At first glance, this point might seem to promise more and yet mean less than it actually does.

As we shall argue, an embrace of it will require us to embrace all seven of the base values given. Now, if we were to read this point as simply being a statement that one should rationally agree that the moral code does not discriminate between individuals and our arguments still worked, we would find ourselves in possession of a proof of the rightness of our fundamental values from nothing. This would truly remarkable. Regrettably, it is also impossible, for reasons that we explore in an aside to our first value.

This far more limited statement, a notion straight out of Kant, is a reflection of little more than Occam's razor - the observation that if the existence of an entity is alleged, the burden of proof falls on the one offering the allegation, not the one opposing it. If we are to allege that the moral code distinguishes between two individuals, a priori (before commentary about the actions and qualities of the individuals in question are considered), then this difference of rights is an entity whose existence has been alleged, and we still await justification for this - as our predecessors have, for generations. The difference being, that our predecessors usually had the good sense to be smiling as they waited, knowing that, like Godot, the explanation of this mystery was not going to come.


The question is this. If a discriminating moral code of this sort exists, then what is the nature of its existence, and of the reality that leads to its greater validity, when compared to opposing codes that might be proposed, and how did we become aware of it?

We do have some faith in the objective existence of an external logic governing reality mirroring our own conception of what that logic should be, based on a lengthy experience of seeing that conception work - not only being compatible with what we see, but telling us things to expect, those expectations being met. The physical world makes sense, albeit in startling ways. So, it would seem, when we speak of logic, we do speak of something that has a concrete, if not directly tangible, existence.

But, logic, when done honestly, involves little more than the formal manipulation of symbols, under a set of rules that are invariant under the exchange of those symbols, the rules being chosen in a way that seems to mirror external reality. There is no way for a system like this to be functionally aware, of who is who, or attach "meanings" to the symbols we use to denote ourselves, and others. So, the only way for an assymetry to arise in the conclusions we draw from an axiomatic system developed to define what morality is, of the sort that our informal discussions would presumably be seeking to mirror in its analysis, is for an assymetry to be present in the axioms - the initial assumptions - it is based on. So, we are thrown back to the question of how it is, that we derived those assumptions in the first place, and how we are to answer the questions posed by Occam's razor.

Presumably, through the application of logic to the only other concrete realities we know of - our internal state of mind, and the physical world that impinges on out senses. One might be tempted to add a third reality - the supernatural - but really, in a sense, this only adds some extra territory, and maybe a few planes of existence, to the physical world, for the purposes of these considerations. Now, in insisting that these privileges are of an a priori nature, we've ruled out the physical world as a source the distinctions leading to intrinsically justified privilege, and we know that logic won't give us these distinctions. So, what remains to us?

On an informal level, we might say that for something to be a fact, something must make it impossible for something contrary to be a fact as well. Thus, our fascination with the concrete (which is not to be mistaken with the tangible, which is defined in terms of the limitations of our own individual perceptions, and not merely in terms of the qualities of the object described.) For example, nature will not allow me to maintain that my bedroom door is made of steel, unless I wish to play the fool. Anyone who comes and examines it, will encounter the same wooden door. It is not in the realm of possibility that an unhampered examination could reveal the door to be of any other material, so we say that it is reality, that it is made of wood.

The nature of the reality of this world, whether it is "actual" - existing independently, or "virtual" - a reflection of some state of something that exists on a higher level, like the realities of a simulated world inside a computer reflects the state of the circuits that make it up, in our word - is of no concern to us, right now. What is important, is the consistency of its running, and the fact that the realities of its description, are unaltered by a mere change in our opinions about it.

So, informally, we might say that for something to be true, something has to make it real. Since we have nothing to anchor the reality of this inborn moral privilege in, it can't exist. There is nothing maintaining its reality. At most, the idea that there is such a privilege, and the systems of morality one could construct accord with it exist as a few concepts among many, much as a Mathematical system will be one among many. Like a Mathematical system, it may be of no interest to us, or tell us of nothing save the irrelevant consequences of its inapplicable assumptions. (Much as Euclidean Geometry may prove of interest to an architect, but it is highly unlikely that a finite Geometry will do likewise. As consistent as it is, its assumptions bear no resemblance to the truths of the situation that confronts him).

On a more formal level, we would ask what the nature of this entity is, that calls on us to show such favoritism. Yes, indeed, there is an externally real concept that would offer such favoritism, if it motivated us - that of promoting the well being of the hypothetical favored individual. But is that what we mean, when we use the word "morality"? One might say we "should" be guided by this motivation, if we define "should" to mean "would do if guided by this motivation", but is that what we intend to say, when we say that someone "should" do something? The question, on a formal level, is not whether or not it is "true" that something is moral, but whether or not if we take something to be moral, that the word "morality" will have the meaning we intend. Is our opponent in a dispute helping us to see the truth more clearly, or are we arguing at cross purposes because in a sense, we aren't even speaking the same language?

Morality, as it is commonly understood, is expected to root its distinctions in something real, and discernable. Thus, if we are to speak English, we must accept the informal argument that preceded our formal considerations.

Thus, we must conclude, the weaker principle holds.


And yet, we still say that our minimal code, has not been derived ex nihilo, though the principle of metaphysical consistency has come extremely close to being derived in just such a manner.

How can this be?

The problem is, that as it is mistakenly interpreted above, our value would be perfectly compatible with absolute amorality. Everyone would be assigned the same rights - none at all. But, that is not what our value means. It doesn't merely tell us that theoretical rights are equal, but that we should agree that it is important that practical rights are equal as well. "Practical rights", as we define them here, are the prerogatives and protections granted to the individual by the system he effectively lives in. That is to say, the rights an individual would enjoy, according to somebody who believed in a system of morality under which the existing order was just, and didn't put any great effort into exploring the possible contradictions of that system.

"Legal rights" can fall into this category, but only if the law is upheld. The law we consider when defining these practical rights, is not that which is "officially" on the books, but that which is acted on. In a neighborhood where the police never show up, it will not be the code of the State of Illinois, but the whims of whichever gang or vigilante group holds sway. When that group acts in a partial and arbitrary fashion, our value calls on us to view that as being a bad thing, that we should put a great value on bringing to an end.

So, what we have here is not some nebulous concept of a duty to observe a degree of metaphysical consistency, but an assertion of the vital importance of having the individuals among us being treated in an even handed fashion, and of the existence of a moral imperative to make seeing that this occurs, a high priority.

Would you like to return, or ask how know that Occam's razor works?