James van Luik

[By clicking on this signature one has access to all articles of the JvL Bi-Weekly.]

(It is genocide to mine the uranium in our land, nor more, no less.—Russell Means, 1980)

Non-Indian America, Euroamerica in particular, has a long and sorry history of blaming the victims of its criminal abuse for the existence of that abuse. Perfectly sincere young professors at Mid-western universities are wont to stand and observe in all seriousness that "the Indians fought each other before the white man came," in a context implying that there is really nothing differentiating traditions of counting coup on the one hand, and wars of annihilation on the other. We are, after all, the same. Others smugly point out that Indians killed the buffalo, often in large numbers, before the advent of professional buffalo hunters. Implication? The extermination of an entire species, in the end as a military tactic, is no different in kind than subsistence hunting. The Indian, it is presumed, will be stifled from complaint by the "fact" of having set an example of butchery for his wanton western brothers.

Again, serious scholars pronounce that dispossession of the Lakota—for example—from their land is little basis for complaint, "given that the Sioux ran the Crows off their land, too." Never mind that the Lakota action resulted from the fact that Anishinabes, well-armed with muskets gleaned from the fur trade, had—when being shoved west by encroaching whites—in turn pushed the Lakota, who lacked comparable weaponry, westward into Crow country. Never mind, too, that the Crows, who fought with the US Army rather than against it, and whom no one claims did much dispossessing of anyone, were as readily stripped of their land as were the Lakota. The fate of the Lakota was sealed—through some process of cosmic justice—in the "nature of their own traditions" according to the convention of liberal Euroamerican academe. Today, the American Indian suffers from the infliction of radioactive colonization. To be sure, it may be rightly contended that Indians have participated, often willingly, in that process. The question which occurs as a result of this obviousness is whether, once again, a form of logical convolution will be applied thereby through which to blame the Indian for his/her fate. And, if such distortive blame is applied , will it be used, as it usually has been, to fabricate a justification for and sanction of the status quo?

In political terms, such an attitude, whether overtly or subtly expressed, has generally led to the assumption that—defects of our own cultures somehow having brought us to our contemporary pass—Indians inherently require, and deserve, non-Indian ideology and leadership. To put it another way, Indians have proven "weak" in a Darwinian sense, have through such weakness been overrun and left prostrate by the "stronger" cultures of Europe, and must now be subsumed as a small but integral component of European conceptions of revolution currently employed against the equally Eurospecific notions of imperialism which generate Indians' (and everyone else's) oppression. For all its "libratory" veneer, such an outlook is fundamentally similar to that of the current oppressor; it preserves, essentially intact, the prevailing and entirely objectionable status quo of American Indian subordination to an external and dominant cultural reality, both at the conceptual and at the physical levels.

The pattern of victim-blaming mentality underpinning the ideology of most imported "cultures of resistance" within this hemisphere has led to certain highly distortive strategic assumptions on the part of those purporting to combat North American imperialism from within. Concern with economies of scale has led non-Indian dissidents to ignore or dismiss the Indians of North America as a critical element (real or potential) of anti-imperialists struggle, primarily because of their small numbers discounting the fact of Indian existence necessarily leads to the missing of their colonial status and the contemporary existence of territorially defined colonies within the physical confines of the North American imperial powers. This, to be sure, is no small oversight.

If Indian reality is effectively voided at the intellectual level of avowed anti-imperialists, the result is the view which seems most commonly held among non-Indians: that of the US and Canada as possessing an essentially seamless (except for class conflicts) internal integrity and hegemony through which their imperialism is uniformly exported to other, usually Third World, nations. Preoccupation with the effects of colonialism, and with indigenous efforts to offset it, thus centers on North America's satellites, seldom upon the continent itself. Such an erroneous view generates a cumbersome method of countering imperial policy, slashing as it does always at the tentacles, never at the heart.

