US relations with China and Taiwan
Chinese/U.S. Strategic Relations Preliminary Outline
Assessing the Risk of Threat between China and Taiwan
The talk in Beijing and Taipei There is a feeling of waiting between the two powers, and the elections results on the tension between Taipei and Beijing has been mixed. Taipei: Chen has toned down his message, no longer directly advocating independence, which regardless of international ramifications, is probably wise domestically. He was only elected with 39% of the vote, and the majority of Taiwanese aren�t in favor of independence. Chen has attempted to placate the party leadership on the mainland with several important moves: 1) Inviting a member of the Chinese mainland government to be a member of his cabinet, 2) Speaking in favor of a peace summit which would include negotiations towards a peaceful resolution of the issue and 3) The most significant negative factor would be the radical statements of vice-president elect Annette Lu, who has advocated independence and has made inflammatory statements regarding the U.S. and Japan�s role in the declaration of an independent Taiwan. Everyone holds their breath to see how Chen will handle his inaguration speech on May 20, which will need to appeal to both members of the Democratic National Party at home and leaders in Beijing.
Beijing: The talk in Beijing has been mixed: before the election, quite hostile and since then, attacks have been severe on Annette Lu (which could be a tactic to make their stance look more radical to appeal to conservatives at home while having little impact on the relationship with Chen�s government). In addition, Beijing has shown unwillingness to cooperate with a Taipei initiated peace summit unless Chen first recognizes the One China policy. There have also been rumors in Taiwanese press that military mobilization has occurred in provinces which are near Taiwan. Despite this, the government has appeared to be watchfully waiting, and does not seem to be taking harsh actions against Chen or the country. There have been no massive changes in the economic relationship, no outward military gestures and tempered talk for the most part. Chinese Domestic Politics and what is at stake with actions against Taiwan
The top priority on the Chinese agenda is the issue of Taiwanese reunification. Disproportionate attention is paid to this issue for several reasons, in part because of Jiang�s desire to reunify Taiwan as part of his legacy. A member of the conservative element of the government, Jiang, who was educated in the Soviet Union and takes a decisively anti-American stance, could be willing to risk hostility with Taiwan. The prime minister on the other hand, who is a reformist, is much more pro-American, and his primary focus is on the economic relationships being built between the two nations. In judging domestic stability, one important issue is the privitization of government owned companies, which is leading to massive numbers of unemployed Chinese workers, who are denied previous rights to housing, education, health and other work related benefits. The creation of a mass of unemployed and economically disadvantaged workers who do not see long-term benefits that WTO assension could bring to China is politically dangerous for the party. One possible ramification could be the capitalization of a nationalist threat to maintain support of hard-liners within the government: deflecting domestic attention from pressing economic conditions by focusing attention on international issues such as a war with Taiwan. This strategy is admittedly very risky, however, as a failure to recapture Taiwan would almost assuredly tarnish the reputation of the party, and lead to a decline in their legitimacy. Weighing the United States commitment to defend Taiwan, and the amount of support which they would dedicate to their defense, is therefore an important part of the strategic calculus. Successful reunification, on the other hand, would be a major boon to the party. Below is what we estimate Chinese domestic leadership preference listing would be for possible outcomes. Preferences of the Chinese government: Peaceful reunification, reunification with limited military usage, status quo, failure to reunify whether through medium military tactics or all out war. � Comparing Chinese and Taiwanese Military Capacities
