Chemical and Biological Weapons:
Possession and Programs
Past and Present¹

	Chemical				Biological
Country	Possession Status2	Possible Agents	Signed CWC3	Ratified CWC3	Program Status	Possible Agents	Signed BWC4	Ratified BWC4
Algeria	Possible5	Unknown	01/13/93	08/14/95	Research effort, but no evidence of production6	Unknown	No	No
Canada	Former7	-mustard gas -phosgene -lewisite8	01/13/93	09/26/95	Former program9	-anthrax -rinderpest virus -botulinum toxin -Rocky Mountain spotted fever -plague -tularemia -ricin10	04/10/72	09/18/72
China	Probable11	Unknown	01/13/93	04/25/97	Likely maintains an offensive program12	Unknown	-	11/15/84*
Cuba	Possible13	Unknown	01/13/93	04/29/97	None/Unknown	None/Unknown	04/10/72	04/21/76
Egypt	Probable14	-mustard gas -phosgene -sarin -VX15	No	No	Research program16	-anthrax -botulinum toxin -plague -cholera -tularemia -glanders -brucellosis -melioidosis -psittacosis -Q fever -Japanese B encephalitis -Eastern equine encephalitis -influenza -smallpox -mycotoxins17	04/10/72	No
Ethiopia	Probable18	Unknown	01/14/93	05/13/96	None/Unknown	None/Unknown	04/10/72	05/26/75
France	Former19	-mustard gas -phosgene20	01/13/93	03/02/95	Former program21	Unknown	-	09/27/84*
Germany	Former22	-phosgene -cyanide -mustard gas -tabun -sarin -soman23	01/13/93	08/12/94	Former program24	-plague -cholera -yellow fever -typhus25	04/10/72	11/28/72
India	Known26	Unknown	01/14/93	09/03/96	Defensive research program27	Unknown	01/15/73	07/15/74
Iran	Probable28	-mustard gas -sarin -cyanide -phosgene29	01/13/93	11/03/97	Research with possible production of agents30	Unknown	04/10/72	08/22/73
Iraq	Known; under UN inspection 31	-mustard gas -sarin -tabun -VX32	No	No	Previously active research and production program; under UN inspection; retains elements of its program33	-anthrax -botulinum toxin -gas gangrene -aflatoxin -trichothecene mycotoxins -wheat cover smut -ricin -hemorrhagic conjuctivitis virus -rotavirus -camel pox34	05/11/72	06/19/91**
	Chemical				Biological
Country	Possession Status2	Possible Agents	Signed CWC3	Ratified CWC3	Program Status	Possible Agents	Signed BWC4	Ratified BWC4
Israel	Probable35	Unknown36	01/13/93	No	Research program, but no evidence of a production effort37	Unknown	No	No
Italy	Former38	-mustard gas -phosgene39	01/13/93	12/08/95	None/Unknown	None/Unknown	04/10/72	05/30/75
Japan	Former40	-phosgene -chloropicrin -cyanide -mustard gas -lewisite41	01/13/93	09/15/95	Former program42	-anthrax -tularemia -plague -botulinum toxin -smallpox -glanders -typhoid -typhus43	04/10/72	06/08/82
Libya	Probable44	-mustard gas -sarin -tabun -lewisite -phosgene45	No	No	Research program46	Unknown	-	01/19/82*
Myanmar (Burma)	Probable47	Unknown	01/14/93	No	None/Unknown	None/Unknown	04/10/72	No
N. Korea	Probable48	-adamsite -mustard gas -hydrogen cyanide -phosgene -sarin -soman -tabun -VX49	No	No	Research program50	-anthrax -cholera -plague -smallpox -botulinum toxin -hemorrhagic fever -typhoid -yellow fever51	-	03/13/87*
Pakistan	Probable52	Unknown	01/13/93	10/28/97	None/Unknown	None/Unknown	04/10/72	09/25/74
Russia	Known53	-VX -sarin -soman -mustard gas -lewisite -phosgene -A-232 -Novichok binary agents54	01/13/93	11/05/97	Defensive research program; some work beyond legitimate defense activities may continue55	-anthrax -tularemia -brucellosis -plague -Venezuelan equine encephalitis -typhus -Q-fever -botulinum toxin -smallpox -glanders -Marburg infection -Ebola -Machupo virus -Argentinian hemorrhagic fever -yellow fever -Lassa fever -Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis -Japanese encephalitis -Russian spring-summer encephalitis -psittacosis -ornithosis -rinderpest virus -African swine fever virus -wheat stem rust -rice blast56	04/10/72	03/26/75
	Chemical				Biological
Country	Possession Status2	Possible Agents	Signed CWC3	Ratified CWC3	Program Status	Possible Agents	Signed BWC4	Ratified BWC4
S. Africa	Former57	-cyanide -Ecstasy -thallium -Mandrax -paraquat -paraoxon58	01/14/93	09/13/95	Former program59	-anthrax -cholera -botulinum toxin -salmonella60	04/10/72	11/03/75
S. Korea	Probable61	Unknown	01/14/93	04/28/97	None/Unknown	None/Unknown	04/10/72	06/25/87
Sudan	Possible62	Unknown	05/25/99	05/29/99	None/Unknown	None/Unknown	No	No
Syria	Probable63	-mustard gas -sarin -VX64	No	No	Research program65	-anthrax -botulinum toxin66	04/14/72	No
Taiwan	Probable67	Unknown	No	No	Possible research program68	Unknown	04/10/72	02/09/73
U.K.	Former69	-phosgene -mustard gas -lewisite70	01/13/93	05/13/96	Former program71	-anthrax72	04/10/72	03/26/75
U.S.	Known73	-mustard gas -sarin -soman -VX -lewisite -binary agents74	01/13/93	04/25/97	Defensive research program75	-anthrax -brucellosis -botulinum toxin -Eastern and Western equine encephalitis -Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis -Argentinian hemorrhagic fever -Korean hemorrhagic fever -Bolivian hemorrhagic fever -tularemia -Q-fever -Lassa fever -glanders -melioidosis -plague -yellow fever -psittacosis -typhus -dengue fever -Rift Valley fever -Chikungunya disease virus -ricin -rice blast -rice brown spot disease -late blight of potato -stem rust of cereal -rinderpest virus -Newcastle disease virus -fowl plague virus76	04/10/72	03/26/75
Viet Nam	Possible77	Unknown	01/13/93	No	None/Unknown	None/Unknown	-	06/20/80*
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY)	Known78	-sarin -sulfur mustard -nitrogen mustard -BZ -CS -CN -LSD-25 -chloropicrin -cyanogen chloride -soman -tabun -VX -siperit -lewsite -phosgene79	No	No	None/Unknown80	None/Unknown	04/10/72	10/25/73