This essay has attempted to show why colonies exist within the countries of North America. Further, it has sought to explain the absolutely crucial nature of the existence of these colonies, by virtue of resource distribution and production, to the maintenance and expansion of north American imperialism. Finally, it has tried to provide a critical insight into the internal colonial methods employed, and the impact of these methods upon the populations most immediately and directly affected by then: the resident populations of the colonies themselves, American Indians. It is to be hoped that within such an articulation lie the seeds of an analysis pointing to an anti-imperialist mode of action which transcends the victim-blaming and misorientation marking past practice.

Within the structural properties and physical characteristics of North American internal colonialism lies the levers with which a properly focused anti-imperialist effort can begin to pry apart the skeletal components of the imperial nations themselves. The application of the broadest possible support to the internationally acceptable (among Third World nations, for example) principle of the sanctity and sovereignty of Indian treaty territories would carry a considerable challenge of and jeopardy to the physical integrity of both the US and Canada. Perhaps even more crucial is that the specific areas most in question in this regard are such that both nations would find themselves denied ease of access to a major proportion of their strategic reserves of vital raw materials. Similarly, any exertion of real tribal sovereignty over treaty territories would serve to curtail an array of both nations' internal production capabilities, both in terms of denying conveniently "remote" locations, and in denying the water upon which many—if not most—industrial processes depend.

Clearly, such a turn of events would prove crippling to imperialism in ways which confronting its presence within the satellite colonies abroad never has, and in all probability never can. Not that facing the facts of the matter provides a panacea, a magic act through which such conditions can be actualized at a stroke. The treaties and other factors at issue have existed all along, and are well known to both corporate and governmental managers. For what must be obvious reasons, such managers have systematically declined to honor the treaties, to respect American Indian ownership of much of the contemporary basis of North American power. Implementation of treaty terms and provisions, with all that this implies, will necessarily entail a considerable and sustained struggle on the broadest possible popular basis.

The question thus emerges as to who is to lead such a struggle , to provide it form and direction in it is day-to-day development. Here, an utter inversion of the principle of blaming the victim and its accompanying orthodoxy of euro-derived movements is indicated. Currently, representative leaders and movements know little of treaties, their implications and practical potentials in the global arena. Nor is the extent of American Indian territoriality, water rights resource holdings, and the like—both current and potential (by virtue of treaty rights)—particularly well understood outside the circles of Indian activism. Nor has the background and experience of most non-Indian anti-imperialists especially suited them for direct interaction with and grassroots organization of the internal colonial populations. All of this combines to present a rather poor case for American Indians being led by non-Indians in any struggle to dismantle the North American internal colonial structure. To the contrary it points very plainly to the prospect that a real and highly visible Indian leadership component of any North American anti-imperialist movement must be accepted as a prerequisite to success.

Native people have, after all, been forced to live in the very front lines of the colonial process, through no choice of their own, for generations. They, among all the people of America, have been imbued with a comprehensive understanding of that process at the most practical level. Inadvertently, this knowledge, and their geographical disposition, has placed them in a position at the very cutting edge of any emergent contestation of North American political economy, regardless of the numerical status of their population and other factors. Hence, the recent actualization of certain American Indian (or Indian led) activist formations and the undertaking of certain actions by these formations should be viewed with hope, as bright spots in what is otherwise a deadening panorama of horror.

The first, and perhaps most obvious, of these has been the founding and continuation of the American Indian Movement (AIM) and, for a time, its subordinate diplomatic component, the International Indian Treaty Council. Another AIM spinoff, and one which should be carefully studied by non-Indian and Indian activists alike, was the Black Hills Alliance. Within this coalition of various regional organizations, native people held a very strong but hardly exclusive leadership position. The formal board of directors was composed not only of AIM members, but also of miners, clergy, area ranchers, and at least one former John Birch Society member (who professes to have shot at AIM people only a few years before). Using treaty rights and the environment as first points of contention, this amalgamation was able to successfully articulate a practical program of anti-imperialism within its area which stressed the commonality of issues between Indians and non-Indians. By adopting such a posture, the Alliance was able to assume a position in the very forefront of local resistance to wholesale mining, uranium production, water diversion, land expropriation (from ranchers and Indians alike), and so forth. It was also able to mount the 1979 and 1980 Black Hills International Survival Gatherings, which formulated a strategy wherein Indian treaty rights were viewed as the key to countering governmental/corporate processes detrimental to the population as a whole, and drew unprecedented numbers of non-area activist to the Black Hills region. Having successfully opposed nuclear dumping at Edgemont and the ETSI initiative, the Alliance essentially dissolved, its membership going on to serve as cadre in other local, regional, or national organizations.

