Solutions for the south

 24 May 2004

A peace plan has been proposed for the south with seven points: 1. give respect to local religious leaders and pull them onto the government side; 2. appoint good officials, not like those sent there in the last ten years who used force and created bad feelings; 3.  support the religion and culture of Thai Muslims, even over small matters; 4. allot budget funds for building mosques; 5. leave matters of religion and education, including the pondok schools, to local community management, because officials get things wrong; 6. trace the weapons sent to rebels in Indonesia; and 7. stop oppressing those of Malay heritage and their culture.

 The government has found that “wrong” doctrines are being taught in local schools. Thai Rath has reported there is “a really anti-Thai movement”.

 The government has agreed to allow freedom of worship, teaching in Malay language at the primary level, removal of corrupt officials, and extra development funds for the region.

 The prime minister has promised equal treatment for all Thais. He says officials sent to the region will be trained about Islam and local sensitivities, and more people from the troubled provinces will be recruited into the police, army, and bureaucracy.

 All the above seems very contemporary and familiar. But every single bit of it comes from around 50 years ago. The 7-point plan is not from Chaturon Chaisaeng but a little known police officer. The prime minister quoted is not Thaksin Shinawatra but Phibun Songkhram.

 But the contents are remarkably similar—even down to the detail of arms possibly sent to rebel groups in Indonesia. The good intentions are also exactly the same: cultural sensitivity, development funds, removal of bad officials.

 Understanding this is important for one key reason. The events of 28 April are not unique but part of a long series. The troubles in the south are not going to be solved by a quick fix.

 Thaksin once gave his people seven days to solve the southern problem. The Cabinet decisions of the last two weeks still imagine there are quick solutions. Thaksin believes misguided people will change their ideas if he pours in development funds. Chavalit is reliving his glory days as architect of policies which undermined the communist movement in the 1980s. The formula is the same: more security personnel; self defence volunteer units in the villages; and a possible amnesty for those who surrender.

 Looking back at events in the south 50 years ago has another important lesson: there were two distinctly separate movements. The first wanted to remove the southern provinces from Thailand, either as a separate state of Pattani, or as part of Malaya. The second wanted the southern provinces to have more self-rule within Thailand so that local people could have their preferred education, law, and religion in the place they considered home.

 These two ideas are very different. The first is separatist, and hence the government can accuse its leaders of treason. But the second is a movement for political and constitutional reform and is not treasonous in any way. The government, however, confused the two movements together. Haji Sulong, the great Islamic teacher who led the second movement, was arrested for treason. The charges did not stick, but they jailed him anyway, and later he “disappeared”, probably murdered.

 Governments ever since—including the current one—have continued this strategy of painting any protest from the south as “separatist” and hence treasonous. Newspapers often report events as if any rebel is “separatist.” The government’s security adviser, General Kitti Rattanachaya, repeatedly tells us the trouble-makers are all “separatists”. The MPs and senator accused of being behind the troubles are reported as “suspected separatists”.

 Fifty years ago, the idea of redrawing the southern border and removing certain provinces was not as strange as it seems now. This border had shifted several times in the past, and twice in the prior decade. Borders all round the world were redrawn in the age of decolonisation.

 But today shifting a border is a much bigger issue. States are very jealous of their territory. A river changing course resulting in a border moving by a few feet becomes a major crisis. Thailand went to war with Laos because of a mistake on an old map. The decision of an international court that Khao Phra Viharn is in Cambodia was a public tragedy. Are we really supposed to believe that some MPs, a senator, and local teachers think they can force Thailand to surrender territory by giving a few hundred youths black pyjamas, some machete training, and some muddled ideas? That is what General Kitti expects us to believe, and that is what any politician or reporter unconsciously endorses when carelessly using the word “separatist” to describe southern dissidents.

 Southern Muslims live peaceably in Thailand most of the time by practising constant passive resistance. They preserve the schooling they want in institutions which at best are semi-legal. For higher education they go abroad. For work they go to Malaysia. For settling legal issues they have at times used courts in Kelantan.

 For most of the time, this results in peaceful coexistence. But every fifteen or twenty years, things go out of balance—for all sorts of reasons. Because the security forces get too heavy-handed. Because the local gangs get more ambitious. Because local people get new aspirations. Because the international situation changes.

 Thaksin has a golden opportunity to confront the issues behind the southern troubles. That would mean taking a long-term view, not just fixing the current mess. It would mean treating it as a national project, because it involves not only the feelings in the three provinces but also the attitudes of people in the other 73. The risk is that Thaksin will opt for a short-term fix. Then the events will recur again, and Thaksin will have lost an opportunity to be a statesman.