Russian Nuclear Forces

The Russian nuclear arsenal remains in an uncertain state of flux due to the direct and indirect consequences of the breakup and economic collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia completed the redeployment of nuclear weapons from the territory of the non-Russian former Soviet republics by November 1996, but now faces severe funding problems for maintaining a standing strategic weapons force. The existing Russian nuclear arsenal, largely built up in the 1970s and early 1980s, is reaching the end of its useful service life. In September 1997 Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, chief of the Russian strategic rocket forces, stated that 62 percent of Russia's ICBMs are beyond their guaranteed service life. In late November 1998, Anatoly Perminov, chief of the strategic missile force's general staff, put the figure at 58 percent. Remanufacturing the existing weapons as the US is currently doing is costly, and Russia appears to lack the engineering and industrial resources to undertake such an effort. Much of the original industrial base for these weapons was located in now independent former republics, particularly Ukraine. The alternative, which Russia is pursuing, is to to replace existing weapons with new ones. The severe budget crisis makes replacing existing weapons on a one-for-one basis impossible.

Although under the (as yet unratified) Start II treaty Russia is permitted 3500 warheads, Pres. Boris Yeltsin apparently used the proposed Start III levels of 2000-2500 warheads as the basis of stockpile planning at a review held on 6 July 1998, perhaps reflecting an awareness of the impossibility of maintaining larger stockpiles. Most estimates of Russia's likely nuclear forces over the next decade are sharply lower than this however.

A variety of estimates have been bandied about over the last year. Such predictions are of course sensitive to the state of the economy. Prior to the July 1998 review, prominent Russian strategist Lev Volkov estimated that Russia may have only 700 warheads by 2007. Sergei Kortunov, a top Kremlin defense aide, has written that "with a lot of effort" Russia might climb back to 1,000 warheads by 2015. Perhaps the most serious indication of the straits Russia's nuclear forces are in, because of its official imprimatur, came in October 1998. News organizations reported that a secret report to the Russian Duma by First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov, a former top Soviet-era military-industrial planner, had estimated that Russia may well be able to field only 800 to 900 nuclear warheads by 2005.

By contrast, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, the Soviet Union in 1990 had 10,779 strategic nuclear warheads (this excludes an estimated 6,000 to 13,000 nonstrategic warheads which have never been covered by arms control treaties.)

The pressure from such hard realities appears to have begun to move the START II treaty, which has been awaiting action by the Russian Communist Party led Duma for 6 years, towards ratification. On 12 November 1998 the Duma finally began consideration of a bill that would have brought START II to a vote. Anger at the December 1998 Operation Desert Fox attacks by the US against Iraq, and then the January 1999 announcement of US intentions for deploying a limited ABM system, has again delayed action however. Despite this no less a figure than the Russian Communist Party leader in the Duma Gennady Zyuganov stated on 26 January that START II could be ratified if the United States guarantees the observance of all the earlier concluded agreements on nuclear missile arsenals reduction and complies with the decisions of the UN Security Council. Reflecting the grim budget realities, Russian officials and Duma members have talked unofficially about revising downward warhead numbers on both sides, even from START III numbers.

The most notable action taken by Russia over the last year towards maintaining its nuclear arsenal was the deployment of the first operational regiment of ten Topol-M ICBMs (designated as either RT-2PM or RS-12M2 and designated SS-27 by NATO). This is the first missile to be built exclusively in Russia.

The first test flight of this missile version was 20 December 1994, it successfully completed its six flight test schedule on 9 December 1998 with a launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in northern Russia. The regiment was declared operational by Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, a former chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, on 27 December 1998 at a strategic missile base in Tatishchevo, near the Volga River city of Saratov. The first two missiles were actually installed at the base in old SS-19 silos near in December 1997.

The Topol-M is being deployed as a single warhead missile although it is capable of carrying three warheads. It has a range of 10500 km, and is suitable for silo or mobile basing. It has improved reliability and operational features, including an improved road-mobile launcher and turning radius, and succeeds the SS-25 Topol. Like its predecessor it is an inertially guided three-stage solid-fuel missile. The missile's launching weight is 47 tonnes, the payload (warhead weight) is one tonne. The missile's length without the warhead is 17.9 meters, and the maximum diameter of the body is 1.86 meters.

Maslyukov, who is in charge of the Russian military-industrial complex, has stated that the Russian Strategic Missile Force (RVSN) will receive another 10 Topol-M missile systems in 1999, with production reaching 40 a year by the end of 2000, at which time a total of 40 will be in service. In the Soviet era, the Votkinsk factory, which builds the Topol-M in the central Urals mountains, made about 80 missiles a year. According to Maslyukov Russia plans to build 35 to 45 Topol-M ballistic missiles every year starting in 2000. It is believed that a complete force of 500 or so will be deployed some time after 2010 if plans stay on track.

In contrast to other state defence programmes, the Topol-M production program was fully funded in the 1998 budget. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, head of the RVSN, said that just to build the Topol-Ms, which cost about $30 million apiece, "will require the concentration of all our resources."

Russia is also working on keeping existing systems in operation as long as practical. To support this effort the RVSN made a successful test launch of an RS-22 ICBM (known as the SS-24 Scalpel by NATO) with multiple warheads from a railway missile system on 10 December 1998. The launch from Plesetsk tested the deployment of 10 warheads and "hit targets at the Kamchatka test site with high precision," according to the Interfax news agency.

Maslyukov has said that Russia must build 35 to 45 Topol-M ballistic missiles every year starting in 2000 and build several nuclear submarines of the Yuri Dolgoruky class, armed with ballistic missiles. It must also modernize its control, early warning and space intelligence systems, he said.

On 27 December it was also announced that a parliament committee is drafting a bill that would guarantee funding to the strategic missile forces until 2010, regardless of the country's economic situation, Interfax reported. The measure would ensure that Russia maintains nuclear parity with the West, according to Roman Popkovich, chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, the lower house of parliament.

A contentious issue currently under discussion within the Russian government is a plan to restructure the command of nuclear forces, an topic which has rarely been discussed in public before. At issue is Defense Minister Sergeyev's recent proposal to establish a single command over all nuclear forces, along the lines of the US Strategic Command. Sergeyev said that on 3 November President Boris Yeltsin initialed a document approving the idea, but there has been stiff resistance from the General Staff. The arguments have been laid out in a series of dueling essays published in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, a weekly newspaper devoted to military issues.

Currently, control over nuclear weapons passes through the General Staff, which would oversee the various services in combat. Sergeyev has proposed creating a separate organization that would be in charge of all of Russia's nuclear weapons, whether on submarines, long-range bombers or land-based missiles. Sergeyev also has proposed including in the new command the 12th Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry, which is in charge of maintaining the nuclear stockpile.

Sergeyev has said he would like the new command to be headed by his protege, Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, the current head of the RVSN, who would be elevated to first deputy minister of defense. A source said Sergeyev sees implementation of his plan as urgent because it is unlikely he would serve beyond the expiration of Yeltsin's term, which ends in the summer of 2000. Sergeyev's proposal supports Russia's current national security doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of preserving its nuclear deterrent at a time when conventional forces are decaying.

Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, said the advantage of Sergeyev's proposal is that it would provide a "substantial simplification of command and control" for the Russian nuclear forces as they grow smaller.

But criticism has come from the military's General Staff, which would lose one of its most important functions. The generals have scoffed at the idea of investing more money in a new organization while the military budget is extraordinarily slim. Alexander Lebed, the governor of Krasnoyarsk and a former general, has joined opposition to Sergeyev's plan, which he denounced as "impossible to create." Lebed said, "We must not complicate an already complicated system."

Under the Nunn-Lugar Act, a program named for its originators originated by Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, D-Ga., the United States has spent more than $400 million each year since 1991 to help Russia dismantle its old Soviet weapons, and plans to allocate an additional $440 million in 1999.

Under the 'swords for plowshares' deal signed in January 1994 to dispose of excess weapons material, the U.S. Government will purchase 500 tonnes of HEU from Russia for dilution, for US$11.9 billion. Under the Russian-U.S. agreement the United States Enrichment Corporation will purchase a minimum of 500 tonnes of military HEU over 20 years, commencing with 10 tonnes for the first five years and not less than 30 tonnes per year thereafter. The weapons-grade is to be blended down to 4.4% U-235 in Russia and the Russians intend to use 1.5% U-235 for this, to minimize the levels of U-234 in the product. In the short term the military uranium is likely to be blended down to 20% U-235, then stored. In this form it is not usable for weapons.

The blending down of 500 tonnes of military HEU will result in about 15,000 tonnes of low-enriched uranium over 20 years. This is equivalent to about 150 000 tonnes of natural uranium, or approximately three times western world demand in 1993. The dilution of 10 tonnes of military HEU per year for the first five years will displace approximately 3,700 tonnes of uranium oxide production per year, equivalent to output from a medium to large uranium mine. By 2000 the dilution of 30 tonnes of military HEU will displace about 11,200 tonnes of uranium oxide mine production per year which represents approximately 20% of the western world's uranium requirements.

In 1995 the U.S. Enrichment Corporation received its first shipments of low-enriched uranium from Russia (186 tonnes), derived from six tonnes of weapons-grade material. The first shipment of this to a customer, valued at US$145 million, was made in November, and is presumably now generating electricity.

On 27 April 1997 Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov announced that Russia had dismantled almost half of its arsenal, removing nearly 400 tonnes of HEU in the process.

 

Current Nuclear Forces

Over the last two years there has been little change in the formal size of the Russian nuclear forces although their effective size has shrunk slightly due to continuing system deterioration.

Current strategic plans are to manufacture the Topol-M (SS-27) to replace most of the ICBMs currently in service. Under START-II Russia can retain SS-19s (downloaded from six warheads to one) and SS-25s in service. The SS-19 is a relatively old system (some have now been in service 20 years) and probably will have to be retired before 2007. By that time the Russian ICBM force would likely consist of 320 SS-27s, and as many as 360 SS-25s, all with single warheads.

The RVSN is organized into four missile armies with headquarters at Vladimir, Omsk, Orenburg, and Chita. There are 19 missile bases, each consisting of a separate missile division. The RVSN's 6th Main Directorate is responsible for nuclear security and custody. As of mid-1998 there were 754 missles of four basic types: 180 SS-18s, 168 SS-19s, and 10 SS-24s in underground silos; 36 SS-24s on railroad cars, and 360 road-mobile SS-25s. 10 silo based SS-27s were added at the end of 1998.

The Russian strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force officially consists of 42 boats of six types (Yankee-I, Delta-I, Delta-II, Delta-III, Delta-IV, and Typhoon), but only boats of the latter three classes are believed to be in actual operation so the true force is much smaller. The Russian Navy only counted 26 submarines as actually operational in mid-1998. Of six Typhoon ICBM-equipped subs built in the last decade, only three are still operational due to technical problems requiring overhaul on the three oldest boats, reducing the effective count to only 23 or so. According to Bruce Blair of the Brookings Institute only only two were on patrol at at time, the remainder are likely kept ready in port as static (but highly vulnerable) missile launchers. By 2003 only 10-15 boats are likely to remain in service -- 3 Typhoons, 7 Delta-IVs, and some Delta-IIIs.

There is a new SLBM missile under development, but as of the end of 1998 had not yet been test flown. The keel of the first Borey-class ballistic missile submarine was laid in November 1996, one of three planned new subs, but is still under construction and neither of the other two has yet been started. Probably no new subs will enter service before 2003. Under the strategic stockpile review held in July 1997, Yeltsin directed Russian strategic forces to shift to greater emphasis on sea-based missiles by putting half of all warheads on submarines (up from about 30% from today).

Of the three legs of the Russian nuclear arsenal, the bomber force is in the worst state. There are nominally 74 heavy bombers in service in mid-1998: 6 Tu-160 Blackjacks and 68 Tu-95 MS6/MS16 Bears. Of the 6 Blackjacks (built in 1991) only 2 (perhaps as many as 4) are believed to be flight-worthy, plans to purchase the 19 Blackjacks located in Ukraine have collapsed due to lack of funds, and their poor condition. The Blackjack production line was shut down in 1994, but efforts to complete 6 remaining planes are evidently underway, and Russia appears committed to keeping a force of Blackjacks, however small, in service. The older Bears are expected to be retired before 2005.

Due to the disordered state of Russian affairs in general, and military affairs in particular, it is difficult to estimate the actual available nuclear forces. The figures given below are the maximum available forces. The actual effective SLBM and aircraft forces are likely to be a fraction of those indicated. At one point during the summer of 1995 only one Typhoon SLBM boat was deployed. Few, if any, Blackjacks are currently operational. Some of the forces that have become unavailable due to maintenance and support problems may eventually be reactivated.

Current Deployment Locations

ICBM 

SS-18: Aleysk, Dombarovski, Kartaly, and Uzhur (186 total)

SS-19: ?

SS-24 M1: Bersht, Kostroma, and Krasnoyarsk (12 each)

SS-24 M2: Tatishchevo (10)

SS-25: ?

SS-27: Tatishchevo (10)

(Only 8 of 19 bases listed)

SUBMARINES

Typhoon submarines: Nerpichya, Kola Peninsula (6)

Delta IV submarines:    Yagelnaya, Kola Peninsula (7)

Delta III submarines:   Yagelnaya, Kola Peninsula (4); 

            Rybachi, Kamchatka Peninsula (9)

BOMBERS

Bear H16:   Mozdok (19)

        Ukrainka (17)

        Uzin (21 - these Ukrainian aircraft are non operational)

Bear H6:    Mozdok (2)

        Ukrainka (25)

        Uzin (4 -  these Ukrainian aircraft are non operational)

Blackjack:  Engels Air Base (5)

        Zhukovsky Flight Center (1)

        Priluki (19 -  these Ukrainian aircraft are non operational)

RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES: 1 JULY 1998*

Russia now has nine power stations operating 29 nuclear reactors, with 22 gigawatts of electrical capacity; this represents 12% of total electricity generated in Russia. The Minatom ministry plans to increase total capacity to 28 or 30 gigawatts before 2005.

Russia has four uranium enrichment facilities, in Ekaterinburg, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk and Angarsk, with a total annual enrichment capacity 20 million SWU. Isotope separation has gone through several stages of development: gaseous dynamic nozzle technology, gaseous diffusion, and gas centrifuge. Russia is currently using 50% of her enrichment capacity for domestic and export production, and is thus aggressively marketing her high technology centrifuge separation capacity.

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles

PLARB
Podvodnaya Lodka Atomnaya Raketnaya Ballisticheskaya
Submarine Nuclear - Rocket, Ballistic

 

 

 

 

After seven years of harsh debates, the START II Treaty has been finally ratified recently by the Russian parliament. This event brought some optimism among those who seek for further nuclear reductions, since START II ratification by Russia had been a condition for beginning START III negotiations between the United States and Russia.

Therefore, it is not surprising, that the following questions occur:

·         Is there a possibility of START III conclusion?

·         If such a possibility exists, what are the conditions?

·         What kind of START III can be reached and when?

·         If concluded, what impact might a new U.S. - Russian arms control agreement have on further nuclear cuts?