Although straight-forward comparison of the capabilities of the two powers strongly favors Chinese dominance, the argument as to the ability of China to launch an effective invasion of Taiwan is more questionable. In order to invade Taiwan, the Chinese have to mount an air-strike and amphibious invasion across the Taiwan straights, a distance three times the English Channel. This requires advanced air force capabilities, including night, open-water and all-weather flying, in which Chinese pilots are poorly trained. Despite current acquisitions of military technology and massive numbers of ground force, experts estimate that China is only capable of mobilizing 20,000 troops across the straight using air force and amphibian means. Taiwan has a standing army of over 400 thousand. The strongest advantage that China has in launching an all-out invasion is missile capabilities, which Taiwan has only minimal ability to defend against with �patriot-style� defensive missiles. Recent Chinese purchases from Russia and Israel are most important in this regard, and also in the purchase of helicopters and submarines. Taiwanese advantages include their strategic position as a defendant and their new air and missile capabilities gained from arms purchases with the U.S. and other nations. � Economic Relationships
In general, the economic relationship between Taiwan and the mainland indicates that China would have a strong incentive not to disrupt the current status, as the nation is benefiting from Taiwan economically. Taiwanese businesses are currently major investors on the mainland, especially in high tech industries. The People�s Daily estimated that trade increased nearly 15% in the past year, increasing to US $23.5 billion. Taiwanese who are expecting China to join the WTO have begun to move their production bases to the mainland, and the Chinese government has sworn protection for Taiwanese investors. The implications of this from a military standpoint are that if resolution of the Chinese/Taiwanese relationship came to a head, nuclear weapons and/or complete destruction of the productive capacity of the island and Taipei itself would not be a desirable outcome. U.S. Domestic Politics and Public Opinion on China � The MFN Vote: Will it gather the support it needs?
In order to gain approval, the bill needs 218 votes in favor. Pro-China Republicans have 140 votes, and democrats are currently promising 50 votes. Still 28 votes shy of in favor. Who�s for and who�s against in the Democratic Party? For: Technological lobbies and pro-free trade democrats, especially in the new economy. Against: Pro-labor and environmental groups in addition to human rights advocates. � What sort of additional bills may effect the vote? Republican leaders are urging the enabling legislation to be linked to the Taiwanese Security Enhancement Act, to send a positive message to Taiwan with the passage of the MFN status. Others are suggesting that the vote be contingent on bans for the sale of nuclear armaments to rouge states. What are the implications of the vote on U.S./Chinese Relations (In other words, why should we care?)
This is still under discussion by the group� Although some of us seem to be of the opinion that gaining permanent MFN status would make the Chinese government more receptive to U.S. demands and friendly gestures, others hypothesize that with the WTO effectively off the agenda, China would be willing to act even more aggressively towards the United States. This is because Taiwan will have moved up even further on their agenda, the United States can no longer use this as a bargaining chip and because of the positive ramifications that the vote would have for nationalist sentiment within the country. Does the American Public perceive China, and their possible aggressive actions against Taiwan, as a threat?
Polls indicate that the American public is not currently preoccupied with any foreign threat, but the approval ratings for China as a whole are as low as they were directly after the Tieneman Square crackdown. Domestic leaders have attempted to use scare tactics to drum up anti-Chinese sentiment to no avail. Though the American people might be prepared to defend Taiwan against an unprovoked attack, they show no desire to be dragged into a war with China by Taiwanese voters seeking a merely legal gloss on their already existing independence. Outside Participants
What would the role of other Asian nations be in a standoff between China and Taiwan?
Japan is the primary actor of interest in any scenario where the United States is going to be involved in defending Taiwan from a Chinese threat. In general, it seems that given a U.S./Chinese conflict over Taiwan, Japan would provide limited strategic and economic support for the United States, but is unlikely to provide massive amounts of military capability or troops to the conflict. The Japanese have recently signed a new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines Document. Under the document, the Japanese have agreed to allow U.S. troops to have access to civilian and military facilities in Japan, should there be a conflict. There direct involvement was left unclear, mainly out of strategic balancing between China and the U.S. They have much to loose in a confrontation between China and the U.S.: retaliatory strikes due to U.S. alliance on cities such as Tokyo, disruption of the balance of power in Asia, blockage of sea lanes essential to trading and serious threats to Chinese/Japanese economic relationships. How would other European allies become involved in such a conflict?
