some reports that the accuracy could be enhanced to an unheard of 10 meters, using maneuvering warheads. The fact that Indian scientists are using commercial U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite navigation data in their missile guidance lends credence to these claims, although whether India could actually accomplish such precision capability is uncertain.⁶

There are two versions of the Prithvi: an Air Force and an Army version, with 250 kilometers range and 150 range respectively (a 350 kilometer version is reportedly under development). The missile recently began deployment, with reports of 100 ordered by the Army for use as a tactical battlefield weapon. India claims it will be used with conventional warheads -- either fuel air or cluster munitions, although it is widely believed it will have a nuclear warhead. In fact, in January 1996, the U.S. asked India to refrain from deploying a nuclear-armed Prithvi because it would increase tensions on the subcontinent. Given the short range and planned deployment area, the target is clearly India's bitter rival, Pakistan. The Pakistani ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament said his nation would take "appropriate measures" if nuclear-tipped missiles were deployed near the border between the two nations ⁷

With its 1,000 kilogram warhead, the Prithvi could carry a nuclear weapon. However, given that the Indians have not tested a nuclear weapon save their first in 1974, developing a miniaturized warhead for a missile would be difficult. The conventional wisdom until recently has been that without nuclear testing data to aid in the engineering process, India would not be able to produce a small ballistic missile warhead. However that assessment has begun to change, and it is likely that given considerable effort, the technological warhead miniaturization problem can be overcome.

• Year Deployed: Testing
• Dimensions: 18.4 meters length, 1.3 meters diameter
• Weight: 14,000 kilograms⁸
• Propulsion: 1st stage -- solid propellent, 2nd stage -- liquid propellent
• Throw-weight: 1,000 kilograms
• Range: 2,500 kilometers⁹
• Guidance: Inertial with terminal guidance
• Circular Error Probable: Unknown
• Warhead: Single
• Yield: Conventional, chemical, or nuclear possible
• Locations: Unknown
• Number Deployed: Unknown
• Primary Contractor: Indian Defense Research and Development Laboratory

The Agni ("fire" in Indian) represents a much more ambitious project compared to the Prithvi. It is a full fledged intermediate-ranged missile which began development in 1979. It has a curious mixture of propellents in its two stages, with the first stage, copied from the SLV-3 space launch vehicle, using solid propellent. The second stage is liquid fueled, using a shortened Prithvi motor system. The inertial guidance is probably an upgraded form of that used on the Prithvi.

The Indians have stated the Agni will not be equipped with a nuclear warhead. However, given China's lack of an anti-ballistic missile system and ability to hit Bejing, such a missile would be a tempting deterrent to India's rival to the north. Even if the Indians did not develop a nuclear warhead, the Chinese would know that they probably could do so. According to the CIA, India is currently working on a lightweight nuclear warhead for the Agni -- the technological problems are difficult, but not insurmountable.¹⁰ If the Agni does not have a nuclear warhead, it might be fitted with a fuel-air explosive (FAE), which -- relative to conventional weapons -- can do great damage. They might also be fitted with chemical weapons, or a form of terminal guidance if high explosives were used.¹¹

The first Agni was tested in 1989, generating significant pressure from the West not to deploy the system. In 1994, perhaps partially due to U.S. pressure, the Indians claimed the Agni was only a technology demonstrator program rather than a full-fledged weapon, and that they would not be deployed. Sources within the Indian Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) claim existing test missiles could be operational in three months if the decision were made to do so.

There folllowed official statements that the Agni would indeed be deployed, but that latest word on the program is that it is indeed dead. The Indian Defense Ministry announced on December 5, 1996, that the Agni "technology demonstration" program was over. The missiles could be deployed given the decision to do so based on the security situation, but India had not made this decision. This announcement came only days after the state visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin -- the country at whom the Agni would clearly be targeted.¹² If the Indians did decide to deploy, several more tests would probably be necessary before production could begin, and the operational date would probably be shortly after 2000.¹³

There have been rumors that India plans to go even further in its missile program and develop an ICBM (called the Surya), using its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and its development experience with the Agni to build upon. It is estimated that if the PSLV were modified and used as an ICBM, it would have a range of 8,000 kilometers. The Indian Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), expected for launch in 1997-98, could have a range of 14,000 kilometers if used as an ICBM -- on par with the U.S. and Russian missiles, and capable of striking the United States.¹⁴

The Pentagon claims, "India has already built guidance sets and warheads, key components needed to convert an SLV (space launch vehicle) into a ballistic missile."¹⁵ This little known fact of India's incipient ballistic missile capability has little immediate significance. However, it could be important should the security climate change for the worse, particularly in the event of increased U.S.-Indian tensions.

Jaguar (Shamsher)

• Year Deployed: Unknown
• Dimensions: 16.83 meters length, 4.89 meters height, 8.69 meters wingspan
• Weight: empty - 7,000 kilograms, maximum takeoff - 16,700 kilograms
• Propulsion: Two Rolls Royce Turbomeca Adour Mk 811 turbofans
• Range: 850 kilometers¹⁶
• Speed: Mach 1.5
• Maximum Loadout: 4,750 kilograms¹⁷
• Weapon Load: Various conventional air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions
• Locations: Squadron Nos. 5, 14, 16, 27 and No. 6 (antishipping)
• Number Deployed: 97 aircraft
• Primary Contractor: Hal, Bangalore Complex

The Jaguar, referred to by the Indians as the Shamsher (Assault Sword), is a single seat attack aircraft. The original batch was purchased from the British, the aircraft were subsequently assembled in India, and finally were built in India under license. The aircraft has an integrated attack/navigation system called DARIN (display attack and ranging inertial navigation) as well as other comparatively advanced avionic and electronic countermeasures gear.¹⁸

The Jaguar is one of India's most capable ground attack aircraft. As such, it is one of the primary candidates to carry India's limited number of nuclear weapons. Although little is known about India's nuclear weapon infrastructure, it is almost certain that if any are weaponized, they are in the form of nuclear gravity bombs.