In order to answer to these questions one should understand current U.S. and Russian attitudes toward nuclear disarmament. There seem to be two groups of long term factors influencing decisions of policy makers in both countries.

The first group of such factors stimulates further U.S.-Russian dialog on nuclear arms cuts. The United States seems to be interested in ensuring the safety and security of the Russian nuclear arsenal to prevent nuclear non-proliferation and a possibility of inadvertent or accidental nuclear war. At the same time, Russia is very anxious to retain the last symbol of its superpower status - nuclear parity with the United States, which is currently possible only by further steps of nuclear reductions.

However, there is also a second group of factors, which creates obstacles to further bilateral nuclear cuts. There are increasingly strong voices in the United States appealing to obtain overwhelming superiority over any "rogue state" and build an invisible "Fortress America". Russia, on the other hand, has to respond to unfortunate developments (such as NATO expansion, war in Yugoslavia and NMD deployment in the U.S.), and therefore concerns over the survivability of its remaining smaller nuclear arsenal are growing. Unfortunately, the second group of factors is becoming more influential, and eventually may destroy the bilateral nuclear disarmament process.

There are also short term factors shaping the window of opportunities for START III negotiations. These factors, however, may play a decisive role in concluding a START III agreement.

On the eve of the forthcoming presidential elections, Clinton's administration proposed a grand bargain.   Russia would agree to amend ABM Treaty, and the United States would negotiate START III Treaty, and possibly, make some concessions to Russia in exchange. However, there are several obstacles. Russia currently objects to any ABM Treaty modifications, and seems to be ready to go as far as destroying the whole arms control regime. The U.S. Congress made very clear that it will not support the current administration's "grand bargain", nor the entry of START II into force. Finally, President Clinton plans to make a decision on NMD deployment by this fall.

In foreseeable future, it seems impossible to separate negotiations on START III and ABM Treaties. Clinton's administration seems committed itself to withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, if Russia refuses to make modifications. If the ABM Treaty regime collapses, Russia will most certainly withdraw from START II and refuse to negotiate (or implement) START III.

Certainly, it is very difficult to predict how this deadlock will be resolved, but at least two scenarios look quite plausible:

·         President Clinton decides to deploy NMD, Russia continues to object. The ABM Treaty will cease to exist. Russia will refuse to implement START II. However, both sides will likely agree to limit the damage to arms control and retain START I regime. START III negotiations will be definitely postponed for at least several years.

·         Russia and the United States concludes a "grand bargain" by the end of 2000. Implementation of START III will be still in question because of strong criticism in both countries. Ratification by both the U.S. Congress and the Russian Federal Assembly will depend on the essence of the concluded agreement and most certainly, the outcome of the second phase of talks on ABM Treaty modification (sometimes after March, 2001). There is a chance, that the NMD factor will be weakened by 2005 (e.g., due to U.S.-Russian joint cooperation on TMD or a U.S. decision to curtail NMD deployment because of increasing costs), but by that time other obstacles may emerge (e.g., high precision conventional weapons).

Thus, START III may be reached even by the end of this year, but its implementation is still in question.

In order to estimate what kind of START III can be achieved, one should look at the U.S. and Russian forces projections by 2010.

Table 1. Russian strategic nuclear forces by 2010 (START II force)

	Launchers	Warheads
Land based forces silo and mobile "Topol-M" ICBMs	300…400	300…400
Sea based forces mix of 6-10 SSBNs ("Delta IV", "Borey" and possibly "Typhoon" or "Delta III")	96…168	400…900
Bombers ~80 (Tu-160 and Tu-95)		600…800
Total		1,300…2,100

Russian land based forces will consist of single warhead "Topol-M" (SS-27) ICBMs deployed in silos and on mobile launchers. Existing mobile land based missiles will likely retire, since they have relatively short service lives (about 10 years). Therefore, the quantity of deployed "Topol-M" ICBMs will depend on their production rate. Currently, about 10-20 new ICBMs are deployed yearly, but eventually the production rate may grow. Land based forces may also include about 90 SS-18 ICBMs if START II does not enter into force.

The sea based leg will represent a mix of "Delta IV," and possibly "Borey," "Typhoon" and "Delta III" class SSBNs. Lowest estimates (six deployed strategic submarines) look more plausible, because all "Typhoons" will likely be decommissioned, and the first "Borey" will not enter in service before 2007-2008.

Table 1 clearly shows that Russia is unable to sustain a strategic force at START II levels and thus is interested in deeper nuclear reductions.

Table 2. U.S. strategic nuclear forces by 2010 (START II force)

	Launchers	Warheads
Land based forces "Minuteman III" ICBMs	500	500
Sea based forces 14 "Trident II" SSBNs	336	1680
Bombers: 21 B-2 71 B-52H		1320
Total		3500

In contrast, U.S. strategic platforms can be retained in service until at least 2020 at a modest cost. Modernization of Minuteman III ICBMs and Trident SSBNs is underway. If START II does not enter into force, the United States may in addition to retain 50 MX ICBMs, and keep 3 warheads on Minutman III ICBMs and 8 warheads on Trident II SLBMs.

Thus, there is a little incentive for the United States to be interested in START III reductions. START III is unlikely impose any constraints on Russian strategic forces, but may force the United States to carry out "premature" nuclear cuts.

If START III negotiations take place, it is not difficult to predict the areas of disagreement and likely attitudes of both sides (see Table 3).

Table 3 U.S. and Russian attitudes at START III talks

	Russia	The United States
Inevitable issues
Number of deployed warheads	1000…1500	2000…2500
Implementation methods toward reduction of strategic platforms	Elimination	Conversion to conventional roles
Counting rules: Warheads on SLBMs MIRVed land based ICBMs   Bombers   ALCMs	Ban on downloading Permission to deploy up to 3 warheads   START II accounting rules   START II accounting rules	Permission to download Ban on MIRVed land based ICBMs   Conversion to conventional roles   Should be excluded from counting
New issues
SLCMs	Limits on SLCMs	Should not be included
TNWs	Should not be included	Limits on TNW
Transparency of nuclear arsenals	Not clear yet	Not clear yet

The outcome of the START III talks will be a compromise between the outlined positions. However, this compromise will strongly be influenced by ABM Treaty modification decisions.

The main issue of negotiations will be a limit on deployed warheads. The U.S. seems unlikely to agree with the Russian proposal to cut the strategic forces to 1000-1500 deployed warheads. The agreement at lower levels can only be reached, if Russia agrees with "formal" U.S. reductions (downloading or conversion of strategic platforms to conventional roles).

Russia will most certainly propose a ban on downloading SLBMs below 4 warheads, which would require elimination of launchers to reduce the number of warheads deployed on "Tridents". However, the Russian attempt to reduce the U.S. "breakout potential" will be weakened if Russia asks for permission to deploy up to three warheads on mobile ICBMs.

Possibly, the U.S. side will propose to consider its strategic bombers (at least, the remaining B-52H bombers) as having been converted to conventional roles and exclude them from counting. If so, the ALCM issue may become a hot topic at the negotiations.

Depending on time frames of the negotiations, new issues (see Table 3) may emerge at the talks. These areas were identified in Helsinki summit in 1997. However, the sides do not seem to be ready to solve the problem of limiting sea launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons in time for the START III Treaty to be concluded by January 2001.

There is some hope for a breakthrough in the area of transparency of nuclear arsenals, because both sides seem to be interested in progress in this area. Russia wants to reduce the U.S. "breakout potential", and eliminating non-deployed warheads might be a temporary solution. The United States, on the other hand, is interested in increased transparency of the Russian nuclear arsenal. However, chances for a success in this area are very small. The Russian side might prefer to agree with U.S. "formal" reductions in order to keep its nuclear arsenal closed from the eyes of U.S. inspectors.

Realistically, there is a strong possibility that START III will be even more unbalanced compared to START II. The "breakout potential" problem is unlikely to be solved. However, it may be softened, if non-deployed nuclear warheads are to be eliminated. Nevertheless, such a decision will take just a temporary effect, unless production of new warheads is covered by transparent measures.

An unbalanced START III may have a strong negative impact on further nuclear disarmament. Deeper reductions may become impossible for a long period of time. START III implementation will be a hostage both of U.S. NMD deployment plans, and the Russian Federal Assembly.

An example of a desirable agreement was described in a report "Nuclear Arms Reduction:  The Process and Problems", published by our Center in 1997. We proposed the following START III limits:

·         1,500 deployed warheads

·         200 SLBMs, irreversible changes of converted launchers (e.g. - filling with concrete).

·         200 silo based ICBMs

·         Verified deployment of new RV platforms on SS-19, Trident II, Minuteman III missiles and elimination of the old ones

·         Prohibition of reconverting bombers back to strategic missions. Elimination of nuclear weapons control equipment on converted bombers including the equipment inside the pilot's cabin. Intrusive verification of converted bombers to ensure that these platforms are technically unable to carry nuclear weapons. Limits on deployment of conventional strategic bombers

·         Verified elimination of nuclear SLCMs, limits on conventional SLCM deployment

·         Verified elimination of non-deployed nuclear warheads

One should mention that other important issues may emerge at the START III talks as well.

Russia will likely propose limiting covert antisubmarine warfare near naval bases. This measure would be very desirable because it allows to improve confidence between the Navies, prevent dangerous consequences of possible submarine collisions and limit destabilizing SLCM deployments.

Another possible Russian proposal is to take into consideration the counter force potential of precision guided conventional munitions (PGM).

The issue was never raised before at SALT or START talks, but the situation has changed since than. If an efficient conventional preemptive strike is theoretically possible against deployed nuclear forces of another side, this option becomes very attractive, because the environmental consequences are much lower compared to the nuclear strike. The situation may become very destabilizing. It is important to bear in mind that if one side ever perceives its strategic forces as being vulnerable, further nuclear cuts become impossible.

As our technical analysis shows, some existing types of conventional PGMs (e.g. the GBU-37 bomb) are already capable of effectively disabling silo based ICBMs. In the near future, the United States will deploy new classes of hard target penetrators (on CALCMs, Tactical Tomahawks, etc). PGM accuracy is constantly improving - CEP of 1-2 m is enough to effectively disable ICBM silos. Mobile land based ICBMs are vulnerable, if detected and U.S. capability to monitor mobile ICBMs will likely continue to grow.

As discussed above, the United States will try to retain most of its existing strategic platforms. Even with conventional payloads these platforms are able to carry strategic roles. Tactical aviation may also play strategic role, as NATO expands further, and Baltic states, Georgia and Azerbaijan become its members.

On the other hand, the capabilities of Russian conventional forces (air defense, antisubmarine warfare) will likely degrade in future. Thus, Russia will be increasingly concerned about counter force potential of U.S. precision guided munitions. Unfortunately, current U.S. and NATO policies contribute to raising Russia's suspicions about their real intentions.

According to our estimates, PGMs will not have a strong impact on the balance at START III levels. Nevertheless, taking this factor into consideration seems very important. One possible way to reducing Russian concerns on conventional weapons could be a ban on conventional ICBMs and limits on the deployment of strategic platforms converted to conventional roles.

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States made substantial progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals. However, problems that arose in the course of preparation for the ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Federal Assembly created serious obstacles for this process. It would be mistaken to think that these difficulties are created exclusively by the State Duma. The Treaty is heavily criticized by the majority of Russian experts who enumerate a number of shortcomings which, in their opinion, not only give the United States a considerable advantage in carrying out strategic nuclear weapons reduction but lead to the violation of the principle of equitable security.

The United States' striving for unilateral advantages in strategic weapons reduction is quite explicable. The United States would like to safeguard itself from possible unfavorable (as the U.S. sees it) development of events in Russia. Because of sophisticated use of the tactic for decision-making on a political level during START II negotiations the United States was able to get the Treaty with considerable benefits. However, the Clinton administration apparently realizes that in order to guarantee the Treaty's ratification by the State Duma, the U.S. will have to agree to a number of steps that could enhance the prospects for Russian ratification. This was manifested in the Helsinki Agreement and the Protocol to the START II Treaty signed on 26 September 1997. These documents extend the START II implementation time-frame from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2007, and also tie the beginning of negotiations on the next phase of reductions to START II's ratification by Russia.

At the same time, the criticism of START II does not mean that Russian society objects to further steps in nuclear disarmament. The idea of reducing of nuclear strategic weapons inventories is very popular in Russia. There is an understanding that in the framework of START III it would be desirable to reach the levels even lower than has been agreed to in Helsinki, as well as keep out both the possibility of unilateral advantages and circumvention of mutual agreements.

This report presents an analysis of the state of strategic nuclear weapons reduction process, considers the role of nuclear weapons in Russian policy and the ability of the Russian military-industrial complex to maintain strategic nuclear weapons. The analysis is followed by the conditions and parameters for the next phase of strategic weapons reductions whose discussion and agreement with the United States could precede the ratification of START II.

Chapter 1. Trends in Nuclear Disarmament. The Drawbacks of the START I and START II Treaties

The last decade of the 20th century is characterized by cardinal changes in world politics brought about, in the first place, by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the entire system of inter-state relations that had been formed after World War II. The main feature of this system was the rigid confrontation of two military-political alliances led by the U.S.S.R. and the United States. This confrontation, founded on different ideological imperatives, resulted in colossal arms race and accumulation of enormous nuclear arsenals that far exceeded any reasonable and sufficient levels. In the bipolar world nuclear deterrence was the central element of international security. The realization of the inevitability of the retaliatory nuclear strike forced leaders of both countries to be extremely cautious and responsible in making decisions in crisis situations, which allowed to avoid an armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Adoption by the Soviet leadership of a new foreign policy based on the acknowledgment of integrity of the contradictory but interrelated world led to serious changes in international relations. Accepting the principle of reasonable sufficiency, the Soviet Union started to carry out a more restrained military policy aimed at maintaining national security without threatening other countries. Thus, conditions were established for a progress in negotiations on drastic reductions in nuclear arms of the two nuclear superpowers.

The signing of the Soviet-American Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) on 8 December 1987 and its subsequent implementation became the first step in this process. For the first time the Treaty included provisions for the exchange of full and detailed data for these weapons, as well as for the reliable verification of their destruction. The INF Treaty realization encouraged an emergence of new weapons reduction agreements. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the ratification of START I and the signing of START II created an unprecedented breakthrough in arms control and disarmament process. Overall, due to serious efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction international situation has improved considerably.

Formation of the Russian state demands, besides grappling with a number of domestic political and economic problems, a rethinking of the role and place of Russia in international system, maintaining its national security, defining Russia's national interests and maintaining the capability for their defense. Both realistic opportunities¹ and geopolitical and geostrategic changes unfavorable for Russia that have occurred recently should be taken into account.

The ongoing discussion within Russia's political and scientific circles about the future of the world's development reveals various approaches to the evaluation of current global changes. A number of military and political experts proceed from an understanding that the world is currently in a transition from the confrontational bipolar system of international relations to a unipolar world dominated by the United States.² NATO's recent decision to admit new states - Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - illustrates that the United States guided by its national interests is, in fact, trying to strengthen its dominating role. Another group of experts think that we are witnessing the formation of a multipolar system whose centers may develop in Western Europe, Japan and an increasing power - China.