*Denotes countries which acceded to the treaty.

¹ This chart summarizes data available from open sources. Precise assessment of a state's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs were, and/or are, secret and cannot be independently assessed.

²

Known- where states have either declared their programs or there is clear evidence of chemical weapons possession

• Probable- where states have been publicly named by government or military officials as 'probable' chemical weapons possessors or as producing chemical weapons
• Possible- where states have been widely identified as possibly having chemical weapons or a CW program by sources other than government officials
• Former- where states have acknowledged having a chemical weapons stockpile and/or CW program in the past

³ "Signatory States to the Chemical Weapons Convention," Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [Online] http://www.opcw.nl/memsta/namelist.htm.

⁴ "Ratifications to the BTWC," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [Online] http://www.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-rat.html.

See also
"Parties and Signatories of the Biological Weapons Convention," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [Online] http://www.acda.gov/treaties/bwc1.htm#3
** Iraq ratified the BWC following the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, which in addition to establishing UNSCOM, also "invited" Iraq to ratify the 1972 Convention (Paragraph 7). S/RES/687 (8 April 1991) [Online] gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s91/4.

⁵ Algeria may be developing chemical weapons.
Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: National Efforts, War Fighting Capabilities, Weapons Lethality, Terrorism, and Control Implications" (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), p. 13, cited in "Algeria: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs," Center for Nonproliferation Studies [Online] http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/algeria.htm.

⁶ Algeria is reportedly conducting research into biological weapons, but there is no evidence of a production effort.
Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: National Efforts, War Fighting Capabilities, Weapons Lethality, Terrorism, and Control Implications," p. 13, cited in "Algeria: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs," Center for Nonproliferation Studies [Online] http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/algeria.htm.

⁷ During World War II, Canada manufactured chemical munitions and purchased both lewisite and phosgene from the U.S. Army. In 1946, following the war, Canada destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), p. 187.

See also
John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1989).

⁸ As part of its World War II chemical weapons program, Canada produced mustard gas and phosgene and procured quantities of mustard gas, lewisite, and phosgene from the United States.
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today, p. 187.

⁹ The Office of Technology Assessment includes Canada in a list of countries that have admitted to having had "offensive [biological] weapon munition supplies or development programs in the past."
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993) p. 63.

Canada's biological weapons program began in 1941 and included U.S. scientists. In 1942, the Canadians also began collaborating with the United Kingdom's biological weapons effort.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), p. 118-119.

See also
John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947.

¹⁰ In its work with the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada conducted research on several biological agents, including anthrax, botulinum toxin, ricin, rinderpest virus, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, plague, and tularemia.
John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947, pp.108, 120, 210, 218, 223, 243.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 118-119.

¹¹ Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence, identified China as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 before the Committee on Armed Services, 102^nd Congress, Second Session, March 7, 1991 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 107.

China was referred to by the U.S. Department of Defense as producing and "capable of using a wide variety of agents."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997) [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/ne_asia.html#china.

An article in The Economist suggests that China might "have destroyed [its] chemical weapons before signing the CWC."
"Chemical Weapons. Just Checking," The Economist 347 (May 2, 1997), p. 42.

¹² The DOD states that it is likely China has "maintained an offensive biological warfare program since acceding to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/ne_asia.html#china.

ACDA reports that "there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive [biological] program."
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1997) [Online] http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm.