While a number of other events and circumstances across the face of Indian Country could be cited to underscore the point being made, the preceding examples should be sufficient to render credible the observation that the rudiments of a serious, seasoned, and effective internal anti-imperialist movement currently exist within AIM and conceptually affiliated organizations. That such a movement must expand tremendously in scale before it can hope to attain its ultimate goals is undeniable. That such expansion can occur within North America only through the attraction of non-Indian allies is equally unquestionable. Here, both the model offered by the Black Hills Alliance, and the earlier mentioned inversion of the usual non-Indian agendas and priorities become crucial.

The struggle currently shouldered by AIM and related native organizations is not merely "for Indians." It is for everyone. To resolve the issue of the colonization of the American Indian would be, at least in part, to resolve matters threatening to the whole of humanity. In altering the relations of internal colonialism in North America, "the AIM idea" would vastly reduce the capability of the major nations there to extend their imperial web into Central and South America, as well as Africa, Asia, and the Pacific Basin. In denying access to the sources of uranium to the industrial powers, American Indains could take a quantum leap toward solving the problem of nuclear proliferation. In denying access to certain other resources, they could do much to force conversion to renewable, nonpolluting alternative energy sources such as solar and wind power. The list could be extended at length.

Ultimately, the Lagunas, the Shiprocks, Churchrocks, Tuba Cities, Edgemonts, and Pine Ridges which litter the American landscape are not primarily a moral concern for non-Indian movements (although they should be that, as well). Rather, they are pragmatic examples, precursors of situations and conditions which, within the not-so-distant future,, will engulf other population sectors; which, from place to place, have already begun to actively encroach in a more limited fashion. Circumstance has made the American Indian the first to bear the full brunt of the new colonialism in North America. The only appropriate response is to see to it that they are also the last. The new colonialism knows no limits. Expendable populations will be expended. "National sacrifice areas" will be sacrificed. New populations and new areas will then be targeted, expended, and sacrificed. There is no sanctuary. The new colonialism is radioactive; what it does can never be undone. Left to its own dynamics, to run its course, it will spread across the planet like the literal cancer it is. It can never be someone else's problem; regardless of its immediate location at the moment, it has become the problem and peril of everyone alive, and who will be alive. The place to end it is where it has now taken root and disclosed its inner nature. The time to end it is now.

The children resemble fictitious, freakish figures better suited for a horror movie than ordinary life.

One child's enormously bloated stomach prevents it from doing anything but lying in bed.

Another child lies in its mother's arms. It's impossible to tell if the child's smiling or crying. Its mouth, which is a huge, purple, scarred, messy hole, is so disfigured it doesn't change from its permanent position: wide open.

Perhaps the most disturbing picture is one of a uniformed American soldier holding his young son in his arms. The child's wrists are attached to his elbows and his legs are so bowed it looks like he was born on a horse.

These pictures are just a few examples of what happens when humans are exposed to vast amounts of depleted uranium, said Dennis Kyne, a former U.S. Army sergeant.

Depleted uranium, or DU, is a by-product of uranium, which is the earth's heaviest metal. During the first Gulf war, the U.S. military used DU to coat missiles fired at opposing tanks.

Once DU penetrates a substance, it burns everything around it, disabling enemy weaponry and omitting deadly radioactive particles.

Dennis Kyne, a sergeant and medic during the Gulf war is concerned continued DU use will effect the men and women that will return from Iraq.

