A Brief Summation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right

© 2002 Clifton D. Healy

Hegel's Elements of a Philosophy of Right¹ is the application of his logical method to the realms of personhood, property, morality, family, society, and the state. It is in general a two-step movement: being gives forth not-being which gives rise to becoming. It is difficult to separate the content of Hegel's ethical thought from his method, and therefore in this paper I will examine both simultaneously as I summarize his thought. Hegel's ethical reflection on the state begins with free will, which is understood first as the concept of Abstract Right. This concept is then particularized in property. From Abstract Right, the free will unfolds in Morality. Within the sphere of Morality free will expands through intention, well being and conscience. But as will be seen, Morality as the development of free will is not yet complex enough for free will to fully instantiate itself, and so unfolds further in Ethicality. It is in this final stage of development of the free will, through family and civil society, that free will is actualized in the State. Thus for Hegel the free will of the person is the actualized instantiation of the free will of the State.

The challenge in understanding Hegel's philosophy of right is knowing where to begin. Hegel's thought moves syllogistically, one could say, from premise to conclusion. In some respects, starting from the conclusion and working, as it were, backwards, is easier. But doing so presupposes some acquaintance with the premises underlying such conclusions. So, in this paper, rather than starting with the State as the actualization of the free will understood as Abstract Right, I will begin with free will and proceed as Hegel himself does in his work.

Hegel begins his discussion of the State as the actualization of abstract right by introducing the understanding of free will as it will apply to abstract right. He writes, "The basis [Boden] of right is the realm of spirit in general and its precise location and point of departure is the will; the will is free, so that freedom constitutes its substance and destiny [Bestimmung] and the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from within itself as a second nature."² That is to say, the will contains the indeterminate "I." This is the immediate I that is not yet "I will," but simply a pure reflection into itself. It is the I without limitation, whether through nature, needs, desires, drives.

At the same time, this immediate I is already becoming an I-will. Contained within itself is already its differentiation and determination. This differentiation may be "given by nature or generated by the concept of spirit."³ It is this "positing of itself as something determinate"--I!--through which "'I' steps into existence [Dasein] in general"⁴ and begins to actualize itself as free will. This I is the particular I.⁵

The free will, then, is the union of the universal and particular I, "particularity reflected into itself and thereby restored to universality. It is individuality [Einzelheit], the self-determination of the 'I', in that it posits itself as the negative of itself, that is, as determinate and limited, and at the same time remains with itself [bei sich], that is, in its identity with itself and universality; and in this determination, it joins together with itself alone."⁶ But this will has two aspects: subjective and objective. The will's objective form is its "external immediate existence" as it relates to a world outside itself, and attempts to actualize its subjective form (its own determinations as its content) in that world.⁷ So Hegel concludes: "This content, or the distinct determination of the will, is primarily immediate. Thus, the will is free only in itself, or for us, or it is in general the will in its abstract concept. Only when the will has itself as its object [Gegenstand] is it for itself what it is in itself."⁸

Free will, then, comes to be when the immediate I is given determination by nature or gives itself determination through its drives, positing its own existence. But this existence is not realized until the I wills what it wills because the I wills it. The I wills to make objective that which is its subjective content, and does so to no other end than that it wills itself to be made real.

I have taken as much space as I have to describe the will because it is the foundational reality underlying the State, which is the actualization of the free will. In my view, an understanding of free will clears the path for an easier comprehension of the remainder of Hegel's ethical thought. But what is important to keep in mind is the means by which Hegel has come to his conclusion. It is a method which suffuses his works. Hegel begins with the most abstract understanding of a particular concept, the thing as it is in itself. Within the thing itself is its own potential negation. The I, as immediate I, is unbounded. But within the I is its own particular drives, desires and needs, its own determinations given by nature. This I risks negating the universal I by its limitations. This particular I, moved by the universal I, actualizes its limitations in the world outside itself. This twofold I is the free will in and for itself. In this actualization it unites both the universal I, which is immediate, as well as the particular I, mediated by its desires, in an individual singularity, a person.

