Jan-Aug, 1914
"Austria finds herself in an impasse without knowing how she is to escape.
People here are becoming accustomed to the idea of a general war as the only possible remedy".

France's Ambassador in Vienna, 13 December 1913
By the beginning of 1914, Anglo-German relations are more cordial than at any time since before the Boer War. Tension between the two nations has eased, as their naval armaments race has slackened. (Though this is not the result of any diplomatic breakthrough, but rather because Germany has just expanded her peacetime army from 700,000 to 870,000 men, and cannot afford to pay for large-scale naval construction and the expansion of the army at the same time).

There is also some degree of understanding, at least among Germany's diplomats in London, of Britain's determination to maintain her naval superiority, with the German Ambassador, Prince Karl; Lichnowsky, commenting that "If we ourselves were responsible for the safeguarding of an empire like that of Great Britiain, we should without doubt strive to maintain our seapower with the same solicitude as that now shown by the British Ministers." He also points out that it is not only in Britain's interest, but perhaps in Germany's too, that the German Empire should not seek naval parity with Britain, for "If Germany succeeds in wresting from England her supremacy at seas, the result will be that the English Channel will practically disappear and that England will be forced to enter into definite military and naval alliances with the other Powers".

Britain's relations with Germany are so cordial that on 23 June 1914, the ships of the Royal Navy's Second Battle Squadron begin a ceremonial visit to the German port of Kiel, where they will spend the week of the Kiel Regatta as guests of the Kaiser himself. The visiting British crews socialise with their counterparts in the German High Seas Fleet at a series of receptions, balls, and friendly competitions, but the warm and cordial atmosphere is broken abruptly on 28 June, when news reaches Kiel that the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand , has been assassinated by a Bosnian Serb nationalist during a visit to the turbulent Balkan province of Bosnia. The Kaiser leaves Kiel immediately, and two days later the Royal Navy squadron departs with one last radio message to its German hosts: "Friends in past and friends forever".
In the wake of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, European public opinion is overwhelmingly sympathetic to Austria-Hungary, and supportive of whatever measures the Empire might take to punish the assassins. Despite the seriousness of the crime, there is no expectation that this Balkan crisis will lead to a general war, any more than did the Balkan crises of 1912/13, which were successfully settled by diplomatic contacts among the Great Powers. But this time, there will be no recourse to diplomacy. Austria-Hungary's government, most vocally the Chief of the General Staff, General Count Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, and Foreign Minister Count Leopold von Berchtold see this incident as the provocation that will allow Austria-Hungary to launch its preventative war against Serbia, finally crushing that kingdom and removing the destabilising effect that it exercises over the southern Slavs of the Empire.

The Austrian government therefore publicly blames the government of Serbia for the death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, describing the assassination as a "well-organised plot whose threads extend to Belgrade". In reality, even the official Austro-Hungarian enquiry into the assassination will find no evidence of official Serbian involvement in the crime, but by continuing to maintain that Serbia is responsible, Austria-Hungary can justify going to war under the pretext that she is punishing the real murderers of the Archduke.

Austria-Hungary is aware that an invasion of Serbia risks a war with Russia, the guarantor of Serbian independence, and is aware too that she is not strong enough to face such a formidable opponent without the support of her ally, Germany. Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary has good reason to expect that Germany will respond positively to any request for support: by 1914, the continued existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire has become central to German foreign policy, as she is Germany's only ally. So unless Germany is willing to face alone her hostile neighbours to east and west, she has to preserve Austria-Hungary as a Great Power, which in turn demands that she offer almost unqualified support for the Hapsburg monarchy. (There was some unease in Berlin about the wisdom of "tying our neat sea-worthy Prussian frigate to Austria's worm-eaten old galleon", as Bismarck had put it fifty years before. In May 1914, Baron von Tschirinsky, Germany's Ambassador to Vienna, acknowledged: "I constantly wonder whether it really pays to bind ourselves so tightly to this phantasm of a state which is cracking in every direction". But Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg reaffirmed that it was still the German government's view that "our own vital interests demand the preservation of Austria").