Kyne recently recounted his horrific experiences with DU in a speech at the Blue Acacia in Glenwood.

An effective agent of war, DU is extremely deadly and is responsible for the deaths of more than 9,600 veterans of the first Gulf war, Kyne said.

"I know people who came home and their skin literally melted away from their bones," Kyne said. "The military told men they had pneumonia, and two days later they'd tell their wives they died of cancer. How does that happen?"

During the Gulf War, soldiers were exposed to large amounts of depleted uranium particles. Unless cleaned up by professional teams, the particles are radioactive for 4.5 billion years, Kyne said.

In many cases, Kyne's soldiers were exposed to the particles for more than five days. When they came home, they suffered psychological disorders, tumors, unexplained cancers and other physical ailments the government labeled "Gulf War syndrome," Kyne said.

"We started seeing sergeants picking their noses and eating their boogers," Kyne said. "You'd walk into a tent and a guy would be sucking on his big toe."

After the military loosely defined Gulf War syndrome, it did little to find out why soldiers were dying, Kyne said.

Capt. Doug Rokke, who was part of the DU cleanup team, blew the whistle on the use of DU and its fatal effects. The military removed him from his rank and Rokke became a schoolteacher.

"People who know about it get railroaded out," Kyne said.

The military, which is still using DU, doesn't want to acknowledge that it's killing its own people, Kyne said.

Any scientific study on DU that doesn't support the military's agenda is brushed aside and considered invalid, Kyne said.

"The army does whatever they do, and they say whatever they say without any empirical evidence," Kyne said. "The soldiers are the greatest study group in the world."

In a documentary about DU, Dr. Michael Kilpatrick, deputy director of the Department of Defense's Deployment Health Support Directorate, said DU does not cause any of Gulf War Syndrome's symptoms.

"It cannot hurt your body," Kilpatrick said in one clip.

A moment later he said, "It has to be ingested to be harmful."

The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses works in conjunction with the Defense Technical Information Center. In a report issued by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illness, a report said DU is a "heavy metal that's slightly radioactive" and as long "as it remains outside the body, it cannot harm you."

Misconceptions concerning the health risks from DU radiation are over exaggerated, according to the report.

"They made us feel safe," Kyne said. "Feel safe, soldier; come, walk into anything. It can't getcha."

But soldiers were far from safe. Most of the soldiers ingested DU while kicking around sand covered in DU particles, Rokke said.

Soldiers spread the contamination to their families by bringing war souvenirs such as duffle bags into their living rooms. Covered in particles, the souvenirs immediately infect the families, causing death in infants, retardation in younger children and infertility in parents, Kyne said.

According to the Gulf War Resource Center, more than 250,000 of the 700,000 men returning from the war asked for health care for DU symptoms.

Many of the men are turned away or told their symptoms are "nothing," Kyne said.

Kyne has made it his mission to expose what he considers the deceit and betrayal the U.S. Army offered soldiers who risked their lives for the sake of their country.

Many commercial aircraft use DU for balance, Kyne said. DU particles are found all over the United States including California and Colorado, he said.

"I would have been a professional musician by choice, but this is what I have to do," Kyne said. "I'm begging for someone to prove me wrong."

3. A REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN NUCLEAR POLICY

JONATHAN SCHELL

A metaphorical "nuclear option" -- the cutoff of debate in the Senate on judicial nominees -- has just been defused, but a literal nuclear option, called "global strike," has been created in its place. In a shocking innovation in American nuclear policy, recently disclosed in the Washington Post by military analyst William Arkin, the administration has created and placed on continuous high alert a force whereby the President can launch a pinpoint strike, including a nuclear strike, anywhere on earth with a few hours' notice. The senatorial "nuclear option" was covered extensively, but somehow this actual nuclear option -- a "full-spectrum" capability (in the words of the presidential order) with "precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and information operations)" -- was almost entirely ignored.