• Year Deployed: 1986
• Dimensions: 17.07 meters length, 5.00 meters height
• Weight: maximum takeoff - 18,000 kilograms
• Propulsion: One Soyuz (Turmansky) R-29B-300 turbojet
• Range: (low altitude) 390 kilometers
• Speed: Mach 1.7
• Maximum Loadout: Two 500 kilogram bombs, various other munitions (Russian version can carry tactical nuclear weapons)
• Weapon Load: 4,000 kilograms¹⁹
• Yield: Unknown, could carry nuclear weapon
• Locations: Squadron Nos. 2, 9, 18, 22, 31, and 222.
• Number Deployed: 148
• Primary Contractor: Hal, Kanpur Division

The MiG-27 Flogger M (corresponding to the Russian MiG-27 Flogger-J) is a single-seat attack fighter known by the Indians as the Bahandur (Valiant). The MiG-27M has variable sweep wings, and an integrated attack/navigation system. It was designed by the Soviet Union and began entering service with the U.S.S.R. in the late 1970s. Its design was based on the MiG-23B Flogger, but had enhanced engines and attack/navigation system. India was licensed by the Soviets to produce the aircraft in 1984, and they entered service in 1986. A mid-life avionics upgrade for the MiG-27Ms is being considered.²⁰

Since the Russian version can carry tactical nuclear weapons, the possibility that the Indian MiG-27M could potentially be tasked with carrying Indian gravity bombs must be considered. The Western Jaguar, with its longer range and presumably more sophisticated electronics would seem to be the more likely candidate for this role, however. India has other attack aircraft, such as the MiG-23 Flogger, but it is most likely that their few nuclear weapons would deployed on their best planes -- either the MiG-27s or Jaguars.

¹ Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Missile Threats and Responses (internet web site - http://www.cdiss.org/countrya.htm#INDIA).

² Prithvi deployment of 100 listed in Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Ballistic Missile Developments" Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1996), p. 200. Deployment only listed as 3-5 launchers in International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1996-7 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 160.

³ CDISS, Missile Threats and Responses (http://www.cdiss.org/countrya.htm#INDIA).

⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (April 1996), p. 38.

⁵ "Prithvi," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems (London: Jane's Information Group, 1990).

⁶ CDISS, Missile Threat and Response (http://www.cdiss.org/countrya.htm#INDIA).

⁷ CNS, Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer, 1996), pp. 141, 150 and (Winter 1996), p. 170.

⁸ Agni weight listed as 17,300 kilograms in CNS, Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1996), p. 200.

⁹ Agni range listed as 1,500-2,500 kilometers in CNS, Nonproliferation Review, (Winter 1996), p. 200.

¹⁰ CNS, Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1996), p. 169.

¹¹ "Agni." Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.

¹² CDISS, Missile Threats and Responses (http://www.cdiss.org/96dec1.htm).

¹³ CDISS, Missile Threats and Responses(http://www.cdiss.org/countrya.htm#INDIA).

¹⁴ CDISS, Missile Threats and Responses(http://www.cdiss.org/smt1e.htm#SA).

¹⁵ OSD, Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 38.

¹⁶ Jaguar range listed for high profile in IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 308, also listed as 1,408 kilometers (with external fuel, hi-lo-hi) in Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1989-90 (London: Jane's Information Group, 1989), p 121.

¹⁷ IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 308.

¹⁸ Jane's All the World's Aircraft, p. 121.

¹⁹ Payload listed as 4,500 kilograms in IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 310.

²⁰ Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1994-5, pp. 124, 326.

Summary of Israel's Possible Nuclear Delivery Systems:

Despite refusals to comment on the issue by the Israeli government, the Israelis clearly have a sizeable nuclear arsenal. There are two interesting loopholes in Israel's oft-repeated pledge never to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region: The U.S. "introduced" weapons in the region in the 1950's when nuclear bombs were stored at Dharan, Saudi Arabia and at sea in the Mediteranean Sixth Fleet. Also, it is believed that Israel might not keep her nuclear weapons fully assembled -- keeping them "a screw away" from completion.

The highly capable and well-equipped Israeli air force would more than suffice in the nuclear weapons delivery role, particularly with U.S.-supplied aircraft such as the F-4E and F-16. However, Israel has also produced ballistic missiles, against which its potential enemies have no defense. The Jericho I suffices for its immediate adversary of Syria, and the Jericho II brings the entire Middle East under Israel's range, particularly Iran. The Shavit space-launch booster could also be adapted to a long-range nuclear delivery role, and given the decision, Israel would be able to develop an intercontinental balltic missile.

The Israeli arsenal will likely remain stable in the years to come. Though Israel signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it will likely not reduce or eliminate its nuclear arsenal of 100+ weapons. The Arab-Israeli peace process would have to advance far greater than it currently has for nuclear disarmament to be considered by the Israelis.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 0

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: 100+

Total Nuclear Weapons: 100+

Go to CDI's Nuclear Weapons Database: Israel's Possible Nuclear Delivery Systems

Summary of Pakistan's Possible Nuclear Delivery Systems: N/A

Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 0

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: 15-25

Total Nuclear Weapons: 15-25

Go to CDI's Nuclear Weapons Database: Pakistani's Possible Nuclear Delivery Systems

Summary of Russian Nuclear Arsenal:

Russia has made dramatic reductions in its nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War -- a major limiting factor has been the funding to destroy the systems. Russia has also received deliveries of all nuclear weapons stationed in the former-Soviet republics, particularly the strategic weapons formerly deployed in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Byelarus.

Some Russian nuclear modernization contiues -- the SS-N-20s onboard the 6 Typhoon submarines will likely be replaced by a new SLBM, the SS-N-26. There are also designs for a new nuclear ballistic missile sub. Also, the SS-25 Topol (with the newer M variant sometimes called the SS-27) mobile single warhead missile continues with steady production on the order of 20 missiles a year.

The START II limits Russia, as the U.S., to 3,500 strategic,deployed warheads. However, as there is no restriction on tactical or reserve weapons Russia will likely retain approximately 3,000 tactical warheads, in addition to an unknwon number of reserve weapons. The wrinkle is that Russia has yet to ratify START II, and the Duma seems increasingly reluctant to do. There are various political reasons for this resistance, but the strategic one is that the Russians perceive START II as tilted in favor of the U.S. The Russians have called for a START III agreement to reduce arsenals to around 2,000-2,500 warheads, a level cheaper to maintain and offering the U.S. less advantage in the event of a treaty "breakout." The U.S. has resisted negotiating a new treaty until START II is implemented.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 7,200

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: 6,000-13,000

Total Nuclear Weapons: 13,200-20,200

Go to CDI's Nuclear Weapons Database: Russian Arsenal

Summary of United Kingdom Nuclear Arsenal:

The British have declared their intention to destroy all air-delivered nuclear weapons by 1998, retaining only a sea-based deterrent. They will destroy their existing estimated 100 WE177 bombs (carried by the Tornado GR.I attack aircraft). Their sole nuclear force will be based on four new Vanguard class SSBNs armed with U.S.-supplied Trident II D-5 missiles. While only retaining one means of delivery (albeit a flexible and reliable one), the British will also reportedly use a mixture of strategic and smaller tactical warheads.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 100

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: 100

Total Nuclear Weapons: 200

Go to CDI's Nuclear Weapons Database: United Kingdom Arsenal

Summary of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal:

The U.S. is continuing with some modernization of the nuclear arsenal. Under the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review, approved in September 1994, the U.S. will retain 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines -- the four oldest ones will be retired, while the next four oldest, which were designed to fire the Trident I C-4 SLBM, will be backfitted to fire the larger Trident II D-5. Half the operational strategic deterrent force will be based on these Ohio SSBNs, which remain at sea 2/3 of the time. The Minuteman IIIs are receiving an upgrade and overhaul to extend their lifespan, though the current force of 530 will be recuded to 500 by the end of FY 1998. Finally, the B-2 stealth bomber should stop production at 21 airplanes. In the Secreatry of Defense's Annual Report, the option to switch the MX Mk. 21 warhead to the Minuteman IIs is retained, as this has been selected as the safest warhead. Short-range attack missiles have been retired.