In a situation when conventional forces are in deep crisis, Russia's strategic nuclear forces are being regarded as the principal guarantor of its security. Nuclear weapons' mission is to guarantee sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as prevent from external aggression.³ This is the dominant substance of the Russian Federation's nuclear strategy.

On the other hand, the degradation of Russia's Armed Forces did not leave its elite-the strategic nuclear forces-untouched.⁴ The lack of resources does not allow Russia to maintain the huge nuclear potential inherited from the Soviet Union. Thus, naturally, that the ongoing discussion of perspective of Russia's strategic nuclear forces is focused on what their structure and size could be. This issue derives a particular intensity, because of the situation with the problem-ridden ratification of START II Treaty by Russia and forthcoming negotiations on the next phase of nuclear weapons reduction.

It is evident that the perspective of long-term development of Russia's nuclear policy, in accordance with its NPT obligations, is a course for gradual declining of the role and size of nuclear weapons till to their total elimination. The dynamics of nuclear disarmament should correspond to the rate of building an effective global and regional security system and increasing mutual confidence and trust among states.

As far as the near future is concerned, in the present international situation it should be rational for Russia to have nuclear forces which would be capable to carry out a non-confrontational deterrence strategy. The basic features of such a strategy, in our view, are its credibility, orientation on all directions, as well as an absence of provoking and aggressive factors. The existing Russia's nuclear forces are excessive in size and inadequate in structure to carry out this strategy.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union persistently tried and, in fact, succeeded to reach a numerical and qualitative nuclear parity with the United States. The status and development of the U.S. strategic forces remains one of the major defining factors in considerations of the future of the Russian nuclear forces.

At present, in the U.S. nuclear policy continues to rely on the premises and doctrines of the Cold War era. It is demonstrated by the U.S. Defense Department's "Nuclear Posture Review" released in September 1994.⁵ This document leaves practically intact the concept of the use of nuclear weapons and the substantiation of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces' size. The Nuclear Posture Review concludes that the United States should not take any steps towards reducing its nuclear arsenal below the START II levels. Besides, it underscores the necessity to keep the ability to double it rapidly in case of "…emergence of a hostile government in Russia and/or failure of the arms control process in the FSU…"

On the other hand, there is no doubt that today, even regardless of its nuclear potential, the United States possesses the most powerful armed forces in the world. Among other nuclear states, Britain and France are close allies of the United States, and the latter's relations with Russia and China have improved considerably lately. As far as threshold countries - India, Israel, and Pakistan - are concerned, there is low probability that a situation may arise in which the United States may decide to use nuclear weapons to deter them. Thus, today and in the foreseeable future for the United States there is no threat of the direct use of nuclear weapons. In such a situation one may expect a change in the U.S. approach to nuclear weapons and further steps towards their reduction.⁶

Some American experts came out with an initiative of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.⁷ However, implementation of this initiative would affect too many political, military and economic interests, and is hardly feasible in the near future. Most probably, in the foreseeable time the United States will continue to rely on nuclear deterrence as the foundation of its security. At the same time, it will try to reduce the nuclear threat by means of the further reductions of nuclear arsenals, de-alerting measures and non-proliferation efforts. In long-term perspective, these directions of the U.S. nuclear policy meet the interests of the Russian Federation.

Continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence and a course towards further reduction of nuclear arsenals will require the politicians of both countries to be ready to transform the nuclear deterrence as it was formed during the Cold War. It is also necessitated by the transition from a central confrontation to a situation when the main nuclear threat is associated with a possibility of accidental or unauthorized use and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

De-alerting of strategic forces and the withdraw from destabilizing concepts of their use could become important steps towards further nuclear disarmament. The recently implemented agreement to de-target strategic ballistic missiles illustrates the will to move in this direction. However, this measure is more of a symbolic value since re-targeting can be accomplished within very short time.

Under new conditions, it seems necessary to reject the destabilizing concepts of preventive strike and launch on warning, and move to a more restrained concept of a retaliatory strike. In this connection the size and structure of nuclear forces should meet the requirements of defense sufficiency. This does not mean the maintenance of numerical parity but the survivability of nuclear forces at a level sufficient to deliver an unacceptable damage to the aggressor in a retaliatory strike.

De-alerting of Russian and U.S. nuclear forces and the loss of the ability to make a surprise preventive strike should also help improve stability. Of course, today this measure has natural limitations due to existence of the other nuclear states. Elimination of any advantages in the number of warheads or missiles that could be re-deployed could become another effective measure fostering trust and stability.

Obviously, transition to the concept of non-confrontational deterrence will require additional control measures over the size of nuclear arsenals, their combat readiness and the elimination of nuclear warheads. According to START I and START II, only the elimination of missiles is under control while elimination of warheads are not covered by these Treaties.

More than four years have passed since START II was signed. On 26 January 1996, the U.S. Senate recommended the Treaty for ratification. So far the agreement has not been ratified by Russia, and that has become a major obstacle for further steps in nuclear weapons reduction. Russian politicians and experts do not doubt that in order to guarantee strategic stability and equal security for both sides an agreement on new reductions should meet at least two conditions: the exclusion of unilateral advantages and strict compliance to mutual agreements.⁸ This seems especially important because with deep reductions even insignificant weaknesses of a treaty may lead to significant advantages of one of the parties, or create a possibility for circumvention of the Treaty.

The development of mutually acceptable agreements is known to be a very difficult process requiring mutual concessions and compromises. At the same time, violation of a treaty's balance creates problems which may sometimes become insoluble during ratification. It is at this stage that a treaty is subject to a particularly thorough and comprehensive evaluation. It seems necessary to analyze the shortcomings of the START I and START II Treaties as seen by the Russian side so that an agreement on further strategic weapons reduction does not share the fate of START II. This will help to clarify obstacles that are already in place for START III, and the circumstances under which this agreement, if reached, could pass ratification.

A number of publications in the Russian press discuss START I and II's shortcomings.⁹ As far as START I is concerned, they are as follows:

1. Counting rules for nuclear weapons on heavy bombers do not count the actual number of weapons.

The U.S. B-1B bomber can serve as an example. Fully loaded it can carry up to 32 weapons. However, START I counts only 1 weapon per bomber. As of 1 September 1990, the START I counting listed 2,112 weapons for 333 U.S. heavy bombers of various types, although in reality these bombers could carry 7,260 (see Table 1.1).

Counting rules were accepted under U.S. insistence. It was argued that in terms of combat effectiveness one weapon on a heavy bomber cannot be compared with one warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It seems doubtful that the United States would insist on such counting rules if its air leg did not have an obvious advantage.

2. Rather moderate limitations and control measures are placed on sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), in which the U.S. has an advantage, in comparison to Russia's mobile ICBMs, which the U.S. does not have.

Defending its position, the U.S. stated that the naval component with its high survivability is intended only for retaliatory strike and, thus, enhances strategic stability. On the other hand, according to the U.S. position, ICBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVed ICBMs) are a destabilizing component since they can be used in the first strike, first of all against hardened point targets.

Such argumentation is one-sided because it does not distinguish between Russian mobile and silo-based ICBMs. Russian mobile ICBMs were built as a supplement to silo-based ICBMs for the purpose of increasing the strategic forces' survivability. On the other hand, the U.S.' arguments in defense of its naval component ignore the fact that Trident II SLBMs are capable to destroy hardened targets like silo-based missile as well as to hit soft area targets. In this sense, Trident II has a counterforce capability and is, therefore, destabilizing.

Such a lopsided approach to SLBMs and mobile ICBMs, implemented in START I, is one of the manifestations of the latter's asymmetry.

Table 1.1. Deployed U.S. Strategic Nuclear Warheads and Delivery Vehicles Before and After START I Reduction (A Possible Scenario)

 

Type of Delivery	Weapons on	1 September 1990			5 December 2001
Vehicle	Delivery Vehicle	Delivery Vehicles	Weapons		Delivery Vehicles	Weapons
			Counted	Possible		Counted	Possible
ICBMs
Minuteman II	1	450	450		-	-
Minuteman III	3	500	1500			500	1500
Peacekeeper MX	10	50	500			50	500
Total		1000	2450		550	2000
SLBMs/SSBNs
Poseidon/Lafayette	10	192/12	1920/12		-	-
Trident I/Lafayette	8	192/12	1536/12			-	-
Trident I/Ohio	8	192/8	1536/8			-	-
Trident II/Ohio	8	72/3	576/3			336/14	2688/14
Total		648/35	5568/35		336/14	2688/14
Heavy Bombers10
B-52G	24	49	49	1176	-	-	-
B-52G	24	96	1038	2304	-	-	-
B-52H	20	93	930	1860	66	660	1320
B-1B	24	95	95	2280	93	93	2232
B-2	16	-	-	-	20	20	320
Total		333	2112	7620	179	773	3872
Grand Total Strategic Weapons (Without SLCMs)
ICBMs, SLBMs, Bombers		2013	10162	15670	1065	5461	8560

3. Under U.S. insistence, START I does not include any reduction of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). There exist only political statements from the parties that they will accept the restriction to deploy no more than 880 nuclear-armed SLCMs within the Treaty's time-frame, but their numbers are not accounted in the strategic warhead and missile totals.

In the U.S. case, we are talking about Tomahawk SLCMs. Four modifications of nuclear and conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles were designed within a single program, and by 1997 over 4,000 of them had been produced. These modifications have identical dimensions as well as many other characteristics. Production of conventional Tomahawks continues and, perhaps, will be halted in 1998, while retaining the production capability. Given that various modifications of the Tomahawk cruise missile are indistinguishable and, to a certain degree, mutually convertible, such a situation can be regarded as a potential for breaking the balance created by START I.

4. Implementation of the Treaty requires Russia to commit unjustifiably large physical and financial resources because Russia faces a much greater elimination burden than the United States.

During the consultations and negotiations over START II the Russian side took efforts to correct these and other drawbacks. As a result, the following agreements were reached.

The United States accepted a Russian proposal on warhead counting in accordance with actual number of weapons deployed on heavy bombers. However, the U.S. side gave the weapon's loading for heavy bombers for inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding only in the last days of negotiations. For the B-1B bomber, the U.S. proposed to count only 16 weapons per bomber although the removal of excessive attachment joints was not envisioned. In response to Russian objections, the U.S. Secretary of State in a letter from 29 December 1992 gave "assurances and guarantees" that the number of nuclear weapons deployed on each U.S. heavy bomber will not exceed levels specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

The U.S. side's consent to the Russian proposal on the actual warheads counting for bombers was countered by a proposal that each side may convert up to 100 bombers for conventional missions, and these bombers will not be included in the aggregate START II levels. It is not hard to discern that in practical terms when talking about conversion of heavy bombers the U.S. meant only its own B-1Bs since Russia is unlikely to take advantage of this provision. Nevertheless, this proposal was accepted by the Russian side. Transfer of B1-Bs to conventional mission leaves over 2,200 weapons out of the account (see Table 1.2). It appears that the United States' approach to the issue of convertible heavy bombers is supposed to help put strategic weapons in reserve by legal means.

The U.S. accepted a Russian proposal that in addition to MIRVed ICBMs which were of interest to the United States, warhead reductions should include MIRVed SLBMs which reflects Russia's interests. Based on that, the Framework Agreement and later START II included provisions that total warhead numbers on SLBMs should not exceed 1,750.

On 17 June 1992, the United States supplemented the Framework Agreement with a letter from the Secretary of State to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs formulating a proposal to allow the downloading of ICBMs and SLBMs without the replacement of re-entry vehicle platforms. This proposal was also accepted by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. It became a significant obstacle for START II's ratification in Russia since it creates an upload potential for U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs. Upload potential in this case refers to the number of warheads removed from ICBMs or SLBMs which can be rather easily put back during servicing of these missiles.

For Trident II SLBMs and Minuteman III ICBMs, upload potential can be over 2,000 warheads, in addition to 2,200 warheads remaining on these missiles (see Table 1.2). Thus, taking into account weapons on heavy bombers, the total U.S. breakout potential will exceed 4,000 warheads while Russia's will be around 500 warheads.

Table 1.2. Deployed U.S. Strategic Nuclear Warheads and Delivery Vehicles in 2000-2007 in the Case of START II Implementation (A Possible Scenario)

 

Type of Delivery Vehicle	According to START II		Possible Scenario
	Delivery Vehicles	Weapons	Delivery Vehicles	Weapons
ICBMs
Minuteman III	500	500	500	1500
Peacekeeper MX	-	-	50	500
Subtotal	500	500	550	2000
SLBMs/SSBNs
Trident II	336/14	1680/14	336/14	2688/14
Subtotal	336/14	1680/14	336/14	2688/14
Heavy Bombers
B-52H	50	1000	50	1000
B-1B	-	-	93	2232
B-2	20	320	20	320
Subtotal	70	1320	163	3552
Total Strategic Nuclear Weapons (Without SLCMs)
ICBMs, SLBMs, Bombers	906	3500	1049	8240

Under U.S. insistence, the SLCM issue was not discussed during the START II negotiations.

The parties acknowledged that the implementation of START I required large expenditures and agreed that the new Treaty should be oriented towards less economically burdensome implementation procedures. As has been noted, the American side insisted on the provisions for preservation of ICBM and SLBM re-entry vehicle platforms and the external attachment joints for pylons on the B-1B bomber. At the same time, arguments in favor of Russian interests were not considered, which eventually resulted in the necessity to restructure Russian strategic nuclear forces. The Russian side could not protect its interests on the following issues:

• The number of silos for the heavy RS-20 [SS-18] ICBMs which the Treaty allows to convert for single-warhead ICBMs of a different type. The U.S. agreed that Russia can convert only 90 silos out of the 120 requested;

• Procedures for the conversion of the silos of SS-18 ICBMs for single-warhead ICBMs. Under U.S. insistence, the Treaty incorporated excessive and expensive procedures for the conversion of such silos

• Verification of the SS-18 silos' conversion;

• Procedures for the elimination of SS-18s and their launch canisters. Under U.S. insistence, START II incorporated more expensive elimination procedures for such ICBMs than the ones established by START I;

• Time-frame for reducing strategic weapons to the Treaty levels. Reductions should take place by 2003, not 2006 as the Russian side proposed.

It should be noted that Russia will be limited in its ability to compensate part of its expenditures on the Treaty's implementation with income from commercial SS-18-aided space launches because, in comparison to START I, the new Treaty presupposes a higher rate of the SS-18 elimination. Besides, Russia will have to eliminate both deployed and non-deployed missiles of this type.

Evaluating the results of the START II agreements, one can conclude that the balance of the parties' interests has been sharply broke unfavorably for Russia. Therefore, it is not surprising that the discussion of the Treaty generates a great deal of fair criticism.

Nevertheless, even the START II levels of nuclear arsenals are excessive, and further bilateral reduction of strategic offensive weapons meets the national security interests of Russia. Therefore, the ratification of START II and the renewal of negotiations on further strategic weapons reduction are necessary.

 

2.1. Projection of Geopolitical and Geostrategic Developments

 

Analyzing the current global geostrategic situation one can assume that in the short term (next 5-10 years) Russia will not be facing any major external military threats. During this period, one can hardly expect that any serious military opponents comparable to those of the Cold War era can emerge.