Europe has no clear stance towards the Taiwanese/Chinese relations, however, their friendliness to the Chinese government has been increasing via non-direct actions recently. This can be seen in Britain and France�s attempt to end the Chinese arms embargo, in order to sell military armaments to China, which would help ailing military sectors at home. In addition, France and other European nations prevented the United States from achieving UN penalization of China for their human rights policies. Despite these recent happenings, Europe�s traditional alliance with the United States is likely to lead to U.S. support should a escalated confrontation occur. If China was effectively painted as a dangerous and aggressive international force to NATO allies, there is some chance that marginal/nominal support could come from Europe. Direct support of China is unlikely. (This statement needs more support) � What would Russia�s role/stance be in a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan? � Would the United Nations be involved in this conflict?
Because both the United States and China sit on the UN Security Council and have veto power, and because Taiwan is not recognized internationally as a sovereign state, this conflict will be handled outside of the realms of the United Nations. � What other land claim areas could be threatened by the escalation of tensions between Taiwan and China?
Spratly Islands (claimed by six nations), Tibet, Macau, Senkaku Islands, and areas of dispute on Mongolian and Indian borders. Possible Courses of Chinese Action Harassment tactics (exercises etc.) and psychological pressure � Occupation of offshore islands- shock Taiwanese society � Attacking Taiwan�s military facilities and equipment Taiwan�s well-developed radar network and strengthened air defense is a problem. High cost for China. �At current force levels, the PLA Air Force could not gain control of the skies over the Strait or Taiwan island, much less carryout a sustained bombing or ground-attack campaign.� � Blockade Qualitative parity and Taiwan�s improving anti-submarine capacities reduce chances of success Amphibious and airborne landing- very difficult Possible Courses of U.S. Action 1.Maintain the Status Quo No public statements to change our policy in one direction or the other. This means that we publicly still uphold both the �One China Policy� and the support of the Taiwanese democracy, but do not commit ourselves more significantly in either direction. Limited sideline and private support, in forms such as those already undertaken at the outcome of the elections, with negotiations between U.S. Government officials and important players. Positives: Strategic Ambiguity. Provides flexibility of response in case of dramatic change in the situation, and allows us to reevaluate our desired involvement in a China/Taiwan stand-off should that come to pass. Sensing current American public opinion, may be the most appropriate stance. Mimics the �watchful waiting� stance of the other participants and buys time in assuring the situation with other U.S. allies. Is desirable given our uncertainty about the stability of Chinese domestic politics. Negatives: The long term status quo may be completely unsustainable, and therefore need more immediate attention if we want to have a hand in this conflict. In addition, the lack of clear commitment in either direction by the U.S. is theorized to be emboldening hard-liners on both sides, who can tell their publics that the U.S. is not supporting them. 2.Clarify and Add Consistency to U.S. Policy This is something that is currently being recommended by a series of American academics who study Sino-American relations. It calls for stating publicly that we would not support Taiwan if they declare independence, but would defend Taiwanese democracy if they were attacked by China. Positives: Clarifies response to both sides without being explicitly in favor of one side or the other, and would add to international perception of clarity and consistency with regards to our policies in Asia. Could help to maintain stability in Asia by letting both parties know exactly what risk their actions incur. Basically, attempting to maintain the status quo with more certainty, and doing this while making the U.S. a larger actor in the process. Negatives: Loose strategic ambiguity, commits us to war if China attacks and would commit the United States to this policy for the long term if stated publicly, even if the situation changes with possibility of peace summit. � 3.Initiate U.S. Active role in brokering peaceful resolution of tensions Positive: This strategy makes U.S. look like peaceable party, and perhaps passes responsibility onto third party negotiator of UN process, thus decreasing pressure on US. Plays to the majority of Taiwanese who still support more conservative stance, while also playing to moderates and reformers in China. Huge legacy for Clinton if success, could lead to worsening of situation if failure, and loss of US credibility towards peace negotiations. Reunification terms further economic interests, especially if WTO passes. Negative: Could contradict policy on democratic Taiwan if not stated carefully enough, may force Taiwanese pro-independence actors into rash action.