The START II Treaty, slated for entry into force in 2003, will limit the strategic arsenal to 3,500 deployed warheads. This will consist of 14 Ohio-class submarines, each carrying 24 Trident II missiles, 500 Minuteman III missiles with a single warhead, 66 B-52Hs carrying nor more than 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and advanced cruise missiles (ACM), and 20 B-2's carrying up to 16 gravity bombs each. But there will be also be 950 tactical weapons (largely gravity bombs and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)), and 2,500 reserve weapons and 2,500 warheads in inactive reserve. These could easily be uploaded onto the START II delivery systems to provide rapid "breakout" capability. The U.S. has resisted Russian overtures for a START III treaty, maintaining that START II should be implemented before negotiations begin.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 8,500

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: 7,000

Total Nuclear Weapons: 15,500

Note: All specifications are from recent Jane's Information Group publications (Strategic Weapon Systems, Fighting Ships, Naval Weapon Systems, and All the World's Aircraft), except "Throw-weight", and "Yield" which are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 1995-6, "Locations," and "Number Deployed" are from Arkin and Norris' "Nuclear Notebook" in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and sources mentioned in the text. Disagreements are footnoted (with hypertext links), as are selected facts in the text.

The entries are listed as follows:

• Land-Based Strategic Weapons
  • Minuteman III ICBM
  • Peacekeeper (MX) ICBM
• Sea-Based Strategic Weapons
  • Ohio-class (Trident) SSBN
  • Trident I C-4 SLBM
  • Trident II D-5 SLBM
• Air-Based Strategic Weapons
  • B-52H Stratofortress
  • B-1B Lancer
  • B-2A Spirit
  • ALCM
  • ACM
  • B53 Gravity Bomb
  • B61 Gravity Bomb (Strategic)
  • B83 Gravity Bomb
• Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
  • Tomahawk TLAM-N SLCM
  • B61 Gravity Bomb (Tactical)
• Principal Sources
• Footnotes
• Link to Brief Summary of United States Arsenal

Minuteman III ICBM (LGM-30G)

• Year Deployed: 1970
• Dimensions: 18.2 meters length, 1.85 meters diameter
• Weight: 34,467 kilograms
• Propulsion: Three stage solid-fuel (liquid PBV), hot launch
• Throw-weight: 1,150 kilograms
• Range: 13,000 kilometers
• Guidance: Inertial, plus computer controlled PBV
• Circular Error Probable: 120 meters (220 meters currently, without planned upgrade)¹
• Warhead: 3 x Mk. 21, W78 (to be fitted with 1 x Mk. 21, W87)
• Yield: 335 kilotons (300 or 400 kilotons with W87 upgrade)
• Locations: Malmstrom AFB - 200 planned, Minot AFB - 150 planned, and F E Warren AFB - 150 planned
• Number Deployed: 530 missiles (500 planned)
• Primary Contractor: Boeing Aerospace

The Minuteman III is a direct successor of the original Minuteman ICBMs first deployed in 1962. This latest version, deployed in the early 1980s, will be the only American ICBM under the Nuclear Posture Review, the current Department of Defense plan for the U.S. nuclear arsenal under START II. All 500 missiles will be deployed in existing silos (hardened to withstand an estimated 2,000 pounds per square inch blast overpressure, little protection against today's more accurate missiles)² in the interior of the country. Fifty of these missiles will be treaty-countable, but in a non-operational reserve status. The 500 Minuteman IIIs are based at Malmstrom, Minot, and F E Warren Air Force Bases -- those currently at Grand Forks AFB will be transferred out by April 1998.³

START II mandates that all Minuteman IIIs be downloaded from their current three MIRVs to a single reentry vehicle. Their current warheads are being removed and the more advanced W87 warhead from the retired MX's will be substituted.⁴ The W87s are safer, with features such as insensitive explosives, fire resistant pits, and the enhanced nuclear detonation system (ENDS). Also, the force is undergoing a costly overhaul at a near-term cost of $8.2 Billion as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office,⁵ and a total lifetime cost of $23 Billion for upgrading and maintenance through 2020, as estimated by the General Accounting Office (there appears to be considerable dispute over the cost estimates).⁶ These improvements are supposed to bring the Minuteman III up to MX standards of accuracy (CEP of approximately 100 meters).

One of the improvements recently completed is the Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting system, or REACT. It replaces the 1960s-era tape-based targeting system (the Command Data Buffer, CDB), where tapes had to be manually inserted into each silo. Whereas the old system took 20 hours to manually retarget the entire Minuteman force, today's computerized version can do so in half the time, with essentially instant retargeting on demand for single missiles. An Air Force officer light-heartedly described the enhanced capabilities as "nuclear war in Windows." Whether or not this capability, which the U.S. did not require given similar SLBM retargeting improvements, was worth the $632 million price tag is another matter.⁷

Even though U.S. ballistic missile submarines will be capable of maintaining day-to-day deterrence with instant retargeting, robust communications, and excellent accuracy, the Minuteman III is being retained largely because of entrenched interests in maintaining the Cold War construct of the U.S. nuclear triad. In the post-Cold War world, the redundancy of the triad is no longer necessary -- two legs, or even just the submarines, are sufficient.

Peacekeeper ICBM (LGM-118, MX)

• Year Deployed: 1986
• Dimensions: 21.6 meters length, 2.34 meters diameter
• Weight: 88,450 kilograms
• Propulsion: Three stage solid plus liquid PBV, cold launch
• Throw-weight: 3,950 kilograms
• Range: 9,600 kilometers⁸
• Guidance: Computer-controlled inertial for booster and PBV
• Circular Error Probable: 90 meters⁹
• Warhead: 10 x W87 warheads
• Yield: 3-400 kilotons¹⁰
• Locations: F.E. Warren AFB - 50
• Number Deployed: 50 missiles (0 planned)
• Primary Contractor: Martin-Marietta Strategic Systems

The Peacekeeper carries 10 warheads (and is capable of carrying 12) with a very high accuracy; the lowest CEP of any deployed ballistic missile. The MX was largely a mirror image of the SS-18, also a heavy, accurate ICBM with 10 warheads, that far surpassed the Soviets in accuracy. In fact, the MX approaches the limit of intercontinental-range ballistic missile accuracy without some sort of terminal guidance, or Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MARV), which has been studied but not deployed. However with a sizable nuclear warhead, there would be no operational significance or gain from terminal guidance -- 90 meters is more than enough destroy any surface target by placing it in the crater of the blast.