A long-term projection of the development of the military and political situation in Europe, on Russian southern borders and in the Pacific presents a complicated problem. If the efforts to build an effective system of collective security fail, intense competition may arise among new centers of power, and their influence may grow in the regions that are of vital importance for Russia. Russia's huge territory, its enormous borderline, the proximity of internally unstable states, and states aspiring to obtain weapons of mass destruction - all these factors make national security concerns particularly urgent.

Serious concerns are caused by the plans of expanding of NATO, which becomes a dominant force in Europe. The alliance's advance towards the Russian borders is regarded as a direct attempt by the United States and other Western countries to take advantage of Russia's temporary weakness in order to strengthen their own geostrategic standing.

In particular, in conventional weapons NATO's superiority is three-fold as compared to Russia, and it will grow after East European countries join the alliance. NATO will be able to gain a particularly large advantage if the Baltic states, which occupy an important strategic position at Russia's north-western flank, join the alliance. NATO's enlargement policy as well as the unresolved territorial problems between Russia and the Baltic states may provoke the alliance to make political and military pressures on Russia.¹¹

The CFE Treaty plays an important role in maintaining stability in Europe. Now, when NATO is the only military alliance in Europe, certain provisions of the CFE Treaty have become obsolete and have to be adjusted to the new political realities. In Russia, a particular concern is caused by the flank limitations which were established by the CFE Treaty during the existence of two antagonistic alliances and which today discriminate against Russia.

In the future, the most probable threat to Russian security may come from its southern neighbors. Escalation of existing conflicts, like, for instance, the Tajik, the Azerbaijani-Armenian and the Georgian-Abkhazian ones, could involve such countries as Pakistan, Turkey or Iran which strive to enlarge their zones of influence. Similar conflicts could break out almost everywhere along the Russian and CIS southern borders.

One cannot rule out the emergence of hotbeds of tensions in the Far East. Japan has territorial claims to Russia. Today Japan's armed forces do not present a threat to Russia, but one can hardly doubt Japan's economic capability to insure their rapid growth. Important is the developing relationship with China - Russia shares a long border with this country and has a number of territorial disputes around the Baikal area and in the Primorsky Kray. China also has problems in its relations with Russia's CIS allies, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China's rapidly growing economy and military power will lead to its becoming one of the most influential centers of power in the 21st century. One should also keep in mind the growth of China's nuclear potential - its size, combat characteristics and deployment present a much greater threat for Russia than for the United States.¹²

2.2. The Defensive Role of Strategic Nuclear Forces

As a result of fundamental political and economic changes, the Russian Armed Forces face considerable difficulties. The country's economic capacity has shrunken dramatically. In the late 1980s, the Soviet GDP was 2,600-2,800 billion USD.¹³ As a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic crisis (now in its seventh year) Russia's GDP shrunk to 600-630 billion USD. The Russian Federation is unable to keep the Armed Forces in their present form, and, consequently, should carry out a radical transformation of the military, i.e. a military reform.

For the duration of the military reform, the principal responsibility for the country's defense could be entrusted to nuclear weapons. Main provisions of the Russian Federation's military doctrine define the role of strategic nuclear forces and their possible use as follows:

The aim of the policy of the Russian Federation in the sphere of nuclear weapons is to avert the threat of a nuclear war by precluding an aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. The Russian Federation:

shall never use its nuclear weapons against any other state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the July 1, 1968 which does not possess nuclear weapons unless:

a) such a state, which has allied relations with a nuclear state, attacks the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and other troops or its allies;

b) such a state collaborates with a nuclear power in carrying out, or supporting, an invasion or an armed aggression against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and other troops or its allies...¹⁴

According to the existing conceptions of military planning, strategic nuclear forces can fulfill their role in defense of Russia's national interests and national security when certain conditions are available. First, strategic nuclear forces must be kept at the level of readiness that would permit, under any circumstances, to render unacceptable losses to the adversary in a retaliatory strike. Second, the capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces and the inevitability of retaliatory nuclear strike should be well known to the adversary. It is necessary to point out that the United States has similar demands to its nuclear forces.¹⁵

2.3. Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine and Its Transformation in the Process of Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction

During the Cold War, strategic stability was based on the balance of power between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., and nuclear deterrence was the crucial element of security. Attempts to gain unilateral advantage whipped up the arms race. As a result, each side accumulated tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. Today, in spite of the reductions of strategic arms carried out by Russia and the U.S., deterrence is the foundation of their nuclear policies.

The magnitude of unacceptable damage is one of the most important elements of the concept of deterrence. It is not rigidly fixed and is determined by opponents under conditions of a specific geostrategic situation, depending on the objectives they set in a conflict. During the Cold War, when the United States' goal was the destruction of the Soviet Union as a social and political system, Robert McNamara's criterion was used. According to it, the damage is considered unacceptable if 30 per cent of population and 70 per cent of industrial capacity are destroyed, which requires the delivery to targets of 400 to 500 megaton warheads. Soviet strategic planning used similar approach. Later on it became clear that this criterion is excessive.

Because of the vagueness of the notion of "unacceptable damage," the term "prerequisite damage" is used in the practice of strategic planning. It seems logical that the magnitudes of both unacceptable and prerequisite damage will go down along with strategic weapons reductions, the decline of tension and development of better relations between the countries.

Deterrence-based stability can be maintained only if, under any circumstances of an initiated military conflict, the attacked side will be able to render unacceptable losses to the aggressor in a retaliatory strike. The nature of deterrence is largely determined by the structure, and size of strategic nuclear forces, and by the type of military actions to be used. In addition, for the Russian strategic nuclear forces it can not be considered separately from nuclear planning, the status and development prospects of the U.S. and its allies' nuclear forces and other strategic systems.

During the Cold War, launch on warning was one of the types of use of both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces in the case of a military conflict. Strategic nuclear forces had to be maintained in a state of high combat readiness, and to have reliable command, control and communications, and early warning systems. For the Soviet strategic nuclear forces (SNF) the choice of launch on warning was determined by their structure, which was based on large number of ground-based ICBMs with relatively low survivability if attacked by nuclear missiles. However, the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict increased because of possible errors of the early warning system and a very limited time available for assessing the situation and making a decision. At the same time, the concept of the launch on warning is also stabilizing in nature because a threat of the launch on warning deters the potential adversary against aggravating the relationship.¹⁶

Lately, due to changes in the geostrategic situation and the nascent partnership between Russia and the U.S., there have been repeated calls to put nuclear deterrence aside. It should be noted that the concept of deterrence adequately reflects the relationship between the two countries. While nuclear weapons exist, deterrence cannot be abandoned by a directive. Nevertheless, the concept of nuclear deterrence in the sense shaped during the Cold War should be modified taking into account the reductions of strategic weapons and improved political and economic relations between the two countries, into a nuclear deterrence that corresponds to new reality.

From this point of view it would be expedient to give up the concept of launch on warning and move to a more stabilizing concept of retaliation. However, the orientation of strategic nuclear forces exclusively towards the retaliatory strike requires high levels of their survivability.

Evaluation of strategic nuclear forces' survivability should take into account not only counterforce strategic potential and capabilities of the adversary's anti-ballistic missile defense, but such factors as tactical nuclear and high-precision weapons potential, conventional systems and forces, threat of sabotages, acts of terrorism and other covert operations aimed at strategic nuclear forces' facilities. Similarly, one cannot completely rule out a possibility of war initiated against Russia by means of conventional weapons and assaults on strategic nuclear forces facilities. In the course of such warfare Russia may find itself under pressure to make a first nuclear strike. Consequently, the composition and structure of SNF and their readiness must, depending on circumstances, permit a certain flexibility in the choice and conduct of all forms of combat operations.¹⁷

At present, the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear forces triad consists of land-based (both in-silo and mobile rail- and truck-based) ICBMs, sea- and air-based strategic nuclear components. The alignment of the SNF components and the dynamics of their reduction are presented in Table 3.1.

3.1. Strategic Rocket Forces

According to official data, as of January 1st, 1997 the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces had 762 missile systems which were accounted as carrying 3,700 warheads. It should be pointed out that the actual number of warheads may differ from this "accountable" number since, for example, all heavy ICBMs are regarded as carrying 10 independently targeted re-entry vehicles each, although some of them carry single warheads.

Table 3.1. Soviet and U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces¹⁸

 

Country	Triad	September 1, 1990		January 1, 1997
	Component	Delivery Systems	Nuclear Weapons	Delivery Systems	Nuclear Weapons
Russia/USSR	ICBMs	1398	6612	762	3700
	SLBMs	940	2804	664	2496
	Bombers	162	855	79	562
	Total	2500	10271	1505	6758
USA	ICBMs	1000	2450	755	2385
	SLBMs	672	5760	480	3904
	Bombers	574	2353	329	1822
	Total	2246	10563	1564	8111

As of mid-1997 silo-based ICBM were deployed in the following six main areas on the territory of the Russian Federation: Kozelsk, Tatishchevo, Dombarovsky, Uzhur, Kartaly, and Aleysk. Mobile truck-based missiles were deployed in nine areas: Yoshkar-Ola, Teykovo, Novosibirsk, Kansk, Irkutsk, Barnaul, Nizhny Tagil, Vypolzovo, and Drovianaya. Bases near Kostroma, Krasnoyarsk and Perm each have 12 RS-22 [SS-24] mobile rail-based missiles.

In accordance with the START I Treaty, considerable reductions have already taken place.¹⁹ To comply with the Treaty, it is necessary to eliminate 32 more SS-18 missiles (to fit in the permitted level of 154 heavy ICBMs). The START I ceiling on the number of warheads on mobile missiles (1,100) is fulfilled automatically, since the currently deployed RS-12M "Topol" [SS-25] missiles carry 360 warheads, and another 360 warheads are deployed on the rail-based RS-22 [SS-24] missiles.

The rate of land-based missile reduction is determined by the expiration of the missiles' design service lives. The ability to maintain missiles is also important. Of the currently deployed missiles, only RS-18s [SS-19s] and SS-25s are built in Russia, while SS-18s and SS-24s main production bases are in Ukraine.

Considering the schedule of initial deployments and the current extended lifetime, one should expect that service life of 170 SS-19 missiles deployed in Russia between 1980 and 1984 expire somewhere between 2001 and 2005.²⁰ Possibly, these missiles can be kept on service after 2005, since some of them have been replaced with new ones after 1984. The design service life of 32 SS-19 missiles, bought from Ukraine to replace older missiles, expires in 2009.²¹ The retirement of SS-19s may also be postponed due to further extension of their service life to 25 years.

For SS-18s deployed between 1979 and 1983, the design service life of 10 years was extended to 15 years. This extended lifetime expires by late 1998. Some of the withdrawn from Kazakhstan SS-18s can also be used to replace portions of the Russian forces. Some SS-18s have been replaced with later modifications. These missiles can be used till at least 2003-2005 even without the extension of their service life, and if the latter is extended they can be kept on service till 2010-2013.

The design service life of SS-24s and SS-25s is 10-15 years, and it expires in 2005-2010.

If Russia ratifies START II, all MIRVed ICBMs are due for elimination or deactivation by 2003.²² Some reductions could be implemented by downloading the number of warheads on 105 SS-19s from 6 to 1. All silos of heavy multiple-warhead ICBMs are due for elimination or retrofitting for single-warhead missiles (only 90 out of 154 may be retrofitted). Thus, if START II reductions are implemented, Russia will have to eliminate all remaining multiple-warhead ICBMs including 154 SS-18s permitted by START I. From the current arsenal Russia may keep 105 SS-19s and some 360 SS-25s.

An alternative to the ratification of START II is to keep the SS-18 missiles permitted by START I, as well as all SS-19s and SS-25s as long as it is technically possible. Such a solution will provide an opportunity to retain the Strategic Rocket Forces at the START I level. Nevertheless, beginning in 2005-2010 multiple-warhead ICBMs will have to be decommissioned due to expiration of their service life, and the number of deployed weapons in the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces will go even below the ceiling allowed by START II. The United States, in this case, will be able to keep a larger force in agreement with START I provisions.

3.2. Sea-Based Strategic Nuclear Forces

By the time of the signing of START I in 1991, the Soviet Union possessed 62 submarines armed with ballistic missiles. The sea-based strategic nuclear forces consisted of the second-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) (12 of the Navaga class [Yankee I], 1 of the Navaga M class [Yankee II], 18 of the Murena class [Delta I], 4 of the Murena M class [Delta II]), as well as the third-generation SSBNs (14 of the Kalmar class [Delta III], 6 of the Typhoon class [Typhoon], and 7 of the Delfin class [Delta IV]). Implementation of START I provisions should lead to the retirement of all second-generation SSBNs. It should be borne in mind that the service life of most of these SSBNs expires by the end of this century.²³

According to START II, not more than 1,750 strategic warheads should remain in the navies of each country by 2003. START II does not provide for any additional reduction of the Russian sea-based strategic forces. At the time of the signing of START II in 1993, Russia was expected to have 23-25 active SSBNs (Delta IIIs, Delta IVs and Typhoons) even without building submarines. In reality, the pace of SSBN's retirement proved to be much faster.

As of January 1, 1997, the sea-based strategic nuclear forces had 26 SSBNs. Missile compartments or SLBM launching tubes have been taken out from 20 out of 36 retired SSBNs, and, in accordance with START I, these SSBNs are not counted. Ballistic missiles have been removed from the remaining 16 SSBNs. SLBM launching tubes are being removed from some of these submarines, the rest awaiting their turn.

The main reason for the accelerated submarine retirement is the inability to provide routine repairs and overhauls. In order to operate a ship for 25-30 years, a major overhaul should be performed every 7-8 years. Otherwise, a submarine's service life shrinks to 10-15 years.²⁴ As of mid-1995, major overhauls are not overdue for only 20 SSBNs, and if the situation does not improve by 2000 there will be as few as 10 strategic submarines not needing a repair.²⁵

3.3. Air-Based Strategic Nuclear Forces

Two types of heavy bombers are deployed in the air-based strategic nuclear forces: Tu-95s [Bears] and Tu-160s [Blackjacks]. The first Bear bombers entered into service as early as 1956. The last modification of the Tu-95MS [Bear H] was designed in the late 1970s, and serial production had taken place from 1981 to the early 1990s. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union most of new strategic bombers remained outside of Russia: in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has transferred to Russia all combat-capable heavy bombers. By mid-1997, Russian air-based strategic nuclear forces had 79 bombers (6 Blackjacks in Engels, 35 Tu-95MS16s [Bear H16s] and 28 Tu-95MS6s [Bear H6s] in Mozdok and Ukrainka, 10 Tu-95K22s [Bear Gs] in Engels and Ryazan). According to START I counting rules, these bombers are accounted as carrying 562 weapons, although they can actually carry 800.

Currently, the process of liquidation of the obsolete Tu-95K [Bear B] and Bear G modifications is under way. START I and START II provisions do not require additional reductions of the Russian air-based strategic forces. Taking into account that Bear H's service life is some 30 years, these aircraft can be expected to carry a substantial portion of the air-based arsenal early next century.