This movement from abstract to concrete to general is one of the basic movements of Hegel's thought. So in the Philosophy of Right we move from the abstract right of property, contract and crime, to morality of purpose, intention and the good, which gives way to the ethical life of family, civil society and the State, as I explain below. Reason generates and encompasses theorectical reason, intelligence, and practical reason, will. Hegel's method, of course, is more complex than my brief formulation. But this general movement is evidenced frequently.

Having deduced free will from reason as the intermediate step of the universal I, Hegel proceeds to deduce the nearest actualization of the free will, property. The free will, insofar as it wills, must have a sphere in which it can actualize itself, a sphere of freedom. This sphere "distinct from the will, which may constitute the sphere of its freedom, is likewise determined as immediately different and separable from it."⁹ This separate sphere is "a thing [Sache], something unfree, impersonal, and without rights."¹⁰ The person relates to a thing by exerting his right to place his will in any thing. The thing then becomes mine, and is no longer merely a thing. This placing of one's will in a thing entails possession. This possession is the actualization of the free will. Hegel writes, "the circumstance that I, as free will, am an object [gegenständlich] to myself in what I possess and only become an actual will by this means constitutes the genuine and right element in possession, the determination of property."¹¹

From the realization of property, in the free will's possession of a thing, Hegel deduces an aspect of property, private property, in which my will, as the will of an individual, is actualized. It quickly becomes apparent that possession of property will give rise to plural uses of a thing. When one owns a thing, one may dispose of it as one wishes, including owning a thing only temporarily. That is, one may place one's will in a thing, but also determine to later alienate oneself from that thing, in effect, removing one's will of possession from it. Even while one possesses a thing, another will may desire to possess it. Or, having removed one's will from a thing, another will may take possession of it. While ostensibly it may appear that one may do what one wishes with, for example, one's body, even to the point of killing oneself But this sort of action is without content, as opposed, say, to giving one's life for the State, and it is not clear to me that this would conform to the imperative to "be a person." Certainly being a person entails the actualization of free will, the possessing of oneself as a person, and killing oneself may well be a alienation of oneself as property, but the free will exercised in such a way that one kills oneself seems an empty negation, and does not appear to give rise to a greater actualization of Spirit as Reason in free will.

If property is the realization of free will in possession, the transition from property to contract takes place within the negation of the thing as for another will. Hegel writes, "Property, in view of its existence as an external thing [Sache], exists for other external things and within the context of their necessity and continency. But as the existence of the will, its existence for another can only be for the will of another person."¹² That is to say, things are actualized in themselves by way of possession by a free will. Since their existence is directed to the free will, they may also give rise to the negation of that relation by being directed to the free will of another.

The unfolding of these moments is the sphere of contract. Contract is that contradiction expressed as "I am and remain an owner of property having being for myself and excluding the will of another, only in so far as, in identifying my will with that of another, I cease to be an owner of property."¹³ In other words, contract is the transfer, of sorts, of a thing from the possession of one will to that of another. It is in that contradictory moment when a thing must still be owned by me to be mine to relinquish, but yet now must also be owned by another to remain a thing in which contract actualizes the free will of myself and another. This is the immediate relation of persons.

As Hegel anticipated previously in § 36 of the Philosophy of Right, "Personality contains in general the capacity for right and constitutes the concept and the (itself abstract) basis of abstract and hence formal right. The commandment of right is therefore: be a person and respect others as persons."¹⁴ Contract distinguishes between the will as identical relation in agreement, as the moment in which free will is identically related in possession and alienation of property, and as its actual performance. This agreement is achieved through stipulation, and it is through this stipulation that "I have relinquishd an item of property and my arbitrary will over it, and it has already become the property of the other party. In terms of right, I am thus immediately bound by the stipulation to perform what has been agreed."¹⁵