¹³ The following are as cited in a chart in Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 168-171.

• Thom Shanker, "West underwrites Third World's chemical arms," Chicago Tribune, 3 Apr. 1989, pp.1,6; and "Lack of candor blocks chemical arms treaty," 4 Apr. 1989, pp. 1,6 (source given as U.S. government official).
  -Shanker identifies Cuba as probably having chemical weapons.
• Harvey J. McGeorge, "Chemical addiction," Defense & Foreign Affairs, Apr. 1989, pp. 16-19, 32-33.
  -McGeorge lists Cuba as a possible chemical possessor.
• Senator John S. McCain, "Proliferation in the 1990s: implications for U.S. policy and force planning," Table 1, Congressional Record, 2 Nov. 1989, p. S14605; "Estimates are based on a variety of sources, including unclassified testimony by CIA Director William H. Webster, Seth Carus, David Goldberg, Elisa D. Harris and others and do not reflect the estimates of the U.S. Government."
  -The report identifies Cuba as a suspected possessor state.

¹⁴ Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Egypt as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

A summary chart included in an article by Anthony H. Cordesman indicates that Egypt has a stockpile of chemical weapons.
Anthony H. Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," Stability and Instability in the Middle East, Volume III (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies) [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html .

See also
Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review, 5 (Spring-Summer 1998), pp. 48-58.

For further information on Egypt's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/egypt.htm.

¹⁵ Egypt likely possesses sarin, VX, mustard and phosgene.
Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," p. 49.

Russian intelligence reports that Egypt has assimilated "techniques for the production of nerve and blister agents."
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 103^rd Congress, First Session, February 24, 1993 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993) p. 92.

¹⁶ "The United States believes that Egypt had developed biological warfare agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist."
ACDA Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress [Online] http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm.

A Russian intelligence report cites Egypt as having "a program of military-applied research in the area of biological weapons." It also states that there is no evidence that weapons for military use have been developed.
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 93.

"Egypt appears to have developed several natural pathogens and toxins as warfare agents and has recently taken the first steps to acquire a capability for the genetic engineering of microbial pathogens."
Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," p. 56.

Cordesman cites Egypt as researching biological weapons.
Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," (see chart) [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

¹⁷ This list represents those agents on which Egypt has reportedly conducted applied research.
Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," pp. 54-55.

¹⁸ Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Ethiopia as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

¹⁹ In a 1988 speech to the United Nations, French President, Mitterrand claimed that France had no chemical weapons, and would produce none.
Victor A. Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 123-124.

An article in The Economist suggests that France might "have destroyed [its] chemical weapons before signing the CWC."
"Chemical Weapons. Just Checking," The Economist, p. 42.

²⁰ At the start of World War II, the French had a stockpile of mustard gas and phosgene.
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 117.

Testing of chemical weapons occured at a cite called B2-Namous in Algeria.
Vincent Jauvert, "Quand la France Teste des armes chimiques en Algerie," Le Nouvel Observateur (Oct. 23-29, 1997), pp. 10-22.

²¹ The Office of Technology Assessment includes France in a list of countries that have admitted to having had "offensive [biological] weapon munition supplies or development programs in the past."
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 63.

²² Following World War II, "West Germany unilaterally renounced the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons." With the signing of the revised Brussels Treaty in 1954 and the establishment of the Western European Union, West Germany's pledge not to manufacture NBC weapons became an international commitment subject to verification.
Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective, pp. 90-91.

²³ Germany's World War II stockpile of chemical weapons included phosgene, cyanide, mustard gas, sarin, and tabun.
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today, p. 127.

The Germans also reportedly produced soman.
John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947, p. 181.

²⁴ Germany's World War II biological weapons program was not institutionalized until the establishment of a research station at Posen in 1943. As Soviet forces moved toward the Posen facility in March 1945, work at the station ended--"without having accomplished anything very startling."
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 117.

²⁵ Plague, cholera, typhus, and yellow fever were among the agents studied by Germany's biological weapons program. SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 117.

²⁶ Under the CWC India has declared possession of a chemical weapons program.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/so_asia.html#india.

"India says chemical arsenal revelations won't hit security," Agence France Presse, June 26, 1997.

²⁷ "India has research and development facilities geared toward biological warfare defense."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/so_asia.html#india.

²⁸ Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 98.

Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Iran as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

Iran is identified by DOD as able to produce agents and capable of using them on a limited scale.
Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#iran.

Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html .

For further information on Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm.

²⁹ Iran reportedly stockpiled cyanide, phosgene, and mustard gas after 1985.
Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

"At present the industrial production of mustard gas and sarin has been established in Iran."
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 98.

Iran "has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents"
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997 (Washington, DC: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1997) [Online] http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/acq1997.html#Iran.

³⁰ Iran "possesses [the] expertise and infrastructure to support biological warfare program. May have small quantities of agent available; seeking larger capability."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#iran.

"Iran probably has produced biological warfare agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents."
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress [Online] http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm.