The Peacekeeper is the first U.S. ICBM to use "cold launch" technique. The missile is ejected from the silo by a cold gas generator which lofts the missile tens of meters into the air before the main engines ignite. This process, which the Soviets used extensively, reduces damage to the silo, allowing for swift refurbishment, and if, possible reloading.¹¹

However, according to the General Accounting Office, there is some uncertainty about the MX's purported great accuracy; "accuracy estimates for the Peacekeeper -- the lead ICBM system -- were based on a very limited number of test shots, some using operationally unrepresentative software or hardware." The Department of Defense also refused to share reliability data with the GAO and scaled back testing, further throwing doubt onto the performance of the missile.¹² However, with the system due for elimination under START II, these allegations are not of major concern.

Only 50 of these missiles were actually deployed, all in modified Minuteman silos at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming.¹³ This small, conventional deployment was in spite of the prolonged debate over basing for the MX that raged in the early 1980s. The many suggestions for a rail mobile system, superhard silos, densely located silos, air-mobile, and even the "shell game" of numerous empty multiple protective shelters were all shelved in favor of this cheaper, conventional deployment.¹⁴

As a multiple warhead missile, the MX must be eliminated under START II, but the U.S. will likely avoid destroying its most accurate ballistic missile until the treaty nears entrance into force in 2003. The U.S. will probably use the removed W87 warheads, the safest in the U.S. arsenal, to arm the Minuteman III missiles that will be retained under START II. See entry on the Minuteman III ICBM for further details.

Ohio-class (Trident) SSBN

• Year Deployed: 1981
• Displacement: 16,600 tons surfaced, 18,750 tons dived
• Dimensions: 170.7 meters length, 12.8 meters diameter, 11.1 meters draft
• Propulsion: Nuclear, S8G reactor, 2 turbines, 1 shaft
• Speed: 20+ knots dived
• Missiles: 24 Trident II D-5 SLBMs (last 10 boats), or 24 Trident I C-4 SLBM (first eight boats)
• Locations: Bangor, Washington - 8, King's Bay, Georgia - 9
• Number Deployed: 17 submarines (14 planned)
• Primary Contractor: Electric Boat Division, General Dynamics

The first Trident submarine, the U.S.S. Ohio, was delivered in 1981, and production will cease in 1997 with the delivery of the final Trident. This ultra-quiet submarine is much longer than the older Poseidon boats and has 24 missile tubes instead of 16. Unlike many of its predecessors, the Ohios do not require overseas basing, given the long range of their missiles, and hence, the larger patrol area. The Ohios that operate in the Pacific are based at Bangor, Washington, while those in the Atlantic are based at King's Bay, Georgia.

The first eight boats are fitted for the Trident I C-4 missile and the next ten in class are fitted to fire the larger Trident II D-5 SLBM. Under the Nuclear Posture Review, the oldest four Tridents will be retired, and the next four will be retrofitted to enable them to carry the D-5. Thus the American SSBN (nuclear ballistic missile submarine) fleet will consist of 14 Ohio-class boats all equipped with the D-5 missile. To put this into perspective, in 1988 the Department of Defense called for a maximum SSBN force goal of 40 boats.¹⁵

The Navy justifies continued production of the newer D-5 by claiming it would be more expensive to maintain two types of SLBMs (though until a few years ago the U.S. maintained three types of SLBMs.). A more probable reason is the desire to keep D-5 production lines in California open, in addition to the declared reason of preserving the industrial base to produce more SLBMs if necessary.¹⁶ The U.S. could save over $4 Billion in FY 1997-2001 if it canceled the D-5 backfit program for the four submarines and retained the older C-4 missiles in the fleet.¹⁷ Such a costly modernization program, when the current C-4 missiles work perfectly fine, appears ill-advised and wasteful.

The Ohio class submarines have maintained a 2/3 at-sea rate by having two crews (designated Blue and Gold), which alternate on 70 day patrols, interrupted only by a 25 day refit period, with an overhaul every 9 years. There has recently been serious talk of cutting operations tempo in half by going to one crew for each boat. According to the CBO, going to one crew and a 1/3 at-sea rate would save $300 million a year, and still provide 4-5 submarines at sea at any one time, with 96-120 missiles and 480-600 warheads deployed. This should be more than sufficient to maintain day-to-day deterrence in the post-Cold War world.

The Ohio-class submarines are equipped with Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) receivers that allow them to remain in essentially constant contact with the shore. This contradicts the Cold War strategic truism that submarines are difficult to communicate with. In fact, SSBN communications are essentially equivalent in speed and reliability with that of ICBM silos.¹⁸

The Ohios will remain the backbone of the American deterrent force under START II, with half the country's deployed strategic warheads. The key advantage of these weapons is that they are essentially invulnerable, and, according to the General Accounting Office, there are no technologies in sight that will threaten them. Indeed, the Ohio class boats are even more difficult to detect than previously thought.¹⁹

These secure advantages of the sea leg have led many to conclude that the U.S. should eliminate the vulnerable, redundant, and expensive ICBM leg of the triad.

Trident I C-4 SLBM (UGM-96)

• Year Deployed: 1979
• Dimensions: 10.39 meters length, 1.88 meters diameter
• Weight: 29,500 kilograms
• Propulsion: Three stage solid plus PBV, cold launch
• Throw-weight: 1,500 kilograms
• Range: 7,400 kilometers
• Guidance: Inertial with stellar reference update plus computer-controlled PBV
• Circular Error Probable: 450 meters
• Warhead: Mark 4 with eight W76 warheads
• Yield: 100 kilotons each
• Locations: 8 Ohio class Trident SSBNs
• Number Deployed: 192 missiles (0 planned)
• Primary Contractor: Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation

Introduced in 1979, the C-4 carries 8 W76 warheads each with a 100 kiloton yield, long range, and moderate accuracy, though little hard-target destruction capability. It has a longer range than its predecessor, the Poseidon, allowing for greater SSBN patrol areas, U.S. basing, and, it was thought, greater survivability. The gas ejection launch technique employed is similar to that of the Peacekeeper missile, and can be launched either just below the surface, or while surfaced.

The Trident I was carried on the Lafayette class SSBNs, but all have now been retired. The C-4 is also installed in the first eight Ohio class missile subs. According to the Nuclear Posture Review, the first four of these boats are slated for removal from the nuclear role (either through retirement or removal of missile tubes and reorientation to other missions). The other four are scheduled to be backfit to carry the more advanced Trident II D-5 SLBM.