3.4. Command and Control System and Its Current Status

The SNF capability to implement a wide range of combat strategies to a very large extent depends on capabilities of the command and control system. Among the most important characteristics of the SNF command and control system is the high degree of automation and the highest degree of survivability against unauthorized access. The existing SNF command and control system with its network of stationary and mobile command centers is meant to guarantee the ability to deliver a nuclear strike of any type: preemptive, launch on warning, or retaliation after ride-out.

The recent changes in the relationship between the nuclear superpowers means that the command and control system does not have to constantly operate with the high degree of intensity that was required during the Cold War. The capabilities of the command and control system are quite adequate for maintaining strategic nuclear deterrence in the current situation.

Among the main elements that support operations of the command and control system and strongly affect a choice of a retaliatory strategy is the early warning system.

The Russian early warning system currently consists of two tiers-ground-based radars and satellites.

The Dnestr and Dnepr radars (at Skrunda, Mukachevo, Balkhash, Mishelevka, Olenegorsk, Nikolayev), known as Hen House-type radars, which were built in the 1960s-early 1970s, will reach end of their operational lives by the late 1990s. By that time the Daryal (Pechora-type) and Volga radars, built at existing bases (Skrunda, Mukachevo, Balkhash, Mishelevka) as well as on new positions (Gantsevichi, Mingechaur, Pechora, Yeniseysk), were supposed to replace the Hen House radars and provide detection of a missile attack practically on all azimuthal directions (see Figure 3.1 and 3.2). Construction at four of these sites has been completed or is near completion (Pechora, Mingechaur, Mishelevka, Balkhash).²⁶

Figure 3.1. Location of Dnestr-M and Dnepr (Hen House) radars and their areas of coverage

Figure 3.2. Location of the missile warning Daryal (Pechora) and Volga radars, the ABM system's radars, and their areas of coverage

By the early 1990s, over two-thirds of construction work at the new generation radars had been finished.²⁷ However, the collapse of the Soviet Union impeded the completion of the modernization of the early warning system, and left most radar sites outside of Russia.

Preservation of the early warning system's radars will require Russia's making serious efforts to reach agreements on the use of radars located in the former Soviet republics.²⁸ In any event, coverage of the western azimuthal direction would require building at least one new radar. However, such construction is highly unlikely because of the lack of resources.

The first tier of the space-based early-warning system was commissioned in 1982. This system in full configuration includes nine satellites in highly elliptical, Molniya-type orbits. However, the system can work with fewer satellites. Although only seven satellites were working as of September 1997, the system is providing continuous coverage of U.S. ground-based ICBM deployment areas (see Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3. Areas constantly monitored by the early warning system's first-generation satellites

The complete space-based early warning system should include geosynchronous satellites along with the satellites on highly-elliptical orbits. However, in September 1997 only two geosynchronous satellites were in working condition.²⁹ These satellites presumably provide coverage of the North Atlantic. Thus, satellites in highly elliptical orbits remain the principal component of the Russian satellite warning system. It means that the early warning system monitors ICBM deployment areas in the continental U.S. and SSBN patrol areas in the North Atlantic.

In its present state, the early warning system cannot reliably assure a launch on warning in a non-crisis situation, since the necessary warning time can be guaranteed only against launches of U.S. ground-based ICBMs. In crisis conditions, when the command and control system is on full alert, the ground-based early warning system would be able to detect the re-entry vehicles of attacking missiles 10-15 minutes before they reach their targets. This time is sufficient for delivering a launch on warning. It should be pointed out that the radars lost at the western flank can be compensated partially by geosynchronous satellites. Thus, the current state of the early warning system does not completely rule out the launch on warning option, but forces Russia to rely on only one out of two-radars and satellites-warning channel.

3.5. Current State of the Military-Industrial Complex and Prospects for the Strategic Nuclear Forces' Development

Principal directions for further development of Russia's strategic armaments system in the next 15-20 years are:

• For the Strategic Rocket Forces: construction and deployment of the new Topol-M ground-based missile system that can be both ground-mobile and silo-based;
• For the Navy: commissioning of a series of the new Yury Dolgoruky-class SSBNs armed with new missiles;
• For air-based strategic forces: construction and deployment of a new precision-guided air-based cruise missile to replace the aging ALCM RKV-500 [AS-15].

In addition, measures will be taken to improve the command and control, the early warning and space monitoring systems. Apparently, economic aspects and the state of the military-industrial complex play a decisive role in the implementation of SNF development plans. Also very important is the implementation of the military reform.

By some estimates, over 2,000 industrial and scientific facilities in the Russian Federation employing some 3.8 million workers - including 1 million engaged in science - are involved in weapons development and production. In the country's industrial production these facilities' contribution is about 7-8 per cent. The State runs some 80 per cent of research organizations and some 40 per cent of weapons production.

At present, the military-industrial complex is in a very precarious economic situation. During the last 5-6 years state purchases of armaments have decreased at least seven-fold, and investments in the defense sector development fell not less than forty-fold. About 40 per cent of industrial and scientific equipment is physically worn out and does not meet contemporary requirements. This is why today Russia is able to produce not more than 20 per cent of the most important armaments by itself, without cooperation with other CIS countries.

It should be noted that as far as strategic weapons are concerned the situation is more favorable since over 85 per cent of the Soviet industrial enterprises involved are located in Russia. The existing Russian research and production infrastructure can build and maintain all necessary components for the SNF's reliable operation.

The Russian Federation's political leadership decided to limit (till the year 2000) the expenditures on the state power structures to 5 per cent of the GNP (for the Ministry of the Defense - to 3.5 per cent). It becomes apparent that the State's annual military budget for this period will not exceed 20-22 billion USD per year. In comparison, in 1998 the United States allocated some 248 billion USD for defense. Costs of maintaining SNF are going to grow in the foreseeable future, since the costs of military production and workforce in Russia will inevitably climb to the world level. Therefore, without actual positive changes in state economy and a significant growth of the GNP, one cannot count on successful development of the Russian SNF.

Strategic Rocket Forces

The industrial infrastructure for the Strategic Rocket Forces incorporates some 200 major enterprises. Its core is the cooperation for the production of the single-warhead Topol ICBM, and its head facility is the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Udmurtia.

In the mid-1980s, the Votkinsk plant produced at least 80 missiles a year. Today the plant produces Topol missiles and new Topol-M missiles. Not more than a quarter of its capacity is used and that has led to a significant increase in the cost of missiles. To keep minimally profitable the plant needs to manufacture 30 missiles a year, and the cooperation can be preserved with the production of 12-15 missiles a year.

Important for the implementation of the program for building Topol-M mobile land-based grouping is the fact that mobile launchers? are manufactured at the Belaz facility in Belarus. Without these mobile launchers? it is impossible to maintain the combat readiness of the existing Topol grouping, and even more so to create a Topol-M ICBM grouping.

Practically all of the currently available 360 Topol missiles will have their design service lives expired by 2010. By that time the Votkinsk plant is expected to have manufactured 400-500 Topol M missiles which means producing 30-40 missiles per year.

Production of missiles at the Votkinsk plant is financed at 55 per cent of the need, and is, thus, in permanent crisis. If this situation continues, by 2007 the Strategic Rocket Forces will receive not more than 300 missiles.

Sea-Based Strategic Nuclear Forces

Over 1,000 enterprises, including shipyards in Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk-na-Amure, used to belong to the industrial cooperation for the manufacture of SSBNs. Today, some 800 industrial facilities remain in the Russian Federation's naval shipbuilding complex, and the SSBN construction base is preserved in Severodvinsk alone.

In accordance with a decision of the nation's highest political leadership, the State Center for Nuclear Shipbuilding was established in Severodvinsk. Its head facility is the production association PO Severnoye Mashinostroitelnoye Predpriyatiye (Production Association Northern Machine Building Enterprise) for construction of nuclear-powered submarines. In the 1970s, this shipyard built up to 8 submarines annually. At present, general-purpose Severodvinsk-class nuclear-powered submarines and Yury Dolgoruky-class SSBNs are being built here.

The cooperation for manufacture of missiles and missile systems for SSBNs consists of some 300 facilities. Today, principal facilities for SLBM production are the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant and the Zlatoust Machine Building Plant. In Krasnoyarsk, all types of naval liquid-propellant missiles are built, and in Zlatoust solid-propellant missiles are manufactured. In the mid-1980s, these two facilities produced up to 40 liquid-fuel and 30 solid-fuel missiles annually. The current plans for a new series of SSBNs demand the production of some 300 ballistic missiles before 2015.

Keeping strategic nuclear forces at sea presents a rather difficult problem for Russia. In 1991, Russia had 6 SSBN bases, 6 SLBM storage and loading bases, several weapon depots, the total of 22 strategic naval facilities. The reform of the entire national military complex and the shrinking military budget make it obvious that after the year 2000 Russia will not be able to maintain the huge infrastructure of sea-based SNF. Besides, the Kamchatka-based grouping will cease its existence by 2005 due to natural causes. One can assume that with the further decrease of strategic nuclear forces, Russia will have to give up the sea-based SNF in the Far East and will limit them to the Northern Fleet alone.

Air-Based Strategic Nuclear Forces

Serial production of Bear bombers was located in Samara and that of Blackjacks - in Kazan. At present, the production of these aircraft was terminated,³⁰ and the plants are converting to civilian production.

The Russian formidable space and aeronautic industry as well as the network of first-rate design bureaus provides grounds for projections that, if necessary, the construction of both the Blackjack-type bombers and new generation military aircraft for strategic missions will be revived.

* * *

Lately, there have been publications in which American experts, on the basis of analyses of the SNF's present state, draw conclusions about the declining reliability and even ruin of the Russian nuclear weapons command and control system. In their opinion, the situation has worsened so much that the Russian SNF are on the verge of losing control, and the possibility of unauthorized launch has become real.³¹ They illustrate the loss of control over SNF with the known facts of electricity cut-offs at the Strategic Rocket Forces' and Navy's command centers, and the inadequate response of the SNF command and control system to the January 1995 launch of the Norwegian meteorological missile.³²

We would like to note that although the technical state of material resources and the personnel's morale are on the decline, nonetheless, the command and control system is not so "out of control" as it appears to foreign experts. The procedure for the use of nuclear weapons prescribes precise and well-coordinated actions of dozens of persons at particular posts, and a rather compact time for performing these operations. The nuclear weapons command and control system presupposes numerous checks and technical measures for "negative control" which are insuperable for a missile that "went out of control."

Because of their particular significance, the issues of control and readiness of the SNF are under constant and close attention of the nation's leadership. Exercise launches of ground-based ICBMs, SLBMs and ALCMs, conducted in 1995-1997 confirmed the reliability of the command and control system, a high level of personnel's preparedness and the reliability of hardware.

An objective evaluation of the state of the Russian SNF is important for developing realistic approaches to further strategic weapons reductions. Possibly, by attracting attention to the current status of the Russian SNF, American experts are trying to achieve the de-alerting of the U.S. and their allies' strategic nuclear forces and a reconsidering of the basic provisions of their policies with the aim of building trust and lowering the risk of incidents involving nuclear weapons. However, an inadequate evaluation of the actual state of the Russian SNF may also create an illusion of their "becoming extinct" and promote the affirmation and spread of the already existing opinion that there is no need to continue negotiations with Russia on further reductions of nuclear arsenals. It may result not only in a breakdown of the negotiation process but in a long-term "freezing" of the Russian and U.S. arsenals.

4.1. The Helsinki Agreements and the Russian Federation's Goals in a New Treaty

At the Helsinki summit on 21 March 1997 the Russian and U.S. presidents made a "Joint Statement On Parameters On Future Reductions In Nuclear Forces" according to which the parties pledge to launch negotiations on START III immediately after START II enters into force.

The new treaty is to include the following basic components:³³

• Establishment, by 31 December 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties;

• Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads;

• Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START Treaties unlimited in duration.

The Joint Statement has some serious drawbacks. Nonetheless, its basic components do not rule out the feasibility of developing a START III Treaty which, even if not fully balanced, could satisfy Russian interests if the goals described below can be reached.

4.1.1. Confidence Building Measures in the Process of Nuclear Weapons Reduction

Confidence building measures which should be introduced to the START III negotiations can be divided into two major categories:

• Effective verification of the parties' obligations to reduce their nuclear arsenals;

• Transparency of military activity and predictability of the parties' activities in the area of strategic offensive weapons.

Verification procedures for strategic weapons and their elimination developed for START I and II will be probably used in START III as well. In addition to national technical verification means great significance will be retained by the inspection of sites and facilities according to the "any site at any time" principle. It seems expedient to consider a possibility of establishing inspection centers on each other's territory by both parties.

It seems logical that as disarmament and confidence building efforts make progress the parties will try to simplify and lower the costs of verification, possibly disposing of the most expensive procedures.

Russia and the United States should get rid of a serious drawback of the previous START agreements, i.e. the lack of verification of the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons themselves. This kind of verification could be expanded to encompass several stages of a nuclear warhead's life cycle, including its production. Effective control over nuclear materials would promote mutual trust. Important role could be played here by measures for preventing unauthorized handling of nuclear weapons (by installing electronic locks, multiple-layer protective systems, blocking devices which incapacitate a warhead in the case of an unauthorized intervention, etc.).

The following measures could be considered as well:

• In addition to notifications of ballistic missile launches, notifications of test launches of nuclear weapons from heavy bombers can be made;

• Forbidding approaches of SSBNs to Russian and U.S. borderline closer than 5,000 kilometers, and approaches of submarines armed with long-range cruise missiles closer than 1,000-1,500 kilometers;

• Establishing continuous monitoring centers with appropriate detecting instruments at storage sites of the non-deployed warheads.

In the discussion of confidence building measures it seems expedient to anticipate a gradual transition to a drastically new relationship in the strategic area, which should be founded on predictability, transparency, and mutual restraint. The parties should inform one another about main parameters and characteristics of any new types of strategic armaments before the commencement of tests. The command, control and communication system should be covered by confidence measures too. Transparency and predictability measures should be expanded to all Russian and American space activities.

The current practice of inspections shows that there are a some problems in the area of START I verification procedures.

One such problem is the United States' refusal to eliminate all the elements of the MX ICBM in accordance with procedures governing the rearmament and elimination of systems subject to START I regulations. The U.S. assumes that only the first stage of this missile is to be eliminated and that the other two stages may be preserved. Naturally, Russian experts view such approach as a direct breach of the Treaty.

Serious concern is also caused by the fact that the nuclear weapons guidance equipment and attachment joints have not been removed from the 93 B-1B bombers converted for conventional missions.

4.1.2. Irreversibility of Reductions

Russian and U.S. officials repeatedly stated their desire to reach a stage when the renewal of the nuclear arms race would become impossible. In this context, an agreement on the elimination of the material basis which could permit a strategic arms build-up is the key for the entire strategic offensive weapons reduction process. Naturally, the resolution of this multi-dimensional objective cannot be simple and instantaneous. We think that at the present time the issue of breakout potential is gaining a tremendous importance. Common efforts towards further reductions will not be possible without solving this issue first.

Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement

Strategic nuclear weapons dismantlement is regarded by many experts not just as a radical practical step identified with the irreversibility of reductions but as a meaningful sign of strategic offensive weapons elimination. No doubt, the dismantlement of warheads does not necessarily mean complete irreversibility of nuclear weapons reductions. As long as fissile materials are available, assembling new warheads will not present difficulties either for Russia or for the United States. However, if for a variety of reasons, a decision to produce an additional number of weapons is made, implementing it will take considerable time.

The discussion of this issue requires a very thorough specification of a list of weapons subject to dismantlement. Situations may arise when, as with the Trident SLBM,³⁴ dismantlement of nuclear warheads cannot guarantee the elimination of breakout potential.

Replacement and Elimination of Old Re-entry Vehicle Platforms

As a result of U.S. insistence, START II has a provision stating that the Treaty does not require the elimination of reentry vehicle platforms of the ICBMs and SLBMs whose warheads are downloaded and the former's replacement with new ones. At the same time, the Treaty does not ban the elimination of the platforms. Thus, in order to prevent a rapid increase in the number of warheads on the SS-19, Minuteman III and Trident II ICBMs, START III should address the need to replace the reentry vehicle platforms of ICBM and SLBM whose RVs are being downloaded.

It should be expected that the U.S. will again object to the elimination of RV platforms under the pretext of money saving. The Russian side could counter this argument by stating the following:

• The elimination of warheads requires incomparably larger expenditures than the elimination of platforms, but the U.S. agrees to eliminate warheads;

• Preservation of RV platforms can create opportunities for quick re-installation of the removed warheads which, similarly to START II, causes grave concerns at the Russian State Duma's Federal Assembly.

In addition, it should be pointed out that U.S. position in regards to RV platforms is not completely inflexible. There are advocates of the platform elimination not only in the industry interested in orders but in the DoD as well. Reportedly, the Minuteman III ICBM will have a platform for just one RV. It is also known that in 1996 the principal designer of the Trident II SLBM, Lockheed-Martin, studied the possibility of replacing Trident II's RV platforms with platforms for fewer RVs.

Limitations on the Number of Deployed SLBMs

Another effective measure to lower the upload potential would be to introduce in START III limitations on the number of SLBM deployed launching tubes. In particular, the parties could limit the permitted number of the deployed SLBMs to 200. This would allow to lower the Trident II SLBM upload potential by technically simple means. The U.S. could find this proposal attractive because it would allow the United States to save money that is allocated to purchase new Trident II missiles to rearm another 4 SSBNs.

It should be noted that the U.S. considered such alternative, too. On 14 September 1993 Senator Bumpers made a proposal to decrease by half the number of launching tubes. He also suggested, that the U.S. would conduct additional negotiations on this issue with Russia, so that a provision concerning the reduction of launching tubes on SSBNs could be included in START II. Sen. Bumpers based his proposal on the results of studies of several scenarios of reductions of SLBM warheads conducted by the CBO of U.S. Congress in 1993, reasoning that money could be saved by cutting the production of the Trident II SLBMs and their warheads.

Upload Potential of Heavy Bombers

The Helsinki agreement's provision on the "jointly agreed technical and organizational measures to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions, including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads" entitles the Russian side to raise the issue of the heavy bombers' breakout potential and insists that it be solved by the following means:

• A one-time conversion by the U.S. of heavy bombers from nuclear to conventional missions;

• Dismantlement of nuclear weapons guidance equipment, including that in the pilot's cabin, on every converted bomber;

• Intrusive inspections of the converted heavy bombers to confirm that they are not nuclear-capable.

It will be very difficult to achieve the goal of eliminating the heavy bombers' breakout potential because the U.S. will most probably regard such an attempt as infringing on its inalienable right to re-convert heavy bombers, in accordance with the START II provisions. However, perhaps, the U.S. will not be too rigid in insisting on its rights understanding that even a non-nuclear-capable heavy bomber remains a strategic system. Heavy bombers carrying high-precision conventional weapons are able to hit various strategic targets.

Considering the complexity of the heavy bombers issue, one should probably try to resolve it at the political level, or on the basis of a U.S. good-will statement on the one-time and irreversible conversion of heavy bombers to conventional missions.

Upload Potential of the MX ICBM

The crux of the problem is that in START I the MX missile is categorized as mobile. Therefore the U.S. assumes that for elimination of MX missiles it suffices to eliminate just the first stage, while exempting all the other stages, the bus and the guidance system. At the same time, the facility that used to manufacture the MX missile's first stage produces the Castor-120 commercial missile. The Russian side regards this missile as analogous to MX's first stage. In Russian opinion, the current American approach to the MX missiles' elimination may lead to a circumvention of START II.

In order to eliminate MX's upload potential, Russia, first of all, should try to force the United States to fulfill the START I provisions referring to the elimination of this type of missiles. Russia's position on this issue is legally well-grounded and strong, and therefore Russia should display fortitude in further dealing with this issue.

In addition, it should be noted that the issue of MX's upload potential probably will not arise if the United States decides to move towards a two-component strategic offensive force. In this case, perhaps, all Minuteman silo launchers will be eliminated. Likewise, the acuteness of this problem will significantly diminish if future START III will foresee the elimination of MX warheads.

The United States may decide to keep the single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMs and give up MXs. In this case, it cannot be ruled out that during negotiations the U.S. will try to retain the right not to eliminate the Mk-21 warheads of the MX ICBM so that it could equip each Minuteman III ICBM with one Mk-21 instead of Mk-12As that are currently in place on these missiles.

START III Counting Rules

From the 21 March 1997 Joint Agreement it ensues that the START III limitations on the parties' strategic offensive arms are based on the numbers of nuclear warheads. Such an approach is principally different from that of START I and II in which the general levels of limitations by aggregate warhead numbers do not distinguish between types. Only in the case of heavy bombers both Treaties refer exclusively to nuclear weapons.

The issue of the type of counted nuclear weapons is not new. It was discussed in detail during the START I negotiations. It was eventually agreed that when counting aggregate levels and armaments on ICBMs and SLBMs it is necessary to employ the term "warhead" but not "nuclear warhead."

The following circumstances generate the problems associated with START III counting rules:

• It is known that there are strategic targets that can be destroyed by high-precision conventional weapons;

• The United States has acquired the scientific and technical capability for the development of high-precision conventional warheads for ballistic missiles;

• If nuclear weapons alone are counted under START III, the reduction of warheads on the Minuteman III and Trident II missiles could be accomplished by replacing the downloaded nuclear warheads with conventional ones, without violating the Treaty.

Inclusion of nuclear warheads alone in the aggregate numbers agrees with the U.S. military-technical policy for strategic offensive arms development and meets the U.S. interests.

It should be noted however that the answer to the question about inclusion of provisions banning "dual-capable" missiles (i.e. those that can carry nuclear and/or conventional warheads) is not obvious. If the U.S. deploys a strategic anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, Russia will need to make its ICBMs and SLBMs capable of overwhelming it. Some of such types of anti-ABM means look as warheads and can be deployed together with nuclear warheads at RV platforms. It should also be borne in mind that despite the progress in the development of self-guidance systems it would be problematic for the United States to have mixed combination of warheads on ballistic missiles since Minuteman III and Trident II after having some of their nuclear warheads removed will have a fairly modest throw-weight reserve potential for conventional warheads.

The issue of conventional weapons on U.S. heavy bombers is a quite different matter. It seems probable that in addition to the B-1B bombers, the B-2 bombers were developed for "chasing" Russian mobile ICBMs will also carry conventional weapons. In this case the United States could have 93 B-1Bs and 20 B-2s, i.e. the total of 113 heavy bombers armed with at least 1,808 self-guided high-precision conventional ASMs. Then the U.S. would no longer have to worry about being able to go above the permitted limit of 100 heavy bombers converted for conventional missions. When the three Treaties (START I, II and III) are in force, the United States will, of course, push for new counting rules so that nuclear weapons alone are counted.

The nuclear weapons counting problem should be studied thoroughly. But even now one can conclude that arming strategic offensive forces with conventional weapons will not violate the Treaty, but will, in essence, circumvent it. The counting of nuclear weapons alone is a departure from effective control of strategic offensive armaments whose history and future are associated with the diminishing yield of strategic weapons and a simultaneous increase in their precision.

4.1.3. Elimination of SLCMs

The exclusion of SLCMs, under U.S. insistence, from strategic offensive arms limitations is a serious shortcoming of the previous agreements on arms control and disarmament. To date the parties have made only political statements concerning SLCM limitations in relation to START I. However, the nuclear SLCM numbers are not included in strategic offensive warheads and delivery systems totals.

The following should be recapitulated about the nuclear Tomahawk SLCM:

• Nuclear and conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles have been developed within a joint program. They have identical dimensions, as well as many other characteristics;

• By 1997, the U.S. has produced over 4,000 Tomahawks of 4 modifications. Production of conventional Tomahawks continues and, perhaps, will be halted in 1998, while retaining the industrial base.

• Also preserved are the 350 W84 warheads removed from the ground-based Tomahawk cruise missiles in accordance with the INF Treaty. These warheads could be used to increase the number of cruise missiles, if need be, since the production of non-nuclear Tomahawks continues.

Tomahawk modifications are practically indistinguishable in appearance and to a certain degree are mutually convertible, which could be considered as a potential for circumventing the START agreements. The Joint Helsinki Statement says that "in the context of START III negotiations ... experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles..." However, there are fears that provisions involving nuclear SLCMs will not be included in the text of the START III, and as far as possible measures are concerned the parties do not have any obligations, so all agreements will hinge on the parties' - first of all, the United States' - good will.

In this context it seems necessary that the Russian side urge for eliminating all nuclear SLCMs and warheads. Assuming that the U.S. will hardly be tractable on this issue, it is necessary at least to insist on the complete elimination of nuclear warheads that can be deployed on SLCMs, including the W84s removed from the ground-based Tomahawks under the INF Treaty.

4.1.4. De-alerting Strategic Nuclear Forces

At the Helsinki summit the U.S. and Russian presidents reached an important agreement to extend the START II Treaty till 31 December 2007 which will significantly ease its implementation by Russia. Nonetheless, the parties agreed to place "in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by 31 December 2003 by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps."

It should be emphasized that deactivation implies not the final elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but measures which would significantly increase the time necessary to prepare them for launch, i.e. modify the level of alert of strategic nuclear forces. This would allow, on the one hand, to make decisions on the basis of more ample information about the adversary's intentions in the case of escalating tensions between the U.S. and Russia, and, on the other, to lower the risk of an accidental launch which causes a growing concern in the West.³⁵ In this regard, deactivation could be propitious not only for lowering the costs of elimination but also for promoting transparency.³⁶

One should nonetheless highlight negative consequences of delivery vehicle deactivation which in the future could not only become a source of mistrust between Russia and the United States but block the ratification of strategic offensive weapons reduction agreements in Russia.³⁷ Several arguments can be made.

Firstly, deactivation of delivery vehicles changes drastically the counterforce capabilities of heavy bombers, nuclear SLCMs and conventional high-precision weapons which all acquire preventive strike potential. In this regard Russia is in worse situation than the United States.

Secondly, despite the fact that both the U.S. and Russia will take parallel and adequate steps to deactivate delivery systems, in reality Russia may be worse off because the maintenance of feasible rapid combat readiness recovery of these systems will require substantial financial resources. Russia, due to objective reasons, will also become more vulnerable to the adversary's preventive measures (diversions, sabotage) hindering the rapid recovery of the delivery systems' combat readiness. In circumstances when there is actual disparity in the recovery potential, the role of nuclear weapons may even increase because in conflict situations the stronger side gains the leverage to put pressure without running the risk of the other side's nuclear strike.

Thirdly, there are some technical problems. For instance, while considering deactivation by means of detaching warheads from missiles one should remember that this operation is a technically complicated and expensive one, especially for multiple-warhead missiles. Removed warheads should be replaced with electronic imitators which are rather complex and costly devices. Removed warheads should be kept at special storage facilities equipped with automated security and protection, fire extinguishing, temperature maintenance and other systems. One such storage facility would cost tens of millions of dollars, and it would be necessary to build them at each of the existing 19 rocket divisions and 5 SSBN bases. Russia will not have this amount of money in the near future. It should also be pointed out that such storage facilities will be a tempting target for a disarming strike.

Thus, the deactivation issue should not be confined to mutual parallel de-alerting measures only. In the future, the need to continue the disarmament process will demand to tie deactivation to the removal of other sources of potential threats and mistrust between the two countries. This is why it seems important to outline this problem right now and move towards its practical solution.

4.1.5. Preparations for the START III Negotiation Process

From the Russian side's viewpoint, the START III Treaty should aim to increase the level of security and stability by attempting to reach two principal objectives:

• Further reduction of strategic offensive weapons;

• Elimination of START II's drawbacks.

Further reduction of strategic offensive weapons meets the interests of both Russia and the U.S. although the two countries' priorities differ. The United States is interested not just in lowering the strategic weapons levels but in the rapid and irreversible reductions of the Russian strategic armaments that would allow the U.S. to make steady progress toward the deployment of a strategic ABM system. As for Russia, further reduction of strategic weapons will be more fitting to its economic ability than the START II levels. These contradictory tendencies - on the one hand, the deployment of a U.S. ABM system and, on the other, the reduction of Russian strategic offensive weapons - will inevitably undermine strategic stability in the future. However, the objective state of affairs is such that these tendencies can hardly be halted, especially after the signing on 21 March 1997 of a Joint Statement on the ABM Treaty by the Russian and U.S. presidents.

Elimination of START II's drawbacks is a purely Russian intention which, no doubt, is not shared by the U.S. on most issues. That's why the Russian and U.S. attitudes to the connection between START II and START III differ. Russia would like to ratify START II (even better if its ratification could be avoided) only after gaining confidence that the progress of strategic weapons reductions will not manifest shortcomings inherent in START II. But the U.S. insisted that the parties could start working on START III only after START II enters into force.

Considering the magnitude and complexity of tasks Russia would have to solve prior to beginning the START III negotiations one may conclude that well-organized preparations for the latter will require up to a year. This is confirmed by the experience of the earlier START negotiations. However, the 21 March 1997 Joint Statement says that "once the START II Treaty enters into force the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement," i.e. the opening of the negotiations is made dependent on the event which, generally speaking, is not related to the preparedness or unpreparedness of the Russian side to begin negotiations.

Unfortunately, even if START II enters into force after Russia has become ready for the negotiations, in the course of these negotiations Russia will apparently find itself dependent on START II, or rather on the United States' good will towards the inclusion in START III of provisions that would offset the undesirable consequences of START II. The United States will not have a particular need to reject Russian proposals directly. It would suffice to discuss the Russian proposals thoroughly and extensively so that time would work against them while the implementation of START II would continue with all its shortcomings advantageous to the United States. As for the reduction of Russian strategic offensive forces to a level planned for START III, this issue should not cause much concern since the U.S. realizes that Russian strategic offensive armaments will probably go down to this level anyway by 2008 as a result of implementing START II.

Thus, by having agreed to START III and by promoting deep reductions the U.S., firstly, achieves its main goal - the entry into force of the START II Treaty - and, secondly, does not particularly jeopardize its own interests, since it will be able to influence the preparation of the appropriately worded START III.

