Storming the election

29 october 2007

Two weeks ago Sonthi Boonyaratglin said, “If there is a mistake in this election, the country will undergo changes, so Interior Ministry officials must ensure people have a sense of nationalism to help maintain the current system of constitutional monarchy. Tell them what to choose and what not to choose.''

The “mistake” is obviously a victory by the pro-Thaksin forces. On his fourth day as deputy prime minister, here was Sonthi ordering Interior officials to tell people how to vote. It is difficult to imagine any more explicit revelation of Sonthi’s view of this election.

The CNS document leaked last week gave further clarification. The document pictures current politics as a contest between “the army” on one side and “opposition groups” or the “old power.” on the other. We can forget the political parties, the one pretty boy and all the ugly old men. The key figures in this election are Thaksin and Sonthi.

Between now and 16 November when candidacies close, Sonthi has to persuade many former TRT MPs, their nominees, and any sure-fire poll candidates that standing for PPP or any pro-Thaksin party is a route to the opposition benches. These candidates may win on 23 December, but their throats will be parched. Sonthi’s tools for persuading the waverers are money and official power.

Chaturon Chaisang accused the military of using kickbacks from arms purchases to finance its poll campaign. In reality, they do not need such funds.

The two budgets passed since the coup have increased the allocation for defence by 56 billion baht, from 85 billion in the 2006 fiscal year to 141 billion for fiscal 2008. On top of that, the budget which is not earmarked but designated as “reserved for emergency purposes” has grown spectacularly – from 89 billion in Thaksin’s last budget for fiscal 2006 to 143 billion in 2008. The total funds designated for defence, public order, and emergencies have increased by 126 billion baht over the junta’s year in power. The “central fund” which Thaksin used very deftly, attracting some fierce criticism, has also increased and is now almost a quarter of the total budget.

The military’s other great political asset is its capacity for intimidation. This capacity is greatly enhanced by the imposition of martial law, whether or not the provisions of the law are actually enforced. Sonthi Boonyaratglin was very clear about this, saying shortly after the coup, “Those who might be planning unrest would be deterred by the power of the law.”

Sonthi is desperate to keep martial law. Surayud, others in government, and many outsiders insist martial law should be abrogated before the poll. At least three times, Sonthi has dug his feet in and refused. His compromise is to reduce the number of provinces from 35 to 27, by lifting the law in eleven provinces and re-imposing it in three. It is very, very difficult not to relate this plan to electoral politics. Of the eleven provinces where martial law may be lifted, three are in the upper south which voted so strongly for the junta’s constitution. The three provinces where martial law is reimposed came first, third, and fourth in voting against the constitution. They are Nakhon Phanom (78 percent against), Mukdahan (77 percent) and Nong Khai (75 percent). After this adjustment, 18 of the 24 provinces which voted against the referendum will still be under martial law, and only 9 of the 52 others.

Sonthi is also desperate to pass the Internal Security Act before the election campaign. The Act would give the military powers to obstruct meetings, restrict movements, and interfere with electronic communications—all power that could be useful for disrupting a poll campaign.  But as with martial law, the Act may chiefly be important as a symbolic threat, a reminder to electoral candidates about the power of the military and the folly of joining any party which the military might target.

The document released last week is a detailed plan for using state media in this crucial period before nominations close. Among the specific proposal are: "create news to attack the old power … spread rumours about the connections between TRT, Singapore, PPP, and the trend towards presidential rule … spread rumours that Thaksin paid foreign media to run articles attacking the institution.” One story to be conveyed by the news is that even were PPP to win the election, corruption charges would prevent its leader becoming prime minister.

Besides rattling the weapons to start a stampede away from the pro-Thaksin camp, the military have been putting up flags to signal where the stampeded candidates should seek sanctuary. General Panlop Pinmanee, a long-time associate of Sonthi, has been inserted into the Motherland Party. Saprang’s cousin, Chienchuang Kalayanamit, turned up in Pracharaj. Ruam Jai Thai quickly gave General Chettha Thanajarao a leadership post to display its “green” credentials. Banharn called up General Yutthasak Sasiprapha.

Although the Motherland Party has no big moneybags, it has plastered the landscape with massive billboards and the press with full-page ads. It has appropriated the national mantra of “nation, religion, and king” as a party political slogan without anyone fluttering an outraged eyelid. The party is clearly charmed.

The military strategy may work. The one intriguing question that remains is whether Sonthi will make a last-minute jump into the leadership of Motherland. He clearly wants to be prime minister. Recently he claimed he could do the job much better than Surayud. He had no reason to resign from the CNS except to clear the way for a political bid. A few months ago, he treated all the labour leaders to a feast, promised to become their political champion, and bathed in the resulting applause. Curiously his current portfolio to oversee “security” includes not only the interior and defence ministries, but also labour. There’s a pattern here.

Perhaps the only thing standing in Sonthi’s way is the total lack of enthusiasm shown by press and public at the prospect of his rise to the premiership. But that’s probably not enough to deter a soldier.