This attendant agreement gives rise to a scenario in which it is possible for a will to enter into opposition to this particularized will, thus making possible that which is wrong. In contract the free will of immediate persons is identical and common, but is also particularized. These persons are no longer merely arbitrary free will in a thing, but in relation to one another. So Hegel writes, "If the particular will for itself is different from the universal, its attitude and volition are characerized by arbitrariness and contingency, and it enters into opposition to that which is right in itself; this is wrong."¹⁶ This wrong may be unintentional, it may be deceit, or harm. It can also be expressed through force or coercion. If this force or coercion is used in a way so as to infringe on the concrete existence of freedom, it is crime. This infringement, being a negation of the abstract right, because it is determined, can be addressed in retribution. It is true that retribution infringes on the criminal will, but this is a negation of a negation, and is just in itself.

Crime and its retribution constitute the shape of a will's development as distinguished between "the universal will which has being in itself, and the individual [einzelnen] will which as being for itself in opposition to the universal. They also show how the will which has being in itself, by superseding this opposition, has returned into itself and thereby itself become actual and for itself. Having proved itself in opposition to the individual will which has being only for itself, right accordingly is and is recognized as actual by virtue of its necessity."¹⁷ That is to say, crime, as individual will, opposes itself to universal will in willing itself only for itself. It does not then supersede this opposition by returning to itself as free will in itself. This opposition necessitates the actualization and recognition of abstract right as the supersession of individual will as free will only for itself. However, this actualization of abstract right does not yet lead to ethical life, but first becomes morality.

Morality in Hegel's thought is an important development as the free will is eventually actualized in ethical life. That is to say, given the development of the will to this point, free will now has its object in personality, and as Hegel writes, "in abstract right the will is no more than personality,"¹⁸ which is subjective freedom without mediation. But in morality, the free will is not only in itself it has being for itself, it has personality as its object, and this constitutes "the moral point of view."¹⁹ In this development lies the reason why morality is deficient, in terms of its actualization. It is subjective, determined by the will, and does not yet take part in the objective actual. As Hegel explains, the three aspects of the moral will are its immediate shape in the purpose of the subjective will, its content directed for me to my own ends as a particular will (intention), and its subsequent realization in the conscience (the good).²⁰

These moments of morality, however, are unlimited. They are subjective. They do not yet have the object form of ethicality. Hegel writes, "The autonomously acting will, in the ends which it pursues in relation to the existence [Dasein] it has before it, has an idea [Vorstellung] of the circumstances which that existence involves. . . . It is, however, the right of the will to recognize as its action, and to accept responsibility for, only those aspects of its deed which it knew to be presupposed within in its end, and which were present in its purpose."²¹ This purpose, being shaped by other external forces may impair the development of an action toward what it is for itself.²²

This is is further developed in intention in which the "right of intention is that the universal quality of the action shall have being not only in itself, but shall be known by the agent and thus have been present all along in his subjective will,"²³ and objectively this action is both known and willed by a thinking agent.²⁴ This intentionality is the individual will as subjective action willing its own well being. It is the combination of purpose (the willing of an action within a set of partially known circumstances) and intentionality (that will directed toward its own end), out of which develops the idea of the good. "The good is the Idea, as the unity of the concept of the will and the particular will, in which abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing, and the contingency of external existence [Dasein], as self-sufficient for themselves are superseded."²⁵ From this concept of good is developed the conscience. The conscience is the "disposition to will what is good in and for itself" but is "merely the formal aspect of the will, which as this will, has no distinctive content of its own."²⁶

However, since the conscience is still determined by the personality and its intention for its own good, it is not yet the ethical life. The conscience, in that its actualization requires its development toward the universal and objective, and the good, in that its actualization must be determined as its own end, "if raised in this way to independent totalities [für sich zur Totalität], become the indeterminate which ought to be determined."²⁷ This ought is, as the integration of these two relative totalities, identical with the good as abstract universal. Or as Hegel indicates, the truth of both the good and the subjective will is "ethical life."²⁸

The description Hegel gives of the ethical life is the largest of the three parts that constitute his Philosophy of Right. It is also increasingly complex, as can be gleaned from the discussion thus far. As free will becomes increasingly actualized, its description in various spheres of human activity also becomes increasingly complex. The ethical life is realized in the family, then rises to civil society, and finally achieves its most complete actualization in the State.