Iran may be "involved in active [biological] weapons production, but no evidence to date that this is the case."
Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

"Western countries have noted attempts by Iranian representatives to buy, unofficially, technology and biological materials used specifically for the production of biological weapons, in particular" mycotoxins.
Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century," Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998) p. 31.

³¹ Iraq's chemical weapons program "suffered considerable damage from Coalition bombing and UNSCOM destruction," but it is likely that Iraq "has hidden precursor chemicals, agents, munitions, documentation for future effort." In addition, Iraq "has rebuilt key portions of production facilities for commercial use."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#iraq.

"Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime."
Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "Latest Six-Monthly Report" (April 16, 1998) [Online] http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s98-332.htm.

See also
E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September/October 1997), p. 38.

For further information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iraq.htm and CNS's "Special Collection on the Iraq Crisis" web page at http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/index.htm.

³² In the past Iraq produced mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and VX.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#iraq.

Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051" (June 10, 1997) [Online] http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s97-774.htm.

³³ "Despite Coalition bombing, UNSCOM destruction, and UN sanctions and monitoring, Iraq may retain elements of its old program, including some missile warheads."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#iraq.

"The United States believes that Iraq is capable of producing biological warfare agents and is probably intent on continuing its offensive BW efforts if the threat of UNSCOM inspections and long-term monitoring are removed."
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1995 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) [Online] http://www.acda.gov/reports/complian.htm.

United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "Latest Six-Monthly Report" (April 16, 1998) [Online] http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s98-332.htm.

Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

³⁴ According to ACDA, Iraq produced anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, ricin, wheat cover smut (economic weapon), and researched Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), hemorrhagic conjuctivitis virus, rotavirus, and camel pox.
ACDA, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1995 Annual Report to Congress [Online] http://www.acda.gov/reports/complian.htm

Iraq's biological weapons program worked with anthrax, botulinum toxin, gas gangrene, aflatoxin, trichothecene mycotoxins, wheat cover smut, and ricin.
Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century," Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998) p. 27.

Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "Fourth Report under Resolution 1051" (June 10, 1997) [Online] http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s97-774.htm.

³⁵ Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Israel as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

Israel has completed extensive research into gas warfare and defense and may have some production facilities. Additionally, Israel may have stocks of bombs, rockets, and artillery.
Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html .

The London Sunday Times reports that Israeli F-16 fighters have been equipped to carry chemical weapons and that their crews have been trained on the use of such weapons.
Uzi Mahnaimi, "Israeli Jets Equipped For Chemical Warfare," London Sunday Times, October 4, 1998.

For further information on Israel's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel.htm.

³⁶ While it is unclear exactly what chemical agents Israel may produce, Dutch officials have identified that an El Al 747 that crashed in Amsterdam in 1992 was carrying a shipment of DMMP destined for Israel. DMMP is a nerve gas precursor used in the manufacture of sarin gas.
Uzi Mahnaimi, "Israeli Jets Equipped For Chemical Warfare," London Sunday Times, October 4, 1998.

³⁷ Israel has conducted research into weapons and defense and has the ability to produce biological weapons; however, there is no indication of a production effort.
Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html

A Russian intelligence report indicates that Israel has a biological research program of a general nature "in which elements of a military-applied purpose are present."
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 94.

The London Sunday Times reports that Israeli F-16 fighters have been equipped to carry biological weapons and that their crews have been trained on the use of such weapons.
Uzi Mahnaimi, "Israeli Jets Equipped For Chemical Warfare," London Sunday Times, October 4, 1998.

³⁸ As part of the 1947 Peace Treaty, Italy is forbidden from possessing chemical weapons, even for deterrent purposes.
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today, p. 187.

³⁹ The Italian chemical weapons inventory during World War II included mustard gas and phosgene.
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 292.

⁴⁰ The Economist reports that Japan ended its chemical weapons program "years ago," placing it together with Britain, which ended its program in the 1950s.
"Chemical Weapons. Just Checking," The Economist, p. 42.

While Japan might have ended its CW program years ago, it remains legally responsible for hundreds of thousands of chemical munitions it abandoned in China during World War II. In an article discussing the problems involved in disposing of the weapons left behind in China, a Japanese newspaper reports that "[s]ince Japan's postwar defense forces do not have chemical weapons,'there is no section in the Japanese government that is completely familiar with neutralization of chemical weapons.'"
Masato Ishizawa, "Chemical Weapons Return to Haunt Japan: Bombs Left in China Pose Dangerous Task of Removal, Disposal," The Nikkei Weekly, January 20, 1997, p. 1.

Chinese officials claim that the Japanese left over two million chemical munitions in China, while Japanese officials insist the number is closer to 700,000.
"Chemical weapons," Mainichi Daily News, July 28, 1998, p.2.

George Wehrfritz, Hideko Takayama, and Lijia MacLeod, "In Search of Buried Poison," Newsweek 132 (July 20, 1998).

For further information on Japan's abandoned chemical weapons in China, see Hongmei Deng and Peter O'Meara Evans, "Social and Environmental Aspects of Abandoned Chemial Weapons in China," The Nonproliferation Review, 4 (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 101-108.