Approximately 3,000 W76 warheads were manufactured, over twice as many as are needed to implement START II. These spare warheads will be retained as part of the U.S. "hedge" stockpile. If there were a Russian "breakout" from START II, they could be rapidly uploaded onto the existing missiles.²⁰ For more information see the Ohio-class Trident SSBN and Trident II D-5 SLBM entries.

• Year Deployed: 1989
• Dimensions: 13.42 meters length, 2.11 meters diameter
• Weight: 59,090 kilograms
• Propulsion: Three stage solid-fuel, plus PBV, cold launch
• Throw-weight: 2,800 kilograms
• Range: 12,000 kilometers
• Guidance: Stellar-aided inertial, plus computer-controlled PBV
• Circular Error Probable: 90 meters
• Warhead: 8 x Mk. 4 or Kk. 5 x MIRV, W76/-88 warhead (to be reduced to 5, capable of 12-14)
• Yield: W76 - 100 kilotons, W88 - 475 kilotons
• Locations: 9 Ohio class Trident SSBNs
• Number Deployed: 216 missiles (336 planned)
• Primary Contractor: Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.

This highly accurate missile was first deployed in 1989, and is slated to arm the entire U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet. The D-5 is the first SLBM to have a credible hard target kill capability, contradicting the traditional notion that the sea leg's weapons are inaccurate.

In the latter days of the Cold War as the missile was under development, there was considerable opposition to the D-5 for this very reason, as its accuracy makes it a destabilizing weapon. In Cold War terms, during a crisis, an enemy might fear that a counterforce strike from these highly accurate weapons might cripple their forces, and the enemy might be tempted to strike first. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency even described it saying, "The Trident II could ... be perceived as a first strike weapon."²¹

Production of the D-5 continues today, given the decision to backfit the remaining four Ohio subs with this missile. The D-5 was originally to be equipped solely with the high yield W88 warhead, but production was halted in 1990 because of the closure of the Rocky Flats, Colorado facility that produced the plutonium triggers. Lower yield W76 warheads are mixed in with the approximately 400 high yield W88s that were produced.²² While each missile must be loaded solely with either the W88 or W76 warhead, U.S. submarines can carry a mixture of missile of each warhead type.

An SLBM Strategic Retargeting System (SRS) was approved in 1995. With this system, D-5s will be able to rapidly retarget to any spot in the world.²³ It is the naval analogue to the Minuteman III's REACT targeting upgrade.

B-52H Stratofortress

• Year Deployed: 1962
• Dimensions: 56.39 meters wingspan, 49.05 meters length, 12.40 meters height
• Weight: empty - 80,000 kilograms, maximum takeoff - 221,350+ kilograms
• Propulsion: eight Pratt & Whitney TF33-P-3 turbofans
• Maximum Speed: Mach .9²⁴
• Range (no refueling): 16,093 kilometers²⁵
• Weapon Load: 29,500 kilograms
• Maximum Loadout: 20 cruise missiles (ALCM or ACM), 8 internal, 12 external
• Locations: Barksdale AFB - 28, and Minot AFB - 28 with spares - 10
• Number Deployed: 66 bombers
• Primary Contractor: Boeing Aerospace Company

This icon of the Cold War remains in service today, and will for some time to come. The B-52H's were delivered in the early 1960's, and have been heavily modified since then. The H model is the most recent of the B-52 series, and been modified to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), completing its transition from the penetration to the standoff role. Twelve ALCMs or ACMs (advanced cruise missiles) can be carried externally, while 8 can be carried internally on the common strategic rotary launcher (CSRL).

Under the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review, the nuclear B-52H force is slated to be reduced from 94 to 66, carrying "approximately 950 cruise missiles." To maintain this level and remain compliant with START II, some of the B-52Hs will have to have their recently-installed internal launchers (the CSRLs) removed to allow them to carry 12 rather than 20 cruise missiles.²⁶

The B-52 force was taken off strip alert in September 1991 -- since 1960 a third of the B-52 force had always been armed and ready to take off on 15 minutes' notice of a Soviet attack.²⁷ Today, the cruise missiles for the bombers are kept separate from the planes, in bunkers. Currently the B-52Hs are stationed at two bases: the 2nd Bomber Wing at Barksdale AFB Louisiana, and the 5th Bomber Wing at Minot AFB North Dakota, each with 28 aircraft, with 10 aircraft as spares.²⁸

Despite the widespread perception that these aging planes should be retired, the head of Strategic Command (STRATCOM, SAC's successor organization) in 1990 noted that the H-model airframes and key components had only reached half of their life expectancy. The Air Force estimates the B-52Hs will be usable until approximately 2030.²⁹

Further, the B-52s have received extensive upgrades and modifications over the years, and remain fully operational, as was shown by their extensive action in the Gulf War. In that conflict the older B-52Gs were very active, dropping a third of all coalition bombs by tonnage³⁰, while the more "sophisticated" B-1B fleet was grounded. A standoff platform need not be a high-tech weapon system -- it only needs to fly within a thousand miles of its target and fire its cruise missiles. The B-52s are ideal for performing this mission for years to come.

B-1B Lancer

• Year Deployed: 1986
• Dimensions: 44.81 meters length, 10.36 meters height, 41.67 meters wingspan (fully spread), 23.84 meters wingspan (fully swept)
• Weight: Empty - 87,090 kilograms, Maximum takeoff - 216,365 kilograms
• Propulsion: 4 F101-GE-102 augmented turbofans
• Maximum Speed: Mach 1.25
• Range: (Unrefueled) 12,000 kilometers³¹
• Weapon Load: 34,019 kilograms internal, 26,762 kilograms external.³²
• Maximum Loadout: Internal - 8 ALCMs or 24 B61 bombs or B83 bombs, External - 8 ALCMs
• Locations: McConnell AFB - 11, Dyess AFB - 45, Ellswoth AFB - 37, Edwards AFB - 2
• Number Deployed: 95 bombers (0 planned for nuclear role)
• Primary Contractor: Rockwell International

The B-1B was originally planned as a supersonic nuclear penetrating bomber, with production ending in 1989. It was designed for low-level missions, and has sophisticated jamming equipment and low observable design purported to have 1% of the radar cross section (RCS) of the B-52. The latter claim has been disputed by the General Accounting Office, which maintains that this only represents the head-on measurement, with radar visibility from other aspects much higher.³³ From the start, the B-1B has been plagued by difficulties, including four crashes, and numerous electronic warfare system, flight control, and avionics problems. Justification for the great expense of these heavy bombers has yet to be realized.

The B-1B can carry a variety of nuclear weapons, up to 24 gravity bombs, or 8 ALCMs internally, and also has six external hardpoints which could carry an additional 12 ALCMs. However, as a practical point, these would not likely be used in a nuclear penetrating mission, given the prodigious internal carriage capability as well as the degradation in flight performance and radar signature carrying external stores entails.

