Fourth Try, Redux


An apologist for John's position could, at this point, have retreated to a much different position. We have already considered the possibility that the netjeru might be less than eternal. Our apologist might argue that we should have considered it more closely. Perhaps, he might argue, Sekhmet emerged (as a separate aspect) from Hethert over a period of time, and so the seperation between the two was only a matter of growing degree during those centuries. The vagueness of the distinction between the two in name, mirrored an intrinsic vagueness in distinction between the identities of the two, and so told the truth, even if it did not do so on the terms we might expect. "An interesting possibility", we might respond. "So, if one deity, or aspect of deity can emerge from another, in so gradual a fashion, perhaps the 'Sachmis' of the Greek and Roman worshippers was a still newer name of Netjer, emerging from Sekhmet as Sekhmet emerged from Hethert before. Any objection to this hypothesis?"

If he is to remain an apologist for Kheru's position, he will have to say "yes". John, you may note, referred to "the ACTUAL names" of Netjer in a way that left no doubt that the Graeco-Roman names didn't count, despite centuries of experience to the contrary, on the part of the worshippers of that time and place. From this, we are forced to conclude that while Netjer, or God, would be free to form new aspects of Himself, he apparently is unable to do so outside of the borders of Egypt. This is interesting, because Egypt, like any other nation state, has nothing but a subjective existence. A piece of land lies in Egypt, only because human beings have decided that it does. Yet, we have eliminated the possibility that Netjer and His aspects could enjoy any but an objective existence, were John's hypothesis to be valid. How, then, can Netjer be constrained in a manner that so strongly suggests a subjective existence? God, in this unusual theology we are left with, would seem to be subject to man, as opposed to the reverse. Yet, as Tamara Siuda, who Kheru claims to honor as a spiritual leader, once told me in person "This (Kemetic Orthodoxy) is about serving God". So, in order to hold onto John's hypothesis, we would have to discard the House of Netjer's very reason for existence, as spelled out by its own founder, and as that House is her ministry, we would be discarding her status as a spiritual leader in the process. This would put John's would be supporter in a difficult position, because John's stated reason for concerning himself with the "actual" names of Netjer, included a citation of Tamara Siuda as his authority.

At this point, we bring forth Ockham's razor, and put John's ailing hypothesis out of its misery. It has suffered long enough.




When one has to create a body of assumptions this increasingly elaborate, with no end to the elaboration in sight, the razor (which calls on us to not multiply our assumptions beyond necessity) compels us to ask what the justification for doing so might be. Some will point to the great emphasis which the Egyptians would place on names (and images), pointing out that to erase the former, or deface the latter, was seen as a sort of annihilation of the one named, or represented. "Who knows the netjeru better than those who worshipped them for four thousand years?", might go the argument, as it often does.

As Menes doesn't show up until well after 2800 BC, and the House only lists two pharoahs before him, one may well wonder where the 4000 year figure comes from, but let us focus on other matters. This argument goes wrong on multiple levels. First, in that it makes the implicit assumption that whatever the ancients believed, must have made sense. To expect people living in a time before the development of formal logic (which occured in the generation before Alexander, while Egypt was under Persian rule) to dwell on a formalistic distinction such as that between symbol and object would be as unrealistic as expecting Medieval Europeans to apply Quantum Mechanics to their study of Alchemy. The Egyptians may have been in the dark about how much prehistory preceded them, but we are not. And so it goes. Knowledge grows in time, when it is not being lost. Any belief system which fails to take this basic truth into account, renders itself irrelevant.

That much having been said, were the ancients necessarily completely naive on this point? To this day, we would still greatly resent the thought of our names being striken from all records, or our pictures being defaced. To wish to be remembered is a basic human desire, and the obliteration of names and defacement of images interferes with the realisation of this wish. So, why seek for magical explanations, when common sense ones are so close at hand?

While, for example, George Bush the elder would probably be horrified at the thought of his name being blotted out of the history books, nobody imagines that "George Bush" is the intrinsic "true name" of our former president, and few even would think that he had one. His mother could have named him "Ralph", and he would have been the same individual. The reason his name matters to him, is because it is the label by which the rest of us know him. It is objectively real, only in the sense that the person history that lead up to the giving and recognition of that name, objectively happened. The significance of the name is social, not magical.

With deities, or aspects of deity, one might argue that the situation is different, so long as we believe that man is the creation of God, rather than the other way around, as Neopagans would have it. A human receives the name humanity knows him by, from his parents, at the beginning of his formative years. It is something that he grows up with, a basic part of his social identity. But, in life, we have other names as well, some given to us by others, and some given to us by ourselves. We do not find it any sort of challenge, to our sense of self, and of personal dignity, when we discover that we are greeted with different nicknames, in different places, the way we might find a deliberate (or even unintentional) mangling of our own personal names. So, the question arises - how would you describe a deity name?

Our given names, when they aren't changed by ourselves, as I said, come from our parents, people who had authority over us in our formative stages. How fitting, that they would feel so much a part of our basic social identities, and how natural that we feel violated at the thought of being forced to change them. But, does man have authority over God or the gods? Anybody with so much as an ounce of piety winces at the very question. No, of course man could not have such an elevated position. Such a question is only one that is asked rhetorically, and with a touch of uneasiness at that. Knowing this, how can we, as mere humans, imagine that we can name the Divine, as a parent names a child?

Yes, children will name parents, and older relatives, and those older relatives will treasure those childish tokens of affection, but what would one say of a child who grew indignant because a sibling called that older relative by a different nickname than that picked out by the child, himself? Such an action takes the joy out of the game, and the life out of the social considerations that give life to the nickname. The older relative would have to insist, in one fashion or another, that the child stop doing so. How much less we would think of the behavior of a child who threw such a tantrum, because another child's nickname, wasn't granted such an exclusive status.

To adopt John's posture on a matter as culturally relative as the names of divinities, is to be as that child. Let us strive to do better, out of respect for both the gods, and ourselves.




I loved the myth about the red beer and Sekhmet, though.

It's a delightful story, one which I'm sorely tempted to steal - er, adapt - for Hellenic purposes, for the festival of jars in honor of Dionysos, although obviously not in the role of myth, for our purposes. Lemon juice with weissbier (*) is an old favorite in the Western suburbs of Chicago, as it is almost anywhere in America thta has a heavy German presence. I'm guessing that pomengranate juice would blend with the beer as pleasantly. I'll have to think about who "our Sekhmet" would be. (Nemesis, perhaps?) In the meanwhile, click here to return.







(*) "Weissbier", or "white beer" is beer made with wheat, rather than barley.