See also, "Abandoned and Old Japanese Chemical Weapons," [Online] http://www.tcp-ip.or.jp/~e-ogawa/CWMENU.HTM.

⁴¹ Japan's World War II stockpile of chemical weapons included phosgene, chloropicrin (a lung irritant), cyanide, mustard gas, and lewisite.
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today, p. 127.

⁴² Between 1937 and 1945, Japan operated a biological weapons program in occupied Manchuria.
United States Army, Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), "Medical Defense Against Biological Warfare Agents Course: History of Biological Warfare" [Online] http://140.139.42.105/content/BioWarCourse/HISTORY/HISTORY.html (accessed October 1998).

⁴³ In its eight years of operation, the Japanese biological weapons program examined anthrax, tularemia, plague, botulinum toxin, smallpox, glanders, typhoid, and typhus for potential weapons use.
USAMRIID, "History of Biological Warfare," [Online] http://140.139.42.105/content/BioWarCourse/HISTORY/HISTORY.html (accessed October 1998).

⁴⁴ Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 100.

Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Libya as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

Libya produced blister and nerve agents in the 1980s and is currently constructing an underground chemical agent production facility at Tarhunah.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#libya.

Libya "continues to pursue an independent production capability for" chemical weapons.
CIA, Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997 [Online] http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/acq1997.html#Libya.

For further information on Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/libya.htm.

⁴⁵ "In the early 1990s, Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulphur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun...In March 1990, American and German intelligence sources claimed that Libya had produced approximately 30 tons of mustard gas at Rabta." Another plant was also reported to produce lewisite.
Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review, 4 (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 94.

According to a Russian source, Libya has produced mustard gas, sarin, and phosgene.
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 100.

⁴⁶ According to the DOD, Libya's biological weapons program is in the research and development stage.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#libya.

"Libya has the expertise to produce small quantities of biological equipment for its BW program and...is seeking to move its research program into a program of weaponized BW agents."
ACDA, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress [Online] http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm
"There is information indicating that Libya is engaged in initial testing in the area of biological weapons."
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 100.

⁴⁷ Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Myanmar as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

⁴⁸ Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Deterrence Series, Case Study 5: North Korea (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), p. 5.

Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified North Korea as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

The DOD reports that North Korea "[p]roduces and is capable of using a wide variety of [chemical] agents."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/ne_asia.html#north.

⁴⁹ Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Deterrence Series, Case Study 5: North Korea (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), p. 5.

"North Korea has a chemical weapons program that, according to the CIA, includes mustard and blister agents."
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, Flashpoints and Force Structure (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997) [Online] http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa97/sa97ch11.html.

⁵⁰ North Korea "[p]ursued biological warfare research and development for many years. Possesses biotechnical infrastructure capable of supporting limited biological warfare effort."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/ne_asia.html#north.

Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Deterrence Series, Case Study 5: North Korea, p. 11-12.

⁵¹ Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Deterrence Series, Case Study 5: North Korea, p. 12.

Russian intelligence reports that North Korea is conducting military applied research on anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague and smallpox.
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 99.

⁵² Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Pakistan as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

"Pakistan has the ability to transition from research and development to chemical agent production."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/so_asia.html#india.

"[R]esearch of an applied military nature is being conducted" by Pakistan in the area of chemical weapons.
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 101.

⁵³ The Department of Defense reports that research into chemical weapons continues in Russia, with Russian officials asserting that it is for defensive purposes only.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/fsu.html#russia.

⁵⁴ "Chemical weapons distribution at the Russian Storage sites," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [Online] http://www.sipri.se/cbw/research/sipri-bicc-cw-map.html

Russia's chemical weapons program has reportedly developed a new class of advanced binary chemical weapons, referred to as the Novichok series. A-232 is both a unitary agent and a Novichok precursor.
Dr. Vil S. Mirzayanov, "Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider's View," Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995) pp. 24-25.

Clifford Krauss, "U.S. Urges Russia To End Production of Nerve Gas," The New York Times, February 6, 1997.

Frank Von Hippel, "Russian whistleblower faces jail," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 49 (March 1993) [Online] http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/m93/m93vonhippel.html.

⁵⁵ According to the DOD, some work "outside the scope of legitimate biological defense activity may be occurring" in Russia.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/index.html.

"[S]ome facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to produce biological warfare agents."
ACDA, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress [Online] http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm.

⁵⁶ "According to its declaration, Russia maintained an offensive research and development program until March 1992 that worked with anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, plague, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, typhus, and Q-fever. With respect to toxins, Russia claimed that the only natural toxin studied in its program was botulinum toxin."
Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State, "Joint US/UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons," Press Release, Office of Public Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, September 14, 1992), cited in Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century," Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998), p. 29.

