Authoritarianism and the war on corruption

 27 sep 2004

Authoritarian governments like to have campaigns against corruption. But they always fail. These campaigns might look good. But in the long run they do not do much good. For several reasons.

Most of all, because authoritarian governments have too much to hide. In many cases, governments are authoritarian precisely because they are corrupt. The leaders have interests to protect or pursue. Alternatively, even if they do not start out this way, governments which are authoritarian soon become corrupt. When the checks and balances on power are removed – in the name of the national interest, national security, rapid growth, or whatever – then power is easily abused.

Authoritarian governments tend to acquire corrupt clients and supporters who they do not want to expose. Authoritarian leaders need supporters, just like any other leaders. Often the people most ready to offer their support are those with corrupt interest to protect. Big friends are the best form of insurance. Once a deal is made, it is difficult to change. One major rule in the code of tough-guy leadership is that leaders must always reward the loyalty of their followers by providing unswerving help and protection. The leader and his supporters soar together and fall together.

Most important of all, authoritarian governments have little respect for the rule-of-law. They believe instead in the rule-of-us or the rule-of-me. They are not taken by the idea of applying one principle to everybody, whoever they might be. Remember the NPKC coup junta of 1991 which targeted many politicians for being “unusually rich” but then absolved those which joined the junta’s own party. Under an authoritarian regime, corruption investigations tend to become part of the process of political bargaining.

Finally, the leaders of authoritarian governments manage to convince themselves they are above the law. They are special people. They are not subject to the rules and regulations that govern ordinary humanity. They deserve privileges because of what they are doing for the country. They can lecture us on driving slowly to save gasoline, and then break the speed limit under police protection. It’s an attitude of mind.

For these reasons, the anti-corruption campaigns of authoritarian governments tend to be more show than substance. They go after the little fish and ignore the sharks. They walk round and round the room without seeing the dead elephant on the carpet. They somehow target only see the bad guys in the enemy camp.

When the Thai Rak Thai government’s “war on corruption” is being unveiled, there is one test which will show whether it fits the above pattern: if it focuses on corruption among bureaucrats and skates past conflicts of interest involving politicians.

All the research on corruption over the past few years has come up with two major conclusions. First, old-style bureaucratic squeeze on ordinary citizens has greatly declined. It remains serious only among the police. Conversely, the big corruption now involves coalitions of businessmen, bureaucrats, and politicians.

Second, the practice of corruption has become much more sophisticated. Simple backhanders are rarer. Direct theft from the public budget is almost unknown. Now the trick is to give everything a veneer of legality.

In the past, those who wanted to rig a contract auction had to bind all the bidders into a cartel, or drive away the competitors using money or intimidation. Such arrangements could be expensive and messy. The modern way is to rig the terms of the contract so nicely that a certain bidder is sure to win, and so that there is plenty of flexibility to increase the returns. This can still be messy as the recent affair of the Health Ministry’s computer contracts has shown. The even more sophisticated and ambitious method is to build the corruption into the structure of policy. One way might be to grant a neighbouring country a cheap loan for buying a certain service from Thailand where there is only one qualified supplier.

This government has not been keen to investigate, expose and punish the inner-circle politicians involved in corruption. Since the start of its term, there has been a spectacular stream of scandals – first in the Labour Ministry, then Agriculture, and later in Health, Education and elsewhere.

The government’s strategy has been to sweep these under the carpet. Hosts of investigative committees are appointed, but they fail to find enough clear evidence to proceed with the case. A few bureaucrats are transferred. A minister is quietly removed in the next reshuffle. The press loses interest and the issue slips away from public memory.

Even the Rakkiat Sukthana case has been allowed to float off into this ocean of forgetfulness. This is remarkable as it was a landmark case in which the courts found a minister guilty. Yet even though Rakkiat has no powerful godfather (he was minister in a previous government and member of a party that has virtually expired), the issue has been allowed to die. Attempts to punish the bureaucrats involved have been sandbagged. Efforts to prosecute the companies involved have come to nothing. Recovery of Rakkiat’s assets has got nowhere. And Rakkiat has disappeared like a UBC signal from Thaicom.

If the details of the “war on corruption” are along these expected lines, then this campaign may sadly follow the pattern of the “war on drugs”. There is a lot of big talk. Lots of little people get badly hurt. Many big new statistics are bandied about. And in the long run, not a lot changes.

Worse, the war on corruption may become another part of the ruling party’s efforts to control the rising tide of criticism and dissent, especially in the run-down to the next election.