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(*) For those concerned with such things, this commentary was added to the original, mostly on May 1, 2002, but some on the day before. I don't believe that my point of view has shifted on any matter relevant to this discussion, but I mention this for the same of keeping records clear, here. Click here to return to your place in the article. (1) As for what the Egyptians themselves thought, as Budge points out, and the House would seem to agree, to automatically translate "netjer" and "netjer" as "god" and "gods" respectively is questionable. (See "The Egyptian Book of the Dead", E. A. Wallis Budge, p. xci. The dubiousness of this practice has been known since the mid 1890's). Erman states that while "Amon, Re, Osiris and Horus" (ie. Amen, Ra, Wesir and Heru) were called "great gods", the pharoah had to be content to be known as "the good god". Again, let us keep in mind that the Egyptians never used the word "god", which is an English word; Erman's English translator is using it for the German word Erman used, when he translated the Egyptian word "netjer". The point here, missed by Afrocentrists and New Age critics of the House alike, the word "netjer" is modified in a different way, when the pharoah is spoken of, as opposed to when mythological figures are spoken of, implying a different status. If one should wish to argue that this is "hair-splitting", let him consider his own language, and imagine a future archaeologist coming across records written in it. a few thousand years after it has ceased to be spoken. Suppose that first he comes across some liturgical material that refers to the supreme being as being "our heavenly father". "Ah", he thinks, "father" was their word for deity. Then he comes across a biography that refers to its subject as having been "a loving father". He concludes that the ancient Americans, in the remote past of the 21st century, had believed that one of their gods had incarnated inside a split-level ranch house in Schaumburg. "What curious beliefs these Americans held", he thinks, and soon mystics steeped in the lore of the province of Illinois lead their followers in the worship of Bob, the ancient Chicagoan god of accounting and lawn care, may he drink Budweiser unto eternity. The moral of this little fable: be careful when you read ancient documents "in the original English". Taking translations dogmatically, and at face value, a la Christian fundamentalism, is a great way of being lead astray. Even Budge, back in 1895, is aware of the ambiguities, mentioning one of his contemporaries who refers translates "neter" with three Arabic words meaning "divine", "holy" and "sacred or set apart". (p. lxxxii) Such things may come in degree. In a Christian setting, one might say that while God's vicar on earth is holy, God Himself is even more so, the understatement involved being missed by none. This hair is worth splitting, as the distinction is not an impossibly fine one to draw. Click here to resume reading the article. (2) See the introduction to "The Instruction of King Amenemhet I for his son Sesostris I, on pp. 134 - 135 in "Ancient Egyptian Literature", Vol. I by Miriam Lichtheim, ISBN 0-520-02899-6, Library of Congress Catalog Number 75-1829225, which is the 1975 paperback edition of a book copyrighted by the University of California Press in 1973. (I hope that I haven't been too vague on the reference). As Lichtheim notes, regicide was a difficult subject to address, because "it conflicted too strongly with the dogma of the divine king". A dogma, which we might add, has the potential to be greatly corrosive, morally speaking. Some might feel that plotting against the king is acceptable, if successful, because were he truly the king, he would be truly divine, and thus invincible, so by assassinating him, one removes a false king from the throne. This argument, if embraced as a normative outlook, would place a successful thug or a betrayer before the people as a moral authority, thus legimitizing violence and betrayal as means of advancement in their eyes. The grossest immorality is made into a perverse sort of virtue, and the only code that remains is "might makes right", the very definition of civil disorder. The only remedy is to remove the possibility of rebellion from the thoughts of the people. The rightness of Lichtheim's commentary becomes obvious: Regicide is a very dangerous subject, indeed, if one starts from the premise of a fully divine kingship. It brings all civil virtue to an end. Pharoah might be tempted to assert his utter divinity, as opposed to merely claiming divine sanction, or even divine guidance, in order to secure the obedience of the masses, but, as we have seen, such a choice has grim consequences for the health of the society he rules over. Morality is what allows us to live with each other, without destroying our neighbors, and ourselves. To tell ourselves "a little white lie" in this area, is an act that is far from harmless. It is, however, the sort of act which, in some circles, is quite fashionable. Let us consider the all too