Russian defector Kanatjan Alibekov (Kenneth Alibek), a former deputy director of the Soviet/Russian biological warfare development program, lists the following agents as either weaponized or researched by the Soviet/Russian program: smallpox, plague, anthrax, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, glanders, brucellosis, Marburg virus, Ebola virus, Argentinian hemorrhagic fever, Machupo virus, yellow fever, Lassa fever, Japanese encephalitis, Russian spring-summer encephalitis, tularemia, typhus, Q-fever, psittacosis, ornithosis, rinderpest virus, African swine fever virus, wheat stem rust, and rice blast.
Dr. Kenneth Alibek, statement before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Terrorism and Intelligence Operations: Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee, 105^th Congress, Second Session, May 20, 1998, [Online]http://www.house.gov/jec/hearings/intell/alibek.htm.

⁵⁷ A government spokesman stated that South Africa's chemical weapons program has been "terminated, and that the material for offensive purposes in government storage has been destroyed." The program was shut down in 1993 and its products dumped at sea.
Buchizya Mseteka, "S. Africa Says it Terminated Chemical Weapons Scheme," Reuters, June 15, 1998.

Lynne Duke, "Doubts Arise on Junking of Chemical Arms; S. African Panel Told Some Drugs, Formulas May Have Been Secretly Held Back," Washington Post, July 9, 1998, A24.

⁵⁸ David Beresford, "Mandela on apartheid's poison list," The Age, 6/11/98, [Online] http://www.theage.com.au/daily/980611/news/news18.html.

Chris Opperman, "Prosecutors Ecstatic as Basson's Buddy Talks," Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), June 27, 1997

"SADF 'made Ecstasy for riot control,'" Business Day, June 10, 1998

Lynne Duke, "Doubts Arise on Junking of Chemical Arms; S. African Panel Told Some Drugs, Formulas May Have Been Secretly Held Back," Washington Post, July 9, 1998, A24.

"Apartheid-Era Scientist: Mandela was Target for Poisoning," Edmonton Journal Extra, June 10, 1998.

David Beresford, "Apartheid's Lab Rats," Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), June 12, 1998.

Andrew Maykuth, "Mandela's Government Becomes Ally of Ex-Foe," Philadelphia Inquirer, June 20, 1998.

**Paraquat is a widely used herbicide employed to kill broad leafed plants and grasses. Paraquat is extremely toxic to humans when inhaled or ingested. Paraoxon is an organophosphate pesticide toxic to humans.

⁵⁹ A government spokesman stated that South Africa's biological weapons program has been "terminated, and that the material for offensive purposes in government storage has been destroyed." The program was shut down in 1993 and its products dumped at sea.
Buchizya Mseteka, "S. Africa Says it Terminated Chemical Weapons Scheme," Reuters, 6/15/98.

⁶⁰ In his testimony before the Reconciliation and Truth Commission, Dr. Schalk van Rensburg indicated that South Africa's biological weapons program used cholera, anthrax, botulinum toxin, and salmonella in its activities.
Beresford, "Mandela on apartheid's poison list," [Online] http://www.theage.com.au/daily/980611/news/news18.html.

Maykuth, "Mandela's Government Becomes Ally of Ex-Foe."

⁶¹ Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified South Korea as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

Citing U.S. government sources, a 1997 article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists counts South Korea among those states suspected of having chemical weapons.
E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," p. 38.

The Economist reports that South Korea is among those countries that, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, have declared possessing chemical weapons.
"Chemical Weapons. Just Checking," The Economist, p. 42.

See footnote # 13. Shanker, "West underwrites Third World's chemical arms"; McCain, "Proliferation in the 1990s: implications for U.S. Policy and force planning;" in Burck and Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, pp. 168-171.

also cited in Burck and Flowerree chart:

• Elisa Harris, "Chemical weapons proliferation: current capabilities and prospects for control," New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery Capabilities in the Third World (Landham, Md.: Aspen Strategy Group, 1990), pp.70-72.
  -Harris classifies South Korea as "seeking to acquire CW weapons or a production capability, or as suspected of possessing CW weapons."

⁶² There is considerable uncertainty as to Sudan's chemical weapons status. For a well documented discussion of the debate please refer to the CNS Fact Sheet on Sudan, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs" [Online] http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/sudan.htm.

⁶³ Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Syria as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

The DOD reports that Syria "[p]roduces and is capable of using chemical agents" and that it is currently seeking an "independent chemical warfare capability."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/index.html.

"Syria already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and may be trying to develop more potent nerve agents."
CIA, Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997 [Online] http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/acq1997.html#Syria.

Syria has production facilities for nerve gas and possibly other chemical agents.
Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html.

See also
M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review, 5 (Fall 1997), pp. 104-111.

For further information on Syria's weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities, see the CNS country profile on the "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" web page at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/syria.htm.

⁶⁴ CDISS reports that Syria's chemical arsenal contians mustard gas, sarin, and VX.
"Devil's Brews Briefing: Syria," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, 1996.

"Syria has reportedly developed the capability to produce both mustard gas and nerve agents."
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, Flashpoints and Force Structure [Online] http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa97/sa97ch11.html.

The CIA reports that Syria has a stockpile of sarin.
CIA, Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997 [Online] http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/acq1997.html#Syria.

⁶⁵ Testifying before Congress in 1991, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks indicated that Syria had "developed an offensive BW capability."
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

Syria "[p]ossesses adequate biotechnical infrastructure to support biological warfare program" and might be "conducting research related to biological warfare."
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/index.html.