The family has three important moments: marriage, the assets and property of the family, and the rearing of its children. The union of the free wills of two persons is expressed in marriage. Here free will is the union of an abstract expression of the desires and drives, that is the inner subjectivity, of two persons. But as this union of wills is particularized in the possession of property as a family, it develops in content of the idea. This possession of property, however, is more actualized than that of the property of abstract right. Here the property is possessed as needed resources for a communal purpose, as opposed to the possession of property for the ends of an individual, which is an important development toward the more complete actualization of the State. In a similar yet greater way, the union of the marriage reaches the development of an external existence which has being for itself in the rearing of children.²⁹ But it is in this rearing of children that the family disintegrates, as these children began to form families of their own as persons of free will in and for themselves. This differentiation is, as, in Hegel's terms, "the world of appearance,"³⁰ the loss of ethical life as the family negates itself and finds a greater realization in civil society.

There is great similarity, as might be expected, between the moments of marriage and the moments of civil society. However, civil society is different in its encompassing of a greater totality of persons and ends. In civil society there is the system of needs, in which the needs of various individuals are met by "the satisfaction of the individual [des Einzelnen] through his work and the work and satisfaction of the needs of all the others," the actualization of freedom in "the protection of property through the administration of justice," and provision for the preceding two moments by the police and the supporting corporations.³¹

But, once again, civil society is not yet the full realization of the will. It has not yet attained universality. It is not yet the actualization of the abstract will through particularization and individualization in the State. The aims of the corporation in the meeting of needs and protection of property is limited and finite, in that its ends are those of its members. These ends, however are not the totality of the State. They do not encompass all the particular wills of persons. Because of this deficiency, the corporation is not yet fully rational. But the negation of itself as its own particular will, passes over into the State, in which it becomes realized.

The State has three moments as well: constitutional law, as internal constitution, reflected in the Sovereign, the executive power and the civil service, and the legislative power, and then as external sovereignty in its relation with other states. This leads to the second moment of the State, international law, or the relationship of states as external sovereigns, and finally, as world history, exemplified by the actuatlization of the Spirit in the unfolding histories of Persia, Greece, Rome, and Germany.

The increasing actualization of free will in the State is complex, and even a brief explanation of its aspects would require more space than the limits of this paper allow. However, what can be summarized is the general descriptions of these moments noted above. For example, the constitution of the state accomplishes a unified relation of individuals and corporations as a universal instantiation of free will. It does this by actualizing the rights and duties of individuals to and for themselves and one another. In this way, the State both surpasses and encompasses the corporations of civil society because civil society's recognition of persons lacked realization of a greater commonality. The State also surpasses and encompasses the individual will in that it free will is not only in itself and for itself, but it is also in and for itself. This individual will and its interests are thus recognized, but also pass over into the interests of the universal will.³²

These aspects are exemplified in the modes of the Sovereign, the executive power and the legislative power. The Sovereign is universal in that he symbolizes the unity of the State and may express the will of the State through pardoning of criminals. The Sovereign is particular, the universal for itself, in that he has a right to appoint officials. The Sovereign is also individual, the universal in and for itself, as subjectively in his conscience, and as objectively in the constitution and its laws. The executive power is responsible for the actual implementation of the Sovereign's decisions and the laws of the constitution, it is the structure which promotes the common ends of the State. On the other hand, the legislative power is responsible for the laws as such, in their developing articulation, or with the universal concerns of the State.

