10 may 2004

Among people who matter to the outcome, there now seem to be three interpretations of what is behind the tragic events in Thailand’s far south. These interpretations are very different, and have very different implications for what might and should happen next.

The first can be labelled “fundamental disloyalty”. This is the view of some key figures in the military, and the amateur boxing club in the Senate. It begins from the assumption that some elements in southern society have never been reconciled to living within a Thai state. They rebel periodically when circumstances are favourable. They have grown stronger over recent years because of increased links with the Middle East.

Gen Thammarak Issarangkun believes “we are not dealing with ordinary bandits, but with insurgents with a separatist ideology”. He suggested 10 per cent of Islamic students who had studied abroad had been recruited by militant organizations. Six weeks ago, General Panlop Pinmanee claimed there were 500 “active separatists” and 70,000 sympathizers in the three southernmost provinces. Some army figures now believe that the recent escalation results from active involvement by militant organisations from elsewhere in the Southeast Asian region.

The implications of this interpretation are very clear. Things will only get worse until the local organisations are firmly suppressed and the foreign links cut. This interpretation argues for an even larger role for the army.

A variant of this view differs only in extending the external linkages all the way to Al-Qaida. This is the position of people who style themselves as “international security experts”, and of the right-wing US press which wants Thailand on the US side of a Manichaean world. They point to signs of more organisation in recent incidents, one JI T-shirt, and the hint of martyrdom in the Krue Se tragedy. Their difficulty is that the true hallmarks of Al-Qaida are efficient suicide attacks on high-profile international targets. Dying hopelessly on your own patch armed with kitchenware is not there. Not yet.

The second interpretation can be labelled “intolerable pressure”. Although the area has a history of revolt, over the past quarter of a century this had faded away. People had found a way to coexist with the Thai state. They could get an Islamic education through the pondok schools and overseas scholarships; go to work in Malaysia; and get some defence against Thai bureaucracy from the new local and national institutions of representative democracy. Separatism declined into banditry because it lacked social support.

The Thaksin government then disturbed this delicate balance by recentralising power, devaluing representative institutions, re-empowering the military, neglecting human rights, and putting renewed emphasis on “Thai culture”. The 2003 war on drugs advertised this new imbalance. Men in uniform got a renewed licence to behave in bad old ways. Many people died with no sense of justice.

Next, three Muslim community leaders were seized to impress President Bush. Arrests, searches and seizures increased. According to Somchai Neelaphaijit, people were beaten and barbarically tortured for confessions. Three prominent local politicians were accused on the evidence of a used car dealer and political fixer who is on the police’s own list of “influential persons”.

As the National Human Rights Commission stated a week before the Krue Se tragedy: “The present problems result from the reactions of Muslim brothers and sisters who decided to stand up and fight after having accumulated grievances and frustrations over a long period…. For example, police captured and tortured people to secure confessions…. Many cases of missing persons have not been investigated.” In response to this increasingly intolerable pressure, some people turned for defence to Islam and the ideal of an independent Pattani kingdom.

This was the interpretation which Chaturon Chaisaeng brought back from the south in early March. The implication of this view is that more state violence will not work but can only make things worse. Things have to be done to recreate the space which made it possible for these communities to exist within the Thai state. That essentially is the Chaturon plan.

The third main interpretation can be labelled “poverty and banditry”. This is the view of the prime minister himself.

Almost two years ago, he attributed problems in the south to “common bandits, just like in other provinces”. More recently, he still said only 0.5 per cent of the area’s population is involved. Over the last month, he has embraced a more complex view with contributions from poverty, lingering separatism, local political conflict, corrupt officials, drug trading, and other bandit businesses.

But among these many causes, he singles out poverty and banditry. Poor people are being exploited by bandits with evil intentions. The role of ideology is only as a tool of the bandits to trick the poor into compliance. The role of the security forces does not enter his equation.

The implication of this interpretation is that government must catch the bandits and rescue the poor with development funds. Religious sensibilities and separatist ideology are not important. On his 1 May radio broadcast he said: “I don’t believe separatism is a real ideology, because it is an important principle in Islam to look after one’s country of birth… we all have to cooperate in developing the country to be a better place to live.”

But ignoring people’s ideas, sensibilities and aspirations is just as dangerous as ignoring their pockets and their stomachs. And ignoring the role of the security forces will be fatal. The National Human Rights Commission called for a broader view: “Government must solve the problem by stopping the use of force. It should revise the policy of throwing money into the areas to develop businesses, but instead giving importance to the political, social, cultural and religious aspects more comprehensively.”