fashionable abuse of the language which has just been mentioned: the line that "to the Egyptians, the pharoah was a god". Unless one wishes to maintain that reality is subjective, this line, taken literally, is devoid of semantic content. The divinity of pharoah, should it exist, is something that exists in the common reality which we all inhabit; it can not exist for one person, and not the other. Let us, instead, read it in an idiomatic sense, then. More often than not, this argument is simply being parroted by those who like to glibly make fashionable sounds in order to create the illusion of their own sophistication (the "cocktail party philosophers" whom Richard Feynman used to so love to hate). Most of these people may rightly be ignored. Does one enter into a debate with a tape recorder or does one ignore the recorder and seek out the person whose words one has heard the record of? Let us presume, then, that we have shoved aside the sheep, and have found the unworthy shepherd who has lead them to such an undesirable place. What should our response to him be? That he is confusing the following two concepts:
"Pharoah is a god, who the Egyptians worship." The two remarks are not equivalent. It is not self-evident that to believe in a deity, is to bring it into being. "Why not?", our apologist for the group mind's collective solipsism will often say. "Have you not granted that language is a thing defined by man, not a thing existing in and of itself? Then, if we decide that something is a god, it is, for us, a god. How can one deny that reality is subjective, when the very language that one uses to describe that reality can be changed at our whim?". Nice try, I respond, but here is where that argument fails. As I hold this book in my hands, whether I say that its length is nine inches, 3/4 of a foot, or 22.5 centimeters, its length remains the same. I have merely found different ways of saying the same thing. Now, suppose that through some miracle of mass insanity, the world comes to redefine the inch so that it is now only half as long, as it was previously defined as being. Has the book become longer? Some, fonder of sophistry than they are of good sense, will say, yes, because it is now 18 inches long. But this is madness, because one is, once again, confusing two fundamentally different concepts. There is the inch, as it would have formerly been defined, and the inch as it would now be defined. While the same word might be applied to both units, the old inch and the new inch, this is a reflection of nothing more than our own semantic sloppiness. These are two different units, regardless of how misleadingly we may label them, and 18 new inches would no more be a different length than 9 old inches, than 3/4 of an old foot would be. As with so many other subjectivist fallacies, the mistake here is to confuse the label with that which is labeled. Likewise, when we say "god", there is a very definite mental image that connects to that word, and it has a lengthy history of being consistent enough, to make clear communication possible, when that word is used. If we remake the word "god" so as to include those that we would have so clearly regarded as not being gods, before, we do not change the reality, we merely change the label. There is the old word "god" and the new word "god" and while they may be misleadingly indicated with the same collection of sounds and letters, in the spoken and written languages respectively, in a very important sense, they are not the same word, any more than "old inches" and "new inches" were the same unit, in the example above. A word is not just the letters and sounds used to express it, it is that combination taken in the historical and cultural context in which it has arisen. "Gift" is spelled and pronounced the same way in both English and German; does one, on that basis, think that Germans are being ungracious when they refuse to drink poison (which is what "gift" means in German)? No, of course not. As these sound and letter combinations occur in different languages, we accept that the similarity in appearance is deceptive, and that they are, in face, different words. Likewise, were we to change the meaning of the word "god", we would get a new language, very slighly different from the old, and thus, likewise, would have a new word, bearing a misleading resemblance to the old. This creates an obvious problem. How does one know which language is being spoken? If the choice is between German and standard English, the difference is glaring enough that there will be little chance for misunderstanding. But our "new English" sounds deceptively like standard English, especially under the non-idealized circumstances of the real world, in which cultural changes aren't instantaneous, but must propogate. Under the rules of the game we may reasonably be expected to know we are playing as we speak, if we are to adopt Wittgenstein's view of language (that which our apologist is most likely referring to), we must expect that the listener will interpret our New English word as the different, but similar sounding standard English