In its annual report to Congress, ACDA states that "it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive biological warfare capability."
ACDA, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress [Online] http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm.

⁶⁶ Syria has a "[p]robable production capability for anthrax and botulinum toxin, and possibly other agents."
Cordesman, "Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism," [Online] http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html

⁶⁷ Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Taiwan as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

⁶⁸ According to a Russian intelligence report, "Taiwan does not have biological weapons...[however], it has shown signs of conducting biological research of an applied military nature."
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 104.

ACDA reports that Taiwan has been upgrading its biotechnology capabilities, but states that the "evidence indicating a BW program is not sufficient to determine if Taiwan is engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC."
ACDA, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress [Online] http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm.

⁶⁹ The United Kingdom renounced its chemical weapons option in 1957 and subsequently destroyed its CW capabilities.
Edward M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study of Proliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) pp. 11, 162.

"Britain decided against building her own nerve-gas factory in the mid-1950s and, having taken that decision, discarded her residual World War II chemical weapons and closed down her chemical weapons research and development program."
Julian Perry Robinson, "Appendix C: United States and NATO Chemical Weapons," in Matthew Meselson, ed. Chemical Weapons and Chemical Arms Control (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1978) p. 113.

⁷⁰ The United Kingdom's World War II stockpile of chemical weapons included phosgene, mustard gas, and lewisite.
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II: CB Weapons Today, p. 127.

⁷¹ The Office of Technology Assessment includes the United Kingdom in a list of countries that have admitted to having had "offensive [biological] weapon munition supplies or development programs in the past."
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 63.

The United Kingdom's biological weapons program began in 1940 with the establishment of a small research unit within the U.K.'s chemical weapons program. In 1942, the British began working in collaboration with both Canada and the United States in biological weapons research.
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 117-118.

⁷² The British biological weapons program involved research on anthrax.
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 118.

⁷³ The United States stopped production of unitary chemical munitions in 1969.
"Chemical and Biological Warfare," The Military Balance 1988-1989 (London: IISS, 1988), p. 244.

In November 1985, Congress passed legislation calling for the destruction of 90 percent of the total U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical agents. On May 13, 1991, the Bush administration announced that U.S. stockpiles of both binary and unitary weapons would be detroyed when the CWC entered into force.
Amy E. Smithson, The U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Program: Views, Analysis, and Recommendations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994), pp. 96, 99.

The U.S. currently operates two chemical weapons destruction facilities, one on Johnston Island in the Pacific and one in Tooele, Utah. As of October 11, 1998, these two facilities had destroyed 12.2 percent of the total U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons.
"The Chemical Weapons Countdown," The Henry L. Stimson Center [Online] http://www.stimson.org/cwc/count.htm.

⁷⁴ U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command [Online] http://www.cbdcom.apgea.army.mil/FactSheets/index.html (site accessed September 1, 1998).
-The Department of Defense is in the proocess of reviewing defense information made available on the web. As such, this site may not be accessible at this time.

Included in the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile are 680.19 tons of binary weapons components.
"U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile Information Declassified," Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 22, 1996) [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1996/b012496_bt024-96.html.

⁷⁵ "In 1969, President Nixon disestablished offensive studies including the destruction of all stockpiles of agents and munitions." Destruction of biological weapon agent stocks and munitions was accomplished between May 1971 and May 1972. The study of biological weapons continued after 1969, but for defensive purposes only.
USAMRIID, "A History of Biological Warfare," [Online] http://140.139.42.105/content/BioWarCourse/HISTORY/HISTORY.html (accessed October 1998).

⁷⁶ Anthrax, brucellosis, Eastern and Western equine encephalitis, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, Argentinian hemorrhagic fever, Korean hemorrhagic fever, Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, Lassa fever, tularemia, and Q-fever are among the biological agents researched by the U.S. program for offensive and/or defensive purposes. All research since 1969 has been for defensive purposes.
USAMRIID, "A History of Biological Warfare," [Online] http://140.139.42.105/content/BioWarCourse/HISTORY/HISTORY.html (accessed October 1998).

According to SIPRI, the U.S. biological program studied the following agents: anthrax, glanders, brucellosis, melioidosis, tularemia, plague, yellow fever, psittacosis, typhus, dengue fever, Rift Valley fever, Chikungunya disease virus, ricin, rice blast, rice brown spot disease, late blight of potato, stem rust of cereal, rinderpest virus, Newcastle disease virus, fowl plague virus
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 122-123.

See also
John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1989).

⁷⁷ Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identified Vietnam as a "probable" chemical weapons possessor in testimony before Congress.
Brooks, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, p. 107.

⁷⁸ The Pentagon has reported the existence of chemical weapons in the FRY. (Judith Miller, "U.S. Officials Suspect Deadly Chemical Weapons in Yugoslav Army Arsenal" New York Times, April 16, 1999.)

