Later this year will be the 30-year anniversary of the 1973 student uprising which started Thailand on the path to democracy. Preparations are being made for a big commemoration. The parliament has given recognition to 14 October as a historic day. The Australian National University already ran a conference on Thailand's thirty years of democracy.

But is there a huge irony here? Are these 30 years of progress towards democracy being celebrated just as they are being buried?

Thailand's political course over these thirty years was unique. Its neighbours went very different ways. Now they are ex-communist party states, authoritarian one-party states, or unreformed military dictatorships.

In retrospect, Thailand had a unique combination. On one hand, students and activists took to the streets to get rid of military dictators. On the other, in the aftermath of these crises, businessmen supported the writing of constitutions, formation of political parties, and the emergence of a parliament. The activists and the businessmen pushed in the same direction. Less dictatorial power. More democracy. More rights. More freedoms. More rule of law. More participation. In sum, a liberal agenda.

But the 2001 election marked a dramatic change. A big business group now has power. They no longer think they need the activists. They no longer seem interested in the liberal agenda of rights, freedoms, participation, and rule of law.

Thaksin has a vision of Thailand rapidly becoming one of the more advanced countries of the world. Incomes triple to OECD levels. Poverty disappears. Farmers turn themselves into little entrepreneurs. Thieving bureaucrats become courteous public servants. Godfathers give up their bad ways. Villagers stop blockading dams and power plants. Teenagers have more clothing and less sex. Everyone kicks drugs. Foreigners stop treating Thailand as an uncompetitive, corrupt, crony-ridden area of darkness.

As an end-point, it's not so different from the liberal-democrats' vision. But how to get there is quite another matter. The liberals believe in creating an open environment within which everyone can contribute to moulding the future. But the Thaksinites believe change must be engineered from above, by the power of the state.

Their first job is to dismantle the old political system because it gets in the way of achieving the new vision. Bureaucrats will stop thinking of themselves as the real ruling class. They will be bewildered by "bureaucratic reform", disoriented by sudden promotions, intimidated by anti-corruption wars, and re-educated in business-school theories of management. Godfathers will be blasted out of control of the electorate and parliament. Villagers will stop relying on their local boss to get the village road paved, and instead will look to the Thai Rak Thai government for housing, health care, village funds, cheap computers, and serious land deeds.

Once the bureaucrats and godfathers have been dealt with, parliament will reign supreme, big parties will dominate parliament, and big money will control the big parties. We are already some way there.

Some people have compared the Thaksin government to the Sarit era, because of its decisiveness and tough methods. But a better comparison is with the military governments of Plaek Phibunsongkhram from the 1930s to the 1950s. They too had a vision of moving beyond an old order (the absolute monarchy) and making Thailand a player in the world of nations. They also had faith in the power of the state to engineer change from above. They thought the state could tell people how to dress, think, speak, behave, and believe.

This government is not there yet, but is on course. The social order campaign recalls the old state mandates. The revival of a Ministry of Culture harks back to the Phibun era. The Ministry's draft masterplan echoes Phibun-style nationalism in its enthusiasm for promoting 'Thai language, Thai manners, Thai food, and Thai dress', and cultivating 'Thai' values ('belief in society, kinship, respect for elders, deference, empathy').

Similar too is the tendency to portray any criticism of the leader or the party as an attack on the nation itself. Any comment from outside is a threat to Thai 'sovereignty'. Talking about the prime minister with a taxi-driver is 'not good for the country'. Even the opposition's parliamentary scrutiny of government policy is 'not done for the country's interests'.

It is no coincidence that the people who are most worried by this trend include some of the stars of the 30 years on the path to democracy. Thirayuth Boonmi was a leader of the 1973 student uprising that started it all. Anand Panyarachun played a curious but important role in pushing the military back to the barracks, and starting the 1990s era of liberal reforms. Prawase Wasi was a force behind not only the 1997 constitution, but other reforms to advance rights and participation.

The government does not argue with these critics. It denies their right to voice their opinions. It understands that they belong to the 30 years of democratic liberalism. It wants to consign this era to the past. In the new era, the party has a monopoly on the knowledge of what is good for the country. Other opinions are unnecessary and illegitimate. The state can be used to bring about this vision by engineering change from above.

The remaining resistance to this trend is found in some pockets of the media, the NGOs, and the universities. But for how much longer? The media are vulnerable to financial pressure. Government is looking for legal ways to rein in the NGOs. A few weeks ago, Thaksin threatened to purge the universities: 'Some academics, for example, cannot teach and cannot make students analyse. Some researchers cannot research, but want to draft the constitution. These people will have to go and do not worry about them. We need to move our country ahead.'

How to make the celebration of 1973 not a funeral wake but a rebirth?