Under Article IV of START II, up to 100 bombers may be reoriented for conventional bombing and will not be treaty countable. The U.S. is exercising this option with the 94 B-1Bs. Modification and training under the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program has been ongoing. Should START II fail (for any of various reasons), it would be a simple matter to reorient these bombers to the strategic nuclear role.

• Year Deployed: 1993
• Dimensions: 52.43 meters wingspan, 21.03 meters length, 5.18 meters height,
• Weight: empty - 45,360-49,900 kilograms, maximum takeoff - 181,437
• Propulsion: 2 modified General Electric F101 turbofans
• Maximum Speed: Mach 1
• Range (No refueling): 12,223 kilometers³⁴
• Weapon Load: 22,680 kilograms
• Maximum Loadout: 16 B53, B61, B83 gravity bombs
• Locations: 12 bombers (21 planned)
• Number Deployed: Whiteman AFB - 12
• Primary Contractor: Northrop Corporation Aircraft Group

The stealth bomber was originally slated to be deployed in large numbers and take over the penetration role from the B-1B Lancer, which is being reoriented towards conventional missions under START II. This flying wing design is supposed to be able to evade radar detection, largely through its composite (mainly graphite/epoxy) construction, honeycomb structure, exterior coating, and its very shape. Cooling of its engine exhaust and even its dark color also make it less detectable to infrared and visual detection (at night) respectively.

A primary mission used to justify the B-2 was the hunting of the Russian mobile missiles such as the SS-24 and SS-25 which were built in the late 1980s. The extremely expensive stealth features of the B-2 would presumably keep it undetected and safe as it roamed the Russian hinterland, seeking these elusive targets. However, the dismal failure of the "Great Scud Hunt" of the Gulf War (where hundreds of coalition sorties failed to destroy a single mobile Scud missile launcher) calls into question whether such missiles could be easily found.

Another doubtful justification for building the B-2 was the supposed high Soviet air defense threat. In retrospect, this threat was greatly exaggerated then, and naturally, the Russian air defense system today is in shambles.

The B-2 payload capacity is 16 nuclear gravity bombs (B53, B61, B83), short-range attack missiles (AGM-69 SRAM, though these missiles were recently eliminated) or advanced cruise missiles (AGM-129 ACM, although only the B-52Hs are planned to carry the ACM). The Air Force originally called for 132 B-2's, then cut the request to 75, and will likely settle for 21 bombers (20 were planned, but one of the prototypes is being modified to make it operational).³⁵ There was a recent attempt in Congress to procure another 20 B-2's, but this prohibitively expensive measure, unjustified in military terms, failed. Given the short production run, the program cost of each B-2 bomber will be approximately $2.2 Billion.³⁶ The B-2s are deployed at Whiteman AFB, Missouri.³⁷

• Year Deployed: 1982
• Dimensions: 6.32 meters length, .69 meters diameter
• Weight: 1,458 kilograms
• Propulsion: F-107-WR-100 turbofan
• Maximum Speed: Mach .66³⁸
• Guidance: Inertial with tercom
• Warhead: W80
• Circular Error Probable: 30 meters
• Yield: 200 kilotons
• Locations: B-52H
• Number Deployed: ~1,500+ (950 planned)
• Primary Contractor: Boeing Aerospace

The Air Launched Cruise Missile, or ALCM, is a small, subsonic air-breathing missile with a range of well over a thousand miles. It uses terrain following guidance to fly low (about 30 meters above ground) and is quite accurate, much like the Tomahawk of Gulf War fame. Its small size makes it difficult for air defenses to detect and intercept. The nuclear version is the AGM-86B, though there is also a conventional variant known as the AGM-86C, which additionally uses a GPS receiver for even greater precision.

With the accuracy of a cruise missile combined with a nuclear warhead, the ALCM is much more capable of destroying hard targets than any ballistic missile. However, with its slow speed relative to ballistic missiles the ALCM is generally not perceived as a destabilizing weapon.

The ALCM was introduced in the early 1980s to extend the life of the B-52s by converting them from penetration to standoff platforms. There are over 1,500 nuclear ALCMs available, though the U.S. plans on deploying only approximately 950 on a B-52H fleet of 66 aircraft.³⁹

• Year Deployed: 1991
• Dimensions: 6.35 meters length, .64 meters height, .70 meters width
• Weight: 1,250 kilograms
• Propulsion: F-112-WR-100 turbofan
• Speed: Unknown
• Range: 3,000 kilometers
• Guidance: Inertial with laser radar
• Circular Error Probable: Unknown, probably 10-30 meters
• Warhead: W80
• Yield: 200 kilotons
• Locations: B-52H
• Number Deployed: ~460 missiles
• Primary Contractor: General Dynamics, Convair Division

The Advanced Cruise Missile is the follow-on to the ALCM. It entered into service in 1991, with 1,461 missiles planned, but the program was cut short and only 460 ACMs were produced.⁴⁰ The ACM incorporates stealth features to reduce radar cross section and infrared signature and also has greater accuracy and longer range than its predecessor. Many details about this new system remain classified.

One justification put forward for the ACM was the specter of a similar Russian system purported to be in development. The AS-X-19 Koala was touted as a supersonic, long-range, stealthy cruise missile. It was also supposed to be ready for deployment in the early 1990s, though the program was cancelled around 1993.⁴¹ Ironically enough, the U.S. counterpart, the ACM, was cancelled only after several hundred missiles were produced.

Actually, the argument that the ACM was needed because of its improvements over the ALCM do not ring true. The range of the ALCM was better than had been originally reported (2,400 kilometers), and the ACM (3,000 kilometers range) offers little improvement. Likewise, the ACM's small increase in accuracy has no operational significance. The GAO has also concluded that the belief that the ALCM had low survivability, and required the ACM as a replacement, has not been demonstrated.⁴² However, given that the ACM has already been procured in large numbers, despite its large, superfluous expense, it will serve well to equip approximately half the the B-52H fleet under START II.

• Year Deployed: 1962
• Dimensions: 3.76 meters length, 1.27 meters diameter, 1.8 meters tailspan
• Weight: (8,850 lbs) kilograms
• Circular Error Probable: Unknown, perhaps between 100-200 meters
• Locations: B-2
• Number Deployed: 50 bombs
• Yield: 9 megatons

The B53 was designed as a high yield bomb to be carried internally by the B-52s. 340 of these bombs, with large (9 megaton) yields by American standards, were built. However, although it was slated to be replaced by the B83, its retirement was curtailed in 1987, probably to retain a high yield weapon to destroy very hardened underground targets.⁴³ The U.S. will likely retain 50 B53 bombs under START II.⁴⁴

The B53 does not have the safety and security features of the newer B61 and B83 bombs. Its fuzing is also more primitive, and must be accomplished on the ground by maintenance personnel. The B53's 9 megaton warhead (similar to that used in the retired Titan II ICBM) is a survivor of the early days of nuclear weapons when yields were very large.