The Federation of American Scientists has confirmed the existence of three operating chemical weapons facilities in Serbia, namely Prva Iskra, in Baric, Serbia; Miloje Blagojevic in Lucani, Serbia; and Milojie Zakic and Merima in Krusevic, Serbia. (FAS news release, "Chemical Agents in the Former Yugoslavia," Nuclear Forces Guide web page, [Online]http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/serbia/cw/index.html, April 8, 1999.)

Jonathan Tucker, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies also reported the existence of a facility that was moved from Mostar, Bosnia to Lucani, Serbia by Yugoslav forces in 1992 (Miller, New York Times).

⁷⁹ Pentagon officials believe the FRY possesses sarin, mustard gas, BZ, and CS. (Judith Miller, "U.S. Officials Suspect Deadly Chemical Weapons in Yugoslav Army Arsenal" New York Times, April 16, 1999.)

Human Rights Watch reports FRY possession of sarin, sulfur mustard, BZ, CS, CN, LSD-25, chloropicrin, cyanogen chloride, soman, tabun, and VX. ("Chemical Warfare in Bosnia?" Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 10, No. 9 (D), November 1998.)

The Federation of American Scientists also reports the existence of nitrogen mustard, lewsite, and phosgene. (FAS news release, "Chemical Agents in the Former Yugoslavia," Nuclear Forces Guide web page, [Online]http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/serbia/cw/index.html, April 8, 1999.)

FRY possession of siperit (in addition to sarin, soman, tabun, and VX) is reported in Nova Bosna. (Azra Terzic, "Chemical Weapons in the Service of Genocide," Nova Bosna, December 30, 1995.)

⁸⁰ Pentagon officials report that they have no evidence of biological weapons production in the FRY. (Judith Miller, "U.S. Officials Suspect Deadly CHemical Weapons in Yugoslav Army Arsenal" New York Times, April 16, 1999.)

However, a former Yugoslav army officer claimed in a letter to the UN Secretary General, the UNSC, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO, SFOR, and the governments of ten nations that the FRY is in fact producing biological weapons, although he did not indicate which agents were being produced. ("Bosnian TV Probes Chemical Weapons Production in FRY," Televizija Bosne I Hercegovine (Sarajevo), February 6, 1999, FBIS, FTS19990207000460.)

 

Chemistry of Lethal Chemical Warfare (CW) Agents

 

Follow the links in this table to information about and chemical data for these compounds. There is also a link to information on binary chemical warfare agents.

Agent Identification and Common Name(s)	Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) Name	Chemical Structure
AC, hydrogen cyanide, prussic acid	Hydrocyanic acid
CG, phosgene	Carbonic dichloride
CK	Cyanogen chloride
CL	Chlorine
CX, phosgene oxime	Carbonimidic dichloride, hydroxy
DP, diphosgene, trichloromethyl chloroformate	Carbonochloridic acid, trichloromethyl ester
GA, tabun	Dimethylphosphoramidocyanidic acid, ethyl ester
GB, sarin	Methylphosphonofluoridic acid, (1-methylethyl) ester
GD, soman, pinacolyl methylphosphonyl fluoride	Methylphosphonofluoridic acid, 1,2,2-trimethylpropyl ester
GF, cyclohexyl sarin	Methylphosphonofluoridic acid, cyclohexyl ester
H, mustard gas, yperite, sulfur mustard, Kampfstoff Lost	1,1'-Thiobis[2-chloroethane]
HN-1, nitrogen mustard	2-Chloro-N-(2-chloroethyl)-N-ethylethanamine
HN-2, nitrogen mustard, Mechlorethanamine	2-Chloro-N-(2-chloroethyl)-N-methylethanamine
HN-3, nitrogen mustard, Nitrogen Lost	2-Chloro-N,N-bis(2-chloroethyl)ethanamine
L, Lewisite	(2-Chloroethenyl)arsonous dichloride
PFIB, perfluoroisobutylene	1,1,3,3,3-pentafluoro-2-trifluoromethyl-1-propene
TP, triphosgene, trichloromethyl carbonate	Carbonic acid, trichloromethyl ester
V-gas	Methylphosphonothioic acid, S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] O-2-methylpropyl ester
VX	Methylphosphonothioic acid, S-[2-[bis(1-methylethyl)amino]ethyl] O-ethyl ester

 

 

BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Binary chemical weapons mix two, separate, relatively non-toxic chemicals in flight to create a toxic chemical agent.

GB BINARY

Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) is initially located in one canister, while a mixture (OPA) of isopropyl alcohol and isopropyl amine is located in a separate canister. When the weapon is fired (or otherwise delivered), a disk between the canisters ruptures, and the two components react in flight to produce GB.

GD BINARY

Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) is initially located in one canister, while a mixture of pinacolyl alcohol and an amine is located in a separate canister. When the weapon is fired (or otherwise delivered), a disk between the canisters ruptures, and the two components react in flight to produce GD.

VX BINARY

O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite (QL) is initially located in one canister, while elemental sulfur is located in a separate canister. When the weapon is fired (or otherwise delivered), a disk between the canisters ruptures, and the two components react in flight to produce VX.