The situation is developing such that concerns about the results of START III are being raised. There are external and internal reasons for that. A number of errors similar to those that occurred during the development of START II have already been made, and the tendency continues. That's why the most crucial task is to analyze the past experience and to be prepared to discuss the substance of the issues. Besides that, it is necessary to outline the START III negotiation tactic before new problems arise in the discussions.

4.2. Possible Structure and Numerical Composition of Russian and U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START III. Implementation Time-Frame

In the "Joint Statement On Parameters On Future Reductions In Nuclear Forces" signed in Helsinki by the Russian and U.S. presidents the parties, in essence, returned to Russia's proposals of 5 years ago.³⁸ It's worth pointing out that the U.S. most probably would have agreed to the 2,000-weapon ceiling but acquiesced to the Russian proposal of 2,000-2,500 which apparently took the Americans somewhat by surprise.

From the legal standpoint, the setting in START III of the reduction ceiling in the form of a spread of 2,000 to 2,500 weapons does not make sense, since only the upper value is limiting, and each party can choose any number below it at its own discretion. But from the viewpoint of possible scenarios relating to U.S. strategic offensive forces and the size of breakout potential there is a major difference as to what ceiling to choose, 2,000 or 2,500.

Thus, it seems necessary to point out the following:

• The option of 2,500 warheads instead of 2,000 is hardly so crucial for Russia that it can ignore those potential advantages that the U.S. gains from this;

• As has been said above, Russia may find problematic even maintaining its arsenal at the 2,000-warhead level by 2007, not to mention 2,500;

• Russian proposals should be founded on numerical assessments of strategic weapon demands on the basis of missions and development possibilities of Russian strategic offensive weapons and projections of U.S. ABM and strategic offensive systems.

In Helsinki an understanding was achieved that by 31 December 2007 Russia and the U.S. will each reach the levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads under START III. In our opinion, it's in Russia's interests to have a treaty anticipating a reduction to 1,500 weapons by that time. It is important to emphasize that it is highly undesirable and, even illiterate, to set the limit in the form of a range as has been done in START II and in the presidents' Joint Helsinki Statement.

The following factors should be taken into account when determining tentative composition of Russian strategic nuclear forces under START III:

• The need to guarantee the effectiveness of the concept of deterrence "on all azimuthal directions;"

• The current structure of strategic nuclear forces;

• The need to ensure a transition from START II to START III with minimal expenditures on rearmament;

• The need to plan the best ways of further (post-START III) strategic weapon reductions;

• The present status and future development of U.S. and other nuclear powers' strategic nuclear forces.

Consideration should be given to a possible influence of the following destabilizing factors:

• The probability of deployment by the U.S. of an ABM system which abandons the 1972 ABM Treaty;

• U.S. ability to use conventional and especially high-precision weapons targeted at facilities of strategic nuclear forces, of national and military leadership;

• U.S. ability to quickly redeploy its breakout potential;

• The advance of the NATO military structure toward Russia's borders as a results of the alliance's eastward expansion.

A program of future development of the Russian SNF should put an emphasis on the guarantees of SNF's invulnerability and preservation of key elements of the strategic nuclear triad as well as related military, scientific and industrial infrastructure.

If START III sets the ceiling of 1,500 weapons to be reached by both parties by 2008 Russia could deploy 500 on ground-based ICBMs, 750 on SLBMs and 250 on heavy bombers.

It seems expedient to keep ground-based ICBMs at their present level and to make the main emphasis on upgrading the existing systems and replacing the aged ones. The optimum number of deployed silo-based stationary missiles is determined by the fact that START II allows Russia to download 105 SS-19s and to convert 90 SS-18 silos. Russia should not hurry to deploy the Topol M silo-based modification because it is not ruled out that START III will make it possible to limit the number of deployed SLBMs in exchange for limitations on silo-based missiles.

By 2007 Russia will probably be able to keep some 10 Delta IV and Typhoon SSBNs, which by that time will have served 17-23 years. Emphasis should be made on extending the service lives of the existing SSBNs instead of replacing them with new ones, under the condition that the United States refrain from constructing a large series of new-generation attack submarines and will limit the number of deployed SSBNs. In addition, the RSM-52 [SS-N-20] missiles should be downloaded from 10 to 6, and the number of launching tubes on the Typhoons reduced from 20 to 10, under the condition that the parties reach an agreement concerning the limits on deployed SLBMs.

Air-based strategic nuclear forces should upgrade and keep Blackjacks and some Bear H16s, while the rest should be converted for conventional missions or retired as they age.

If START III does not set additional limitations beyond the aggregate level of 1,500 counted weapons the United States, most probably, will attempt to keep their current strategic weapon development programs and to create the maximum possible breakout potential. Various scenarios of U.S. strategic weapon developments (see Tables 4.1-4.4) show that under START III U.S. breakout potential may equal to 3,300-4,100 weapons even without preserving the MX missiles, B-52 aircraft and nuclear-capable SLCMs. The upload potential for the B-1B bombers alone can exceed 2,000 weapons.

Table 4.1. Possible Composition of U.S. Strategic Forces by 2007 (Scenario I)

 

Strategic Weapons	Counted Under START III	Including Breakout Potential
Minuteman III	220	660
Trident II (on 10 SSBNs)	10 x 24 x 4 = 960	1920
B-2	20 x 16 = 320	320
B-1B	0	93 x 24 = 2232
Total	1500	5132

Table 4.2. Possible Composition of U.S. Strategic Forces by 2007 (Scenario II)

 

Strategic Weapons	Counted Under START III	Including Breakout Potential
Minuteman III	348	1044
Trident II (on 12 SSBNs)	12 x 24 x 4 = 1152	2304
B-2	0	20 x 16 = 320
B-1B	0	80 x 24 = 1920
Total	1500	5588

Table 4.3. Possible Composition of U.S. Strategic Forces by 2007 (Scenario III)

Strategic Weapons	Counted Under START III	Including Breakout Potential
Minuteman III	156	468
Trident II (on 14 SSBNs)	14 x 24 x 4 = 1344	2688
B-2	0	20 x 16 = 320
B-1B	0	80 x 24 = 1920
Total	1500	5396

Table 4.4. Possible Composition of U.S. Strategic Forces by 2007 (Scenario IV)

Strategic Weapons	Counted Under START III	Including Breakout Potential
Minuteman III	0	0
Trident II (on 12 SSBNs)	12 x 24 x 4 = 1152	2304
B-2	20 x 16 = 320	320
B-1B	0	93 x 24 = 2232
Total	1472	4856

For this reason it seems logical to insist on the following additional limitations:

• If the parties fail to work out verifiable irreversible measures for the conversion of bombers, they should ban the conversion of the B-2 bombers to conventional missions. In response, Russia could agree to ban the conversion of Blackjacks.

• Limit the number of deployed SLBMs to 200. As a compromise, the Treaty could permit the elimination in an irreversible fashion (pouring of concrete, design modifications) of some launching tubes on active submarines and exclude them from the deployed count. In response, Russia could agree to limiting the number of silo-based launchers to 200.

If such limitations take force, the U.S. will have to lower either the number of SSBNs or the number of warheads downloaded from SLBMs (upload potential). Although theoretically the U.S. will be able to deploy all 1,500 warheads on submarines, this will require eliminating the ground-based component of the triad and B-2s, in which case the SLBM breakout potential will be reduced to minimum.

If such limitations enter into effect, it seems most probable that the United States will implement a scenario presented in Table 4.5. It is assumed that the U.S. will keep one or two ground-based missile bases and eliminate 300 silos. Service lives of the 8 most recent Ohio SSBNs will reach 11-18 years by that time.

Possibly, the United States will decide to completely eliminate the ground-based leg of the triad and will revive the production of bombers, or begin constructing new SSBNs. It should be noted, however, that in the latter case a limitation on the number of deployed SLBMs will demand the elimination of a portion of launching tubes on the remaining 8 Ohio SSBNs.

Table 4.5. Possible Composition of U.S. Strategic Forces by 2007 (Scenario V)

 

Strategic Weapons	Counted Under START III	Including Breakout Potential
Minuteman III	200	600
Trident II (on 8 SSBNs)	8 x 24 x 5 = 960	1536
B-2	20 x 16 = 320	320
B-1B	0	93 x 24 = 2232
Total	1480	4688

4.3. Strategic Offensive Weapons Reduction and Verification

4.3.1. Nuclear Warhead Elimination and Verification

Simultaneously with the reduction and elimination of delivery vehicles Russia and the U.S. are destroying nuclear warheads. By late 1995, Russia had destroyed 3,500 nuclear warheads withdrawn from Ukraine,³⁹ 1,500 of which were strategic. Additionally, a half of nuclear weapons from tactical aviation and ABM were destroyed, as well as one third of the Navy's tactical warheads. According to some estimates, by the end of 1995 Russia had destroyed the total of 10,000 warheads.⁴⁰ The United States has also destroyed over 8,500 nuclear warheads.⁴¹

As has been mentioned, dismantlement of warheads proceeds without mutual verification. Verification procedures developed in the START I and II Treaties for the reduction and elimination of certain nuclear weapon systems - in addition to national technical procedures - are applicable to delivery vehicles only.

How can one explain that despite the fact that both sides have begun destroying nuclear warheads - and this process cannot be verified by national technical means - no appropriate verification measures have been adopted? Apparently, there are several reasons.

Firstly, verification of warhead dismantlement requires much greater efforts than of delivery vehicle elimination. A nuclear warhead cannot be destroyed by blast, cannot be cut or split apart by any other method. The warhead dismantlement process consists of several stages: disassembly of non-nuclear components, removal of tritium containers, removal of the nuclear explosive physics package, removal and disassembly of the secondary. It is followed by disassembling the nuclear explosive physics package, which begins with removal of climate control system, separation of the high explosive from the nuclear components, and disassembly of the pit. Parts of the pits made of fissile material are placed in special canisters. Next, the secondary is disassembled, and all of its nuclear parts are also placed in canisters. Currently, fissile-material-containing parts are kept at special storage located at the dismantling facilities.

There is no doubt, that direct monitoring of nuclear warhead dismantlement will result in revealing classified data related with warhead design. These data refer to the warhead total weight, weight of fissile materials inside the warhead, configuration, size and weight of fissile-material-containing parts. For this reason arms control experts have a clear understanding that today the direct monitoring of warhead dismantlement is unrealistic as a verification procedure.⁴²

Another serious obstacle to the verification of warhead destruction is the fact that as a rule nuclear warheads are dismantled at the production facilities. Maintenance of the active nuclear weapons requires a regular replacement of the expired warheads and, consequently, their production. Thus, warheads of the same type may go in and out through the gates of the same facility. Some of them enter for dismantlement, and the other leave for military units.

Finally, some nuclear warheads removed from eliminated delivery vehicles can be used in other weapon systems.⁴³

Altogether, these circumstances significantly complicate the verification of warhead dismantlement and require developing new measures and procedures.

In a joint Summit statement in Moscow on 10 May 1995 it was declared that the Russian Federation and the United States were to hold negotiations on an agreement to increase the level of transparency and irreversibility of nuclear weapons reductions. The statement proclaimed that the main provisions of the future agreement will include:

• An exchange on a regular basis of detailed information related to aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of the accumulated fissile materials, and on their safety and security;

• Cooperative arrangements for reciprocal monitoring of storage facilities for fissile materials released from dismantled warheads and declared to be excess to defense needs;

• Other joint measures promoting confidence in exchanges of data related to the accumulated fissile material stockpiles.

However, very little progress has been made in this area despite this statement.

4.3.2. START III and Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement

The Joint March 1997 Helsinki Statement declared that "measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads" will lie at the foundation of a new nuclear weapons reduction treaty. Considering the past experience of the parties' cooperation on this issue the following approach seems desirable.

It is obvious that verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement should be constructed differently from that of delivery vehicle elimination. For the reasons mentioned above, direct monitoring by one party's inspectors of the other party's warhead dismantlement is out of question. Therefore, the verification procedure should be arranged in such a fashion as to guarantee the security of sensitive design information to the party who owns the warheads. Simultaneously, this procedure should reliably assure the other party that the warheads are being actually dismantled.

It should be emphasized that with the limitations mentioned above it becomes impossible to implement a 100-per cent reliable warhead dismantlement verification system.

At present, when each side has several thousand warheads, it hardly makes sense to seek a comprehensive verification system. This could become a goal at further stages when nuclear arsenals will be reduced to several hundred weapons and when the parties have acquired an expertise of verifiable dismantlement. It seems that a warhead dismantlement verification system should be built gradually, "step by step."

The initial phase of such verification should include the following steps:

1. Exchange of data on the total amounts of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium accumulated in Russia and the U.S. by the time of exchange.

2. Exchange of data on the amounts of fissile materials which are going to be released for defense use as a result of the reduction of nuclear arsenals.

3. Exchange of data on the types of warheads to be eliminated, their amounts, serial numbers and storage sites. Information about warheads already dismantled should be in this category.

4. Establishment of bilateral or international (under the auspices of the IAEA) monitoring at storage facilities of fissile materials removed from nuclear weapons and their final disposition. Inspectors of the verifying party non-intrusively inspect the contents of canisters arriving at the verified party's storage facility in order to determine whether the canisters contain weapon-grade uranium or plutonium and their mass. Inspectors also regularly check whether the canisters are in place and for signs of tampering. When the canisters are taken out of repositories for disposal of nuclear weapon parts contained in them inspectors check them and put verification seals on them. The seals are then checked as canisters arrive at a conversion facility. It should be mentioned that as far as weapon-grade uranium is concerned verification measures for its conversion in low-enriched uranium have already been developed and implemented.⁴⁴

5. Establishment of verification of the newly produced weapon-grade materials. This refers to Russia alone. In Russia, three production reactors continue operating in nuclear power plants operating mode. For technical reasons, chemical reprocessing of irradiated fuel continues too, and it generates some 1.5 tons of weapon-grade plutonium annually. Officials of the Ministry of Atomic Energy stated that since 1 October 1994 the newly produced plutonium has not been used for defense purposes and gone to storage in oxide form.

All these issues have been discussed many times at various Russia-American negotiations, and working agreements have been reached on some of them. Basically, Russia has to make a reciprocal step and declare the data about its accumulated fissile materials. It seems that this information does not have a strategic value, and Minister Viktor Mikhailov has already several times cited the approximate numbers for Russia's inventory of highly-enriched uranium.⁴⁵ The United States declassified the size of its inventory of weapon-grade plutonium and plans to do the same for highly-enriched uranium.

Subsequently, if progress is made towards implementing START III, the verification mechanism could be developed further by the following steps:

1. Exchange of data between Russia and the U.S. on the history of fissile material production including information about the operation of production reactors, radio-chemical facilities and facilities generating metal uranium and plutonium.

2. Exchange of data on the total amount, types, time of production and dismantlement of nuclear warheads, the numbers of deployed warheads, the amount of fissile materials and number of warheads in reserve.

3. Establishment of monitoring of warheads that are scheduled for elimination. Verification could begin with the sealing of canisters containing warheads removed from delivery vehicles and intended for dismantlement. The owner of the warheads provides access to the canisters to the other party's inspectors who seal the canisters but do not have the right to check their contents.

