The death throes of a political generation

16 November 1997

We have just watched the death throes of a political generation.

Since the early 1980s, the faces on the political front line have been the same. The pack has been reshuffled many times, but it has mostly been the same pack. The personalities, foibles, games, squabbles, vendettas and party pieces have become very familiar.

In the high-pressure environment created by the baht float and economic slump, these political games built to a writhing climax. The sequence began with the usual chessboard cunning of Thai coalition politics. Chavalit had been able to stab Banharn in the back because he was standing so close to him. Now Chatichai was preparing for the same manoeuvre. But then things ran riot. Gamesmanship. Posturing. Blackmail. The prime minister and interior minister toying with the idea of a rural revolt. Calls to turn the political clock back ten years and reseat General Prem. Street demos by the assembly of the rich on Silom Road. A procession of bewildered technocrats. All leading to an endgame which teetered between high tragedy and farce. Any and every permutation of parties was mooted. Followers rebelled against leaders. Devils metamorphosed into angels.

In the aftermath, many of the old faces are slipping into the shadows. Samak Sundaravej has been beached without a party. Montri Pongpanich has chosen to take a back seat, possibly because he does not want to tangle with the new rules on asset disclosure. Banharn Silpa-Archa is pushing forward his younger supporters as representatives of a political new wave. Wattana Asavaheme talks eloquently of the arrival of a new political generation. Snoh Tienthong has hinted that he is ready to retire from the political stage. Chatichai Choonhavan wants to step aside for Korn. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh will find it difficult to resurrect his career from such depths.

Of course the old generation is not stone dead and gone. There will be twitches and lunges for years to come. But we are watching a significant transition of generations.

Even Chuan Leekpai is likely to lead the government from behind. The centre stage will be occupied by the Democrats’ economic team (Tarrin, Supachai), internationalist team (Surin, Sukhumphand, Abhisit) and other young bloods. In the switch from Chavalit to Chuan, the average age of the Cabinet drops by several years.

Age here is more than just a number. Age is an indicator of life experience, of mind set, and of the political background to each generation’s formative years.

The old generation grew up politically in the era of the cold war, US tutelage, coups, and military dictatorship. Chatichai had his first political training as a tank commander in the coups after the second world war. Chavalit worked on anti-communist strategy in the army. In this era, American support kept the economy healthy and the military strong. Any form of popular organisation or protest was treated with suspicion. Politicians prospered by working within this framework.

The word "democracy" acquired a curious meaning. The US was fighting the cold war and intervening in Thailand to "preserve democracy". But in Thailand it was sponsoring military dictatorship. Political power in this "democracy" came from guns and money. The word became very debased. To this day, there is a tinny sound about the way the politicians of this generation talk about "the people" and "democracy".

This old generation rode the gradual transition from military dictatorship to parliamentary politics. Chatichai was one of the first generals to found a modern political party. Chavalit was the last. They learnt many new words and many new tricks. But they never completely shucked off their early training. They worked out how to orchestrate electoral victories. But they still distrusted popular organisation and popular expression. They revelled in the power and patronage of ministerial office, but (with the exception of the Democrats) they did not equip their parties with the expertise for managing the increasing complexities of Thailand’s economy and society. They dabbled in manifestos and party slogans, but they were much more at home in the wheeler-dealer world of power-broking in secluded rooms.

The recent crisis showed how easily the old-guard politicians revert to the old ways under pressure. The tussle between Chavalit and Chatichai smacked of the clique politics of the era of military dominance, with feints, thrusts, challenges, sucker traps and other war gaming. Both sides used the old tactic of rent-a-mob and staged scenes of political theatre for the public audience. Chavalit’s team dug out the tired old polemic of the communist threat and Chinese menace. Chatichai’s repeated claim that he would make the economy boom quickly betrayed a deep cynicism about political rhetoric. Both seemed so intent on their rivalry that they were insensitive to the growing public exasperation at this type of politics.

In the past, these old-guard politicians have brushed aside criticism and claimed the support of a silent majority. True to form, on the eve of Chavalit’s fall, Snoh Tienthong claimed on TV that "at least 70 percent" of the people still supported the government. But the majority is no longer so silent, passive and tolerant. This showed in the editorial and commentaries of the quality press. But these politicians are also practised at dismissing this criticism as a minority view. More striking was the virulent criticism in the cartoons of the mass-circulation Thai dailies. Often scabrous, outrageous and totally tasteless, they pictured the scrapping politicians as jungle animals, pirates, crooks, dinosaurs and buffoons.

The new generation grew up politically against a very different backdrop: the struggles of 1973-6, the challenge to military rule, the rejection of US tutelage, the collapse of the cold war, the greater exposure of Thai economy and society to global influences, the gradual emergence of popular expression. This has been a very different education. For this new generation, the meaning of the word democracy is a little less confused. The sensitivity to public opinion a little more acute.

But this is far from being a transition from darkness to light. Among the new generation, as among the old, there are both good men and bad. The pressures and temptations remain unchanged. Some of the old generation will hover in the background like ghosts for many years to come. Scattered through the new generation, there are sons and daughters of the old guard for whom blood may mean more than education.

Even so, the shift in generations changes the balance of forces. There will still be no progress without struggle. But the limits on possibility have widened by a significant margin.