Question:

So, you would seek to convert atheists through fear? Are you so intolerant that you can't respect their lack of belief?

I do not object in the least to their atheism. I do, however, highly object to the evangelism that I have seen and the intellectual dishonesty that has accompanied it. It would be an inversion to refer to a hostile response to intolerance, as being intolerant itself. Again, we see this deliberate confusion between the self and other in the course of the discussion. What is at issue is not whether or not the atheist should become theistic, but whether or not the theist he speaks to should feel obliged to become an atheist. To suggest that that the reasonability of one person holding an opinion renders the choice of another to hold a contrary belief unreasonable, is to suggest that all must think alike, this position being the very essence of intolerance. To then complain about the intolerance of the person who objects to this stance would be the height of hypocrisy.

No, it is not the case. Not only would I not seek to convert them through through fear, I would not seek to convert them by any means whatsoever. I do believe in welcoming those who would believe as one does, and in making one's ideas available, giving people who wish to hear them something to think about, thus enhancing their freedom to find for themselves what it is that they believe. One adds one more choice to the menu, as it were. But having done so - remembering that the arguments one offers in support of those thoughts, and the logical framework that those arguments fall into, are part of those thoughts - I feel that one should then support that person's freedom to reflect freely, and without pressure, and decide for himself whether or not to accept those arguments. One should recognise that emotional pressure is a form of coercion.

In particular, I would question whether or not the gods (or God) would even appreciate an aggressive attempt at evangelism, and whether such an attempt should be considered an act of loyal service to the diety. If the diety has not seen fit to reach out to this person and give him an experience that would lead him to strong belief, then hasn't the diety, should he exist, clearly indicated that it is not his will that such faith should exist? Here, we speak of the case of the open minded disbeliever, who having examined the belief in a diety, found that he wasn't naturally inclined to believe. In this case, would the evangelist not then be substituting his own will for that of the diety he worships? Given that he is doing so in an attempt to establish a bond between the would be convert and the diety - that the diety doesn't seem to want - couldn't this be viewed as a violation of the diety? Scarcely a very respectful act, is it?

Question:

But isn't this a contradiction? First you say that we should not be guided by anything but a search for the truth, when deciding what to believe. Now, you have the god(s) deciding whether or not you need to know the truth. Which is right?

Both. In finding the truth, do you ever expect to find all of the truth? Even were your goal merely to know your own hometown, your mind couldn't encompass a truly complete description of it. There is too much detail, and too many relations between the details. How, then could one hope to have a complete picture of all existence?

The aim here should not be achieve completeness in theology, but merely to attempt to avoid the postulation of the existence of that which does not actually exist, or is not actually true. One seeks to have something akin to a fragment of the truth.

There is also a confusion between necessary and sufficient conditions, here. I would maintain that if it is the case, that belief in a particular diety is a thing that should be desired, then it the case that the diety exists. (Here, we do not use a presumption of theoretical desirability to prove existence, but merely claim that this desirability (which we can only speculate as to the presence of, in practice) is only present in the case that the diety actually exists, and is not merely a fiction). To conclude from this, that a diety who exists, and is rational, must feel that everyone should be conscious of her existence, is to confuse a statement with its converse - an inference that is not logically valid.

Let us put it this way. If one of my neighbors starts seeing people who don't exist, that is a bad thing. It doesn't follow that I'm going to feel the need to introduce myself to everyone on the North Side of Chicago just because I do exist.

Question :

Are you saying that an atheist shouldn't feel free to hold an opinion as to whether or not your beliefs are correct?

No, of course not. Such an opinion would be implicit in his own beliefs. What I am saying is that he should recognise his own fallibility, and the possibility that I have seen things that he has not - and not spend a lot of time thinking about which conclusions I, personally, should be drawing from my experiences. It is my job to find those conclusions for myself, not his. Again, the question is rooted in a confusion of vantage points. While I should choose to allow my individual search for the truth to guide my outlook, it doesn't follow that I should breach the boundary between myself and another, and seek that it guide his outlook as well. My thoughts do not pass through his mind, nor does he see through my eyes.

Question:

So, is that the only model of divinity that you're going to discuss?

Answer:

No, of course not.

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