And so, when the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph asks Kaiser William on 5 July 1914 whether he can count on German support for a punitive campaign against Serbia, the Kaiser assures him that Austria can "rely on Germany's full support", even in the face of "possible serious European complications". According to the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, the Kaiser even urges Austria-Hungary not to delay in its action against Serbia, declaring that: "If [Austria-Hungary] had really recognized the necessity of warlike action against Serbia , he would regret if [she] did not make use of the present moment which is all in [her] favour". The Kaiser recognises that Russia will be hostile to an invasion of Serbia, but believes that "Russia is in no way prepared for war", and will be forced to back down from a military confrontation with Austria-Hungary and Germany, as she did in the Bosnian crisis of 1908. He is aware, however, that if Russia does not climb down, his own General Staff's strategic plan for war with Russia - The Schlieffen Plan - will escalate the Sarajevo crisis into a full-scale European war. This is what the Kaiser means by "possible serious European complications".
"The more resolute Austria shows herself and the more energetically we support her, the sooner will Russia stop her outcry.
To be sure, they will make a great to-do in St Petersburg, but when all is said and done, Russia is at present not ready for war".

Gottlieb von Jagow, German Foreign Secretary, 18 July 1914.
The Assumptions of the German General Staff, August 1914
The Schlieffen Plan Germany knew that an Austrian attack on Serbia could lead to war between the Austro-Hungarians and the Russians. If Germany supported Austria in a war against Russia, there was a danger that Germany's western frontiers would come under attack from Russia's ally, France.

The German General Staff had anticipated this situation and had a plan ready to forestall a war on two fronts. In the event of war with Russia, Germany would launch a pre-emptive attack on France. And she would send her troops through neutral Belgium to attack French forces in the rear, which offered a better prospect for swift success than a frontal attack on the heavily fortified Franco-German frontier.

This scheme was known as "The Schlieffen Plan", after General Alfred von Schlieffen, the former Chief of the German General Staff who devised it. Schlieffen's successor, von Moltke, was confident that the result would be a short, sharp war in which the French would soon be decisively defeated. The German armies which conquered France could then be transferred east to face the huge but cumbersome Russian Army, which would still be lumbering towards Germany's eastern frontier.
With the assurance of German support, Austria-Hungary's Council of Ministers makes a final decision for war on 7 July 1914. They decide to proceed by preparing an ultimatum to Serbia, which will place impossible demands upon the Serbs, whose inevitable refusal to comply will give Austria-Hungary its pretext for declaring war. The ultimatum is completed by 16 July, but Austria delays its presentation to Serbia until 23 July. This is because the French President, Poincare, is conducting a state visit to Russia from 21 to 23 July, and by delaying the presentation of the ultimatum until just after he leaves, Austria-Hungary can prevent France and Russia co-ordinating a response to it. While the ultimatum is being prepared, Austria-Hungary's Chief of Staff and Minister of War ostentatiously take summer leave, to give the outward impression of "business as usual" in Vienna, while the Hapsburg Empire's diplomats assure the governments of their host countries that the demands they plan to make of Serbia will be moderate and will contain nothing that could lead to international complications.

As a result, the Serbian government - and most of Europe - is taken aback when Austria's ultimatum is finally delivered on 23 July, and it is found to be "the most formidable document that was ever addressed from one state to another" (Sir Edward Grey). Its demands include the suppression of all newspapers, and the withdrawal of all schoolbooks, containing material critical of Austria-Hungary; the dismissal of all Serbian government officials, army officers and teachers holding anti-Austrian views; the arrest of named Serbian officials and army officers; and the participation of Austrian officials in the Serbian judicial enquiry into the Sarajevo assassination. Most difficult of all is the 48-hour deadline which Austria-Hungary allows for complete Serbian compliance, which ensures that there will be no time for international mediation over any of the demands. The Austrian Emperor, Franz Joseph, frankly acknowledges that the terms are so severe that "Russia will never accept it. There will be a big war."

Serbia is reluctant to comply with such far-reaching demands, but under Russian and British pressure to be conciliatory, she submits to all of Austria-Hungary's demands except one: the insistence on Austrian participation in the Serbian judicial enquiry, which Serbia cannot grant without contravening her own constitution and legal code. Serbia suggests that this single outstanding point could be resolved by referral to the International Tribunal at the Hague. France, Britain and Russian see Serbia's accomodating response as a promising basis upon which to begin a negotiated settlement. But as the ultimatum was actually intended as a basis for war, rather than discussion, both Germany and Austria-Hungary reject any possibility of negotiations.
"Ultimata are fulfilled or not, but there is no more discussion!
Hence the name!".