The order to enable the force, Arkin writes, was given by George W. Bush in January 2003. In July 2004, Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated to Adm. James Ellis Jr., then-commander of Stratcom, "the President charged you to ‘be ready to strike at any moment's notice in any dark corner of the world' [and] that's exactly what you've done." And last fall, Lieut. Gen. Bruce Carlson, commander of the 8th Air Force, stated, "We have the capacity to plan and execute global strikes."

These actions make operational a revolution in US nuclear policy. It was foreshadowed by the Nuclear Posture Review Report of 2002, also widely ignored, which announced nuclear targeting of, among others, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya. The review also recommended new facilities for the manufacture of nuclear bombs and the study of an array of new delivery vehicles, including a new ICBM in 2020, a new submarine-launched ballistic missile in 2029, and a new heavy bomber in 2040. The review, in turn, grew out of Bush's broader new military strategy of pre-emptive war, articulated in the 2002 White House document, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which states, "We cannot let our enemies strike first." The extraordinary ambition of the Bush policy is suggested by a comment made in a Senate hearing in April by Linton Brooks, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, who explained that the Defense Secretary wanted "bunker buster" nuclear bombs because "it is unwise for there to be anything that's beyond the reach of US power."

The incorporation of nuclear weapons into the global strike option, casting a new shadow of nuclear danger over the entire planet, raises fundamental questions. Perhaps the most important is why the United States, which now possesses the strongest conventional military forces in the world, feels the need to add to them a new global nuclear threat. The mystery deepens when you reflect that nothing could be more calculated to goad other nations into nuclear proliferation. Could it be that the United States, now routinely called the greatest empire since Rome, simply feels the need to assert its dominance in the nuclear sphere?

History suggests a different explanation. In the past, reliance on nuclear arms has in fact varied inversely with reliance on conventional arms. In the very first weeks of the nuclear age, when the American public was demanding demobilization of US forces in Europe after World War II, the U.S. monopoly on the bomb gave it the confidence to adopt a bold stance in postwar negotiations with the Soviet Union over Europe. The practice of offsetting conventional weakness with nuclear strength was soon embodied in the policy of "first use" of nuclear weapons, which has remained in effect to this day. The threat of first use under the auspices of the global strike option is indeed the latest incarnation of a policy born at that time.

This compensatory role for nuclear weapons emerged in a new context when, after the protracted, unpopular conventional war in Korea, President Eisenhower adopted the doctrine of nuclear "massive retaliation," intended to prevent limited Communist challenges from ever arising. And it was in reaction to the imbalance between local "peripheral" threats and the world-menacing "massive" nuclear threats designed to contain them that, in the Kennedy years, the pendulum swung back in the direction of conventional arms and a theory of "limited war" to go with them. Meanwhile, nuclear arms were officially assigned the more restricted role of deterring attacks by other nuclear weapons -- the posture of "mutual assured destruction."

Today, though the Cold War is over, the riddle of the relationship between nuclear and conventional force still vexes official minds. Once again, the United States has assigned itself global ambitions. (Then it was containing Communism, now it is stopping "terrorism" and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.) Once again, the United States is fighting a limited war -- the war in Iraq -- and other limited wars are under discussion (against Iran, North Korea, Syria, etc.). And once again, nuclear arms appear to offer an all too tempting alternative. Arkin comments that a prime virtue of the global strike option in the eyes of the Pentagon is that it requires no "boots on the ground." And Everett Dolman, a professor at the Air Force School at Maxwell Air Force Base, recently commented to the San Francisco Chronicle that without space weaponry, "we'd face a Vietnam-style buildup if we wanted to remain a force in the world."

For just as in the 1950s, the boots on the ground are running low. The global New Rome turns out to have exhausted its conventional power holding down just one country, Iraq. But the 2000s are not the 1950s. Eisenhower's overall goal was mainly defensive. He wanted no war, nuclear or conventional, and never came close to ordering a nuclear strike. By contrast, Bush's policy of preventive war is inherently activist and aggressive: The global strike option is not only for deterrence; it is for use.