• Year Deployed: 1967
• Dimensions: 3.6 meters length, .34 meters diameter, .58 meters tailspan
• Weight: 315-325 kilograms
• Circular Error Probable: Laydown delivery: estimated under 200 meters, as low as 30 meters for Mod 10 tactical version⁴⁵
• Locations: B-2
• Number Deployed: 750 bombs
• Yield: Variable 100-500 kilotons, with a 10 kiloton "low" setting

This is the most common version of U.S. gravity bomb that will be in service under START II. The B61-7 has four yield options that can be selected in flight. This strategic version can be dropped at high speed from as low as 15 meters in a "laydown" delivery (a delayed surface burst where the bomb parachutes to the ground allowing the bomber to escape the blast.) The B61 can also be delivered free-fall or parachute-retarded ground or air-burst. The latest versions have in-flight fusing and yield selection, as well as integrated Permissive Action Links (PALs), requiring the correct code for arming. Over 3,000 B61s were manufactured during the Cold War, though many are tactical versions. See the tactical B61 for further details.. About 750 Mod 7 strategic B61's remain in the active inventory.⁴⁶

With the reorientation of the B-1B to conventional operations, and the use of the B-52Hs as dedicated cruise missile carriers, gravity bombs will strategically be the sole purview of the 21 B-2s. A variant of the B61 is under development for destroying deep bunkers, such as the Libyan chemical weapons plant at Tarhuna. The improved B61 will have an enhanced penetration capability, and is slated to become operational in 1997.⁴⁷

• Year Deployed: 1984
• Dimensions: 3.66 meters length, .46 meters diameter, .9 meters tailspan
• Weight: 1,088 kilograms
• Circular Error Probable: Unknown, perhaps between 100-200 meters
• Locations: B-2
• Number Deployed: 650 bombs
• Yield: 1-2 megatons

The B83 is the most recent major U.S. bomb design, and possibly the last. It is the first megaton-range bomb designed for laydown (delayed blast, allowing the aircraft to deliver the bomb at very low altitude and escape) surface delivery against hardened targets. As such its nose cone is capable of withstanding high-speed impact with concrete or steel (in excess of 30 meters per second) with a delayed detonation up to 120 seconds to allow the aircraft to escape the blast. The B83 can survive delivery at up to Mach 2 at 45 meters.⁴⁸ It was originally intended to be the principal weapon of the B-1B Lancer, but will likely be carried by the B-2 stealth bomber under START II.

Tomahawk TLAM-N SLCM (BGM-109A)

• Year Deployed: 1984
• Dimensions: 6.25 meters length, .52 meters diameter
• Weight: 1,452 kilograms
• Propulsion: Solid booster and turbofan
• Maximum Speed: Mach .7⁴⁹
• Throw-weight: 109 kilograms⁵⁰
• Range: 2,500 kilometers
• Guidance: Inertial and tercom
• Circular Error Probable: 80 meters
• Warhead: W80
• Yield: 200 kiloton
• Locations: Storage facilities, location unknown, designed for various ship or submarine launch
• Number Deployed: 350 missiles
• Primary Contractor: General Dynamics Convair Division

The Tomahawk TLAM-N (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Nuclear) sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) was carried aboard a variety of ships and submarines. All have been removed and are in storage since September 1991, when President Bush recalled all non-SLBM sea-based nuclear weapons (a sweeping measure, which when included with the Russian reciprocation, removed on the order of 6,000 operational warheads).⁵¹

The missile is launched with a solid fuel booster to initially accelerate it, which is subsequently jettisoned as the turbofan engine takes over. Guidance is similar to the air-launched cruise missile, with terrain contour matching (tercom) in which the missile has a digital map of the terrain it is to fly over, and follows it at low altitude to the target. In addition to the nuclear version, there is of course the TLAM-C (conventional) of Gulf War fame. The conventional versions have improved terminal guidance which allows for a CEP on the order of 10 meters or less, though such precision is unnecessary with the TLAM-N, given the 200 kiloton warhead.

Approximately 350 nuclear SLCMs were produced, and all will remain in storage. Surface ships can mount the Tomahawk in Armored Box Launchers (ABL) and Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). Submarines can mount them in vertical Capsule Launch Systems (CLS) or in steel launch canisters from conventional Torpedo Tubes (TT).⁵² Currently, 78 submarines and 66 surface ships have launchers capable of using the TLAM-N. It carries the same W80 warhead as the ALCM, and is very similar to that cruise missile in many respects.⁵³

During the 1980's the sea-launched cruise missile became known as the "fourth leg" of the triad to some strategic analysts, Given its long-range, and the forward deployment of U.S. naval forces, it did qualify as a strategic system. It was regarded by many arms controllers as "the nemesis of arms control" because of the vexing problem of verification when dealing with a small weapon that can be carried aboard various ships and submarines.⁵⁴ However, only a small number of long-range nuclear SLCMs were manufactured by either side in the Cold War, and they, along with all naval nuclear weapons, have been removed from U.S. and Russian ships.

B61 Mod-3,-4,-10 gravity bomb (tactical)

• Year Deployed: 1967
• Dimensions: 3.6 meters length, .34 meters diameter, .58 meters tailspan
• Weight: 315-325 kilograms
• Circular Error Probable: Laydown delivery: estimated under 200 meters, as low as 30 meters for Mod 10 tactical version
• Locations: Storage facilities, assumed 350 in Europe, designed for various strike aircraft delivery
• Number Deployed: 600
• Yield: Variable .3 to 170 kilotons, varying by Mod

These are the tactical variants of the B61 bomb, see the description of the Mod-7 strategic B61 for further details. The F-111, F-4E, F-16, A-6E, and F/A-18 aircraft are all capable of carrying the B61 nuclear gravity bomb.⁵⁵ Large numbers of these aircraft will remain in the U.S.force structure in the conventional role. Three variants of the tactical B61 exist, the Mod-3, Mod-4, and Mod-10, the last of which is a converted W85 Pershing II warhead. Each version has four variable yields from .3 to 170 kilotons -- the settings for the various tactical versions are B61 Mod-3 (.3, 1.5, 60, and 170 kilotons), B61 Mod-4 (.3, 1.5, 10, and 45 kilotons), B61 Mod-10 (.4, 5, 10, and 80 kilotons). 350 tactical B61s remain in the U.S. stockpile, some of which would be allocated for use by NATO forces.⁵⁶

The U.S. once deployed the entire panoply of tactical nuclear weapons (from nuclear artillery and demolition mines to short-range rockets and even air-to-air missiles). However, nearly all have been removed and are slated for destruction, largely as a result of President Bush's unilateral initiative of September 27, 1991. Indeed, the only operational non-strategic forces are currently the B61 tactical bombs, largely allocated for use in Europe (and perhaps the TLAM-N SLCMs, though these could arguably be considered strategic, and are in storage in any case.)