Kaiser William II, on the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.
Because Serbia will not meet the one outstanding demand in the ultimatum, Austria-Hungary declares the Serbian answer unsatisfactory. She breaks off diplomatic relations with Serbia immediately upon receiving the Serbian reply, and on July 28th Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia . The following day, Russia tries to put pressure on Austria-Hungary not to invade Serbia, by mobilizing her armed forces in the four military districts that border the Hapsburg Empire. (Russian forces in military districts bordering Germany are not subject to the mobilization order). Tsar Nicholas also begins a personal correspondence by telegram with his uncle, the Kaiser, appealing for Germany to urge restraint upon Austria-Hungary.
"To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name
of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far. -- Nicky"

Tsar Nicholas II to Kaiser William II, 29 July 1914
But instead of deterring Austria from action, Russia's partial mobilization actually raises the likelihood of war, as it provokes other Great Powers to mobilize too, rather than be caught unprepared in the event of hostilities. Germany begins partially mobilizing her own forces late on 29 July, and Austria-Hungary announces the full mobilization of her forces on 30 July. When Russia responds by proceeding to a full mobilization on 31 July, Germany issues an ultimatum warning that unless Russia cease all military preparations within twelve hours, Germany will declare war on her. With her ally in the east now threatened with invasion, France makes a show of support by announcing that she too will mobilize.

On 1 August, Germany's ultimatum to Russia expires without response, so Germany's fully mobilizes, and declares war on Russia. (Austria-Hungary, whose Balkan rivalry with Russia has been a leading cause of the crisis, is slow to follow, and only finally declares war on Russia after much German prompting on 6 August). The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazanov, receives Germany's declaration of war from the German Ambassador to St. Petersburg with the accusation: "You [Germany] could have prevented the war by one word; you didn't want to."

Even at this late stage of the crisis, the Kaiser still has some hope that the war already declared in the east might be averted in the west. He suggests to his Chief of Staff, General von Moltke, that instead of attacking France, as the Schlieffen Plan demands, Germany should instead attack only Russia. He hopes that if there is no attack on France, Britain and France might yet stay out of the war. But Moltke informs him that it is impossible at this late stage of preparation to redeploy the hundreds of thousands of German troops massing in the west for the invasion of France. Within hours, on the night of 1 - 2 August, German troops begin their wwestern campaign by crossing the border and occupying neutral Luxembourg. On 2 August, German troops invade France by crossing the southern part of their common border, near the Swiss-German frontier. In the skirmishes that result, Corporal Andre Peugeot of the French Army becomes the first victim of the war on the western front.

But the main assault on France is to come through Belgium. At 7:00pm on 2 August, Germany issues a 12-hour ultimatum to the Belgian government, demanding that German troops be allowed free passage through Belgium in order to attack France. This threat to Belgian neutrality has far-reaching political repercussions, especially in Britain. By the terms of the Treaty of London of 1839, Britain, Austria, Prussia, France and Russia had agreed that Belgium should form an independent and perpetually neutral state. In 1914, that Treaty is still in force, and its signatories are still charged with guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality. A German invasion of Belgium is one issue that unites the British cabinet and British public opinion, both of which are deeply divided over whether Britain should go to war in support of France and Russia, or remain neutral. Britain has no treaty obligations to France or Russia, but she is pledged to defend Belgian neutrality. There is consequently a much greater willingness to support Belgium, should she choose to resist the German advance through her territory, than to intervene for France or Russia.
"It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of the war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right and to adjust them to our point of view...
If in a crisis like this we ran away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether whatever material force we might have at the end of the war would be of very much value in the face of the respect that we should have lost."

Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, 3 August 1914.
In the early hours of 3 August, Belgium makes it clear that she will indeed resist any violation of her neutrality, when she replies to Germany's ultimatum: "Were the Belgian government to accepts the propositions conveyed to it, it would be sacrificing the nation's honour and betraying its engagements to Europe". Belgium declares that she is "firmly resolved to repel by all means in its power every attack upon its rights".

Later that day, Germany finally declares war on France. Britain issues a 24-hour ultimatum, warning Germany that if she proceeds against France by invading Belgium, Britain will enter the war. But passage through Belgium is the key to Germany's plan for war on its western frontier, and on the morning of 4 August, German troops cross the Belgian frontier and begin the invasion of Belgium. At 11:00pm on 4 August 1914, Britain's ultimatum expires with no response from Germany, and the five Great Powers are at war. The Great War has begun.
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