A clash between the triumphal rhetoric of global domination and the sordid reality of failure in practice lies ahead. The Senate, on the brink of its metaphorical Armageddon, backed down. Would the President, facing defeat of his policies somewhere in the world, do likewise? Or might he actually reach for his nuclear option?

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4. CHERNOBYL CAN HAPPEN HERE

LINDA AND PAUL GUNTER

Last month, the 19th anniversary of the Chernobyl atomic reactor disaster in Ukraine slipped by with scarcely a murmur in the media. Instead, headlines were trumpeting the new nuclear “renaissance,” as the Bush administration flaunts its pork-laden energy bill and the industry crows about “clean, green, nuclear power.”

In attempting to muscle its way into the climate change argument, with a barrage of misinformation and flawed statistics, the nuclear industry is conveniently ducking the very real horrors that would ensue if one of their reactors suffered an accident or attack resulting in a release to the environment of its radioactive contents. And the weight of scientific evidence suggests such an outcome is not only possible but also probable.

Since 9/11, the security landscape has changed forever. We know that an attack on a U.S. reactor was in the original al Qaeda plans and likely will be again. The 103 operating U.S. reactors are all now reaching the end of their life spans, meaning they are more prone to technical problems that could lead to accident. And despite their geriatric status, older reactors are subject to fewer safety checks and are run hotter and longer, leading to cracking and embrittled parts vulnerable to failure.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), congressionally charged with safeguarding the public, has instead capitulated to the industry’s profit-margin priorities. Added to that, older reactors contain radiation inventories far larger than the infant reactor at Chernobyl that had operated for just two years before the catastrophe. And of course, both the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents were a result of human error, the one wild card that can never be entirely eliminated.

Also forgotten amidst the Washington pundits' pro-nuclear pronouncements are the tragic consequences so vividly seen today in the children of Chernobyl. These are young lives forever altered by the birth defects they inherited from their parents who had the misfortune to live close to the reactor or downwind of its toxic fallout cloud. Many have been abandoned in orphanages. More than seven million people in the former Soviet Republics of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are believed to have suffered medical problems and genetic damage as the direct result of Chernobyl. In Ukraine alone, more than 2.3 million people, including 452,000 children, have been treated for radiation-linked illnesses, including thyroid and blood cancers and cancerous growths, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Health.

New findings reported last November in the “Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health” published by the British Medical Association concluded that more than 800 cancers in Sweden are being attributed to the ever-widening impact of the “Chernobyl-effect.”

It is increasingly disingenuous of the nuclear industry to distance itself from a potential catastrophic accident in the United States. Considerable evidence exists that currently operating U.S. reactor containments can also fail during a severe accident. A 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) study of risks associated with severe reactor accidents concluded that none of the five different U.S. designs it analyzed were capable of remaining intact during all severe accident scenarios.

Furthermore, a terrorist attack on just a single U.S. nuclear plant could deliver the unimaginable. One study that examined such a catastrophe at the Indian Point nuclear plant just 25 miles from Manhattan, concluded that the number of near-term deaths within 50 miles, due to lethal radiation exposures received within seven days after an attack by a large aircraft would number approximately 44,000 under worst case scenario weather conditions. Long-term cancer deaths could soar as high as 500,000. Manhattan would become a near-permanent sacrifice zone.

The recently released National Academy of Sciences report on the vulnerability of reactor fuel pools supports these conclusions. According to the report, an attack on a fuel pool and the resulting fire “would create thermal plumes that could potentially transport radioactive aerosols hundreds of miles downwind under appropriate atmospheric conditions.”

Fortunately, Americans have a choice. We can reject the nuclear liability and tell our elected representatives to advocate for energy efficiency and renewable energy, measures that carry none of the dangers nor the toxic legacy of nuclear power. It’s common sense. And our children’s children will thank us.

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5. THE SECRET BUSH DECISION OF JULY, 2002 TO INVADE IRAQ

As Recorded

(The Downing Street Memo)

(Editor's note: "The intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy". There wasn't any imminent Iraqi threat, only an imminent fraud.)

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

Subject: IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

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