word. Thus, we speak an untruth, as the only cause which our change may be expected to serve, is that of an effort to deceive. Yes, language is a social construct, but it is a construct with a history which exists independently, of the collective fantasies which some segment of the population may wish to hold at the moment. What is subjective, from the collective viewpoint of a traditional culture, is made objective for the individual, as he exists in this present moment, through the action of history. It is that very history which our misguided common man will respond to, and not the mental reservations some will build into their speech in support of some recent (and, one may hope, transitory) fashion. Even if the affectations of a few will lead them to use the word "god" as they wish, he will hear the word "god", as it is traditionally meant, and be guided by this meaning. If this verbal game of "bait and switch" is all that lies within one's philosophy, and it is received at face value, that common man may be mislead, indeed, with appalling consequences, a sad reality which changing the meaning of the word "appalling" will not dispell. (Note added on April 27, 2002) Click here to return to the previous document. (3) In the usual, postmodern confrontational style, I now expect somebody to write in, and ask "so, you're telling me that you personally think that the pharaohs were divine, and so is the Nisut of the House of Netjer?". To this, my response would be "No, what I'm telling you is that in the context of this forum, what I or you personally believe on this subject is beside the point". The House does not pretend that its boards are part of an eceumenical outreach effort, as the Wiccan community pretended that the so-called "Pagan community of Chicago", with its socials and networking events, was. The boards, taken collectively are one of its own internal discussion forums. Given this, any disrespect shown to these cornerstones of this different faith, in that forum, would have to be considered a form of evangelism, a practice which I have already condemned for on general philosophical grounds, in part for reasons given elsewhere. Let us note that the House has engaged in no evangelism of its own, so there is no imbalance to be restored here, that would justify the setting aside of the usual principles that guide one's behavior. I am not saying that to be present, obliges one to pay lip service to an article of faith which one does not subscribe to. That would be hypocrisy. It does, however, occasionally oblige one to hold a polite and respectful silence, and to depart when one finds that one's self-control is growing weaker to the point at which politeness becomes strained rather than spontaneous. Click here to return to the body of this article. (4) I had thought that I recalled that the queen in question was Nefertiti, but apparently I must have been mistaken on this. Those better informed on the subject than myself have indicated that her body was never found. If and when I get the definitive word on this subject, I'll update this article accordingly (appropriately footnoted, of course). For a less than authoritative source to start one's search with, though, here are some pages which I found during a casual stroll through Altavista. I haven't had time to check this material, so no endorsement should be inferred from the presence of some of these links. One might check "Discovery Online -- Face to Face With Mummies", or, if one has more time and wishes to do a little better, one can look up a Science News book entitled "Conversations with Mummies, and maybe look through the homepage of the Department of Egyptology at The Manchester Museum, where such work is apparently done. (I really don't have time to look, right now). Click here to return to "A rebuttal to some afrocentric commentary". (5) Regarding the spelling of "Ockham" in "Ockham's razor" : Sigh. No matter which spelling I use, somebody always writes in to "correct" me. So, let me settle this once and for all. I refer the reader to an actual book, as opposed to a web page : On pp. 629, 631 of the reference below, we find that William of Ockham (c. 1285-1347, according to the reference below) used both spellings. Ockham was a village in Surrey, near London, and still is at the time of this writing, if only barely. English spelling has become standardized since William's time, and Ockham is the modern spelling. Properly speaking, it is the one that should be used, pronouncements of Internet resources to the contrary notwithstanding.
Reference :
Title : The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
Edition : 2nd
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Copyrighted : 1999
ISBN : 0 521 63136 X
LOC : R 103 C178a1999
Found in : DePaul University Library, Lincoln Park Campus
Editor : Robert Audi, Charles S. Mach Distinguished
Professor of Philosophy at the University
of Nebraska at Lincoln
A source authoritative enough to satisfy any reasonable man. The unreasonable ones can find satisfaction on their own. Click here to return to where you left the discussion. |