Populism, rights and violence

 30 oct 2004

A loan shark who charges 20 percent a day interest sent thugs to cut off the hand of a defaulting debtor. If this incident had not appeared in the newspaper headlines and TV news, we would think this was a story from medieval history. But it is also part of an increasingly visible culture of violence. The same month’s news included a gruesome family murder, another in the string of dead local activists, and another property dispute settled by gang violence.

Over recent months there has been a steady stream of reports linking such violence to the “culture of impunity” created by the current government’s contempt for human rights and the rule of law. And in the wake of these reports, there is a great deal of debate and soul-searching on why Thailand finds itself in this situation. How come such a government commands such large popular support? Why do surveys show 80 percent of people support the drug killings and the deaths in the Krue Se mosque? While Buddhism teaches that all life is sacred and inviolate, how come a majority of monks support the drug killings and the death penalty?

Last week, the historian Thongchai Winichakul entered this debate. His answer, shorn of its flourishes, was chillingly simple. In Thai political culture, might is right and ends justify means.

In classical theory, the ruler was by definition the person with the highest merit of his time. If there was someone better, that other person would have become ruler. Because of his merit, the ruler’s actions were always guided by benevolence or the best intentions. He might kill his own brothers and uncles but only to preserve the social order from which everyone benefited. The alternative was chaos.

In the transition to a modern political system, much has changed yet, there is still a strong residue of the past. Thailand imported the forms of democratic process, the rule of law, and human rights. But the mentality did not change, nor did the power relations. So how the institutions of the state operate in theory and in practice are very different. Rulers now emerge by electoral processes, but they tend to grow in popularity, following and prestige after they have reached the top — after they have proved they have merit. In power, they are judged by what they do, not how they do it. Human rights advocates criticise the methods used in the drug war, but the majority of people welcome the result and do not care about the means. Only if a leader chooses obviously wrong objectives do people think his merit is exhausted and his capacity for benevolence is over.

But for many other people, Thongchai’s explanation is too bleak. It embeds the problem deep in the culture, suggesting change will be difficult.

An alternative approach argues there is nothing specifically “Thai” about this at all. In fact one only has to look at the USA – supposedly the world’s most advanced country and one of the founts of democracy – to find many parallels. When the US government became desperate in its own war on drugs, it began to cancel rights formerly granted to every person as a citizen. Under the threat of terrorism, this trend has increased. In the international arena, the US has become increasingly contemptuous of treaties, conventions, and UN processes.

In this interpretation, the problem is a growing level of economic disparity, social division, and cultural conflict on a world scale. As a result, violence is on the increase. Some people are challenging what they see as injustice. Others are defending themselves. At many different levels from relations between states down to relations within the family or in the school playground, people have lost faith in old institutions and rules.

In this explanation, Thongchai’s argument that might is right and ends justify means is spot on, but is a world problem not a Thai one. But for many, this explanation is even more depressing because it makes any solution even more remote and difficult.

A third explanation says that the liberal bundle of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has failed to deliver anything substantial to the majority of people. As a result, the majority see no reason to value this bundle.

Ordinary people in Thai society, especially the poor, have low expectations of the police and judicial system. They expect them to be corrupt and biased against them. They are used to having their own rights violated. They face violence in their daily lives as a matter of course. They have got relatively little from a political system which claims to be democratic.

In such circumstances, what difference can people detect between a proper judicial punishment on one hand, and an extra-judicial killing on the other. What is the magic in such ideas as human rights, human dignity, democracy, participation and the rule of law if there are no rational reasons for ordinary people to value them. Why should they care that Thaksin has undermined the checks and balances in the constitution, tamed the media, shown no interest in human rights, and devalued parliament. Why not support the guy who turns up in the province promising billions, whatever else he does.

This comes down to a  chicken-and-egg problem. People will value the liberal bundle (democracy, rights, law) only if they have proof they get benefits from the bundle. But this can never happen as long as government takes advantage of people’s low expectations of government to by-pass rights, democratic process, and the rule of law at every opportunity.

But at least this interpretation provides a window of hope. The solution does not depend on a cultural revolution or a shift in the world order. It can be achieved by incremental changes which bit by bit offer proof that democracy, rights and law can be more effective in the long run than populist patronage. This interpretation says that social and political activism is still worth while.