freethought and philosophy

On the relationship between freethought and philosophy
by Charles Glenn

Philosophy, as is commonly known, means the "love of wisdom." When a person is in such a relationship with wisdom as can be characterized as "love," then it follows that the individual feels the same affection for what wisdom produces, and for what reason it exists -- namely, the discovery of truth. How else can the word "wise" be applied, if not in reference to a person who has sought after truth, and subsequently discovered at least a portion of it?

In contrast, freethought is a more modern term that has been used by certain non-theists to describe themselves, or rather to ascribe to themselves, some sort of enlightened manner of behavior, thought or action. In this context, freethought is portrayed as the ability to use reason and think critically -- implying that those who cannot claim the label, cannot claim to use reason or critical thinking.

Additionally, it also implies that those who can claim the label, by virtue of these "objective" faculties, have the ability to decide who is, and who is not, a "freethinker." It appears that this is largely determined by a person's metaphysical viewpoint, and since freethought is claimed by non-theists, theists are automatically disqualified from membership in this august assembly.

In this sense, it alienates itself from all that is good about freethinking (in the philosophical sense), presupposing its own evolutionary superiority over all the philosophies of history. One of the characteristics of this modern term is that truth is subjective to each person individually. It is, in effect, a "trump-card" in relation to philosophy, because it eliminates the reason for its existence.

If truth is not objective, then wisdom becomes meaningless and philosophy becomes an exercise in futility. One could characterize the modern version of freethought, then, as "love of self," since it is based on the idea of subjective truth and does not allow for any external objectivity.

Consequently, the modern philosophical dichotomy becomes a battle between the love of wisdom and the love of self, and unless the observer has a tendency toward narcissism, he or she will notice that one has real merit that can be useful for the common good of all, while the other is little more than the exaltation of self.

Ironically, the ranks of the non-theists themselves have produced a rational argument against such nonsense. In a recent column entitled, "Is 'Freethinker' synonymous with Non-theist?," Internet Infidel Jeffrey Jay Lowder, offered a well-reasoned, even generous, argument -- reasoned in that his thesis was to deny that "freethought" is synonymous with non-theism, and generous in advocating the idea that theists are able to possess and exercise this freedom (a rare sentiment among the Internet Infidels, and to be sure, tempered somewhat by his almost cryptic dismissal of Evangelical Christian epistemology).

This rational argument, however well received it is to all right-thinking people, is nevertheless tainted with the bias of the modern non-theist. It does not go far enough. If true philosophical speculation is to thrive, or to retain its essence, the concept of freethought must be further subjected and limited to what it is, in reality, after all -- simply a condition, or at best, a helpful environment, which could possibly allow for proper reason to be exercised -- but it must never be seen as synonymous with reason itself.

It is not a foregone conclusion that humanity is fundamentally progressive, and that each generation has somehow become "wiser" than generations past. Many of the greatest thinkers have worked within the boundaries of philosophical, and even theological, traditions -- and have contributed greatly to collective human wisdom.

Lowder's argument and his generosity are to be commended, as are most of his conclusions. His methodology, however, leaves something to be desired. By "methodology," here, I mean the manner in which he arrived at his conclusions. In limiting his citations to only Richard Swinburne and Bertrand Russell, he was correspondingly limiting the potency of his argument -- and in what Lowder failed to examine lies his central fallacy.

Although he prudently called for the removal of freethought as the uniting term for those who think as he does, he did not complete the argument. In fact, he began a train of thought that if followed through to its end, could mean the removal of freethought entirely from the vernacular of non-theists. I will attempt to show that, at best, freethought is a condition, or state of being, and is in no way equal to philosophy itself.

First of all, we must examine the definition of these two terms. Freethought, as Lowder correctly pointed out through the mouthpiece of Russell, is the act of thinking that is largely unencumbered by either tradition or personal passions. Lowder, however, goes beyond this definition by associating the lack of these two limitations with a supposed a priori possession of two other things -- namely reason and critical thought.

On the surface, it appears that he does not do this, such as when he asserts that non-theism and freethought are not synonymous. Nonetheless, his entire argument presupposes the idea that freethought is inherently reasonable, which it clearly is not. A man who has freed himself from the traditions and passions of life may conclude that he is Napoleon Bonaparte, and unless he actually is Napoleon Bonaparte, he is not exercising reason or critical thinking.

It is redundant to add "critical thought" to "reason," since one is part of the other, and neither can exist independently of each other -- so I will condense Lowder's two qualities into one, and call it reason. Now, if Russell's definition of freethought is to be the model which we both use, then it is plain that reason and freethought are two entirely separate things. Reason, as defined by Plato and Aristotle, is the application of rational thought, and it is characterized by "common sense" and sound judgement.

Freethought, on the other hand, is a static state of being that is not derived solely from the actions or thoughts (reasonable or unreasonable) of the person in question, but is more effected by the mental, physical and material condition in which that person finds him or herself in at any given moment. Freethought, then, is closer to being the limitation of the forces of tradition and passion than to being an enlightened state in itself, or to being a condition over which the individual has full control. Philosophy, on the other hand, is the thoughtful reflection on the nature of those traditions and passions, an examination of their origins, and at times, the development of an alternative to them or a method to keep them in proper perspective.

Plato's epistemology, for example, consisted of the governance of reason over the base animal instincts of passion, motivation and intellect -- creating a "just soul," whose instincts were replaced by temperance, courage and wisdom.

Throughout history, men and women from all traditions of life and culture, from the entire spectrum of human passions, have postulated new ideas about the metaphysics of the universe, about the "nature" of nature, and about the qualities or defects of human nature. It has been said that all of western philosophy is but a collection of footnotes to Plato, and although that is obviously not completely true, there is some sound rationality behind such a statement.

Without Plato or Aristotle, for example, where would we have gained the ideas that formed the foundations for the various governments humans have experimented with throughout history? Where would we have gained the contrary ideas that the world of the senses was a shadow of truth, or that the material world formed the entirety of creation? In fact, the very thing that gives life to new philosophy is the tradition of the older philosophy. For whether the new disdains the old and seeks to replace it, longs after the old, or blends the traditions of various philosophies to create a new one -- the constant is the tradition of philosophy itself.

Yet, there are certain non-theists who would have us believe that we have progressed beyond the need for such traditions. In their minds, history is one long story of "almost-truths" that culminate, conveniently, in their own generation (and in their own minds). And they, being the possessors of this super-philosophy they call "freethought," can look down at the rest of us from on high.

Consequently, they introduce the idea that theism is a crutch for weak minds, and belief in God becomes something other than "freethinking" (it should be pointed out that Lowder is not one of these, per se, and although he hints at holding such personal sentiments, he correctly identified and condemned publicly advocating them).

Since our new priesthood of non-theists has disallowed any other definition of correct thinking, the theist is forced into a defensive posture in which he or she must defend his or her belief in God without reference to "faith" or "spirituality." If they do, they receive only the ridicule and disdain of those "magnificent freethinkers," who are so far advanced in human evolution that they consider themselves to be above even ancestors like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, whose intellectual traditions they have inherited despite themselves, and who themselves never thought it unnatural to combine reason with faith. I believe that in the presence of thinkers such as these, some humility is in order.

That said, Jeffrey Lowder is to be commended for his insight and integrity. Speaking as a Christian, he has my respect. In the never-ending debate over what is "really" real, there are only a handful of people who play by the rules of good manners on either side, and he is one of them.