¹ "Minuteman III" Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems (United Kingdom, Jane's Information Group, 1990) lists 120 meters for the Minuteman III CEP, which seems low compared to other sources. However, this level of accuracy seems likely with the W87 warhead retrofit and upgrades underway. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1995-6 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 286 lists Minuteman III accuracy as 220 meters.

² Congressional Budget Office, The START Treaty and Beyond, (1991), p. 148.

³ William Arkin and Robert Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 1996), p. 62.

⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1995 (London: SIPRI - Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 328.

⁵ Congressional Budget Office, Implementing START II (1993), p. 58.

⁶ GAO high estimate is from General Accounting Office, The U.S. Nuclear Triad: GAO's Evaluation of the Strategic Modernization Plan (unclassified summary GAO/T-PEMD-93-5, June 10, 1993), p. 9.

⁷ William Arkin, "The Six-Hundred Million Dollar Mouse" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November/December 1996), p. 68.

⁸ MX range is listed as 13,000+ kilometers in Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, p.121, and 11,000 kilometers in IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 286.

⁹ MX accuracy is listed as 100 meters CEP in IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 286.

¹⁰ Yield of W87 warhead is listed as 500 kilotons in "LGM-188 Peacekeeper," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, as 300 kilotons in Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1996), p.63 and as "300 kiloton range" in the older source, Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, p. 121.

¹¹ " LGM-118 Peacekeeper" Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.

¹² GAO, The U.S. Nuclear Triad, p. 6.

¹³ SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook, 1996, p. 614.

¹⁴ Examples of the MX debate and basing proposals include Office of Technology Assessment, MX Missile Basing (1981), Edited by Lauren H. Holland and Robert Hoover, The MX Decision: A New Direction in U.S. Weapons Procurement Policy? (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), Robert Hoover, The MX Controversy: A Guide to Issues & References (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1982).

¹⁵ Joshua Handler and William Arkin, Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: A Complete Inventory, Neptune Papers, No. 2 (Washington, DC: Greenpeace and Institute for Policy Stdies, 1988), p. 11.

¹⁶ Department of Defense Press Release, "Press Conference with Secretary of Defense William Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutsch" (September 22, 1994), p. 9.

¹⁷ Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options (August 1996).

¹⁸ GAO, The U.S. Nuclear Triad, p. 6, also Jane's Fighting Ships 1996-7 (United Kingdom, Jane's Information Group, 1996), p. 794.

¹⁹ GAO, The U.S. Nuclear Triad, p. 5.

²⁰ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1996), p.63.

²¹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control Impact Statement FY 79, other examples include Center for Defense Information, "First Strike Weapons at Sea: The Trident II and Sea-Launched Cruise Missile" The Defense Monitor (Number 6, 1987).

²² "UGM-133 Trident D-5," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.

²³ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February, 1996), p. 63.

²⁴ IISS, Military Balance 1995-6, p. 287 credits B-52H with Mach .95 maximum speed.

²⁵ IISS, Military Balance 1995-6, p. 287 lists B-52H unrefueled radius of action at 6,140 kilometers.

²⁶ "Factfile: U.S. and Soviet Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Past, Present, and Projected", Arms Control Today (December 1994), p. 29.

²⁷ Norman Polmar and Timothy Laur, Strategic Air Command: People Aircraft, and Missiles, 2nd Edition (Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Company of America, 1990), p. 69.

²⁸ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February), p. 63.

²⁹ GAO, The U.S. Nuclear Triad, p. 4 and GAO, Air Force Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force Would Reduce Planned Spending (GAO/NSIAD-96-192, 9/30/96).

³⁰ GAO, Air Force Bombers.

³¹ B-1B radius of action is listed as 4,580 kilometers in IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 287.

³² B-1B maximum ordnance load is listed as half of what Jane's quotes for internal capacity, only 12 B61 bombs, in IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 287.

³³ B-1B RCS 1% of B-52's quoted in Janes's All The World's Aircraft, 1989-90, p. 492, disputed in GAO, The U.S. Nuclear Triad, p. 3.

³⁴ IISS, Military Balance 1995-6, p. 287 lists B-2A unrefueled radius of action at 5,840 kilometers.

³⁵ Aerospace Daily, 22 March 1996.

³⁶ Aerospace Daily, (December 9, 1993), page 395.

³⁷ Kathryn Shultz, "The B-2 Spirit Bomber" Fact Sheet (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Informaton, 1996).

³⁸ Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems does not list a speed for the ALCM. IISS, Military Balance 1995-6, p. 287 states ALCM's maximum speed is Mach .66, Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, p. 174 lists maximum speed as 500 miles per hour, equivalent to Mach ,67.

³⁹ R. Jeffery Smith, "START Treaty Will Impose First Numerical Limits on Warheads, Washington Post (April 3, 1990), p. A8.

⁴⁰ IISS, Military Balance 1995-6, p. 287.

⁴¹ AS-X-19 Koala mentioned in Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (1989), p. 47, listed as believd cancelled in Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1993), p. 57.

⁴² GAO, The U.S. Nuclear Triad, pp. 5, 12.

⁴³ "B53 Nuclear Bomb," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.

⁴⁴ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1996), p. 63.

⁴⁵ CEP is mentioned as "highest accuracy under 600 feet" in Thomas Cochran, William Arkin, Milton Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume 1: U.S. Nuclear Capabilities (Ballinger Publishing Company - Natural Resources Defense Council, 1984), p. 66. Mod 10 tactical version with converted-Pershing II warheads have "accuracy in the neighborhood of less than 100 feet" William Arkin, "The Last Word: Nuking Libya" Bulletin of the Atmoic Scientists (July/August 1996), p. 64.

⁴⁶ "B61 Nuclear Bomb," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.

⁴⁷ Aerospace Daily (April 24, 1996), p. 145.

⁴⁸ Cochran, Arkin, and Norris, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, p. 200 and "B83 Nuclear Bomb," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.

⁴⁹ Cochran, Arkin, and Norris, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, p. 184.

⁵⁰ The Military Balance lists throweight/payload for the ALCM as unknown, figure is from Cochran, Arkin, and Norris, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, p. 184.

⁵¹ Estimate was 6,350 non-SLBM warheads deployed by the U.S. and Russia as of the end of 1987 in Handler and Arkin, Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons, p. 2.

⁵² "BGM-109 Tomahawk," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.

⁵³ IISS, Military Balance 1995-6, p. 286.

⁵⁴ Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jacquelyn K. Davis, The Cruise Missiles: Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain? (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977), p. v. Another example of the cruise missile debate was Richard K. Betts, Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, and Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981).

⁵⁵ As listed in IISS, Military Balance, 1995-6, p. 287.

⁵⁶ Arkin and Norris, "Nuclear Notebook" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1996), p.63.