When Hegel proceeds from his description of the State and its constitution to descriptions of its external sovereignty in relation to other States, he describes the State in way similar to his descrition of free will. The State is conceived of as an individual.³³ This individual free will of the State has being in itself, but in that it has its own welfare in mind, it is also being for itself. This particularity (for itself) expresses itself in relation to other states. This relation of states in their external sovereignty to other states brings forth the necessity of international law. International law has some general similarities to the contract of property, as treaties demarcate aspects of the relations of states with one another.

But the State and its relation to other states is a paticularity that is encompassed by the spirit as universal being in and for itself, world history. World history "is reason, and since the being-for-itself of reason in spirit is knowledge, world history is the necessary development, from the concept of the freedom of spirit alone, of the moments of reason and hence of spirit's self-consciousness and freedom. It is the exposition and the actualization of the universal spirit."³⁴ That is to say, if the free will of the State as instantiated in its constitution is its universal moment, and the relation between States as instantiated in international law is its particular moment, then the actualization of spirit in world history is its being in and for itself.

I have attempted to describe how Hegel's thought explains how free will moves from its very abstract notions of I and I-will, to the more concrete existence in property, to its development in morality, and then later its ethical expression in family life and civil society, and in the State. In all these instances, the relation of the will to its further development is unified. I began as Hegel does in looking at the will itself, which laid the foundation for an understanding of abstract right. In abstract right, it was shown that the will realizes itself through the sphere of freedom that is property. The possessing, using and alienation of property led to understandings of the relation of free will in contract. This also led to the first understanding of person and personality. Through the discussion of contract was developed an understanding of crime and coercion which led to a larger realization of abstract right in the expression of free will in morality. Morality, however, was insufficient in itself to supply a full reality of the free will as reason, and gave way to the ethical life and its moments of family, civil society and the State. In the family, there begins the more easily recognizable transition from free will in abstract right, to free will as objectively realized. But the family is similarly insufficient to actualize the will, so family life gives way to civil society. In civil society we can see an ever-closer realization of free will as reason. But again, though the free will is more fully realized in both the system of needs and the administration of justice, nonetheless, the corporations are still insufficient for the universalization of the particular will. It is in the State that the will is fully free and fully rational.

If my summary accurately describes the reality Hegel is explaining, the willing of the State as a figure of world history is also the willing of the person. Both are instantiations of the spirit willing that which is itself, in and for itself. Thus, it follows that a citizen's acquiescence to the laws of his own political community is not necessarily coerced because it is the actualization of his free will. Indeed, in its full actualization, the citizen wills himself as an instantiation of the State to will and to do that which is in and for the State itself. In this sense, though the freedom of the individual will is bounded by the State, it is nonetheless free in that it is the fully rational activity of the will in concrete instances.

² Ibid., § 4, p. 35. Italics and brackets original unless noted.

³ Ibid., § 6, p. 39.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., § 6, p. 39.

⁶ Ibid., § 7, p. 41.

⁷ Ibid., §§ 8 and 9, pp. 42, 43.

⁸ Ibid., § 10, p. 44.

⁹ Ibid., § 41, p. 73.

¹⁰ Ibid., § 42, p. 73.

¹¹ Ibid., § 45, pp. 76-77.

¹² Ibid., § 71, p. 102.

¹³ Ibid., § 72, p. 104.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁵ Ibid., § 79, p. 109.

¹⁶ Ibid., § 81, p. 113.

¹⁷ Ibid., § 104, p. 131.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 132.

²⁰ Ibid., § 114, p. 141.

²¹ Ibid., § 117, p. 144.

²² Ibid., § 118, p. 145.

²³ Ibid., § 120, p. 148.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., § 129, p. 157.

²⁶ Ibid., § 137, p. 164.

²⁷ Ibid., § 141, p. 185.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., § 173, p. 210.

³⁰ Ibid., § 181, p. 219.

³¹ Ibid., § 188, p. 226.

³² Ibid., § 260, p. 282.

³³ Ibid., § 321, p. 359.

³⁴ Ibid., § 342, p. 372.

© 2002 Clifton D. Healy

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