Feb 26, 2003
By David M. Shribman
One is the cradle of an ancient civilization, a place where, between the Tigris and Euphrates, pioneering developments in irrigation, cultivation and culture -- even double-entry accounting procedures -- flourished. The other is the cradle of democracy, a place where, between two mighty oceans, a civilization of unprecedented freedom and technological advancement -- so sophisticated that even its bombs are smart -- developed.
Now these two great civilizations, known to the modern world as Iraq and the United States, are about to clash.
It is a conflict of two stubbornnesses. Iraq, facing devastation from vastly superior force and, because of its leader's willingness to initiate unprovoked conflict (once against Iran, once against Kuwait) and to use the most frightful weapons (chemical and biological agents), lacking moral standing in the councils of nations, has every rational incentive to disarm. The United States, possessing unprecedented conventional economic and military power, nonetheless faces grave threats from fanatics who love the idea of America's destruction more than life itself; it has little reason to think that the swift, decisive victory it anticipates in a corner of the world once known as ancient Mesopotamia will enhance its own security in North America.
But the two stubbornnesses, serious as they are, nonetheless may be overshadowed by two blindnesses. These two nations are about to go to war without a clear vision of reality, both on the battlefield and in the field of diplomacy.
Here are Iraq's blindnesses:
1. Iraq believes that the anti-war protests of February represent a moral force that will shield it from destruction from America's drones, bombs and infantry soldiers. The anesthetizing effect of these protests on five continents has been reinforced by Baghdad's insistence on airing endless reruns of the demonstrations on Iraqi television.
The truth: President Bush, who was unmoved by anti-war protests in New Haven, Conn., as a Yale undergraduate, was equally unmoved by the demonstrations in Canberra, Toronto, Rome, Paris and Pittsburgh. Indeed, these demonstrations may have the unintended consequence of hastening American action, if only to show Bush's resolve and to prevent the anti-war movement from spreading.
2. Saddam Hussein (news - web sites), blinded by memories of U.S. weakness in Vietnam a third of a century ago and in Somalia a decade ago, believes Iraq can win an urban war. Draw American fighters into Baghdad, the reasoning goes, and the casualties climb, and with them grows American intolerance for warfare.
He's wrong. The Pentagon saw "Black Hawk Down" too, and is determined not to be chased out of Baghdad the way it was chased out of Mogadishu. Besides, unlike 1968, when the war consensus was breaking apart, the war consensus may be building in 2003; the latest New York Times/CBS News Poll shows a majority of Americans believe that removing Hussein from power is worth the loss of American life.
3. Iraq believes that if it loses in the desert, and then loses in the cities, it can still prevail with a scorched-earth policy that involves the destruction of the country's oil fields and the devastation of its infrastructure and institutions.
Almost certainly wrong. The prospect of a devastated Germany didn't stop Franklin Roosevelt in 1944 and 1945. It won't stop George W. Bush in 2003.
But this is a case where the blind is leading the blind into war. Here are America's blindnesses:
1. President Bush believes a "coalition of the willing" of almost any size is big enough. His father didn't think so in 1990 and 1991, and as a consequence began a painstaking process of building the biggest war coalition in world history. Right now the United States can count on Bulgaria, Spain and Britain in the Security Council. That sounds more like a tennis foursome than a fearsome coalition. Poland is with Bush, too. It's hard to think of a sixth supporter except maybe Turkey, depending on the size of the American check. The administration has so bungled the diplomacy that the best it can hope for is a reluctant coalition of the whining.
2. The United States is proceeding with the notion that war with Iraq is more a mop-up operation than a mobilization for bitter, bloody combat. Saddam Hussein, who used mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun against Iran, and who unleashed hydrogen cyanide against the Kurds, could use anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin against American forces. The consequences would be frightful. And if the United States had trouble finding Manuel Noriega in Panama in 1989 and 1990 and has been unable to find Osama bin Laden in 2001, 2002 and 2003, what is the guarantee it can capture Saddam Hussein, who has more than a dozen body doubles, this spring -- or next?
3. The administration has devoted no energy to a public explanation of the long-term implications of American victory in Iraq -- the time (years, not months) an American occupation would require and the strains on American resources and patience it would produce. The mere presence of American troops and aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base north of Riyadh in Saudi Arabia was cited as a provocation that led to the destruction of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon. Actual American occupation of an Islamic land could be even more provocative to terrorist groups and even more destabilizing to the United States' few allies in the region.
Middle East experts are sometimes fond of saying that the Arab-Israeli fight is a conflict between two sides that are both right. This may be a conflict between two sides that are both wrong -- about major parts of the struggle they are about to undertake.