4. Establishment of monitoring at warhead dismantlement facilities. Verification procedures should include both the inspection of safety of warheads arriving for dismantlement in sealed canisters and monitoring of a type and amount of fissile materials released during dismantlement and removed from the facility to the storage.

Implementing these steps would allow the parties to gain a collaboration expertise which could be subsequently used for creating a more comprehensive verification system along with further reduction of nuclear weapons. At the same time, international community will receive convincing assurances of the U.S. and Russia's steadfast progress towards total elimination of nuclear weapons.

4.4. Factors Influencing the START III Negotiations

4.4.1. The ABM Treaty and Further Disarmament

According to the 1972 ABM Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty from 3 July 1974, each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country or of an individual region. Another important provision of the Treaty is the ban on deployment of a base for a nationwide defense. As an exception, each party is permitted to deploy one ABM system to protect its capital or an ICBM launch area, which is limited to 100 interceptors.

Limitations imposed by the Treaty play a crucial role in determining the numerical composition and structure of strategic offensive forces. Even an ineffective ABM system affects the estimates of the number of offensive weapons required to inflict a prerequisite damage. The presence of an ABM would most significantly affect the calculations of the number of weapons required for a retaliatory attack and therefore could result in distorted estimates of the offensive potential necessary to achieve assured damage. As a result, an ABM defense could prevent the sides from reducing their offensive forces lower than a certain level. This factor raises the Treaty's role during the current strategic offensive weapons reduction by Russia and the United States.

The future of the ABM Treaty and of the progress in arms control would certainly depend on the general state of the relationships between Russia and the United States. Both countries inherited huge arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons as well as the relationship based on nuclear deterrence. At the same time, despite serious differences in Russian and U.S. approaches to various international problems and sometimes unavoidable discrepancy of the two countries' national interests, one can hardly justify the development of relations founded on nuclear deterrence.

An analysis of the current state of the U.S.-Russian relations shows that attempts to abandon the ABM Treaty or substantially change its provisions could not result in any fundamental change in the relationship. Rather contrary, weakening the ABM Treaty would indeed encourage the elements of mistrust and confrontation between the two countries and prevent deep reductions of nuclear weapons.

This conclusion is based primarily on the fact that mechanism that ensured the effectiveness of the ABM limitations regime for more than 25 years in recent years has substantially changed. The current reductions of strategic offensive forces limit the countries' ability to take steps that would be required in a case one side breaks out of the Treaty. The difficult economic situation in Russia makes its position even more vulnerable, for Russia would find it very difficult to take measures that would neutralize deployment of an ABM system.

Another important factor that provided a solid base for the ABM Treaty limitations was that both sides had sufficient time to respond to an ABM deployment. In this area the situation has changed radically too, first of all as a result of U.S. efforts to create ABM systems for theater missile defense. Although it is very unlikely that theater missile defenses will be used for creating a strategic ABM system, some of their elements could serve as a base for a nationwide ABM system. Moreover, the United States does not rule out the possibility of deploying a strategic ABM system oriented against a limited strategic ballistic missile strike. As a result, deployment of a theater missile defense as well as large-scale efforts to create the so called "thin" nationwide ABM system would substantially reduce the time necessary for deploying a full-scale strategic defense of the U.S. territory. Since Russia would be tied up by the arms control treaty obligations and difficult economic conditions, it would take it much longer time to respond.

An analysis of the current situation shows that preservation of the ABM Treaty would allow Russia to develop its relations with the United States regardless of the latter's ability to build a strategic nationwide defense. This will, in turn, enable the continuation of strategic arms reductions and, as a result, a gradual change of the nature of relationships between the two countries. From the Russian perspective, an alternative to the ABM Treaty is adoption of measures that will let Russia keep its retaliatory potential even in the case the United States deploys a strategic ABM system. One of the most effective ways to preserve this possibility is for Russia to refuse to go below the START I levels.

The possibility of the United States deploying an ABM system puts certain requirements to the structure of Russian strategic forces as well as to their readiness. In particular, since an ABM system can be most efficient when defending against a weakened retaliatory strike, survivability of strategic platforms and the ability to launch them on warning begin to play a much more important role.

To strengthen its position on the ABM Treaty Russia should develop a realistic plan that would aim at neutralizing a possible deployment of a strategic ABM system. This plan could involve arming of existing ICBMs with penetration aids, increasing the number of strategic platforms, and, possibly, MIRVing its ICBMs. No doubt, implementing such programs would require a major effort. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that their implementation will be necessary only if the United States starts deploying a strategic ABM defense.

A concrete realistic program of actions in case the United States deploys an ABM defense against Russia would allow Russia to continue weapon reductions and, eventually, would certainly affect the U.S. position on abandoning the ABM Treaty.

On the whole, Russia should take a fairly firm position in regards to preserving the ABM Treaty. A first step could be the recognition that the current U.S. ABM developments would eventually lead to abandoning of the ABM Treaty. In particular, the agreement on demarcation between strategic and non-strategic missile defenses would eliminate almost all limits on ABM systems development. As a result, Russia should make its policy with the assumption that the ABM Treaty's limits do not have any force in reality. By properly accounting for this fact, Russia could work out a policy that would allow it to continue the strategic arms reduction process.

Overall, it seems that Russia will be able to reduce its strategic offensive weapons to the 1,500 level without endangering its security, if it conducts a balanced and firm policy towards preserving the ABM Treaty. Unfortunately, the current Russian policy effectively encourages the United States to circumvent the Treaty and leaves Russia without any leverage that could be used in the future to prevent the United States from abandoning the Treaty.

4.4.2. Limiting Threats for Strategic Submarines on Patrol

Banning or limiting anti-submarine activity in SSBN patrol areas is as important to Russia as the observance of the ABM Treaty, since in both cases the issue is the limitation of strategic defense systems. Although some Russian experts clearly exaggerate the U.S. anti-submarine warfare capability against Russian SSBNs, the U.S. Navy's activity in Russian patrol areas is, overall, destabilizing. At least, covert attempts to chase Russian SSBNs by U.S. SSNs could cause unintended collisions which may lead to submarines' sinking, the death of crews, and environmental contamination.⁴⁶

As far back as in late 1970s, a proposal to restrict nuclear-powered submarine patrol areas was first raised at U.S.-Soviet negotiations. However, all Soviet attempts to discuss this issue have been constantly rejected by the U.S. on the grounds that the idea is contrary to the main principle of the U.S. Navy: freedom of navigation. Another stumbling block is the lack of adequate technical means for the verification of violations of such an agreement even if it is reached. Characteristically, when foreign nuclear-powered submarines are spotted in Russian territorial waters, it is not always possible even to present substantiated proof of their nationality, not to mention forcing the transgressor to surface and detaining it.

It seems that the Russian side should be more persistent in urging the U.S. to adopt measures limiting the anti-submarine defense.⁴⁷ Since a real threat to Russian SSBNs is presented only by U.S. attack SSNs,⁴⁸ two steps are possible:

1. Banning clandestine activity of non-strategic nuclear-powered submarines in agreed areas (SSBN patrol areas)

The implication is to ban clandestine activity of U.S. SSNs in the Barents, White, Kara Seas, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, and in the Central Arctic. Russian non-strategic submarines are not to approach North America closer than 1,500 kilometers when acting clandestinely.

The parties should inform one another about submarines in such areas at least once every 24 hours, and show the submarine to the other party if requested. Such organizational measures will prevent from constant secret tracking of SSBNs even in those cases when it is technically feasible.

Restricting anti-submarine activity in SSBN patrol areas could become an important supplement to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas effective since 1973. It could reflect the spirit of the times and increase confidence between the United States and Russia. At minimum, unilateral announcements by the U.S. and Russian presidents could be useful for limiting covert anti-submarine activity.

2. Limiting the Number of Deployed Non-Strategic Submarines

Actual technical capabilities of modern submarine sonars are such that even if an attack submarine can trail a noisy SSBN for a long period of time, it can track no more than one SSBN at a time.⁴⁹ That's why a permitted number of attack SSNs should correspond to a number of the other side's strategic submarines. For instance, if strategic offensive forces are reduced to 1,500 warheads, each side apparently will not be able to deploy more than 10-15 SSBNs. Therefore, it seems expedient to limit each party to 20-25 deployed attack submarines.

If such measures are taken, the U.S. will have to additionally retire 20-35 submarines as compared to current plans.⁵⁰ Possibly, Americans will agree to such proposals because they will be able to cut expenditures on upgrading the existing submarines and new construction which should begin next century.

By the beginning of START III reductions Russia will apparently have not more than 50 nuclear-powered submarines, so their number could be decreased by saving money on repairs and upgrading. It should be noted that some missions of Russian non-strategic nuclear-powered submarines can be assigned to diesel submarines.

It is important to underscore that restrictions on the activity and/or number of non-strategic nuclear submarines will also permit to reduce the counterforce potential of SLCMs since the same delivery vehicles are used for cruise missiles.

4.4.3. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Development of High Precision Weapons. NATO Enlargement

In addition to strategic nuclear armaments, an important role in the correlation of military potentials on regional basis is played by tactical nuclear and high-precision weapons. An analysis of combat characteristics of some tactical weapons shows that the division of nuclear weapons into strategic and tactical is rather theoretical. In a number of cases, tactical nuclear weapons - having a larger yield and comparable delivery range - could fulfill strategic missions.

Military experts also draw attention to the development and possible combat use of conventional high-precision weapons. Initially, high-precision weapons were regarded as effective for tactical use. However, subsequent use including the use of high-precision weapons in the Gulf War, demonstrated that their capabilities increasingly approach those of tactical nuclear weapons. At present, the use of modern high-precision weapons as a means of strategic attack and deterrence is on the list of the U.S. highest priorities of military planning. High-precision weapons could aid in assuring the destruction of dispersed individual targets incapacitating an entire strategic facility. Massive use of high-precision weapons should serve as a basis for "assured deterrence by conventional means."⁵¹

As high-precision weapons are further developed and accumulated they will have greater impact on strategic stability. New weapons are able to undermine strategic stability as a result of two factors. Firstly, there will be a temptation to use the advantages of high-precision weapons in order to achieve the set military goals. Secondly, the party whose strategic nuclear potential is vulnerable to the adversary's high-precision weapons could be forced to use nuclear weapons first out of fear to become disarmed.

All this necessitates control over the construction and accumulation of tactical nuclear and high-precision weapons, consideration of their impact on the correlation of the parties' forces and the strategic stability level.⁵²

Tactical nuclear and high-precision weapons are becoming even more pivotal in the context of NATO's eastward enlargement. Some Russian experts tend to think that to compensate NATO's newly acquired advantage in conventional weapons Russia will have to rely more on its tactical nuclear weapons similarly to NATO's reliance on the Western allies' tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War in order to offset the U.S.S.R.'s superiority in conventional weapons.⁵³ Also, there are discussions of unilateral actions that could be taken if NATO ignores Russian interests in the future. In particular, it is proposed to strengthen Russian western military districts, to target tactical missile systems on the territories of NATO's new member-states, to establish a new anti-NATO alliance by applying political, economic and military pressure, to introduce economic sanctions against Central, East European and Baltic countries. However, it must be said that such measures will push Russia to isolation from Europe and ensue a rolling back to a Cold-War-like confrontation. It seems that this is in fact the most serious threat to Russia from the consequences of NATO expansion. That's why Russia should when possible avoid coercive methods and rely on political and diplomatic efforts to solve complex foreign policy problems.⁵⁴

It should also be pointed out that the reduction of nuclear weapons and the weakening of the latter's role in international politics in future will inevitably take place at the backdrop of an objective factor, i.e. increased capabilities of conventional weapons. Due to objective trends, Russia will apparently find itself in less favorable conditions than its potential adversaries. Thus it seems that it's in Russia's interests, on the one hand, not to let its security decline as a result of nuclear weapons reductions and, on the other, to avert the shift of the mission currently assigned to nuclear weapons to conventional weapons.

To solve this problem Russia should use and develop the available methods.⁵⁵ For instance, the CFE Treaty continues to be vital for guaranteeing security of Russia's European territory. The Treaty can be modified not only as a result of changes in geopolitics but also in capabilities of conventional weapons. Russia should be interested to create a similar relationship in the Pacific region and on the CIS southern borders.

Russia faces a historic opportunity to become an initiator of preventive policy towards the improvement of the existing and the development of new weapons. It is crucial to identify in time potential technological breakthroughs, to evaluate the possibilities and consequences of their military use in order to create a regime of laws and agreements inhibiting further development of these technologies in an undesirable direction. In particular, already today's urgent issues are not only restrictions on development, deployment and use of anti-missile or laser weapons, but existence of new types of information warfare or high-tech weapons.

Openness in the area of conventional weapons should be an inalienable part of the transparency system in inter-state relations in order to lower the role of nuclear weapons and achieve their radical reduction and elimination in the future.

Conclusion

• Despite the post-Cold-War improvements in international climate, nuclear weapons remain an important instrument of foreign policy. They cannot be annulled by a declaration, and conditions for their presence in the world will quite likely endure for more than one decade. Nevertheless, Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals are excessive even in the framework of the proclaimed deterrence strategies. Further joint reduction of deployed strategic offensive forces would allow to lessen the economic burden on both countries, to lower significantly the risk of an unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, and their proliferation. Following the path of nuclear arsenals' reduction would strengthen confidence between the leading nuclear powers and demonstrate to the world their desire for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

• Nuclear superpowers could make an important step toward lowering the role of nuclear weapons in global politics and in strategic stability by adopting a concept of non-confrontational nuclear deterrence. The new concept should exclude provocative elements of the Cold War era. Nuclear weapons should be regarded as extreme means of a nation's protection against the threat of destruction. When shaping a new configuration of its SNF Russia should put an emphasis on guaranteeing their survivability under any wartime conditions, maintaining key elements of the strategic forces as well as the industrial and scientific infrastructure.

• Ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian parliament is currently the main obstacle on the way toward further disarmament. Despite all the Treaty's shortcomings its ratification and implementation are in Russia's interests.

• Russia's obligations under START II should be linked to a new U.S.-Russian agreement on the next stage of strategic offensive forces' reduction. We believe that at the next stage strategic forces should be reduced to 1,500 warheads on each side by 2008. To prevent START III from sharing the fate of START II it is vital to correct the imbalance ensuing from the previous negotiations. This seems possible if the new Treaty incorporates measures for the elimination of warheads and warhead RV platforms of the eliminated strategic offensive weapons, limiting the number of deployed SLBM launchers, guaranteeing the irreversibility of the conversion of heavy bombers, and other specific proposals for decreasing the breakout potential. It also seems important to include verifiable measures for eliminating or limiting nuclear SLCMs and strengthening the transparency regime which could also encompass production and dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

• If  START III is signed, then prospects for its ratification and implementation by the Russian side will to a large extent be determined by such factors as the development in the United States of an ABM system, dynamics and nature of NATO enlargement, and whether Russian interests are going to be considered in the process. Russia should also insist on working out U.S.-Russian agreements relating to limits on the counterforce capability of conventional high-precision weapons and anti-submarine warfare. This becomes particularly important because the survivability of strategic offensive forces will certainly be a decisive factor during the process of further nuclear reductions.